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- Abstract - 
 
 
Regulating telecommunications is complex: international experience indicates that there 
is no ‘successful’ regulatory framework due to the balancing of industry and regulatory 
interests (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 13). The New Zealand ‘light-handed’ regulatory 
experiment failed and the 1999 General Election presented an opportunity for change in 
telecommunications. The Labour-led Government in implementing a policy of 
‘responsible re-regulation’ enacted the Telecommunications Act 2001, signalling the 
passage of “landmark telecommunications legislation …” (Swain, 2001d).  
 
Within the Telecommunications Act 2001, ‘cost’ assumed a central regulatory role. It is 
this move to cost that this thesis considers in identifying, developing, and critiquing the 
interface of law and accounting. The thesis examines the increasing call for accounting 
information in law and regulation by interrogating the use, presentation, and reception 
of accounting to examine the interface between law and cost in the regulation of 
telecommunications. The Telecommunications Act 2001 incorporates total service long 
run incremental costing as the ‘costing technique’ for interconnection access and annual 
net costing for the Telecommunications Service Obligation. Through interrogating 
‘cost’ as an accounting technology, in contrast to the economic and legal conception of 
cost as a simple, objective concept, the thesis illustrates the role of cost at 
methodological, technical, and political levels, and the challenges that this poses for 
telecommunications regulation.   
 
The thesis articulates the relevance of discourse theory to the interface of law and 
accounting. Consequently, the thesis investigates the formation and discursive 
enunciation of standpoints of political identities characterised by antagonism and 
uncertainty. This includes identifying attempts by interested parties, including industry 
actors, stakeholders, and the Government and its agents, to articulate ‘new’ discourses 
centred on nodal points around ‘cost’. The rhetorical analysis examines how actors 
articulate the metaphorical element of ‘cost’ in agitating for particular costing methods 
to be included in the legislation. The empirical analysis examines the process of 
rhetorical condensation as arguments for and against the incorporation of total service 
long run incremental costing and net costing came to signify the complete failure of the 
light-handed regulation. Then, by examining the politics following the enactment of 
legislation, this condensation is unpacked. The analysis of the contestation over 
interpreting and implementing the regulation illustrates displacement of the ‘common’ 
signifier resulting in confusion and disappointment in relation to the aims of the new 
regulatory regime.  
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- Chapter One - 
 
Introduction 
 
Regulating telecommunications is complex: international experience indicates 
that there is no ‘successful’ regulatory framework due to the balancing of industry and 
regulatory interests, as competitors require network interconnection for landlines, tolls, 
cellular telephony, Internet service provision [ISP], and cable television (Laffont & 
Tirole, 2000, p. 13).1 This degree of network interdependence tends to promote natural 
monopolies. Due to society’s reliance on telecommunications, there is an important 
social welfare component: society’s access and the ability to enjoy telecommunications 
depends on effective regulation (Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications [MIT]2, 
2000d, p. 11).  
 
During the Fourth Labour Government’s (1984-1990) liberalisation and 
privatisation of State assets, New Zealand [NZ] introduced the competition law 
‘experiment’ of “light-handed regulation”. For telecommunications, this involved 
business separation, information disclosure, the anti-competitive rules of the Commerce 
Act 1986, Commerce Commission [CC] enforcement, an expectation that new entrants 
would pursue legal remedies, and threatened further regulation if the incumbent 
‘misbehaved’. However, by the late 1990s, the light-handed approach failed for 
Telecommunications, as Telecom, the dominant incumbent, hindered competitive 
development by controlling access to the network. The judiciary produced indistinct 
outcomes, struggling with the complexity of telecommunications regulation, resulting in 
the Privy Council approving the recoupment of ‘monopoly rents’ in interconnection 
pricing. There was limited competition, characterised by stagnating retail prices and 
limited adoption of new technology. NZ’s telecommunications was ranked amongst the 
                                                 
1
 A further complication is the degree of technological change in telecommunications. 
 
2
 Note the list of abbreviations in the appendices. 
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most expensive and least developed of 32 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD] nations. Consequently, disquiet about the Government’s ability 
to control Telecom and manage competition law increased.  
 
 The 1999 General Election presented an opportunity for new regulatory 
direction. The Labour-led coalition Government, elected on a platform of ‘responsible 
re-regulation’, reconstituted commercial regulation by increasing the powers of the CC 
and Securities Commission, regulating Charities, and introducing an electricity sector 
regulator. In telecommunications, the Government established the MIT. Following 
extensive consultation with stakeholders, the MIT’s final report identified two core 
regulatory issues: interconnection access to Telecom’s PSTN and the Telecom’s Kiwi 
Share Obligation [KSO].3  
 
In identifying international interconnection pricing methodologies, the MIT 
recommended cost-plus total service long run incremental costing [TSLRIC] with the 
establishment of an independent regulator to determine final prices. In considering the 
KSO, the inquiry focused on whether Telecom should recoup costs of providing the 
KSO from industry participants. The MIT argued against recoupment, as Telecom’s 
shareholders accepted the burden of the KSO at privatisation.  
 
 The Government’s Telecommunications Act 2001 [TA] accepted the MIT’s 
TSLRIC recommendation, but ignored the KSO advice by enacting a net costing model 
where Telecom would recoup KSO costs from industry participants. Then 
implementation.  This is where I began to interact with telecommunications regulation. 
My honours dissertation in law argued that the TA failed to deal with Telecom’s 
underlining economic incentives to inhibit the development of competition, by focusing 
                                                 
3
 This is a form of universal service obligation requiring Telecom to maintain residential local free 
calling, to cap the price for residential line rental, to ensure comparability in service performance 
between rural and urban residential users, and to ensure the availability of residential services.  
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on anti-competitive and not anti-developmental behaviour. Chapman Tripp, a law firm 
holding a contract with Telecom, employed me to their regulation team. Thus, I was 
involved in the implementation of the TA, experiencing the ‘coal face’ interface of law 
and accounting: a political strategic interaction between law, accounting, regulation, 
and telecommunications.   
 
The TA introduced sector-specific regulation, focusing on: a) dispute resolution 
for interconnection access to Telecom’s national network based on TSLRIC; and b) 
providing a transparent, competitively neutral system for the KSO, requiring an annual 
net costing. Of interest is the TA’s increasing reliance on accounting information, as 
cost assumes a central regulatory role. This thesis concentrates on the interface between 
law and accounting in a regulatory setting at the discursive level by examining the 
articulation of cost by interested parties in the institution of, and within, the TA’s 
regulatory framework. Consequently, this thesis concentrates on a series of questions: 
1) What is the interface between accounting and law? Specifically, what is 
the role of accounting in telecommunications regulation? What is the role 
of cost and cost theory within a regulatory framework? 
 
As law and regulation increasingly call on accounting to provide information for their 
processes, for what purpose is the information used, how it is used, and how it is 
presented and received? 
2) What are the insights of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory [DT] in 
moving from costing as technical to costing as political? In particular, 
what insights emerge from Glynos and Howarth’s logics of critical 
explanation? 
 
Adopting a post-Marxist, post-structuralist theoretical framework is deliberate. 
Conventional forms of analysis, such as economic regulatory theory or Marxism fail to 
capture the complexity of the multi-layered political games involved in this exploratory, 
interdisciplinary research. Marxist accounts provide little leverage in accounting for 
contemporary society, as ‘critical’ interventions tend to be motivated by singular 
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universals, such as labour, gender, or race, which portray an over-simplified ‘picture’ of 
a complex world and dichotomously exclude community members from the struggle. 
Second, traditional economic regulatory theory tends to ignore the linguistic turn. As 
law and accounting are linguistic practices focusing on persuasion, DT considers 
rhetorical strategies that illustrate contestation and the limits of language. Third, 
‘politics’ exists: “We can say, then, that a post-structuralist approach to politics points 
always to a certain void that makes social and political identities indeterminate 
(Newman, 2005, p. 154). 
 
The thesis is presented unusually as much of the empirical research and analysis 
of the economics of NZ’s telecommunication regulation and the associated legal and 
cost issues are in early chapters. This enriches the early contextual detail and helps the 
ease of exposition as this lays the ground for subsequent DT analysis and marks the 
point of departure from more conventional economic and legal analyses. The thesis 
divides into two sections. The first section introduces each of the main theoretical 
influences: regulation, telecommunications, (cost) accounting, law, paradigmatic 
research, and DT. Chapter two considers the complexity of telecommunications 
regulation, by examining the insights and limitations of dominant economic regulatory 
theories with respect to the genealogical analysis of NZ’s regulation. In part, the chapter 
depicts the shift from the market-based, light-handed regulatory model to the current 
sector-specific framework. The chapter examines insights and challenges of Chicago 
and Harvard school economics, capture theory, and public interest regulation as they are 
implicated in NZ’s regulatory approaches. The chapter concludes that the limits of 
economic regulatory theory illustrate the need to move beyond current constraints to tell 
a richer story of the complexity of telecommunications regulation. Chapter three 
considers the interface between accounting and law. This chapter empirically canvasses 
the regulatory reliance on accounting in telecommunications. In illustrating the 
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challenge of the interface of law and accounting in telecommunications regulation, this 
chapter characterises the problems of costing from an economic perspective. While this 
thesis is not economic in nature, the economic lens provides a framework to illustrate 
the arbitrariness of the employment of cost as a regulatory tool. The chapter illustrates 
the role of choice, arbitrariness, and conditionality within conceptions of traditional 
economic cost in arguing for an analytical framework that embraces the role of 
accounting at methodological, technical, and political levels. In incorporating cost into 
telecommunications regulation, public policy makers, Government, lawyers and 
economists tend to assume a simplistic, positivistic notion of cost. For an accountant, 
this is problematic as cost is complex due to issues of arbitrariness, choice, 
contestability, social and institutional constructionism, politics, and subjectivity. 
Consequently, the thesis examines the interface of law and accounting by 
problematising the role of cost in telecommunications regulation, as cost shifts from the 
technical to the political. Chapter four reflects on the current state of paradigmatic 
research within law and accounting by comparing and contrasting the paradigms of 
positivism, interpretivism, and critical theory. Chapter four suggests the limitations of 
current paradigms render them unsuitable in dealing with the complex range of issues 
identified in Chapters two and three, and that the uncertainty and antagonism invites 
post-structural analysis. Chapter five presents Laclau and Mouffe’s DT. The chapter 
develops the central concepts of DT, highlighting the relevance of these concepts for 
interrogating the interface of law and accounting in telecommunications regulation. 
 
The second section develops the theoretical and empirical material introduced in 
the first section. Chapter six examines Glynos and Howarth’s logics of critical 
explanation in answer to the perceived normative and methodological limitations of DT, 
by characterising the social, political, and fantasmatic logics. In terms of research 
methods and data collection, the chapter canvasses interviews, document analysis, 
 - 17 - 
dislocation, and rhetorical redescription. Chapter seven presents the main empirical 
analysis by examining the institution of TSLRIC pricing for interconnection access and 
net costing for the TSO. The analysis considers ‘dislocation’ by examining attempts by 
political actors to articulate ‘new’ discourses around the nodal point of ‘cost’. The 
rhetorical analysis focuses on how actors articulate the metaphorical element of ‘cost’ in 
agitating for costing methods and in implementing the TA. The thesis characterises the 
social landscape by examining the concepts and presuppositions that dominate the 
TSLRIC and net costing discourse. Political logics examine dislocatory moments in the 
institution of TSLRIC and net costing by illustrating public contestation over the ‘best’ 
model for regulation and accounting for alternatives. Finally, fantasmatic logics explain 
and critique how subjects were ‘gripped’ by certain ideological presuppositions of 
‘costing’ attached to the social and political logics of cost. The thesis investigates the 
formation of political identities characterised by antagonism and uncertainty at 
numerous levels, including the discursive enunciation of standpoints by actors, and then 
moves past the enactment of legislation to analyse the contestation over interpreting and 
implementing the regulation.   
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- Chapter Two - 
 
Utility Regulation in New Zealand: The Great Competition Law Experiment  
 
Speech from Theresa Gattung, Chief Executive Officer, Telecom NZ 
March 20, 2006 
 
Think about pricing. What has every telco in the world done in the past? It’s used 
confusion as a marketing tool. And that’s fine, you could argue that’s helped all of 
us keep calling prices up, keep those revenues of high margin businesses going for 
a lot longer than would have been the case. But at some level whether they are 
conscious of it or not, customers know that that’s what the game has been. They 
know that were not being straight up. 
… 
Anyway, back to regulation …Clearly it is also about, at least in terms of the 
public discourse, our relationship with our competitors … But clearly that’s not 
enough. There’s still this feeling about disparity and we can say all we like that 
we’re just smarter than the other guys, but how do we demonstrate that in a way 
that over time will be believed … Because people want to believe in something, 
they want to work in an environment that’s moving forward. 
 
 
I CHAPTER TWO OVERVIEW 
 
Chapter two examines dominant economic theories and their insights into the 
historical story of NZ’s regulatory approaches, by interrogating two questions: 
1) What are the dominant regulatory economic theories? What insights into 
NZ regulation do these theoretical perspectives provide? 
 
2) What is the genealogy of telecommunications regulation in NZ? What is 
the current regulatory framework? 
 
The chapter examines the theoretical insights and challenges of Chicago and Harvard 
school economics, capture theory and public interest regulation as they are implicated 
in NZ’s approach to regulating telecommunications. Empirically, the chapter details the 
shift from the market-based, light-handed regulation to the current sector-specific 
regulation. The chapter notes the limits of economic theory which include the 
challenges of a dominant incumbent, the tendency to monopoly and natural monopoly 
behaviour, the degree of network interdependence, the risk of technological 
obsolescence, and the social welfare functions of telecommunications (MIT, 2000d, p. 
11). 
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II ECONOMIC REGULATORY THEORY 
 
Prominent economic regulatory theories, namely Chicago and Harvard school 
economics, capture theory, and public interest regulation, are implicated in NZ’s 
regulation of telecommunications (Laffont & Tirole, 2000).  
a) Chicago school economics, popularised by Stigler and Friedman, 
favours “free-market economics” with little government intervention in 
markets. It favours ‘laissez-faire” regulation, where markets correct 
market disparity, focusing on economic efficiency, premised on 
rationality, and positivism.4 For competition law, Chicago school results 
in more ‘rigorous’ economic regulation (Hovenkamp, 2007). 
 
b) For competition law, Areeda and Turner argue that Harvard school 
economics recognises the social impact of markets, acknowledging that 
markets fail (Sullivan, 1977).5 The Harvard approach recognises that 
social factors conflict with economic analysis, and that it is appropriate 
to consider the wealth transfer effects between consumers and 
producers.6   
 
c) Public interest regulation endeavours to ‘protect’ the public from 
numerous problems, including inefficient markets, exploitation, or from 
fettered access. As public interest regulation often seeks to enhance 
consumer welfare at the expense of producer-focused economic theory 
(Chicago), there is a clear link with Harvard. 
 
d) Regulatory capture,7 popularised by Posner and Stigler, holds that the 
regulated dominate regulatory agencies, despite the agency supposedly 
acting in the public interest. Due to vested interests in the outcome of 
regulatory decisions, the regulated will work to capture the decision 
makers.  
 
Consequently, this chapter illustrates that each economic theoretical perspective 
explains aspects of NZ’s regulatory approach, but in isolation, each possesses limited 
explanatory power. Chicago school economics informed the Fourth Labour 
Government’s (1984-1990) economic policies of “Rogernomics”,8 incorporating 
                                                 
4
 See Chapter three and four for the further discussion of positivism.  
 
5
 By Harvard school economics, the thesis refers to the 1970s reformulation, as opposed to the 
structuralist Harvard school, 1930-1960. 
  
6
 For overviews of Chicago and Harvard approaches, see Hovenkamp, 2007; Elhauge, 2007; Elizinga, 
1977; Adhar, 2002.   
 
7
 This is also referred to as “capture theory”. 
 
8
 “Rogernomics” was coined after the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas, Member of Parliament [MP]. 
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deregulation, privatisation, and the sale of State-owned assets,9 and characterises the 
approach to competition law from 1986-1999. However, the 1999 election of a Labour-
led Coalition Government resulted in a shift to a Harvard-informed competition law 
policy. However, in instituting the new telecommunications regime, the Government 
legislated a confusing mix of public interest regulation and regulatory capture.   
 
III ECONOMIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT: CHICAGO AND HARVARD 
 
The history of NZ regulation reflects the competition law debate between 
Chicago and Harvard, concerning consumer welfare and wealth redistribution. Chicago 
holds that as wealth redistribution is governmental, consumer welfare transactions are 
an irrelevant regulatory consideration. Harvard accepts that regulatory bodies play a 
role in consumer welfare, as wealth redistribution is unavoidable in economic decisions 
(Adhar, 2002).  
 
Competition policy tends to harmonise the goals of efficiency and income 
distribution. However, in critiquing Chicago, the Williamson model demonstrates net 
efficient anti-competitive arrangements that result in wealth transferring from 
consumers to producers (Williamson, 1968). The regulatory focus is what should be 
done with these wealth redistribution effects. Chicago holds that redistribution is a 
Government function, and as there is no effect on total surplus the redistribution effect 
is ignored. Efficiency remains the key goal. Harvard holds consumer welfare should 
temper efficiency, and that competition law should address the redistribution effect as 
the transfer of wealth from consumers to producers reduces consumer surplus.  
 
The subsequent section outlines the characteristics of Chicago and Harvard, 
developing a genealogy of the Chicago and Harvard debate in NZ.  
                                                 
9
 For accounting studies of this heavy reform period, see Gallhofer, Haslam & Roper, 2001; Lawrence, 
Davey & Low, 1998; Lawrence et al, 1997; Lawrence, 1999; Lawrence & Rahaman, 2001.  
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A Chicago: Efficiency  
 
The competition law objective of Chicago school economics is efficiency, with 
consumer welfare and wealth redistribution considered irrelevant, as redistribution is 
public policy issue similar to taxes and social welfare (Adhar, 2002). Advocates argue 
that regulatory decisions should be limited to economics, as regulatory bodies are 
appointed and not elected: in a democracy, an elected Government has a mandate to 
‘govern’ the people, and consider wealth redistribution. Thus, as CC members are non-
elected, economic experts, the scope of inquiry should be confined to economic 
considerations: the non-elected CC should leave social policy, wealth redistribution to 
Government. Finally, if the CC were to make social policy, wealth redistribution 
decisions, commercial organisations would face an unacceptable degree of uncertainty 
between competitive and anti-competitive behaviour.   
 
In market situations, Chicago recognises ‘total surplus’: figure 2.1 illustrates this 
in a monopoly situation (Mankin, 2001, p. 315).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.1: Graph of ‘Total Surplus’ for Chicago school economics (Mankin, 2001)  
 
Through re-conceptualising all producers as ‘consumers’ (see figure 2.2 below), 
Chicago argues that ‘consumer surplus’ equates with ‘total surplus’. Consequently, any 
gain in producer wealth accrues to consumers (Mankin, 2001). These assumptions 
Fig 2.1: ‘Total Surplus’ Chicago school economics  
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render wealth redistribution irrelevant, as ‘market failure’ becomes a social policy issue 
(Adhar, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.2: Chicago school economics flow of wealth (Mankin, 2001) 
 
For Chicago, if an inequitable portion of wealth accrues to producers it will be 
redistributed through increased consumption or Government taxation and social welfare 
policies. Thus, wealth redistribution is a public policy consideration for Government, 
not competition law and the CC.  
 
B Harvard: Consumer Welfare 
 
Harvard advocates for consumer welfare: figure 2.3 illustrates the Harvard 
distinction between producer and consumer surplus (Mankin, 2001) such that increases 
in producer surplus correspondingly reduce consumer surplus. Harvard economists, 
then, are concerned by the unavoidable transfers of wealth as predicted by the 
Williamson model where net efficient anti-competitive arrangements transfer wealth 
from consumers to producers. Harvard challenges the Chicago assumption that all 
producers are consumers, arguing that firms retain earnings for future investment and 
not all surpluses can be guaranteed to return to consumers in the long run.  
Fig 2.2: All Producers are Consumers 
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Fig 2.3: Graph of ‘Total Surplus’ for Harvard school of economics (Mankin, 2001) 
 
Equally, Harvard economists challenge the assumption that CC members are 
merely economic experts, as 9(4) of the Commerce Act 1986 states that CC members 
are appointed on the basis of their “knowledge or experience in industry, commerce, 
economics, law, accounting, public administration, or consumer affairs”. Harvard 
proponents argue that the CC is an expert panel, authorised to consider consumer 
welfare and other redistribution issues.  
 
In reflecting the theoretical implications of the Chicago and Harvard approaches 
to competition law, the next section illustrates the genealogy of these economic 
approaches to NZ regulation.  
 
C Genealogy of Economics in Competition Law 
 
In thirty years, there have been three shifts in economic approaches to 
competition law in NZ since the Commerce Act 1975. The following discussion 
illustrates the effect of these ‘shifts’ in economic theory. 
Fig 2.3: Consumer Surplus: Harvard school economics  
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1 1975 – 1986: Consumer Welfare 
 
Section 2A proscribed the purpose of the Commerce Act 1975: 
 
An Act to promote the interests of consumers and the effective and efficient 
development of industry and commerce through the encouragement of competition 
… 
 
In referencing ‘consumers’, the purpose statement could reflect a Harvard approach 
(Adhar, 2002). However, the combination of ‘consumer’ and ‘efficiency’ implicates 
both Chicago and Harvard. This is confusing in statutory interpretation terms: a) 
presentation order can suggest a hierarchal interpretation, in that consumer welfare is 
‘more important’ than efficiency, as it is listed first (McDowell & Webb, 1998, p. 299); 
or b) the Act positively requires the advancement of two mutually agreeable goals: 
consumer welfare enhances efficiency; efficiency enhances consumer welfare 
(Burrows, 2002).  
2 1986-2001: Chicago Efficiency 
 
The 1984-1990 Labour Government introduced radical economic and social 
reform (“Rogernomics”), focusing on efficiency and privatisation.10 This resulted in 
significant commercial reform, the Commerce Act 1986, and the creation of the CC. 
The Act contained no explicit purpose statement, although the long title of the 
Commerce Act 1986 stated, “This is an Act to promote competition in markets in New 
Zealand”. The judiciary was influenced by the Chicago school in the interpretation of 
the Act, focusing on efficiency (Kingsbury, 2000):  
a) Tru Tone v Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 353 
(CA): Justice Richardson interpreted the Act’s focus as:  
 
… the best allocation of resources occurred in a competitive market where 
rivalry would ensure maximum efficiency in the use of resources (Tru Tone, 
1988, p. 358). 
 
 This interpretation reinforces the link between efficiency and competition, 
in a strong Chicago manner.  
                                                 
10
 In part, this was in answer to the protectionist economic policies of the early 1980s, characterised by 
‘Think-Big’ infrastructure investment, wage and price freezes, tariffs, and heavy subsidies. 
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b) ARA v Mutual Rental Cars [1987] 2 NZLR 647 (HC): determined an 
efficient, localised geographic market for car rental booths at Auckland 
International Airport under ss 27 and 36 focusing on Chicago product 
substitution. 
 
c) Telecom v Commerce Commission [1992] 3 NZLR 429 (HC): expanded 
the market definition by requiring the CC to consider ‘long-term’ dynamic 
efficiencies in the market, including new technology and new entrants. 
Efficiency is a core component of Chicago analysis. 
 
d) Fisher & Paykel Ltd v Commerce Commission [1990] 2 NZLR 731 (HC): 
Fisher & Paykel defended their exclusive dealing clauses with retailers 
across NZ due to competitors penetrating the market shrinking market 
share from 95 to 80 per cent, indicating that there was no foreclosure in 
the NZ whiteware market. Longdin considers the decision to illustrate the 
Chicago ‘stranglehold’ on NZ’s competition law due to its focus on 
efficiency and the failure of the Court to consider effects on consumers 
(Longdin, 1993).  
 
 
In 1990, the Government clarified that economic efficiency was beneficial to the 
public, affirming that competition was an end in itself, rather than a means to an end. In 
relation to mergers and acquisitions, s 3A of the Commerce Act 1986 mandated that the 
CC consider efficiencies. In further reinforcing the dominance of Chicago economics, 
the CC argued that wealth transfers between producers and consumers provided no net 
efficiency gain and should be ignored (CC, 1994, p. 8): e.g. consider Ruapehu Alpine 
Lifts’ application to purchase Turoa ski-field (CC, 2000). The decision excludes 
potential benefits from wealth transfers to an economically deprived area, as these 
public policy concerns were considered inappropriate (CC, 2000). Instead, the decision 
focuses on efficiency gains including increased ski days, cost savings, and ‘other 
efficiencies’.  
 
However, the 2001 amendments to the Commerce Act 1986 challenged 
Chicago’s dominance, as the Labour-led Government policy of “Improving 
Competition” favoured a consumer welfare approach to competition law. 
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3 2001 to Current: Consumer Welfare and Efficiency? 
 
Under the “Improving Competition” policy, the Commerce Amendment Act 
2001 inserted s 1A into the Commerce Act 1986: 
The purpose of this Act is to promote competition for the long-term benefit of 
consumers in New Zealand.  
 
The Minister of Commerce highlighted the shift in focus: 
 
Consumers are given special mention as they are the ultimate beneficiaries of 
competition. However, the welfare of all New Zealanders will continue to be 
important … The focus on competition in the purpose statement also does not 
preclude wider public benefit issues being taken into account where appropriate. It 
simply clarifies that there should be a presumption in favour of competition … 
(Paul Swain, MP, 2001, p. 23).  
 
David Cunliffe, MP, chairperson of the Commerce select committee, reported that the 
new purpose statement made it “clear that the New Zealand Parliament supports a 
welfare-based Harvard School approach that puts the interests of consumers first” (NZ 
Hansard, 2001). Section 1A constitutes significant policy change in that competition is 
no longer an end in itself: competition is a means to an end, and the end is the long-term 
benefit of consumers. The new purpose represents a shift to a Harvard-informed model 
of competition regulation (by incorporating ‘consumers’), with an aspect of the Chicago 
school (by implicating ‘long-term’). However, the CC openly expressed its reluctance 
to shift to the consumer welfare test mandated by s 1A of the Commerce Act 1986 (CC, 
2005): e.g. the Air New Zealand and Qantas merger decision had major implications for 
consumers, as noted by the CC (2006, para 60). However, efficiency was still the 
overarching economic measure applied, particularly in relation to cost savings and 
market structure. This illustrates that the CC is politically active in ignoring directions 
to shift economic focus to the Harvard approach and openly expressing discontent (CC, 
2005).  
 
The incorporation of “long-term benefit” into s 1A somewhat clouds the 
interpretation of the purpose statement. The phrase re-introduces Chicago economic 
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efficiency as a regulatory driver. Potentially, the consumer could be worse off in the 
short term. The CC favours long-term dynamic efficiency, due to the emphasis on long-
term benefits to consumers (CC, 2001, p. 22). Dynamic efficiency is complex, 
incorporating shorter-term elements of allocative or productive efficiency. Due to the 
‘long-term’ nature of dynamic efficiency, certain transactions and market arrangements 
will result in short-term allocative or productive inefficiencies, but could result in 
greater long-term dynamic efficiency: consumers may suffer short-term harm for 
longer-term benefits. 
 
 Generally, there have been shifts between Chicago and Harvard informed 
approaches to NZ’s competition law, illustrating the political nature of the underlying 
rationale for regulatory intervention. These debates are relevant to the regulation of 
telecommunications. In particular, the heyday of Chicago economics resulted in the 
“light-handed” regulatory experiment.  
 
IV THE GREAT COMPETITION LAW EXPERIMENT: LIGHT-HANDED 
REGULATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
 
Chicago economics dominated NZ’s competition law, focusing on minimal 
‘market’ interference, while assuming that the market would correct any irregularity, 
such as dominance or the lack of competition.11 Successive Governments held that the 
market-driven, light-handed regulation provided the most effective means of “achieving 
consumer benefits and efficient economic outcomes” (Ministry of Economic 
Development [MED], 2001, p. 4). ‘Light-handed’ referred to the Government 
approaching competition regulation in a limited ‘hands-off’ manner, emphasising 
commercial negotiation, generic competition law rules, and promoting the Courts as a 
forum for dispute resolution. This is known as the ‘great competition law experiment’ 
                                                 
11
 The implications of telecommunications and Chicago economics are considered in more detail later in 
the chapter. 
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for two reasons: a) NZ was one of the first countries to deregulate and privatise 
telecommunications; and b) NZ was the only country to adopt light-handed regulation 
for all competition law, including networked industries (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 34). 
The experiment proved unsuccessful.  
 
NZ’s telecommunications industry was deregulated and privatised in the late-
1980s. On 1 April 1987, the Government formed Telecom Corporation of NZ, a State-
owned enterprise.12 The reforms intended to “improve the telecommunication industry’s 
economic performance and increase consumer benefits by creating competitive, open-
entry telecommunications markets supported by general competition law” (MED, 2001, 
p. 3). In facilitating ‘competitive entry into telecommunications’ the market was fully 
deregulated on 1 April 1989. In September 1990, Telecom was privatised to a 
consortium fronted by Ameritech of Chicago and Bell Atlantic of Philadelphia for NZ 
$4.25 billion. Conditions of sale required that a portion of shares be offered to the NZ 
public, Telecom operate a ‘business separation’ model, and Telecom comply with 
information disclosure provisions, including:  
a) Price information about prescribed services; 
b) The full text of interconnection agreements within a specified time after 
their conclusion; and 
 
c) The financial statements of Telecom NZ Ltd (MED, 2001, p. 3). 
 
 
The sale included the national network (PSTN) and residential and business 
retail businesses. Telecom’s control of the PSTN constituted an effective monopoly.13 
                                                 
12
 This separated telecommunications from the NZ Post Office, an incredibly inefficient State Department 
with over 18,000 employees. For example, it could take six months to get a new telephone. 
 
13
 The following table demonstrates the extent of dominance in the provision of PSTN Main Lines (fixed-
wire local-loop) in 1999 (MIT, 2000d, p. 60):  
Operator Number of Lines Percentage of Total 
Telecom 1,800,000 98.3% 
CLEAR 10,000 0.5% 
TelstraSaturn 22,500 1.2% 
Please note that TelstraSaturn and CLEAR subsequently merged to form TelstraClear in 2001. 
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In recognising Telecom’s ‘dominance’, the KSO obligations incorporated into 
Telecom’s Constitution required that Telecom: 
a) Maintain a local free-calling option for all residential telephone customers. 
 
b) Ensure that the rate of increase in the residential telephone line rental does 
not increase in real terms above its 1 November 1989 rate of $27.80 per 
month, unless Telecom’s profits are unreasonably impaired. 
 
c) Ensure that the line rental for residential users in rural areas is no higher 
than the standard urban residential line rental. 
 
d) Continue to make ordinary residential telephone services as widely 
available as at the date of adoption of the KSO. 
 
Consequently, the following sections demonstrate the light-handed approach, 
before moving to illustrate practical limitations.  
 
A The Light-Handed Experiment 
 
The light-handed regime was modified for NZ’s networked industries (including 
telecommunications, gas, and electricity), operating in a four-fold manner (Gilbertson, 
2001, p. 5; Patterson, 1998, p. 139).  
1 Information Disclosure and Business Separation  
 
At privatisation, Telecom was obliged to provide key accounting information to 
the Government, including profit margins and the cost of satisfying the KSO (MED, 
2001, p. 11). Telecom was required to separately conduct business units including local 
calls, long-distance tolls, and mobile services.  
2 The Commerce Act 1986 
 
Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 intended to capture anti-competitive 
behaviour by large market players. To establish a breach of s 36, it was necessary to 
determine that Telecom: 
a) was ‘dominant’ in a market; 
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b) had ‘used’ its dominant position; and  
 
c) had acted for an anti-competitive ‘purpose’. 14 
 
Litigation had to establish all three elements, with the Courts concentrating on ‘use’. In 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v CLEAR Communications Ltd [1995] 1 
NZLR 385 (PC), the Privy Council applied the ‘competitive conduct test’ (p. 403).15  
3 Private Attorney-Generals: Telecom’s Competitors  
 
The CC had limited dispute resolution capacity (due to insufficient funding) and 
consequently, Telecom’s competitors resorted to litigation to ‘enforce’ the Commerce 
Act 1986 (MIT, 2000d, 13; Patterson, 1998, p. 139). Although the CC did instigate 
several proceedings against Telecom in the early 1990s this was rare, as the CC would 
instigate proceedings to establish important principles under the Commerce Act 1986, 
where there were serious breaches and where there was a reasonable chance of success 
(Borrowdale, 2000, p. 656). The cost and complexity of litigation challenged the ability 
for the CC and the Courts to enforce the Commerce Act 1986. Consequently, the CC 
encouraged Telecom’s competitors to take action, as the CC could not ‘afford’ litigation 
against Telecom (Patterson, 1998, p. 139).   
4 Threat of Government Intervention 
 
If the telecommunications industry failed to ‘effectively’ develop competition, 
the Government threatened to further regulate the industry. Further regulatory options 
included enforced business separation, increased information disclosure, sector-specific 
regulation, or heavy-handed regulation with direct Government involvement in the day-
to-day management, pricing, access, and dispute resolution of telecommunications.16   
                                                 
14
 The Commerce Amendment Act 2001 amended s 36 in line with Australia: ‘substantial degree of 
market power’ replaced ‘dominant’ and ‘taking advantage of’ replaced ‘used’.  
 
15
 Telecom v Clear is considered in more detail later in the chapter. 
 
16
 More rigorous examination of regulatory approaches follows later in the chapter. 
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These four elements characterised the light-handed framework for 
telecommunications from 1986 to 2001. It was a unique system, as NZ was the first to 
implement such an approach and no other country followed NZ’s lead: it is the ‘great 
competition law experiment’. The next section illustrates the practical application of the 
light-handed framework through examining the interconnection dispute between 
Telecom and Clear.  
 
B Light-handed Regulation – Telecom v Clear 
 
Networking telecommunications in NZ is complex due to its high-density 
urbanisation, sparsely populated rural areas, and difficult geographical terrain. As the 
light-handed system provided no interconnection access regime, Telecom possessed a 
competitive advantage by holding the PSTN (Gilbertson, 2001, p. 2). 
Telecommunications relies on network interdependence, as industry players need access 
to each other’s networks to deliver services: all industry players required access to 
Telecom’s network (MIT, 2000d, p. 60). Under the light-handed system, industry 
players negotiated interconnection agreements with Telecom: Telecom’s dominant 
negotiating position resulted in litigation. The interconnection dispute between Telecom 
and Clear proved to be the primary issue shaping telecommunications competition 
during the 1990s. The debate came to a head in early 1994, resulting in the Privy 
Council case of Telecom v Clear.  
1 The Dispute  
 
Clear won a contract to provide the Ministry of Justice with telecommunications 
services, requiring access to the PSTN, with Clear entering negotiations for an 
interconnection agreement in 1990. The principal contractual issue was the appropriate 
methodology for interconnection pricing: Telecom wished to charge Clear its standard 
business per minute rate for any call to Telecom’s network, arguing that Clear was a 
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normal business customer. Telecom rejected any notion of reciprocity, paying for calls 
originating on its network and terminating on Clear’s network (Carter & Wright, 1999, 
p. 2). Clear proposed ‘bill and keep’ pricing (a two-way interconnection pricing scheme 
where each network agrees to terminate calls originating from another network at no 
charge).17 Telecom objected on the basis of the difference in network size and the 
imbalance in the direction of calls. Both parties subsequently modified their positions: 
Clear sought interconnection pricing at incremental cost, recognising the call 
imbalance; Telecom argued for interconnection prices based on the “Baumol-Willig” 
rule (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 34).18 The “Baumol-Willig” rule requires that a “new 
entrant pay the dominant incumbent the opportunity cost of providing interconnection 
together with a contribution to common costs and profits, including any monopoly 
profit foregone by the dominant incumbent from any business lost to the new entrant” 
(Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 23). As both parties objected, commercial negotiations 
stalled.  
 
In August 1991, Clear took Telecom to court alleging a s 36 breach, arguing that 
the “Baumol-Willig” rule constituted “use” of a “dominant position” for the purposes of 
restricting or preventing competition in the telecommunications market. It was complex, 
costly litigation, with numerous appeals and cross appeals: the High Court found that 
the “Baumol-Willig” rule did not contravene s 36; the Court of Appeal disagreed, 
holding that Telecom ‘abused’ its dominant position. Telecom appealed to the Privy 
Council.19 
                                                 
17
 ‘Bill and keep’ pricing is traditionally applied in situations where competing networks are of a similar 
size (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 30). See Chapter three for more discussion. 
 
18
 The “Efficient Component Pricing Rule” was developed by William Baumol and Robert Willig.    
 
19
 The London-based Privy Council was the highest judicial appellate court for NZ, but it has 
subsequently been replaced with the establishment of the NZ Supreme Court. 
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2 Privy Council Appeal 
 
The Privy Council found no s 36 breach, holding that the “Baumol-Willig” rule 
was a valid interconnection pricing method, and determining that the appropriate ‘use’ 
test was the ‘competitive conduct test’:  
a person cannot be said to use a dominant position if he or she acts in a way which 
a person not in a dominant position but otherwise in the same circumstances would 
have acted (Telecom v CLEAR, 1995, p. 403).   
 
In applying the ‘competitive conduct test’, their Lordships concluded:  
Telecom in charging Clear its opportunity cost for local interconnection was not 
using its dominant position since that is what it would have charged in a fully 
competitive market (Telecom v CLEAR, 1995, p. 405).  
 
Thus, Telecom was entitled to use “Baumol-Willig” for interconnection pricing.  
3 Effect of the Decision 
 
The decision stunted the development of competition, allowing Telecom to 
control network access. As access to the incumbent’s network is crucial in developing 
‘effective’ competition, the decision to allow Telecom to charge ‘Baumol-Willig’ 
strengthened its dominant position: 
a) Telecom could charge a higher interconnection price than would be 
possible in a competitive market. The fallacy in the Privy Council’s 
application of the competitive conduct test is that to be able to charge 
monopoly rents, the company would have to be in a monopoly or near-
monopoly market, which is not possible in a competitive market.20  
 
b) Telecom enjoyed supra-normal interconnection profits. This investment 
recoupment presented a significant barrier to entry in development 
competition, and affected public perception of the industry, the CC, and 
the Government, as promised reforms failed to materialise (Patterson, 
1998, p. 139). 
 
c) Saturn and Clear invested in the development of localised networks. 
Saturn invested in Petone and the Kapiti Coast, while Clear invested in 
core business districts in Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch. This 
was a positive result, as network competition is the most stable form of 
competition (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 13).  
 
                                                 
20
 Although Telecom did not use the “Baumol-Willig” rule in subsequent interconnection agreements, it 
had a ‘cooling’ effect, as it retained the ability to use this rule (MIT, 2000d, p. 9). 
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d) Telecom was the pseudo-telecommunications regulator, controlling 
market access (Gilbertson, 2001, p. 4).  
 
 
Therefore, Telecom’s encumbrance of industry competition represented a 
manifest failure of light-handed regulation. The subsequent section illustrates the 
theoretical and practical limitations of the light-handed framework. 
 
V THE FAILURE OF LIGHT-HANDED REGULATION 
 
The New Zealand experience is a fascinating, perhaps extreme one. It 
demonstrates the difficulty of competition in the absence of regulation (Laffont & 
Tirole, 2000, p. 34).  
 
A What is it About Telecommunications? 
 
Telecommunications provides a challenging regulatory environment for four 
reasons: 
1) The networked component encourages the development of natural 
monopolies. 
 
2) Network interdependence, as industry players require network access to 
deliver services. 
 
3) The challenge of constant technological change, investment, and 
innovation. Technical obsolescence constitutes a very real threat, as 
today’s telecommunications services will be radically different in the 
foreseeable future.  
 
4) Society is reliant on telecommunications, and as a public good, ‘private’ 
telecommunications become ‘pseudo-public’ with an increasing social 
welfare role (Horwitz, 1989, p. 131). The incorporation of the KSO into 
Telecom’s constitution recognises this. Society’s access and the extent to 
which one is able to enjoy the advantages of telecommunications depends 
on the ability to gain ‘competitive’ access to the network, and thus, the 
effectiveness of regulation (MIT, 2000d, p. 11). 
 
The MIT noted that the primary failures of the light-handed regime included the: 
1) inability to supervise the strong interdependence of the networked 
industry and rapid technological changes; 
 
2) significant barriers to entry preventing the establishment of efficient and 
desirable competition between network operators; 
 
3) failure to discourage Telecom’s economic incentives to prevent, delay, or 
add costs to the entry of competitors; and 
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4) significant cost and time delays of the dispute resolution process, as well 
as the incomplete remedies, particularly in relation to interconnection 
access (MIT, 2000d, pp. 7-11, 51). 
 
In short, the light-handed regime was inappropriate for regulating telecommunications, 
due to Telecom’s dominant position, the necessity for network access, and the lack of 
an interconnection access regime. Consequently, the following sections examine the 
theoretical constraints of regulating networked industries and the specific failures of 
light-handed regulation.   
1 Telecommunications: Networked Natural Monopolies 
 
McConnell explains the characteristics of a natural monopoly: 
In a few industries economies of scale are particularly pronounced, and at the 
same time competition is impractical, inconvenient or simply unworkable. Such 
industries are called natural monopolies, and most of the so called public utilities 
– the electric and gas companies, bus and railway firms, and water and 
communications facilities – can be so classified … (McConnell, 1960, p. 373). 
 
They arise where the largest or first supplier possesses an overwhelming cost advantage 
over other competitors,21 particularly in industries where capital costs predominate, 
creating economies of scale and high barriers to entry. Telecommunications networks 
possess high capital costs: the “network characteristics of telecommunications” pertain 
to monopolistic-type market structures (Gilbertson, 2001, p. 1). In networked industries, 
although industry players compete in the end-user services market, these players are 
interdependent in the provision of complementary network services (Gilbertson, 2001, 
p. 1).  
 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the microeconomic characteristics of a natural monopoly: 
first, high sunk costs; second, low constant marginal costs [MC]. A ‘natural monopoly’ 
describes a firm’s cost structure, while a ‘monopoly’ depicts market structure (see 
figure 2.5 below). 
                                                 
21
 Economists disagree as to the existence of natural monopolies. Free-market oriented economists tend to 
argue that natural monopolies only exist in theory and not in practice. 
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Fig 2.4: Graph of a Natural Monopoly 
 
In contrast, Figure 2.5 illustrates the normal MC characteristics of a monopoly, where 
MC decreases with increased economies of scale, but past the optimal point of supply, 
MC increases due to the increase in inefficiency and the reduction in economies of 
scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.5: Graph of a Monopoly 
 
The difference between natural monopolies and monopolies manifests itself in the 
presentation of MC as illustrated in Fig 2.4 (low, constant LRMC) and Fig 2.5 
(curvilinear MC). In economics, the natural monopoly ‘cost’ advantage is difficult to 
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replicate: by definition, a natural monopoly is the most efficient market form. 
Consequently, natural monopolies present a difficult regulatory challenge. Friedman, in 
relation to natural monopolies, said “there is only a choice among three evils: private 
unregulated monopoly, private monopoly regulated by the state, and government 
operation”, arguing that “the least of these evils is private unregulated monopoly where 
this is tolerable” (1962, p. 28).22  
 
The existence of a monopoly is not anti-competitive, as the regulatory concern is 
where monopolists “use” or “take advantage of” of their position to disadvantage 
potential or new entrants (see s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986). Such behaviour is anti-
developmental and anti-competitive. Due to the nature of natural monopolies, they not 
only have the natural advantage of the dominant market position, but habitually the 
opportunity arises to use this market position. Telecom holds the national PSTN; 
entrants require interconnection; Telecom’s bargaining position and power cannot be 
understated. In negotiating interconnection, Telecom holds the economic incentive to 
excise monopoly rents.23 Equally, there are powerful incentives to control the market 
share: 
[E]ven ‘small’ acts by the incumbent, such as complicating transfer processes and 
requiring customers of competitors to dial an access code or receive two bills 
instead of one, quickly escalate into a substantial problem for competition 
(Gilbertson, 2001, p. 3). 
 
This results in entrants facing higher access prices, higher operation costs, and product 
restrictions.  
 
New entrants earn income by suppling end-user services delivered by Telecom’s 
PSTN; Telecom aimed to maximise interconnection prices and impose unfavourable 
                                                 
22
 Friedman argued: “over time I have gradually come to the conclusion that antitrust laws do far more 
harm than good and that we would be better off if we didn’t have them at all, if we could get rid of 
them” (1999, p. 7). 
 
23
  See the Privy Council’s acceptance of the Baumol-Willig rule in Telecom v Clear. 
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terms and conditions (Gilbertson, 2001, 4). To maximise monopolistic rents, Telecom 
could: 
1) Reach agreements to supply end-user services in its own timeframe, as 
delay is often to its advantage. Delay tactics include litigation to test the 
limits of agreements. Although unsubstantiated, delay could justify the 
Telecom and Clear litigation (Gilbertson, 2001, p. 5);   
 
2) Impede competition (and innovation) by introducing terms and conditions 
and pricing methodologies that favour the incumbent, such as the 
“Baumol-Willig” rule; 
  
3) Impose unfavourable conditions and higher access prices to limit 
competitors to small market shares in an environment of increasing returns 
to scale or to restrict competitors from exploiting the incumbent in an 
environment of economies of scope;  
 
4) Impose interconnection standards limiting network functionality, or which 
lead to higher costs for competing network operators; and finally, 
 
5) Limit competition by impeding number portability, as the incumbent 
controls telephone numbering. NZ examples include the 0867 access code 
introduced by Telecom to channel Internet traffic from ISP, and toll free 
numbering (with a dispute between Telecom’s 0800 and Clear’s 0508).24   
 
The light-handed regime failed to regulate these economic incentives. First, 
Telecom and new entrants had to commercially negotiate, placing Telecom at a 
comparative advantage due to the network. Second, under the Commerce Act 1986, the 
onus of proof was on the complainant: complainants instigated litigation against 
Telecom, demonstrated the alleged breach of the Act, countered Telecom’s defence, and 
invited the court, on the balance of probabilities, to determine whether the Act was 
breached. Finally, Gilbertson argues that Telecom had to exploit the regulatory regime 
to restrict competitors: 
In fact, the directors of [Telecom] have a fiduciary duty to seek to extract the 
highest rents available to it as a result of its business position, as does any other 
profit-maximising firm (Gilbertson, 2001, p. 3). 
 
                                                 
24
 This problem has been improved through introducing the Number Administration Deed [NAD] in 
December 1998, removing Telecom from solely administering numbering in NZ.  
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In summary, Patterson argues that the tendency for the development of natural 
monopolies within telecommunications explains the failure of light-handed regulation:25 
The fundamental flaw of the light-handed model adopted in New Zealand is that it 
relies on the incumbent monopolist to act in a fair and reasonable way. As a matter 
of public policy, a regime to control the activities of industries with natural 
monopoly characteristics which has, as its central tenet, an assumption that the 
monopolist will act fairly and reasonably and not use its monopoly position to 
benefit itself at the expense of its competitors, is at best naïve. It is because economic 
theory predicts that a monopolist will act in its own self interest in confronting 
emerging competition, and is likely in that process to misuse its own monopoly 
power, that a policy to prevent that possibility is needed at all (Patterson, 1998, p. 
148).    
 
 
The preceding sections examined the general theoretical constraints of regulating 
telecommunications, demonstrating the extent of economic incentives to hinder the 
development of competition. The following section illustrates the specific reasons for 
the failure of light-handed regulation, including the lack of CC resources, the lack of a 
credible threat of Government intervention, and the failure to capture anti-
developmental behaviour. 
2 Problems with Light-handed Regulation 
(a) Limited Commerce Commission Resources  
 
Financial constraints limited the CC’s capacity to exercise jurisdiction over the 
Commerce Act 1986. Despite the political rhetoric of support, Governments failed to 
provide sufficient funding for investigation and litigation. Due to technological changes 
and network interdependence, it is necessary to have comprehensive information to 
regulate telecommunications (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 15). However, the CC had 
limited scope for investigations. The 1991-1992 CC investigation of 
telecommunications resulted in the publication of a critical report describing Telecom 
as a ‘de facto regulator’. In court, Telecom challenged the CC’s right to investigate, 
claiming that the investigation was ultra vires. Telecom succeeded: The Court of 
                                                 
25
 The United Kingdom [UK] Office of Telecommunications [OFTEL] reinforces this: “Some rules 
beyond general competition law are necessary to prevent the residual powers and advantages of 
incumbents being exploited in a way which frustrates the development of competition or unfairly 
exploits the consumer” (OFTEL, 1998, paras 4.24 and 4.34-4.35). 
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Appeal in Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 
NZLR 421 (CA) severely circumscribed the CC’s investigatory role. President Cooke26 
noted that the Commerce Act 1986 conferred no express or implied power on the CC to 
conduct such investigations:  
Wide though the powers and functions are, they do not extend to conducting an 
inquiry and publishing a report on the efficacy or otherwise of the Disclosure 
Regulations … Nor do the functions and powers extend to making findings 
adverse to persons or corporations (in this instance Telecom) otherwise than when 
determining an application before the Commission. That being so, it follows that a 
report publishing such findings cannot be permissible (Commerce Commission v 
Telecom, 1994, pp. 428-429).  
 
Despite conferring broad powers on the CC to enforce the Commerce Act 1986, the CC 
had limited capacity to take judicial proceedings. Not only was litigation expensive, but 
a lack of investigative material made judicial proceedings unlikely due to the CC’s 
requirement for guaranteed wins (Borrowdale, 2000, p. 656). Furthermore, Gilbertson 
illustrates the litigation problem in telecommunications: 
Experience has demonstrated that such litigation is slow, costly, susceptible to 
manipulation and delay by the incumbent, often fails to produce definite outcomes, 
and only results in remedies after the conclusion of the proceedings, which can be 
too late to prevent substantial harm to the developing process of competition 
(Gilbertson, 2001, p. 5).  
 
Allegedly, litigation became a tactic for Telecom, as they had superior financial 
resources (Gilbertson, 2001, p. 5). Thus, the lack of funding in respect of investigations 
and litigation affected the efficacy of the light-handed regime.  
(b) The Lack of a Credible Threat of Government Intervention 
 
Although acknowledging that a threat of Government re-regulation may have 
existed, Ergas doubts whether this threat held any credibility. To be credible, the threat 
needed ‘substance’: 
Governments may have had a gun pointed at the incumbent’s head; unfortunately, 
they stood between it and the target … In practice, the threat of re-regulation could 
not have seemed especially credible. Having staked substantial political capital on 
the virtues of the [light-handed] regime, governments were hardly likely to walk 
away from it … The hand which was meant to be light had all but vanished (Ergas, 
1995). 
 
                                                 
26
 Later, Lord Cooke of Thorndon in the House of Lords (UK). 
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Given the ‘political capital’ in the system, the threat of Government intervention did 
not seem especially credible.  
(c) Failure to Regulate for Anti-developmental Behaviour 
 
The light-handed regime was unable to counter the Telecom’s incentives to act 
in an anti-competitive or anti-developmental manner. Gilbertson argues that the 
framework, particularly s 36, failed to deal with the developing nature of 
telecommunications: e.g. the Privy Council’s “competitive conduct test” enabled 
Telecom to engage in conduct with an anti-developmental effect in a developing 
market: 
Examples of conduct [in NZ] that passes the ‘use’ test, but which is prohibited by 
foreign regulators because of its anti-competitive effect in developing 
telecommunications markets, include: highly targeted price discounting; use of the 
Baumol-Willig Rule in interconnection pricing; refusal to provide local call resale; 
and refusing all rebilling (Gilbertson, 2001, p. 3).    
 
 
NZ’s approach to telecommunications regulation contrasted with most OECD 
countries: only four countries (Turkey, Poland, Japan, and NZ) had no independent 
telecommunications regulator (MIT, 2000d, p. 16). The ‘standard’ approach to 
telecommunications regulation is characterised by asymmetric, sector-specific 
regulation (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 13). The international best practice model 
consisted of an independent telecommunications regulator governing access, pricing, 
and associated technical regulation, and general competition law. Some countries also 
had a regulator for telecommunications mergers or take-overs (MIT, 2000d, p. 17).  
 
The deregulation and privatisation of State telecommunications is complex, 
requiring regulation of the ‘anti-competitive’ and ‘anti-developmental’ economic 
incentives that result from these structural changes (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 13). The 
MIT acknowledged the failure of the light-handed regime: 
- there is considerable scope for Telecom and, in some cases, other network 
operators, to: 
- refrain from passing cost reductions on to consumers 
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- charge inefficient non-cost based access prices 
- inhibit or delay competition, without necessarily breaching the Commerce 
Act. 
… The existing [light-handed] regulatory regime is not best suited to achieving the 
Government’s objective for electronic communications (MIT, 2000d, p. 25). 
  
 In summary, within the light-handed regime, there were too many incentives for 
Telecom to act anti-competitively or anti-developmentally. Politically, the failure of the 
light-handed system was disconcerting, and telecommunications was entrenched as a 
major election issue for the 1999 General Election. The following section depicts the 
increasing politicisation of telecommunications, before moving to consider the ‘re-
regulation’ of telecommunications subsequent to the election.  
 
VI POLITICISING TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
 
Telecommunications is political, as the industry operates in the public-private 
dichotomy where ‘private’ telecommunications possess social welfare, public good 
qualities (Horwitz, 1989, p. 131). Throughout the 1990s, Telecom was publicly and 
politically criticised for profit hoarding, poor service, high prices, and slow technology 
‘rollout’. Telecommunications increasingly became a political issue and the 
Government’s agents tried to intervene: the CC failed to publish the 1992 report on 
telecommunications. However, the Ministry of Commerce (now the MED) published 
several discussion papers and investigations into the telecommunications industry: 
a)  In January 1998, a discussion paper proposed increased penalties for anti-
competitive behaviour to decrease Telecom’s incentives to act anti-
competitively. The maximum corporate penalty under the Commerce Act 
1986 was originally $300,000. As Telecom’s annual profit was 
significantly above $500,000,000, the maximum penalty did little to deter 
Telecom from contravening the Act. Equally, due to the contestable nature 
of litigation, demonstrating a breach of the Act was complex. 
Consequently, the Commerce Amendment Act 2001 increased the 
maximum penalty for contravening the Commerce Act 1986 to the greater 
of $10,000,000, three times the value of any commercial gain resulting 
from the contravention of the Act, or ten per cent of the turnover of the 
body corporate and its interconnected body corporates (see s 80).  
 
b) In June 1998, the Treasury and Ministry of Commerce released a 
“Strategic Overview Paper”, highlighting key industry reviews including 
 - 43 - 
number administration and portability issues; penalties and remedies 
under the Commerce Act; and the Telecommunication (Disclosure) 
Regulations. 
 
c) In November 1998, the Ministry of Commerce published a 
Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regulations discussion paper. The 
paper recommended that Telecom produce separate financial statements 
concerning the local-loop and its other telecommunications businesses and 
provide a “full economic costing” of the KSO, disclosing the methodology 
employed to determine the cost.  
 
d) The Government enacted the Telecommunications (Disclosure) 
Regulations 1999 detailing significant changes to Telecom’s disclosure 
regime including requiring Telecom to calculate and disclose the net 
economic cost of complying with the KSO obligations.27  
 
 
The increasing political and public discord surrounding Telecom and 
telecommunications, illustrates that the Government and its agents increasingly turned 
to accounting information as a mechanism for gathering information about and 
controlling Telecom.28 The failure of the light-handed regime resulted in the 1999 
general election presenting an opportunity to re-regulate telecommunications. During 
the election campaign, all major political parties argued for industry reform, e.g. Labour 
campaigned for ‘responsible re-regulation’ where necessary, promoting a full 
Ministerial Inquiry and the implementation of regulatory changes in the pursuit of 
consumer benefits and efficiency. Its coalition partner, the Alliance Party, campaigned 
for full industry regulation. Although not key party manifesto, these policies played 
‘expertly’ on the public perception of the telecommunications industry (Patterson, 1998, 
p. 138).    
 
                                                 
27
 See Appendix 1 for the KSO net costing requirements as prescribed in the Telecommunications 
(Disclosure) Regulations 1999.   
 
28
 This forms the focus of this thesis, in terms of the interface of law and accounting and the increasing 
need for accounting information. 
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A The Labour-Alliance Coalition Government - 1999 
1 The Fletcher Report – the Ministerial Inquiry 
 
Labour and the Alliance won the 1999 election. The Coalition Government 
organised a MIT, with broad terms of reference, to recommend regulatory change. After 
a detailed study, the MIT recommended ex ante regulation, which included: 
a) Telecommunications-specific regulation, with the establishment of the 
Electronic Communications Commissioner; 
 
b) Designated interconnection with Telecom’s network with TSLRIC pricing 
and wholesaling of Telecom’s retail services; 
 
c) Specified interconnection between all carriers; 
 
d) An access regime, with access objectives to assess the desirability of 
specification or designation of a service to promote the long term interests 
of existing and potential end-users, by: 
 
i) Facilitating efficient competition; 
 
ii) Promoting efficient any-to-any connectivity; 
 
iii) Encouraging efficient use of and efficient investment in infrastructure; 
and  
 
e) Maintenance of the existing KSO regime (MIT, 2000d, pp. 7-11, 51). 
 
The MIT released its report in September 2000. 
 
2 The Government’s Response 
 
In December 2000, the Government detailed a new regulatory regime to ensure 
the “delivery of cost efficient, timely, and innovative telecommunications services on 
an ongoing, fair, and equitable basis to all existing and potential users” (MED, 2001, p. 
15). The key features included: 
a) Establishment of the Telecommunications Commissioner in the CC. 
 
b) Designation (to enable pricing and access obligations to be set) of: 
 
i) Interconnection with Telecom’s fixed telephone network with 
TSLRIC pricing; 
 
ii) Wholesaling of Telecom’s fixed services; and 
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iii) Number portability. 
 
c) Deferred specification of fixed to mobile carrier pre-selection on 
Telecom’s network; 
 
d) Provision for Commissioner to recommend the regulation of other 
services to the Minister of Communications; and 
 
e) An upgrade of the KSO requirements and the development of a net costing 
model for the KSO, allowing Telecom to recoup a proportional element of 
the cost of meeting the KSO from ‘liable’ industry participants who 
interconnect with Telecom’s network (MED, 2001, p. 17). 
 
 
In May 2001, the Government introduced the Telecommunications Bill to 
Parliament. After Royal Assent, the Minister for Communications, Paul Swain MP, 
declared that: “[t]he government has passed landmark telecommunications legislation 
aimed at reforming the telecommunications industry in New Zealand to deliver a better 
deal for consumers” (Swain, 2001d). 
 
VII CORRECTING EXPERIMENTS: TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 2001 
 
A ‘Re-regulating’ Telecommunications 
 
The Labour Government campaigned for ‘responsible re-regulation’, and the 
recent regulatory history consists of a systematic re-regulation of the commercial sector. 
This State re-regulation ‘reverses’ Government policy from 1984-1998. Government 
rhetoric indicates that light-handed regulation was unsuccessful due to a stagnation and 
poor competitive growth in key infrastructure industries such as telecommunications 
and electricity. In response, the 1999 Government increased its participation in the 
commercial sector, reconstituting the regulatory framework. Government rhetoric 
reinforced the ‘public interest’ in and ‘public benefit’ of re-regulation, recognising the 
increased politicisation of competition law.  
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1 The Move to Sector-Specific Regulation 
 
In implementing sector-specific regulation, the TA signals a significant shift 
from light-handed regulation in moving NZ closer to the international best practice 
regulatory model (including the UK, the United States of America [USA], the European 
Union [EU], Canada, and Australia) (MIT, 2000d, p. 17). Professor Kahn, in advocating 
for sector-specific regulation, stated: 
It cannot be overemphasised that immediate blanket deregulation is not a panacea. 
Well designed regulations and anti-trust safeguards are likely to result, ultimately, 
in more competitive markets with more innovation than immediate deregulation 
could provide. Moreover, until competition develops, it is important to maintain 
safeguards to protect consumers and to prevent incumbent monopolists from 
stifling the growth of competition (Kahn, 1996). 
 
 
With telecommunications and electricity,29 successive NZ Governments have 
placed key industries within sector-specific regulatory environments, radically altering 
competition law and calling the ‘light-handed’ approach and the Commerce Act 1986 
into question. The following section illustrates the shift by depicting the five specific 
components of the TA. 
2 Overview of the Telecommunications Act 2001 
(a) Telecommunications Commissioner 
 
The TA establishes the Telecommunications Commissioner, within the CC. The 
Commissioner is responsible for regulating the telecommunications industry, including: 
a) dispute resolution concerning compliance with access obligations for 
access services; 
 
b) making recommendations to the Minister of Communications on access 
services and the industry; and  
 
c) monitoring and enforcement of the KSO. 
 
NZ’s first Telecommunications Commissioner was Douglas Webb.30 
                                                 
29
 The National-led Government commenced sector-specific electricity reforms in 1998, furthered by 
Labour in 2001. 
 
30
 Ross Patterson is the second Commissioner. 
 - 47 - 
(b) The Access System 
 
Interconnection access is the main focus of the TA, reflecting the history of 
dispute through the 1990s. The TA proscribes interconnection and wholesaling to 
enable competitors to access Telecom’s network and retail services, based upon the 
concepts of designated and specified services. Designated services are split into access 
services (where bilaterally, an access provider provides a service to an access seeker) 
and multi-network services (which involve more than two access providers) (Eeles, 
2001). In particular, the designated access services focus on interconnection with 
Telecom’s PSTN and Telecom’s retail services. Table 2.1 details the full range of 
designated access services, designated multi-network services, and specified services 
regulated by the access regime: 
Table 2.1: Telecommunications Services regulated under Part II of the TA 
Designated Access Services 
Interconnection with Telecom’s fixed PSTN 
Interconnection with other PSTN other than Telecom’s PSTN 
Retail services offered by means of Telecom’s fixed telecommunications network 
Residential local access and calling service offered by means of Telecom’s fixed 
telecommunications network 
Bundle of retail services offered by means of Telecom’s fixed telecommunications 
network 
Retail services offered by means of Telecom’s fixed telecommunications network as 
part of a bundle of retail services 
Designated Multi-network Services 
Local telephone number portability service 
Cellular telephone number portability service 
National toll-free telephone number portability 
Telecom’s fixed PSTN 
Specified Services 
National Roaming 
Co-location on cellular mobile transmission sites 
Co-location of equipment for fixed telecommunications services at sites used by 
Broadcast Communications Limited 
 
The TA provides standard access principles: 
1) The access provider must provide the service in a timely manner; 
 
2) The service must be supplied consistent with international best practice; 
and 
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3) The access provider must provide the service on terms and conditions 
consistent with how the access provider provides itself with the service.31 
 
(i) Dispute Resolution Process 
 
Part II of the TA details a dispute resolution process. The TA emphasises the 
importance of commercial negotiations to resolve access disputes. There is no a priori 
right for the Commissioner to determine access prices. Where commercial negotiations 
fail, an industry participant must request that the Commissioner determine access prices 
and conditions. With regard to designated services, the Commissioner can make price 
and non-price determinations. For interconnection, the main pricing rule is TSLRIC.32 
For specified services, the Commissioner is limited to non-price determinations. 
Separate determination processes exist for designated access services, specified 
services, multi-network services, and to review pricing determinations. Section 45 of 
the TA provides determination-specific timeframes for the CC.   
(ii)  Purpose and Efficiency  
 
Section 18(1) of the TA explains that the purpose of the TA is to “promote 
competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term benefit of end-users of 
telecommunications services”. By s 18(2), the Commissioner must consider the 
allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiencies that “will result or are likely to result 
from [the] act or omission” in promoting competition (MIT, 2000d, p. 43). In 
telecommunications, the efficiencies take the following characteristics: 
                                                 
31
 TA 2001, Schedule 1, Subpart 2, Clause 6 provides for the following limitations on these standard 
access principles: 
1) Reasonable technical and operational practicability having regard to the access provider’s 
network; 
2) Network security and safety; 
3) Existing legal duties on the access provider to provide a defined level of service to users of the 
service; 
4) The inability, or likely inability, of the access seeker to comply with any reasonable conditions 
on which the service is supplied; and  
5) Any request for a lesser standard of service from an access seeker. 
 
32
 See Appendix 2 for pricing principles available to the Telecommunications Commissioner. 
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a) Allocative efficiency results from service providers utilising resources to 
produce the best range of services for end-users, with ‘best’ referring to 
the product set creating the most utility for the end-user; 
 
b) Productive efficiency refers to the least-cost industry production of 
products demanded by the end-user; and 
 
c) Dynamic efficiency is longer-term: “when service providers invest, 
innovate, and improve end-user services, increase relevant productivity, 
and lower production costs over some undefined time-period” (Snow, 
1986, pp. 49-50).   
 
The CC clarified that it favours long-term dynamic efficiency over the short-term 
allocative and productive efficiencies. The TA supports this approach as it focuses on 
‘long-term benefits to end-users’ (CC, 2001, p. 22).33 
 
Thus, the TA addresses the access problem by mandating an access regime. In 
particular, in implementing Part II, the Commissioner must consider the purpose of the 
regulation (‘competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term benefit of end 
users’) and efficiency (the allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency effects within 
the telecommunications market through promoting competition).  
(c) The Telecommunications Service Obligation 
 
Part III of the TA concerns the establishment of a new universal service scheme 
entitled the telecommunications service obligation [TSO]. By s 70(1), the purpose of the 
TSO is to: 
facilitate the supply of certain telecommunications services to groups and end-
users within New Zealand to whom those telecommunications services may not 
otherwise be supplied on a commercial basis or at a price that is considered by the 
Minister to be affordable to those groups of end-users. 
 
 
Section 70(4) of the TA governs the establishment of a TSO instrument, by 
detailing what must be included in a TSO document, while ss 70-71 deem the existing 
KSO a TSO. The TSO system is considered more flexible than the KSO (Eeles, 2001), 
                                                 
33
 Efficiency is discussed later in this chapter in the economic theories of regulation. 
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as any “service provider” is able to meet the TSO. Thus, developing networks, such as 
TelstraClear’s urban network,34 could become subject to a TSO instrument:  
It is envisaged that TSO instruments will not only apply to services supplied by 
Telecom NZ.  The idea is that services akin to those covered by the Kiwi Share 
Obligation will be subject to contestability, such that service providers compete for 
the right to be a service provider under a particular TSO instrument (Bowie, 2001). 
 
 
Part III mandates determining the “net costs” of TSO service provision, detailing 
how to establish the ‘contributions payable’ by liable competing network operators. 
Contributions to the cost of TSO from other operators are based on market share and 
revenue. The calculation of contributions payable is complicated, and “fraught with 
difficulty” (Steeman, 2002; Bowie, 2001). 
 
(d) General Network Regulation 
 
Section 102(1) of the TA provides a framework for network operators to 
“facilitate entry into, and competition in, telecommunications markets”. This 
declaration provides certain powers of entry onto land for network construction and 
maintenance. Part IV also details rules of connection and misuse of a network.   
(e) Self-regulation 
 
A system of self-regulation under Schedule 2 of the TA enables industry forums 
to prepare telecommunication access codes in relation to designated and specified 
services. The Commissioner oversees the codes, varying or approving to ensure 
consistency with the interests of end-users. The TA prohibits certain codes including the 
implementation of pricing principles for designated access services or apportioning the 
cost of multi-network services (Eeles, 2001). 
 
In summary, the TA constitutes a significant shift from the light-handed regime. 
The following section summarises the re-regulation of telecommunications. 
                                                 
34
 Please note that TelstraSaturn merged with Clear Communications in 2001 to form TelstraClear. 
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B Conclusion: The Context of Re-Regulation 
 
The historical and political context of re-regulation illustrates that the 
Government concentrated on correcting past errors each of which provided the genesis 
for several targeted regulatory responses. Table 2.2 highlights the range of sector-
specific regulatory responses.  
Table 2.2: Government Responses to Failures of the Light-Handed Regime 
Concern: Government Approaches to Dealing with Issue: 
Light-handed 
regulation  
a) Sector-specific regulation regulating interconnection and wholesaling of 
designated and specified services; 
b) Establishment of Telecommunications Commissioner, funded by levy;  
c) Mandatory review of local loop unbundling (more heavy–handed 
regulatory option); and 
d) Broad powers allowing industry information gathering. 
Interconnection: 
Telecom v Clear, 
“Baumol-
Willig” pricing, 
and Telecom’s 
PSTN 
a) Regulated interconnection and wholesaling of designated and specified 
services; 
b) Definitions of initial and final pricing principles. 
c) Clarification that the “Baumol-Willig” rule is not an applicable pricing 
rule in NZ; and 
d) Limited appeal rights and appeals to the Privy Council prohibited. 
KSO a) Continuation of KSO as TSO (requiring information disclosure, minimum 
coverage and service levels, etc); 
b) Detailed regulations requiring the costing of the TSO and recoupment of 
cost of compliance from competitors; and 
c) Mandatory review into local loop unbundling. 
 
 
The re-regulated framework attempts to resolve the perceived failures of light-handed 
regulation by moving to sector-specific regulation under the Telecommunications 
Commissioner. The dedicated interconnection access regime, with pricing principles 
provides a solution to the interconnection disputes through the 1990s. The perceived 
KSO issue is resolved by introducing a TSO system with an annual net costing and 
proportionate contributions from liable industry players. Thus, in light of the historical 
and political context of the NZ experience, the next section illustrates the Chicago and 
Harvard economic influence in the TA.  
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C Chicago and Harvard Economics within the Telecommunications Act 2001 
 
The Government’s objectives for reform were: “Cost-efficient, timely, and 
innovative telecommunications services on an ongoing, fair, and equitable basis to all 
existing and potential users” (MIT, 2000d, p. 11). Section 18(1) explains that the 
purpose “is to promote competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term 
benefit of end-users of telecommunications services”. In achieving competition, s 18(2) 
requires the Commissioner to consider the efficiencies that “will result or are likely to 
result …”. The inclusion of “existing and potential users” and “end-users” supports a 
Harvard interpretation. ‘End-users’ denotes competition as a means to an end, with the 
end being long-term consumer benefit. The Government’s telecommunications 
objective concerns potential and future consumers, leading to issues of inter-
generational equity in balancing current and future consumers. 
 
However, despite the Harvard influence, the TA incorporates Chicago-style 
efficiencies (s 18(2) mandates the consideration of efficiency). Efficiency is complex, 
representing a measure of competitive efficiencies deriving from perfect competition 
(Frank, 1998, p. 418). However, the monopoly and natural monopoly tendencies of 
telecommunications are inaccurately reflected in perfect competition. Efficiency ignores 
deadweight losses arising from natural monopolies, which pertain to losses arising from 
structural market irregularities (Frank, 1998, pp. 357-425). The efficient pricing 
principal is MC (Frank, 1998, p. 418), but for monopolies MC is below AC, and is 
unsustainable in the long run (Snow, 1986, p. 241).35 Figure 2.4, at p 36, illustrates that 
monopolist’s price at AC (Frank, 1998, p. 417). Pricing above MC impacts on 
allocative efficiency, for the provision of end-user services will be less efficient. 
Second, natural monopolies indicate productive inefficiency, with economic rents in the 
                                                 
35
 The economic rationale behind MC below AC in telecommunication derives from the substantial cost 
investment in network creation. However, it is necessary to consider whether any of these costs are 
unavoidable. If unavoidable, and are not incurred by some service provision, then these costs are 
sunk costs, and should form no part of the efficiency calculation (Snow, 1986, p. 241). 
 - 53 - 
provision of end-user services. Snow argues that these rents are not available in a 
competitive market (Snow, 1986, p. 241), while Frank argues, “by definition a natural 
monopolists costs may be lower than if other firms also served the same market” 
(Frank, 1998, p. 419). Third, the presence of economic rents and pricing above MC 
indicates dynamic inefficiency (Snow, 1986, p. 52). However, dynamic efficiencies are 
always partial, as they attempt to capture future potentialities (Vogelsang & Mitchell, 
1997, p. 126). Thus, efficiency is complex: it is a competitive market analytical concept 
that does not counter the incumbent’s economic incentives and the natural monopoly 
characteristics (Gilbertson, 2001, p. 5).  
 
This section illustrates the complexity of analysing the economic rationale of 
NZ’s competition law and telecommunications regulation. The regulatory approach 
over the last 30 years consisted of a hegemonic debate between Chicago and Harvard 
economics. Each school provides limited explanations of the regulatory model. The 
next section outlines the characteristics of public interest regulation and regulatory 
capture in the telecommunications context. 
 
D Public Interest and Regulatory Capture: Telecommunications Act 2001  
  
The TA includes aspects of both public interest and regulatory capture. “Public 
interest” regulation holds that regulation should operate like a public trust, preventing 
monopolistic telecommunications companies from earning supernormal profits through 
scarcity and high prices (Gilbertson, 2001, p. 4).36 The “capture” school regards 
regulators as pawns, as the regulated can manipulate the regulator. Hence, regulation 
seeks to minimise the instances where regulators lose control (Snow, 1986, p. 7). The 
objective of the TA is to further the interests of existing and potential end-users (public 
interest regulation). However, the regulator relies on industry participants to provide 
                                                 
36
 A monopolist earns monopoly profits by charging where MC equals MR. However, a monopolist will 
always (bar a perfectly discriminating monopolist) exceed MR (Frank, 1998, p. 385-389).  
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regulatory information (which promotes regulatory capture). The following sections 
detail the components of public interest and regulatory capture. 
1 Public Interest Regulation 
 
Public interest regulation endeavours to ‘protect’ the public from inefficient 
markets, exploitation, and fettered access: 
regulation is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction of 
inefficient or inequitable market practices (Posner, 1974, p. 335). 
 
The regulator is the neutral arbiter of the ‘public interest’, free from self-interest. The 
regulator:  
does its best to regulate so as to maximise social welfare. Consequently, regulation 
is thought of as a trade-off between the costs of regulation and its social benefits in 
the form of improved operation of markets (Scott, 2003, p. 448). 
 
Regulation benefits society generally, rather than particular vested interests. Regulation 
should create confidence, despite Scott’s recognition of the balancing act between social 
costs and benefits of regulation. Thus, a problem with public interest regulation and 
infrastructure assets is that regulation may provide incentives to actors to act in a 
manner contrary to the intent of the regulation.37  
                                                 
37
 For example, regulation may create incentives to cross-subsidise. Cross-subsidisation, like transfer 
pricing, occurs when operators transfer costs from a profitable business segment to another segment 
where consumers contribute to a higher fraction of costs. The networked nature of 
telecommunications presents a complex mix of subsidies and cross-subsidies (Snow, 1986, p. 148). 
There are two forms of cross-subsidies relevant to telecommunications: accounting and managerial 
cross-subsidies. Accounting cross-subsidies have been the traditional focus of regulatory regimes, 
including Canada, the EU, and the USA (Vogelsang & Mitchell, 1997, p. 197). Accounting cross-
subsidies occur when a firm benefits from allocating costs incurred in service one to service two. The 
NZ Government mandated accounting separation following Telecom’s privatisation, but Gilbertson 
notes that Telecom merged business segments to avoid individual monitoring (Gilbertson, 2001, p. 
5).  Mandated accounting procedures fail to capture managerial cross-subsidies, which relate to 
managers making ‘real’ allocations of people and resources between services. For example, an 
incumbent may allocate its most inexperienced or under-performing personnel to service one, a high-
cost, regulated service, while placing its best-performing personnel in an unregulated activity, so that 
the unregulated service runs more efficiently earning a greater profit share. Controlling managerial 
cross-subsidies is difficult, as attempting to do so involves substituting the regulator’s judgment for 
the firm. Laffont and Tirole warn, “it is by no means easy to prevent cross-subsidies once one has 
created incentives for them” and that cross-subsidies can hinder competitive development (2000, pp. 
146-147). 
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(a) Public Interest Regulation and Infrastructure Industries 
 
Government rhetoric claimed that telecommunications re-regulation was in the 
public interest reinforced through the s 18(1) “long-term benefit of end-users of 
telecommunications services” purpose statement. Relevant questions include: Is the 
regulation in the public interest? Are the regulatory instruments and bodies empowered 
to act in the public interest? For Mansell, ‘public interest’ is an undefined concept in 
relation to telecommunications, due to traditional State ownership (Mansell, 1993; 
1996; 2007). ‘Public interest’ was traditionally identified with the State, as the State 
was ‘representative’ of the public. Following deregulation and privatisation, ‘public 
interest’ was linked to the market and to technological criteria including the promotion 
of competition and the establishment of network standards, rather than establishing 
criteria emphasising equality of access to the network (Mansell, 1996; 2007).38  
 
“Public interest” reflects positivistic or normative standpoints. For legal 
positivism, law purports to obligate acting in the ‘public interest’. Law tells us what we 
must do, (often) requiring us to act contrary to our self-interest, in other’s interests, or in 
the public interest more generally. Bentham applied an aggregative definition to public 
interest, arguing that public interest was merely the sum of the interests of individual 
citizens (Bentham, 1843, p. 2). The aggregation principle is critiqued as untenable 
‘psychological hedonism’, lending itself to laissez-faire individualism incompatible 
with social responsibility and a strong sense of community. Equally, what happens if 
interests are irreconcilable? Some interpretations of Bentham suggest that it is not that 
                                                 
38
 To date, there have been few comments by NZ’s judiciary on the ‘public interest’. In India, for 
example, the Supreme Court held in Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v State of Jammu and Kashmir 1980 
(3) SCR 1338 that:  
 
… the concept of public interest must as far as possible receive its orientation from the directive 
principles. If any governmental action is calculated to implement or give effect to a directive principle, 
it would ordinarily be subject to any overriding consideration formed in the public interest. 
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interests are the same, but rather that the population seeks the same general range of 
interests (Gunn, 1968).  
 
The normative ‘public interest’ asserts what the concept should mean in 
regulation. In defining ‘public interest’, common ideas include “public good”, “public 
welfare”, “general interest”, and “in the interests of the community”. These terms are 
capable of varying interpretations, involve judgment, and require information outside of 
the regulatory process in order to evaluate public good, welfare, or interests. For 
infrastructure, regulation should represent society’s interests rather than the private 
interests of regulators.  
 
Many public interest definitions emphasise ‘common interest’, shared by all 
citizens. Meyerson and Banfield describe special interests and the public interest as 
follows:  
A decision is said to serve special interests if it furthers the ends of some part of 
the public at the expense of the ends of the larger public. It is said to be in the 
public interest if it serves the ends of the whole public rather than those of some 
sector of the public (Meyerson & Banfield, 1955, p. 322). 
 
Critics dispute the notion of a ‘common interest’ by recognising inherent power 
imbalances, and instead, link public interest to democracy, arguing that it equals 
consensus among the ‘majority’ of people: 
The concept of public interest is closely related to the universal consensus 
necessary for the operation of a democratic society. This consists of an implicit 
agreement among the preponderance of the people concerning two main areas: the 
basic rules of conduct and decision-making that should be followed in the society; 
and general principles regarding the fundamental social policies that the 
government ought to carry out (Downs, 1962, p. 10). 
 
Marks describes ‘pubic interest’ as a balancing of interests, in that the ‘public interest’ 
is “… the sum total of all interests in the community – possibly all of them actually 
private interests – which are balanced for the common good” (Marks, Leswing & 
Fortinsky, 1972, p. 211). 
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For political economists, power struggles and welfare inequalities are at the 
centre of ‘public interest’ analysis, as is the interaction between regulatory, economic, 
political, legal, and technological forces. Horwitz argues that the interpretation of 
‘public interest’ is crucial in defining State action, including the role of regulatory 
agencies (1989). For telecommunications regulation, the development of competition 
and increasing efficiency in the ‘public interest’ justify the State’s regulatory role 
(Horwitz, 1989). In Horwitz’s analysis of the divestiture of AT&T in the USA, the 
‘public interest’ was a balance of interests: “[a] black box whose meaning or 
representation is the terrain of struggle”, which redefined public interest from “a 
concern with stability and a kind of social equity to a concern with market controls and 
economic efficiency” (Horwitz, 1989, p. 131). Powers suggests that 
telecommunications deregulation tends to generate efficiency gains and new services, 
but recognises the unequal distribution of benefits and costs throughout society, 
particularly for rural and residential consumers (Powers, 1987). 
 
The underlying tension for Downs is that if the ‘public interest’ exists, who 
possesses the ability to balance ‘public’ interests? 
The idealist school believes that the public interest consists of the course of action 
that is best for society as a whole according to some absolute standard of values, 
regardless of whether any citizens actually desire this course of action … Public 
opinion need not understand the wisdom of the policies arrived at (Downs, 1962, 
p. 26). 
 
Thus, regulation is political:  
 
The essential commodity being transacted in the political market is a transfer of 
wealth, with constituents on the demand side and their political representatives on 
the supply side … the market here, as elsewhere, will distribute more of the good 
to those whose effective demand is the highest (Peltzman, 1976, p. 212). 
 
Gerboth, in agreement, states that: 
 
When a decision making process depends for its success on the public confidence, 
the critical issues are not technical; they are political … In the face of conflict 
between competing interests, rationality as well as prudence lies not in seeking 
final answers, but rather in compromise – essentially a political process (Gerboth, 
1973, p. 497). 
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 At the crossroads of regulatory and legal theory, ‘public interest’ becomes “a 
process, and not a policy”: namely substantive due process to ‘account’ for the value 
judgments as to what constitutes ‘public interest’; and procedural due process to 
‘account’ for how value judgements are arrived at. Burkhead and Miner explain: 
In administrative law it is usually impossible to define substantive due process, but 
it is not as difficult to define procedural due process. If this analogy is appropriate, 
it should be possible to define a procedural public interest, even though its content 
cannot be specified. A procedural public interest would consist of an assurance, in 
the decision process, that the widest possible range of interests will be consulted. 
This consultation will assure that the intensities of preferences are revealed, even 
if these cannot be measured with precision. The aesthetic cost of destroying a 
scenic wilderness cannot be compared with the value of power and water to be 
produced from a reservoir, but the intensity of reaction of affected groups can at 
least be assessed. A procedural public interest would both establish the values that 
underlie the public interest and reveal the consequences of alternative policies. 
The rules of the game are important, not just the specific, isolated outcomes 
(Burkhead & Miner, 1971, p. 232). 
 
This debate suggests that there is little consensus in public interest regulation. As the 
following section demonstrates, public interest regulation is criticised by regulatory 
capture theory. 
(b) Criticisms of Public Interest Regulation 
 
Critics challenge the ability for regulators to shed individual interests in favour 
of a ‘public interest’. Furthermore, the concept of ‘public interest’ is a rhetorical tool for 
actors to legitimise their actions at the expense of others. Economists criticise the 
‘public interest’ view as simplistic by overstating the:  
a)  fragility and inefficiency of economic markets (McNamara, 1991, p. 96); 
 
b) assumption that regulation is virtually costless (Posner, 1975, p. 819); and 
 
c) that there is a public interest, or that legislation is able to reflect a public 
interest (Posner, 1974, p. 344). 
 
Posner states: 
 
[There is] a good deal of evidence that the socially undesirable results of 
regulation are frequently desired by groups influential in the enactment of 
legislation setting up the regulatory scheme … Sometimes the regulatory scheme 
itself reveals an unmistakable purpose of altering the operation of markets in 
directions inexplicable on public interest grounds … Much of it is consistent with 
the rival theory that the typical regulatory agency operates with reasonable 
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efficiency to attain deliberately inefficient or inequitable goals set by the 
legislature that created it (Posner, 1974, p. 337). 
 
Thus, ‘public interest’ is ‘meaningless’, with powerful groups receiving the ‘public 
benefits’: 
Since the coercive power of government can be used to give valuable benefits to 
particular individuals or groups, economic regulation – the expression of power in 
the economic sphere – can be viewed as a product whose allocation is governed by 
the laws of supply and demand … economic regulation is better explained as a 
product supplied to interest groups than as an expression of social interest in 
efficiency or justice (Posner, 1974, p. 344). 
 
 
These criticisms introduce regulatory capture theory. 
 
2 Regulatory Capture 
 
Regulatory capture theory holds that irrespective of the underlying ‘rationale’ 
behind regulation, self-interested groups capture and control the regulatory process:  
The original purposes of the regulatory program are later thwarted through the 
efforts of the interest group (Posner, 1974, p. 342). 
 
Regulatory capture demonstrates where the regulated dominate the regulator (Posner, 
1974). This is a central tenet of the economics of regulation, which critiques ‘public 
interest regulation’ (Laffont & Tirole, 1991; Levine & Forrence, 1990). Examples of 
regulatory capture in the USA include: 
a) The Civil Aeronautics Board providing competitive protection to airlines;  
 
b) The Interstate Commerce Commission preventing competition developing 
in transportation, colloquially known as the “trucker’s best friend”; and  
 
c) The Department of Agriculture implementing farming policies favouring 
large corporate farmers over small-hold farmers and consumers (Laffont 
& Tirole, 1991). 
 
There are two approaches to the capture school: a demand-side and a supply-
side model (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Laffont & Tirole, 1993). The central premise 
is ‘joint relationship maximisation’, where concerned parties maximise utility through 
controlling the regulatory process.  
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(a) Demand-Side Regulatory Capture 
 
The demand-side model holds that political institutions respond to ‘constituents’ 
based upon demand patterns, voting capacity, and financial interests. As Government is 
risk averse, it will try to avoid conflict. Thus, during the 1999 General Election, there 
was considerable public disquiet surrounding telecommunications: regulatory reform 
was on the political agenda, and the public disquiet represents ‘organised demand’. The 
Government appeased these ‘interest groups’ by passing the TA. A demand-side model 
tends to treat the political process as “a black box”, which is problematic as legislation 
can be revised or removed through lobbying by alternative interest groups (Laffont & 
Tirole, 1993, p. 477). In contrast, the supply-side model of regulatory capture presents a 
complex regulatory environment. 
(b) Supply-Side Model of Regulatory Capture 
 
The supply-side model explains the complex pattern of regulatory development 
by acknowledging multiple interests facing Governments, in supplementing the 
demand-side. Through organisational economics, supply-side models illustrate that 
institutional arrangements affect regulatory outcomes. This enables capture theorists to 
explain the political insecurity confronted by interest groups, who may get some but not 
all of their demands. The model relies on complex agency theory, with Government 
disaggregated into an immense web of principal-agent relationships (Laffont & Tirole, 
1993, p. 491). While acknowledging public pressure as a genesis for 
telecommunications regulation, a supply-side model would suggest the presence of 
alternative interest groups, as the CC relies on industry participants for almost all 
information in the regulatory process. 
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3 The Insights of Public Interest Regulation and Regulatory Capture 
 
The TA is a form of public interest as the regulatory objective is to further the 
interests of existing and potential end-users. However, this is hindered by the struggle 
over the complexity of the meaning of ‘public interest’. Thus, the “capture” school 
identifies opportunities for the regulated to manipulate the regulator: e.g. as the 
regulator must rely on industry participants for information this promotes regulatory 
capture. Therefore, each theoretical influence informs part of NZ’s regulatory approach 
to telecommunications, but each theoretical insight, in isolation, possesses limited 
explanatory power. 
 
VIII  THE LIMITS OF EXISTING REGULATORY THEORY 
  
Each theoretical perspective, Chicago and Harvard schools, public interest 
regulation, and regulatory capture, illustrates part of the complexity of NZ’s 
telecommunications regulation: 
a) Chicago economics was an important hegemonic movement through 
initial competition law reforms (1987-1999). Neo-liberalism influences 
competition law, although there are attempts to minimise its impact. Thus, 
Chicago provides an insightful account into tensions within the regulatory 
environment, but is analytically limited by its theoretical foundations.  
 
b) Harvard economics is promoted as the economic theory underpinning re-
regulation in NZ. However, although much rhetoric surrounds ‘consumer 
welfare’ economics, it struggles to have impact on the regulatory schema, 
troubled by Chicago and trapped by its limitations, particularly around 
‘welfare’.  
 
c) Public interest regulation is hindered by struggles over the complexity of 
the meaning of ‘public interest’, and thus the account is too simplistic in 
its conception of ‘public’, ‘interest’, ‘regulator’ and ‘regulation’. 
 
d) Regulatory capture theory, especially in its links to regulatory 
communication, provides some insight into the NZ model in identifying 
the scope for capture.  
 
However, the conflict between the accounts is appealing. The regulatory theories 
illustrate that economics is tied to the social and political: e.g. the Chicago-Harvard 
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debate illustrates the role of the CC as a political actor. Economic movements play a 
role in telecommunications, but it is a complex, conflictual role. This illustrates the need 
for a theoretical account with space to incorporate economic, social, and political 
elements.  
 
IX CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, this chapter characterised the historical and political genealogy of 
telecommunications regulation in NZ, by tracing the movement from light-handed to 
sector-specific regulation and the theoretical insights of key economic regulatory 
theories:  
- The light-handed system implemented subsequent to the deregulation and 
privatisation of Telecom failed to manage the network interdependence 
and rapid technological change. The Chicago focus argued that the 
efficacy of markets to correct market irregularities.  
 
- In developing competition, network interconnection is vital. However, 
Telecom used its position to prevent and delay the establishment of 
competition.  
 
- The Privy Council in Telecom v Clear accepted the Baumol-Willig rule, 
which allowed Telecom to charge monopoly rents in negotiating 
interconnection access.  
 
- There was increasing political and public disquiet through the 1990s. 
Increasingly, Government agencies turned to accounting information as a 
regulatory mechanism. 
 
- The 1999 General Election presented an opportunity for change, and the 
newly elected Government established the MIT to recommend appropriate 
telecommunications regulation. The MIT concentrated on the need for 
competitive interconnection access and the KSO. 
 
- The sector-specific TA 2001 established the Telecommunications 
Commissioner, provided a dispute resolution process for interconnection 
access based upon TSLRIC, and required an annual net costing of TSO.  
 
- The TA 2001 invokes a complex mixt of regulatory theories, 
incorporating elements of a Harvard, Chicago, public interest, and 
regulatory capture. 
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The contingent explanations of telecommunications regulation illustrates that regulatory 
theory is intimately linked to the social and political. Consequently, Chapter three takes 
the illustration of economics as part of a richer, political game and considers its 
implication in relation to the interface of law and accounting. As indicated, the TA 2001 
requires a substantial range of cost information. Cost, traditionally, is the measure of 
economic sacrifice, but if economic cost can be linked to the social and political, then 
the regulatory use of cost accounting information increases the complexity of the 
interface of law and accounting.  
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- Chapter Three - 
 
The Interface between Law and Accounting: Cost Theory 
 
Not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted. 
Albert Einstein 
 
I CHAPTER THREE OVERVIEW 
 
Chapter two introduced telecommunications sector-specific regulation, and 
considered the limited economic regulatory theory explanations of the genealogy from 
deregulation and privatisation through to sector-specific reform. Thus it is necessary to 
move beyond current theories to explain telecommunications regulation. For Horwitz, 
there are three main areas of regulatory theory: economic, historical, and political 
science (1989). He argues that economic analysis provides insight into measuring 
outcomes but will misconstrue origins and processes; the historical approach provides 
insight into the historicity of regulation but lacks analytical tools for considering 
outcomes; and traditional political science politicises the regulatory environment but 
inclines to process-oriented analysis (Horwitz, 1989). For Horwitz, an ‘insightful’ 
regulatory model is interdisciplinary, incorporating the economic, historical, and 
political, as regulation is ‘evolutionary’, responding to economic and political 
developments with unique structural components, challenges, and public interests 
(Horwitz, 1989, p. 1). Thus, an account of telecommunications re-regulation should 
recognise its historical, economic, and political aspects. Chapter three addresses this by 
examining the increasing interface of law and accounting to answer three central 
questions: 
1) What is the theoretical and empirical interface between accounting and 
law? Specifically, what is the role of accounting in telecommunications 
regulation? What is the role of cost and cost theory within legal 
regulation? 
 
2)  Why did the Government incorporate cost-based regulation (TSRLIC for 
interconnection access pricing and net costing for the TSO)? What 
arguments did the Government and its agents present for instituting cost as 
the regulatory focus? 
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3) What is cost? Specifically, what are the technical, methodological, and 
political challenges of using cost in telecommunications regulation? What 
are the limitations and consequences of the assumptions of economics and 
law in relation to ‘cost’ accounting?  
 
This chapter identifies the increasing use of cost as a regulatory tool. However, 
public policy makers, Government, lawyers, and economists when using costs tend to 
accept the assumptions of positivism despite accountants being aware of the problems 
associated with cost, which include arbitrariness, choice, contestability, social and 
institutional constructionism, and subjectivity. Consequently, in tracing the interface of 
law and accounting, this chapter considers the effect of ‘positivist’ assumptions within 
regulation. However, before this the next section reviews empirical and theoretical 
work on the interface of accounting and law. 
 
II THE INTERFACE OF LAW AND ACCOUNTING 
 
The TA signalled a diversion from light-handed regulation, introducing a sector-
specific regime and providing a forum for interconnection access and monitoring TSO 
compliance.39 The increasing regulatory reliance on accounting information was 
signalled prior to the TA: the Telecommunications (Disclosures) Regulations 1999 
required detailed accounting disclosures, e.g. Telecom had to disclose the net economic 
cost of complying with KSO obligations.40 However, the TA comprehensively adopted 
accounting information as a regulatory measure, requiring the Telecommunications 
Commissioner to employ TSLRIC as the final pricing principle in regulating 
interconnection access and mandating an annual ‘net costing’ in monitoring TSO 
compliance. The chapter then moves to problematise the interface of law and 
accounting by considering the theory of cost. The challenges of costing from an 
                                                 
39
 Sections 70-71 of the TA deem the existing KSO a TSO. 
 
40
 See Appendix 1 for the KSO net costing requirements in the Telecommunications (Disclosure) 
Regulations 1999. 
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economic perspective require an analytical framework at methodological, technical, and 
political levels to detail the shift from cost as technical to political and its implications 
for its interface with law and regulation. 
 
A Cost and Regulation: No Interconnection Panacea for Telecommunications 
 
In examining the interface of law and accounting in telecommunications, the 
nature and extent of accounting information needs, and the potential for dispute, is 
immense, e.g. the dispute surrounding the first interconnection price using the TSLRIC 
model. In August 2002, the Telecommunications Commissioner’s first draft 
determination for interconnection prices recommended that accessing Telecom’s PSTN 
should fall within 1.21 to 1.42 cents per minute. The first step in constructing the 
TSLRIC price was to benchmark eight comparable countries using cost-plus pricing. 
The CC benchmarking exercise produced a price range of 0.4 cents to 2.67 cents with 
NZ’s interconnection price in the upper third quartile. Both Telecom and TelstraClear 
objected to the TSLRIC price, arguing it was incorrect. Telecom claimed that the price 
was low and should at least be doubled, arguing for an interconnection price at the 
upper end of the fourth quartile of 1.42 to 2.67 cents. As the TA requires the 
Commissioner to give primacy to commercially negotiated settlements, Telecom 
submitted that the Telecom-Vodafone interconnection agreement of 2.6 cents per 
minute should have substantial weight before the CC. Telecom warned that incorrect 
interconnection prices would be detrimental and unsustainable due to NZ’s higher costs 
of network provision associated with difficult terrain and sparsely populated rural areas.   
 
TelstraClear counter-submitted that the interconnection price should at least be 
halved to enable full competitive development arguing for ‘the more appropriate’ price 
of 0.67 cents a minute, calculated by the “purchasing power parity” method. 
TelstraClear criticised the CC’s rejection of this and criticised the CC’s averaging of 
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certain USA States by arguing that these States should be de-averaged and considered 
separately. TelstraClear argued for the CC giving primacy to the “purchasing power 
parity” method, as “[it] was used by almost every telecommunications regulator” 
(Steeman, 2002a). TelstraClear argued the CC should not be concerned with a 
potentially large adjustment in Telecom’s interconnection price but should consider the 
impact on Telecom’s competitors if the price is too high. Mr Grant Forsyth, general 
manager of TelstraClear’s government relations stated: “[n]ew entrants have been 
horribly stifled by rates charged to us by the incumbent” (Steeman, 2002b).  
 
This dispute illustrates the central concern of this thesis. The Government 
promised that the TA would solve problems of the light-handed regulatory regime by 
providing an interconnection access regime. All interested industry parties were 
consulted on the introduction and construction of the TSLRIC model; Telecom and 
TelstraClear submitted their estimates of the interconnection price and costing 
information to the CC. However, there is still disparity in the expected interconnection 
price from the TSLRIC model. In short, cost accounting does not solve problems of 
telecommunications regulation, with repercussions for the interface of law and 
accounting. 
 
B The Interface between Law and Accounting 
 
Law and accounting are intertwined. The two disciplines increasingly become 
closer and the interface continues to grow. There are three main aspects to the interface: 
1) law provides a framework for accounting; 2) accounting produces information for the 
legal process; and 3) at rare intervals, law passes judgment on accounting. Napier and 
Noke acknowledge that the relationship is multidirectional and multifunctional as each 
discipline influences the other (Napier & Noke, 1992, p. 32).  
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Law provides a framework for accounting: first, in the day-to-day practice of 
accounting; and second, through law’s influence over accounting’s scope (Napier & 
Noke, 1992, p. 32). Law defines parameters for the operation of accounting: e.g. 
Parliament designated the Accounting Standards Review Board [ASRB] as the authority 
to promulgate the delegated legislation of the NZ International Financial Reporting 
Standards [NZIFRS] and their equivalents, which provide legal guidance in the 
preparation of financial reports.41  The influence of law continues to develop as much 
accounting works “within particular legal structures” (Napier & Noke, 1992, p. 31): 
financial reporting, tax, audit, trusteeship, and insolvency require knowledge of relevant 
law. Law’s role in shaping accounting is reinforced through education: e.g. to qualify 
for chartered accountancy in NZ accounting students must study commercial law 
(contract and company law). 
 
Accounting is a common source of information in legal disputes and is a 
powerful media of expression. Consequently the interrelationship between the 
disciplines increases in significance (Napier & Noke, 1992, p. 30). There are two trends 
in law’s use of accounting: 1) aspects of law and accounting compete, intersect or 
overlap: e.g. tax, industrial relations, auditor’s liability, and perhaps intellectual 
property; and 2) many legal processes require a wide range of accounting information to 
function, e.g. in contract, conveyance, banking, company law, insurance, and torts. In 
legal processes, accounting information plays important roles in the law of trusts, 
partnerships and companies; criminal prosecutions (especially fraud); negligence 
(damages); insurance, competition, consumer, insolvency, and banking law; 
matrimonial property, contracts, property valuation, employment law (collective 
                                                 
41
 Parliament reserves the right under s 33 of the Financial Reporting Act 1993, subject to the Regulations 
(Disallowance) Act 1989, to disallow any approved financial reporting standard or to overturn a 
decision of the ASRB to revoke a previously approved NZIFRS. The right to overrule has not been 
exercised.  
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bargaining), and even public law (such as State Owned Enterprises and public funds) 
(Hadden & Boyd, 1992, p. 58). Thus, law increasingly requires accounting information. 
 
Although the interface continues to grow, law rarely passes direct judgment 
upon accounting, its processes or information. For commentators, irrespective of the 
apparent simple marriage of the two disciplines, the root of conflict between the 
disciplines arises from the subordination of accounting to law (Hadden & Boyd, 1992, 
p. 57; Napier & Noke, 1992, pp. 31-32). Given the law’s power to interrogate and 
adjudicate, its lack of interrogation and judgment concerning accounting is striking. 
Although an over-simplification, the legal process does not adjust to accounting 
information but rather law imposes its own framework and language around accounting: 
e.g. regarding auditor’s liability the courts impose the common law framework of 
negligent misstatement (duty of care, breach of the duty of care, and damages) not the 
auditing language of significant error (Atkin et al, 2002). Within this framework, the 
legal process appears uncomfortable with notions of the auditor expectation gap,42 
applying its own framework of negligence: reasonableness, proximity, and 
foreseeability (Atkin et al, 2002). However, whilst recognising the reluctance of law to 
interrogate accounting information, there is little foundation to Hadden and Boyd’s 
claim of ‘subordination’ of accounting to law: both are respected, well regarded 
professions.43 Historically, socially, culturally, and politically the disciplines are 
important and powerful, affecting the day-to-day life of citizens. Although their subject 
matter differs, their practice is similar (Moore, 1991, pp. 765-766), revolving around 
debate and opinion concerning a primary source: for law, legislation, case-based 
precedent, or a legal doctrine; for accounting, an accounting standard, accepted, or 
                                                 
42
 See Chapter four for further discussion of the auditing expectation gap and the discussion of Napier’s 
work below. 
 
43
 This thesis is not directly concerned with the vast array of professional or professions literature (see 
Gerboth, 1973; May & Sundem, 1976; Dyckman & Zeff, 1984; Hines, 1988; Hines, 1991; Collison, 
2003). 
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suggested practice. Remarkably, as the next section demonstrates, despite practical and 
theoretical similarities between the disciplines, there is a limited literature on the 
interface of law and accounting.  
 
C Insights on the Interface between Law and Accounting 
 
A limited body of research on law and accounting considers the boundaries of 
the interface, primarily focusing on practice (e.g. Moore & Sussman, 1931; Moore, 
1991; Freedman & Power, 1992; Bromwich & Hopwood, 1992; Laughlin & Broadbent, 
1993; Gangolly & Hussein, 1996; Power & Laughlin, 1996; Napier, 1998; McCrudden, 
1999; Preston & Vesey, 2008). Four areas of work examining the interface of the 
disciplines deserve especial attention.  
 
First, Bromwich and Hopwood’s edited collection of essays on the interaction 
between accounting and law (1992)44 is exploratory, focusing on accounting regulation. 
Although interdisciplinary with work by legal and accounting academics and 
practitioners, little is done on identifying interconnecting or explanatory theory or 
critiquing interaction between the two disciplines. The chapters by Bromwich and 
Hopwood and Hadden and Boyd discuss the pragmatic intertwining of the professions, 
with Napier and Noke considering the historical relationship between accounting and 
law, tracing the growth, compatibility and close ‘working relationship’ between the 
professions. In noting that, “the respective claims of the accountants and lawyers to 
professional expertise have been expanding, bringing the professions into increasing 
commercial rivalry” they argue that:  
Conflict has arisen as accountants, aware that their subordination to law may have 
an inhibiting effect on the development of accounting, have appealed to alternative 
paradigms for their theories (Napier & Noke, 1992, p. 31). 
 
                                                 
44
 Twelve of the thirteen essays were originally prepared and presented at the Sixth Deloitte Haskins and 
Sells and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales Accounting and Auditing 
Research Symposium, held on 26 and 27 September 1988 at the London School of Economics. 
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There is tension about the source of rules for corporate financial disclosure: a tension 
between legally regulated accounting and internally regulated accounting. There is also 
dispute over the role of the auditor, as law ignores auditing codes of conduct, practice, 
and ethics, imposing a ‘duty of care’ and civil damages for negligence (Napier and 
Noke, 1992, pp. 31-32). 
 
Second, Napier’s 1998 historical study differs from the plethora of auditor’s 
liability work by considering the interface of the disciplines in the attribution of liability 
with reference to the UK case, Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL 
Eng). Napier considers how historical change and the development of accounting and 
auditing influenced the law on auditor’s liability, noting the changing role of the 
company (1998, p. 112). Napier depicts two alternative models of the company: 
‘concession theory’ and the ‘business company’. In analysing Caparo, the decision 
reinforces concession theory, where a company is ‘no more than its members’.45 Napier 
argues that the ‘crisis in auditor’s liability needs a solution’, as auditors are effectively 
open to unlimited liability.46 In general, Napier’s framework provides a useful source 
for analysing the regulation of utilities by illustrating the impact of different judicial 
influences on accounting information. The act of adjudication is practically and 
theoretically influenced by conceptions of the firm. 
 
Third, there is literature on the Habermasian doctrine of juridification, which is: 
a process in which human conflicts are torn through formalization out of their 
living context and distorted by being subjected to legal processes (Habermas, 
1986, p. 203). 
 
This concerns laws’ continued capture of social relationships (beyond the scope of the 
modern welfare State). For Habermas, there are stages (‘thrusts’) of juridification: 1) the 
                                                 
45
 This rejects the ‘business company’ model, which characterises shareholders as transient, solely 
interested in their investment and less interested in the company per se.  
 
46
 Napier is incorrect with respect to the unlimited liability thesis. Liability is limited, in the fashion of the 
seminal case of Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465 (HL Eng), as the UK position for auditor’s 
liability requires an auditor’s direct unqualified advice and reliance.  
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bourgeois State; 2) the bourgeois constitutional State; 3) the democratic constitutional 
State; and 4) the Social Welfare State (Habermas, 1986, pp. 205-209). Juridification is 
relevant as it theorises the proliferation of law, judicial expropriation of conflict, the de-
politicisation of society, and law’s incessant introduction to social institutions including 
accounting (Teubner, 1986, p. 24). Miller comments that: 
The ubiquitous process of juridification in the modern industrial society has, at the 
same time, led to a judicialisation, not only in matters of the state, but in all social 
relationships … (Miller, 2004, p. 587). 
 
 
The Habermasian concern is not the increasing role of legal institutions in a 
juridified society but the shift of policy-making authority from political, democratic 
representatives to an unaccountable, unrepresentative judiciary (Teubner, 1986, p. 24). 
Hence, Laughlin and Broadbent claim the increased use of law tied to accounting 
moulds social systems, such as in the public sector, i.e. legislation constitutes 
“juridification at work” (1993). They look at the political use of law in ‘active 
partnership’ with accounting in health and education legislative reform and how this 
coupling extends the influences of both. Here law and accounting work for a common 
purpose.  
 
Finally, Preston and Vesey’s historical narrative concerning US utility 
regulation and the electricity industry from 1882 to 1944 (2008) is an important turn in 
the study of the interface of law and accounting. The three-phase study first examines 
the challenges for engineers in understanding the complexity of ‘cost’ in generating and 
distributing electricity, before moving to study how entrepreneurs then used this 
‘institutional accounting’ knowledge to dominate the early US electricity market. The 
final phase is important in its analysis of how accounting became the centre of conflict 
between regulators and regulatees in the US courts. The analysis of a series of 
regulatory judgments, which began by recognising the ‘information primacy of 
accounting’, culminates with a 1944 Supreme Court ruling displacing accounting in 
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favour of regulatory economics. In Preston and Vesey’s analysis, this decision resulted 
in accounting being taken-for-granted and matter-of-fact. This is a unique turn in the 
literature as it takes as its starting point that accounting, law, and regulation in 
combination shape utility regulation as opposed to merely reflecting regulatory 
processes. However, although there is little attention on the ‘politics’ between the 
disciplines of law, accounting, and economics, the paper provides a solid platform for 
the analysis that this thesis undertakes. 
 
Thus, there are three lessons to draw from this. First, law and accounting are 
intertwined; second, the interface is pragmatic and theoretical; and finally, both 
disciplines pragmatically and theoretically learn from the interface between them. 
Before analysing the interface between law and accounting it is necessary to 
demonstrate the centrality of accounting (particularly cost) in telecommunications 
regulation in NZ.  
 
III THE INTERFACE OF LAW AND ACCOUNTING IN THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 2001  
 
The TA makes accounting a vital component in regulating telecommunications, 
especially in resolving interconnection access and monitoring TSO compliance. In 
particular, the regulatory regime establishes cost as the primary control mechanism 
(through TSLRIC and net costing of the TSO). 
 
A Accounting Information in the Telecommunications Act 2001: 
Methodological, Technical, and Political Issues 
1 The Extent of Accounting Information in Regulating Interconnection Access  
 
The Act specifies that competitors must be able to interconnect with competing 
networks. An access seeker may apply to the Commissioner to determine 
interconnection terms with Telecom’s fixed PSTN “in the event” that they cannot 
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commercially negotiate an interconnection agreement. Section 45 prescribes 
benchmarking interconnection prices with comparable countries that use ‘forward-
looking cost-based pricing method’ as an initial pricing principle, with TSLRIC as the 
final pricing principle. 
 
Consequently, the role for accounting information is extensive at 
methodological, technical, and political levels: e.g. parties disputed the meaning of 
‘benchmarking’ and ‘comparable countries’ and how to calculate a ‘benchmark’, while 
at a practical level they disputed how costing information should be presented (i.e. 
averaged or de-averaged). Parties disagreed methodologically as to what factors should 
be included in a TSLRIC model and how TSLRIC should be calculated (as a bottom-up 
or top-down model). Practically, there was debate over cost information for 
maintenance and switching, costs of capital and carriage, and the Commissioner’s final 
price determinations.  
2  Accounting Information in Wholesaling  
 
Wholesaling is the “sale of telecommunications services at a discounted or 
wholesale price to other telecommunication services suppliers who then resell them to 
customers” (MIT, 2000d, p. 121). Access seekers can purchase retail services deemed 
“designated” from Telecom at a “wholesale” rate. The Commissioner determines the 
terms of the wholesaling agreement (including price) if the parties cannot negotiate an 
agreement. Consequently, accurate and detailed accounting information is vital. 
Generally, pricing for these services is “retail minus wholesale discount” (reflecting net 
costs saved). Accounting information and ‘economic efficiency’ determine the retail 
price on which the discount is based (either average or best price for the service).  
3 Accounting Information in Regulating the Telecommunications Service 
Obligation  
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Part III mandates annual ‘costing’ of the TSO’s compliance costs. Accounting 
plays an important role in determining the ‘net cost’ of providing the TSO obligation by 
the TSO provider; competitor liability for the ‘net cost’ of the TSO based on market 
share, revenue, and turnover; and in calculating amounts payable by liable persons, 
implicating accounting methodologically, technically, and politically, as demonstrated 
in disputes over the type of costing model. Interested parties argued between Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital [WACC] and various Capital Asset Pricing Models [CAPM], 
and the ‘cost of compliance’. At a technical level, when the Commission chose a 
“simplified CAPM model” for costing the TSO, there was considerable disagreement 
over appropriate rates of WACC, cost of debt and equity, and the beta equity of capital 
to be applied.47 Finally, after releasing the ‘net cost’ of satisfying the TSO, industry 
participants disagreed over the costing.  
 
This brief survey of accounting in telecommunications regulation highlights its 
important role, and how it takes numerous methodological, technical, and political 
forms regarding evidential information, ‘accounting’ policy choices, and presentation. 
Consequently, the next section examines the emergence of accounting as the central 
regulatory tool in interconnection and the TSO and the arguments that the Government 
and its agents presented for this. 
 
IV WHY INSTITUTE COST-BASED REGULATION FOR 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: TSLRIC FOR INTERCONNECTION AND 
‘NET COSTING’ FOR THE TSO? 
 
Chapter two identified three key issues surrounding the re-regulation of 
telecommunications: the light-handed regulatory system; interconnection; and the KSO. 
In effect, the Government sought to re-regulate interconnection and the KSO through a 
combination of law and accounting, using a TSLRIC interconnection pricing model and 
                                                 
47
 See Appendix 3 for a breakdown of the accounting information required in the TSO process. This 
illustrates the complexity and centrality of the role of accounting information.  
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net costing for the TSO. But how and why was accounting implicated? This section 
traces the emergence of the proposed ‘re-regulatory’ measures (in the form of cost-
based accounting regulation) to ‘solve’ the fundamental ‘failures’ that emerged from the 
light-handed regulatory period by examining the functioning of the MIT.48 Following an 
‘open’ inquiry into telecommunications the MIT was quick to focus on interconnection 
and the KSO as the primary regulatory issues, marking the emergence of accounting 
and ‘cost’ as a mechanism considered appropriate for regulation. 
 
A The Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications  
 
The Government established the MIT with a broad ambit and a promise of an 
open inquiry. The publication of the MIT’s Issues Paper challenged this openness and 
constricted the scope of the debate. It was the first comprehensive assessment of the 
Government’s objective for telecommunications and it confined the scope of regulatory 
conversation and pre-empted key elements of the final regulatory proposal. The ensuing 
analysis identifies key moments during the MIT when cost and accounting emerged as 
recommended mechanisms for telecommunications regulation.  
1 Establishing the Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications: The 
Government’s Objective and the Terms of Reference 
 
On 23 February 2000, Trevor Mallard, Acting Minister of Communications, 
announced the institution of the MIT noting the importance of effective 
telecommunications in NZ. Mallard announced the Government’s objective for 
telecommunications:  
… to ensure that the regulatory environment delivers cost efficient, timely, and 
innovative telecommunications services on an ongoing, fair and equitable basis to 
all existing and potential users (MIT, 2000a, p. 1). 
 
Mallard distanced the Government from a commitment to particular reforms by 
reinforcing the openness and independence of the MIT: 
                                                 
48
 This overview of the MIT, from establishment to conclusion, provides important context for the 
empirical material in Chapter seven. 
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… New Zealand’s approach to telecommunications regulation is different from 
that adopted elsewhere in the world. We need to evaluate whether our current 
regulatory approach is in the best interests of New Zealanders for the future, and, 
if not what changes need to be made ... The Inquiry process will be open. I urge 
telecommunications consumers and the industry to make good use of the 
opportunity to make their views known (Mallard, 2000).  
 
The MIT’s terms of reference concentrated on the “communications revolution” as the 
genesis for regulating telecommunications rather than pointing to failures of the light-
handed framework:  
The world is experiencing a communications revolution … New Zealand must 
position itself to meet the challenge of this revolution … The telecommunications 
industry is of vital importance to the development of the information-based 
economy … The ability of new telecommunications networks to interconnect 
fairly and efficiently with existing networks is critical to the development of 
competition (MIT, 2000a, p. 1). 
 
Mallard appointed Hugh Fletcher, the former Chief Executive of Fletcher 
Challenge,49 to head the MIT, with fellow Inquiry members Allan Asher, Deputy Chair 
of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [ACCC] and Cathie 
Harrison, a competition lawyer. The MIT received a broad ambit: 
[t]he Inquiry was established to assess the regulatory regime for 
telecommunications, and recommend any changes. It has been asked to investigate 
and include particular comment on a range of issues, including:  
 
• the environment for telecommunications network access and interconnection, 
including Telecom’s 0867 initiative;  
• the development of an information economy;  
• the Kiwi Share obligations; and  
• numbering (MIT, 2000a, p. 2). 
 
On 9 March 2000, Fletcher announced the timetable for the MIT. Table 3.1 details the 
MIT’s timeline for submissions and reports.  
                                                 
49
 Historically, Fletcher Challenge was one of New Zealand’s largest companies. Fletcher is a well-
recognised and respected businessman in New Zealand. 
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Table 3.1: The Ministerial Inquiry Timeline of Submissions and Reports 
DATE EVENT 
7 April 2000 Issues Paper: Review of terms of reference; Identification of issues for 
submission and proposed solutions. 
5 May 2000 Due: Submissions on the Issues Paper, which “will provide a key input 
into the … Draft Report”. 
30 June 2000 Draft Report: Analysis of solutions for issues identified in the Issues 
Paper.  
24 July 2000 Posted: Submissions on MIT’s Website:  
28 July 2000 Due: Submissions on Draft Report, which “will provide a key input into 
the … Final Report”. 
9 August 2000 Due: Public comments on Draft Report Submissions 
11 August 2000 Posted: Comments on submissions. 
14 August – 1 
September 2000 
Public Hearings: For interested stakeholders (Auckland, Wellington, and 
Christchurch) 
29 September 
2000 
Final Report to Minister of Communications: Recommendation for 
telecommunications regulation.  
 
The MIT’s first step was to publish the Issues Paper, which outlined the core regulatory 
issues: it reinforced the centrality of regulation and cost. 
 
2 Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunication: Issues Paper: 7 April 2000 
 
The Issues Paper reviewed the terms of reference and identified particular issues 
confronting telecommunications regulation. The MIT commented on the Government’s 
objective for telecommunications: 
The Inquiry takes ‘cost-efficient’ to mean that telecommunications services are 
produced at the lowest cost and delivered to consumers at the lowest sustainable 
price. ‘Timely’ is taken to mean the absence of barriers that would impede the 
implementation and uptake of innovative telecommunications services. 
 
The requirement that these services be delivered on an ‘ongoing’ basis has 
important implications. The Inquiry takes this to mean that regulation should be 
forward-looking, robust, durable and consistent over time, and not sacrifice long-
term gains for short-term considerations … In achieving this, an important 
consideration is how the cost associated with meeting this objective is met, and by 
whom (MIT, 2000b, p. 7). 
  
Consequently, the MIT introduced two key concepts that framed the ensuing debate: 
‘robust’ and ‘cost’. The MIT focused on several regulatory issues including the KSO, 
but emphasised the centrality of interconnection for effective telecommunications: 
… [Interconnection] is critical so that customers on different networks can 
communicate with each other … Comprehensive, timely, efficiently priced 
interconnection with the incumbent’s telecommunications facilities is essential to 
enabling competitors to enter the market on a viable basis and deliver a high 
standard of services to consumers (MIT, 2000b, p. 13). 
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After outlining the approach to interconnection under light-handed regulation (including 
Telecom v Clear), the MIT outlined approaches to regulating interconnection pricing: 
Different Regulatory Approaches 
 
… World-wide, investments in telecommunications networks are proceeding on a 
massive scale … The regulatory framework is a key determinant of the extent and 
efficiency of investment. In particular, interconnection prices play an important 
role in ensuring optimal investment. If they are set ‘too high’, they may encourage 
inefficient investment in network infrastructure. If they are ‘too low’, they may 
discourage efficient investment. If interconnection prices are regulated, it is 
important that they are set at a level that avoids these problems. This requires 
appropriate pricing principles, good information, and effective implementation 
(MIT, 2000b, pp. 7-8). 
 
… Negotiated interconnection prices can take some of the following forms:  
 
• payments for terminating and originating calls;  
• bill and keep - each operator keeps the revenue from its own customers;  
• revenue sharing - the operators share set proportions of the revenue from all 
calls;  
• wholesale prices - the incumbent charges the entrant its retail prices less a 
discount; and  
• cost-based - prices are set to cover costs and a return on capital. 
 
There is, today, widespread international agreement that interconnection prices are 
most economically efficient if they are based on costs and are forward-looking. 
The final price would also include a mark-up to recover a reasonable share of an 
efficient operator’s joint and common costs. Such an approach must, however, 
build on a range of judgements and assumptions. It is also demanding in terms of 
the data it requires (MIT, 2000b, pp. 13-14). 
 
Consequently, the Issues Paper established ‘cost-based’ regulation as the most common 
and appropriate regulatory measure for interconnection, reinforcing the focus on cost:50 
… 
3. What regulatory developments in other countries should the Inquiry consider? 
What constitutes best practice? 
4. Would these need to be modified to allow for factors specific to the New 
Zealand environment? (MIT, 2000b, p. 8). 
… 
6. Does the current regulatory regime meet the Government’s objective for the 
telecommunications services market? If the current regulatory regime will not 
achieve the Government's objective, what amendments to the policy and 
regulatory framework are needed in order to achieve the Government's 
objective? (MIT, 2000b, p. 10). 
… 
13. What different means are there of establishing interconnection terms and 
conditions? Which of these means is the most efficient? 
14. Is there a need for regulation of pricing principles and other terms and 
conditions (such as service quality standards) for interconnection? If so, what 
principles? 
15. Should access prices be symmetrical between providers and identical across 
all providers? 
16. Should pricing principles include a specific pricing rule (e.g. Total Service 
Long Run Incremental Costs)? (MIT, 2000b, p. 14) 
                                                 
50
 There were 55 questions in total. 
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Thus, cost and interconnection shaped the regulatory agenda early in the MIT’s 
process.  
 
The KSO was different, as cost-based regulation received little consideration 
from the MIT. With respect to the KSO the MIT’s terms of reference were broad:  
Whether the Kiwi Share Obligations are the best means of meeting the 
Government’s objective for residential telephone consumers and facilitating the 
ongoing delivery of telecommunications services, and if not what alternative 
arrangements should be put in place (MIT, 2000a, p. 3). 
 
Consequently, the Issues Paper included extensive coverage of elements of the KSO 
including level of coverage, free local calls, static line rental charges, the Internet, 
effects on telecommunications, and social welfare implications. However, it appeared 
that cost-based regulation was not on the MIT’s agenda: 
The Inquiry is concerned to establish the minimum level of telecommunications 
services that should be available to all New Zealanders to meet the social 
objectives of the community for an information economy. Universal service 
obligations are part of most countries’ telecommunications regulatory regime. 
Without such obligations, some services in some areas could be compromised or 
not provided, because they may not be sufficiently profitable in a purely 
commercial environment (MIT, 2000b, p. 10).  
  
Of the MIT questions concerning the ‘KSO’ the questions focused on social welfare and 
the Government’s objectives for telecommunications, except for question 34, which 
mentioned funding: 
34. Should geographic price averaging continue to be the underpinning of a 
universal service obligation? If not, how should the obligation be funded? 
(MIT, 2000b, pp. 24-25). 
 
The MIT indicated no interest in cost-based regulation for the KSO. From the 
beginning it signalled that cost was a necessary mechanism for regulating 
interconnection but not for the KSO. This directly affected submissions on the Issues 
Paper.51 The Inquiry received 64 submissions from interested stakeholders including 
                                                 
51
 The Issues Paper and Draft Report submissions form an important part of the empirical analysis in 
Chapter Seven. 
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industry participants, interest groups, economists, accountants, lawyers, consultants, 
and the general public.52 
3 Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications: Draft Report: 29 June 2000  
 
The most intriguing aspect of the Draft Report, released on 29 June 2000, was 
the MIT’s apparent shift from supporting TSLRIC interconnection to supporting a ‘bill 
and keep’ methodology: 
In the Inquiry’s view, the most desirable approach to interconnection is ‘bill and 
keep’, where each network provider bills their own customers and keeps the 
revenue. Bill and keep is simple, and it avoids the need to enter into negotiations 
over an interconnection price. Implicit in the bill and keep approach is recognition 
by each operator that, over time, their costs will be roughly equal and, thus, there 
is no point in paying each other on a regular basis. 
 
Bill and keep is used in other countries … Given the possibility that payments may 
not be balanced over time, bill and keep may not be appropriate for all 
interconnection agreements …  
 
TSLRIC pricing, widely supported by leading academic research and best practice 
regulation, is sometimes referred to as calculating interconnection prices on the 
basis of “forward-looking costs”. Such costs would include the direct costs of 
supplying the services, including the capital costs, as well as a share of common 
costs that are related to supplying the services in the long term … of an efficient 
operator. 
 
As a number of submissions pointed out, cost-based models (e.g. TSLRIC) are 
complex and take considerable time to build. In addition, they require numerous 
assumptions on which there can be legitimate differences of opinion. Thus, not 
only can cost-based modelling be expensive and take considerable time to 
complete, but agreement about the appropriate interconnection price can be 
difficult (MIT, 2000c, pp. 31). 
 
Consequently, the Draft Report maintained the focus on cost, but indicated a shift in 
interconnection methodology.  
 
The Draft Report recommended that Telecom should not be able to recoup the 
costs of the KSO over and above the access cost charged to competitors. The report 
centred on defining the parameters of the KSO by considering access deficits and 
Telecom’s cost recovery as KSO provider: 
An access deficit arises when revenues from line-related services (e.g. fees from 
connecting customers and from line rentals) are insufficient to recover line-related 
costs. 
… 
                                                 
52
 See Appendix 5 for a list of all submitters to the MIT and the Commerce select committee. 
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In New Zealand, there are no legislated constraints on line charges for non-
residential customers but there are on residential customers through the Kiwi 
Share, which limits the monthly line rental charge. The Kiwi Share also requires 
Telecom to originate local calls from residences without charge and therefore 
prevents Telecom from recovering call-related costs for residential local calls.  
… 
Having regard to these factors … it would appear that the Kiwi Share price 
limitation creates, or is likely to create, an access deficit for only a small 
proportion of residential users … In acquiring Telecom when it was privatised, 
shareholders accepted this contingent liability, and subsequent purchasers have 
also. This exposure is undoubtedly offset by investors against the actual and 
contingent benefits of Telecom being the incumbent operator, such as those arising 
from ubiquity, the brand, customer inertia and the directories business.  
… 
The Inquiry notes that, in 1997, the United Kingdom telecommunications regulator 
(OFTEL) determined that British Telecom bore no undue financial burden as a 
result of its universal service obligation. OFTEL decided not to establish any 
funding mechanism for the universal service obligation on the basis that the 
benefits to British Telecom of being the incumbent operator (e.g. ubiquity and 
brand enhancement) were comparable with the estimated costs of providing 
universal service … In considering designation of Telecom’s interconnection 
services, the Inquiry’s preliminary view is that Telecom should not be able to 
recover, in its charges for designated services, any cost for which it would not 
receive incremental revenue through providing the incremental service directly 
itself, rather than through a competitor (MIT, 2000c, pp. 49-50).  
 
The MIT concluded the KSO commentary with the question: “Do you agree Telecom 
should absorb any access deficit?” (MIT, 2000c, p. 50). Costs and the KSO entered the 
agenda but the MIT showed reluctance to consider cost-recovery mechanisms. The MIT 
sought further comment, receiving 55 submissions on the Draft Report, and two cross-
submissions from Clear Communications and Vodafone. The Inquiry scheduled public 
hearings and heard from 36 interested parties representing a broad constituency. The 
MIT delivered the final 131-page report on 27 September 2000 recommending 
regulatory reform.   
4  Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications: Final Report: 27 September 2000 
 
The Final Report reinforced the MIT’s commitment to cost-based regulation for 
interconnection. However, in a further switch, the MIT argued that the default 
regulatory pricing model should be TSLRIC, noting support from leading academics 
and ‘best practice regulation’. In recognising the complexity of TSLRIC pricing, the 
MIT recommended benchmarking of OECD countries that regulate “using a TSLRIC 
type methodology” for an initial determination, commenting that: 
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… a benchmarking approach would give a range of prices that could be ranked 
from lowest to highest by country or, as in the United States, by operator/state. A 
judgement would then be required as to where New Zealand should, at any time, 
fit with the ranking. The Inquiry recommends that this judgment be made by the 
Commissioner on the basis of his/her best estimate of where New Zealand would 
fall if a full TSLRIC assessment were undertaken … (MIT, 2000d, p. 68). 
 
After acknowledging the issue of KSO provision and cost, the MIT’s Final 
Report recommended the maintenance of the existing KSO with no cost recoupment: 
Telecom’s interconnection prices should not include a contribution to any losses 
arising from the Kiwi Share obligations … The proviso in the existing Kiwi Share, 
that residential line rentals should be capped unless overall profitability is 
‘unreasonably impaired’, remains an appropriate mechanism for addressing any 
concerns that Telecom may have over the cost of the Kiwi Share obligations.53 
The Inquiry considers that Telecom would not be able to establish such a case 
today (MIT, 2000d, p. 5). 
 
The MIT provided a detailed discussion of the ‘costs’ of the Kiwi Share, noting that:  
 
Some submissions argued that it is not appropriate that Telecom continue to bear 
the full burden of meeting the costs associated with a USO. Other submissions, 
however, considered that it would not be appropriate to release Telecom from its 
Kiwi Share obligations ‘for free’ since this would confer a windfall gain on 
Telecom’s shareholders (MIT, 2000d, p. 83). 
… 
The Kiwi Share limits increases in the monthly line rental for residential 
customers. The Kiwi Share also requires Telecom to provide an option whereby 
local calls can be originated from residences without charge and therefore prevents 
Telecom from recovering call-related costs for residential local calls … For any 
individual residential access line, these constraints involve a net cost for Telecom 
when the revenue generated by the line is insufficient to recover the costs of 
maintaining that line and paying any interconnection charges arising from that 
line. Such loss-making lines are not necessarily restricted to rural areas. 
… 
Under recent information disclosure obligations Telecom will shortly be releasing 
an estimate of the losses it incurs in performing its Kiwi Share obligations in loss 
making areas. A preliminary estimate provided by Telecom is around $100 million 
per annum. This has been calculated by Telecom using the methodology in the 
disclosure regulations, which excludes some revenue derived from customers of 
Telecom’s fixed local-loop network. The estimate also includes a return on capital 
that may have no recoverable value if Telecom abandoned its customers in loss 
making areas. The $100 million may therefore be seen as an upper estimate of the 
amount by which Telecom could increase its annual pre-tax profit in the complete 
absence of the KSO. Currently, except for a contribution from interconnection 
revenue related to fixed and common costs, Telecom’s shareholders absorb 
whatever KSO loss there is … It should be noted that, even if the KSO cost was 
industry funded or recovered through access charges and there was no pass on to 
retail prices, Telecom would still at this time bear the majority of the costs due to 
its size in the market. 
… 
                                                 
53
 In acquiring Telecom when it was privatised, the Telecom shareholders accepted the KSO as part of the 
business of Telecom. At the time of purchase, though, an “out-clause” was negotiated, termed the 
“unreasonable impairment clause”. The clause reads: 
  
 Telecom will charge no more than the standard residential rental … provided that overall profitability 
of the subsidiary regional operating companies, as evidenced by their audited accounts, is not 
unreasonably impaired (MIT, 2000d, p. 88). 
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Having regard to these factors the Inquiry recommends that Telecom remain 
responsible for the Kiwi Share obligations and bear their cost until it can prove 
unreasonable impairment. The Inquiry also recommends that Telecom should be 
precluded from recovering any element of KSO losses in the supply of any of its 
services (MIT, 2000d, pp. 87-89). 
 
Following the release of the Final Report and subsequent tabling in Parliament, the 
Government prepared a response. The next section considers events in Parliament 
leading to the passing of the TA. 
5 The Government’s Response to the Final Report of the Ministerial Inquiry into 
Telecommunications 
 
The Government published its response to the MIT’s Final Report on 20 
December 2000. Paul Swain, Minister for Communications, commented that: 
The new regime is forward looking. It concentrates on tomorrow’s solutions rather 
than yesterday’s problems. What we are announcing is designed to bring greater 
certainty, investment, competition, opportunity and consumer benefit … I believe 
we have come up with a world leading piece of work (Swain, 2000a). 
 
The Government accepted many MIT suggestions, particularly the recommendation for 
cost-based regulation of interconnection agreements: 
 The pricing principles to apply are: 
 
- the cost-based pricing principle for interconnection with Telecom’s network 
will be total service long run incremental cost (TSLRIC); 
 
- the price for interconnection with the other network will the price of 
interconnection with Telecom’s network corresponding most closely to the 
nature of the other network (e.g. urban, rural); or a TSLRIC model; or bill and 
keep (where no payments are exchanged), if appropriate. 
 
- where TSLRIC interconnection prices are required, each network will 
undertake its own modelling to estimate the price for interconnection with its 
network, with the Telecommunications Commissioner having the power to set 
the price (Swain, 2000a, p. 4). 
 
However, there are differences between the MIT’s and the Government’s 
proposed regulatory plans regarding the KSO. Despite the MIT insisting that the 
existing disclosure regime was sufficient, the Government proposed cost-recoupment 
regulation, based on annual net costing:  
 Net costs of the Kiwi Share obligations 
  
• Telecom will carry out an initial costing of the Kiwi Share obligations in 
accordance with a robust and transparent costing methodology (including auditing 
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and consultation with interested parties). The Telecommunications Commissioner 
will make a final determination on the level of any net operating costs. 
 
 Industry contribution to any net costs 
 
• Telecom and other firms connected to Telecom’s fixed network will contribute to 
any net operating costs of the Kiwi Share obligations.  
 
• The level of each industry member’s contribution will be determined by the 
Telecommunications Commissioner in accordance with an appropriate 
methodology, based on a share of relevant telecommunications revenue streams 
including mobile, long distance, data and local access. Approved shares will be 
recoverable by Telecom as a debt from other companies (Swain, 2000a, pp. 6-7). 
 
In a section entitled “Telecommunications: Questions and Answers”, the Government 
stated: 
 Why should industry contribute to the Kiwi Share costs? 
Industry will only be contributing to net Kiwi Share costs if it is established that 
there are any costs (using a robust costing process). Industry currently contributes 
to the costs through a premium on interconnection. The proposed mechanism will 
replace this. It will be more transparent and competitively neutral, and will give 
the Telecommunications Commissioner the final decision over the calculation of 
costs and cost contributions. It is also linked to the enforcement mechanism, as the 
Commissioner will be able to withhold the industry contribution if Telecom fails 
to meet its Kiwi Share obligations (Swain, 2000a, p. 8). 
 
The Telecommunications Bill was read for the first time in Parliament on 9 May 
2001 where it was sent to the Commerce select committee for consideration. In 
Parliament, Swain stated that: 
This is a watershed day for the telecommunications industry and consumers in 
New Zealand. It is a pioneering, forward-looking piece of legislation that 
concentrates on tomorrow’s solutions rather than yesterday’s problems, and is 
designed to bring greater certainty, investment, competition, opportunity, and 
consumer benefit ... (Hansard, 9 May 2001). 
 
The select committee received 31 submissions from interested parties. Following 
hearings, the select committee proposed a series of amendments to the Bill and tabled 
its report in Parliament on 18 September 2001, with the Bill receiving its second 
reading. The Commerce Select Committee chairperson, David Cunliffe MP, stated: 
It is with some pride that this bill comes back for its second reading today. It is a 
big bill, it is a complex bill, and it is a bill on which I think industry has lobbied 
more heavily than any other bill that I can remember in recent times … The 
Minister has been able to bring along with this bill, up to this point at least, most 
of the industry (Hansard, 18 September, 2001). 
 
With the Bill passing its third reading in Parliament on 18 December 2001, the 
Telecommunications Bill became an Act of Parliament encapsulating the regulatory 
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interface between law and cost accounting. Therefore, this invites analysis of the 
interface of law and accounting, which should reveal: 
a) How law and accounting work together? This thesis investigates this by 
examining the emergence of cost as a regulatory technology. Specifically, 
it continues to examine why TSLRIC for interconnection pricing and net 
costing for the TSO became the legislated regulation method; and 
 
b) Complexities and protocols surrounding the presentation, comprehension, 
and use of accounting information in the regulatory environment, and the 
capabilities of the regulatory environment to ‘handle’ the complexities of 
conflicting accounting information. This involves examining the rhetorical 
tools implicated in the presentation and use of accounting information by 
accountants, lawyers, and regulators. 
 
Hence, the thesis considers the interface of law and accounting in relation to cost 
theory.54 The following section illustrates that the wholesale adoption of cost as a 
regulatory mechanism is problematic. First, the term ‘cost’ is examined, then the 
technical and methodological challenges of costing within telecommunications, and 
finally, cost is considered from economic and socially constructed perspectives.  
 
V THEORY OF COST 
 
Cost is vital in modern discourse: cost, like accounting, is all around us, shaping 
many aspects of life including life itself, food, clothes, houses, travel, and relationships. 
Management accounting education focuses on cost concepts, classifications, and 
techniques, rather than ‘cost’ itself. However, cost is an intriguing concept, often taken-
for-granted. It is rare to stop and consider what is cost? How is cost measured? What is 
measured? What is excluded? 
 
A What is a Cost? 
 
Most management accounting textbooks state that cost provides a measure of 
“economic sacrifice”:  
                                                 
54
 The thesis focuses on ‘cost’ in regulation as opposed to some other accounting measure. The NZ 
regime heavily relies on costing information. While revenue and other accounting measures could be 
valid tools for inquiry, the sheer weight placed on cost is intriguing. 
 - 87 - 
Cost is the cash or cash equivalent value sacrificed for goods and services that are 
expected to bring a current or future benefit to the firm (Hansen & Mowen, 1994, 
p. 213).  
 
At an enterprise level, cost is relatively straightforward, as markets and legal 
transactions tend to provide the boundaries for identifying cost. However, cost becomes 
more complicated in relation to products, developments, divisions, and departments: 
e.g. consider the cost of training a telephone operator: at one level the cost is traceable 
as the costs paid for providing training but at a departmental level the allocation of the 
training cost becomes more complex, as the operator may contribute to several products 
and services. In telecommunications similar examples abound, involving the costs of 
developing and maintaining networks, engineers, product development, software, and 
marketing.  
1 Complexities of Cost and Telecommunications: Cost in Context 
 
Telecommunications provides a rich environment for considering the 
complexities of cost, as the (economic) telecommunications costing literature illustrates 
(see, Ergas, 1998; Kahn, 1988; Gasmi et al, 2002). In particular, interdependencies, 
shared services, and non-market relationships create challenges regarding joint and 
common costs, transfer pricing, and cost allocation and apportionment. These pose 
difficulties to any utilities regulatory system, and specifically telecommunications due 
to extensive ‘cost allocations’ of joint and common costs (Bromwich & Hong, 2000; 
Covaleski et al, 2003; Major & Hopper 2005).  
(a)  Joint and Common Costs: Choice and Arbitrariness 
 
Joint costs are shared costs resulting from the production of multiple products or 
services via common technology (such as Telecom’s PSTN).  Common costs are shared 
costs resulting from products or services being produced jointly, but in variable 
proportions. Common costs often are unattributable indirect fixed costs, that are 
incurred in common for all services supplied by the firm and do not vary with the level 
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of output (Hansen & Mowen, 1994, p. 389). Ergas argues that common costs are likely 
to account for a substantial part of the total resources deployed in a telecommunications 
network (Ergas, 1998, p. 91). Joint and common costs pose challenges for calculating 
the profit of individual products or services. Ergas and Kahn acknowledge that joint and 
common costs affect regulatory pricing. Ergas notes that the exclusion of common costs 
from a regulatory price will distort the market, resulting in inefficient entry (Ergas, 
1998, p. 105). Thus there is a degree of choice and arbitrariness in relation to the 
treatment of joint and common costs at the regulatory level. 
(b)  The Challenge of Choice of Transfer Pricing  
  
 Transfer pricing occurs when a good or service produced by one division is 
‘transferred’ to another (Hansen & Mowen, 1994, p. 827). Telecommunications are 
multi-faceted businesses involving network development, retail, and wholesale 
services, and consequently, there is considerable transfer pricing: e.g. the development 
of a telecommunications service like call waiting by a residential division has potential 
for other business units like mobile. However, if divisions are evaluated on 
profitability, transfer pricing creates perverse incentives, and becomes a matter of 
contention, as the price charged for the intermediate product is revenue to the selling 
division (residential) and a cost to the purchasing division (mobile) (Ezzamel, 1995, p. 
145). There are two traditional transfer price methods:55  
1)  Traditional transaction methods test the prices of inter-division 
transactions by comparing similar transactions between unrelated parties. 
Acceptable methods include comparable uncontrolled price, cost-plus, and 
resale-minus; and  
 
2) Transactional profit methods focus on comparing internal divisional 
profits with comparable independent companies with similar functions and 
risks. Methods include the transactional net margin method and the 
residual profit split method (Ezzamel, 1995, p. 148).   
                                                 
55
 Transfer pricing increases in complexity in cross-border organisations. For example, Telecom operates 
in NZ, but owns AAPT in Australia. The transfer price of goods from a parent company sold to a 
foreign subsidiary affects the division of the total profit across parts of the company, and may have a 
tax effect. 
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 Laffont & Tirole point to the importance of controlling transaction pricing due 
to its potential to defeat a regulatory system (2000, p. 114). Although NZ’s taxation 
authority (the Inland Revenue Department) ‘encourages’ the use of the ‘arm’s length’ 
principle where associated entities charge market price to minimise the issue, the range 
of transfer pricing methods give scope for manipulating costs. Common transfer pricing 
models in telecommunications include:  
a) The service provider model where the parent company assumes all the 
entrepreneurial risk for the enterprise. Subsidiaries exist to provide 
services for the parent company. Consequently, the subsidiary has limited 
influence over business risks and the transfer price model reflects this;  
 
b) The entrepreneurial model where the subsidiary has considerable control 
over the risk and rewards of its business. Although the parent company 
retains ultimate responsibility to shareholders, the transfer price model 
reflects the benefits and burdens of its operational risks; and 
 
c) The joint venture model where the parent and subsidiary operate as 
partners collaborating on business operations. Thus, the transfer price 
model reflects the share in the burdens and benefits of its operational 
risks, depending on contribution. 
  
There are complex issues concerning transfer pricing and joint and common costs that 
are relevant to the TSLRIC and net costing models in NZ’s regulation. Below 
illustrates how the range of economic incentives and the degree of choice between 
transfer price models impacts on the arbitrariness of costs. 
(c) Arbitrariness of Allocating and Apportioning Cost and the Cross-Subsidy Risk  
 
Joint and common costs pose significant challenges to regulators, particularly 
through cost allocation and apportionment affecting departmental, product, line, and 
externally reported costs. Cost allocation techniques, include: 
a) Absorption Costing (full cost accounting): Absorption costing allocates 
direct costs (such as materials and labour) to products as the costs are 
incurred but estimates the allocation of indirect costs (fixed, overhead 
costs). This provides a ‘full cost’ of production. Absorption costing is: 
 
A product costing method that assigns all manufacturing costs to a product: 
direct materials, direct labour, variable overhead, and fixed overhead (Hansen 
& Mowen, 1994, p. 911). 
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b)  ABC: a costing system whereby costs are assigned to the activities that 
drive the incurrence of cost, defined as a cost system: 
 
that first traces costs to activities and then to products … Activity-based 
costing uses both unit-based and nonunit-based cost drivers … As a result, the 
ABC method produces increased product-costing accuracy (Hansen & 
Mowen, 1994, p. 215). 
 
In telecommunications the allocation of joint costs can result in accounting cross-
subsidies, as discussed in Chapter two. The USA Congress imposed a cross-ownership 
bar to prevent cross-subsidisation, enforced “accounting separation” between business 
segments, and strict regulation of joint cost allocation (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 53). 
Similarly, the EU’s prescription of ABC aims to control cross-subsidies. The NZ 
Government does not mandate a cost allocation accounting method.  
  
Wells criticises cost allocations because they are arbitrary and not useful “as the 
allocation of overhead costs is wrong in principle” and anyone who disagrees with the 
arbitrariness of cost allocation are confused (Wells, 1978, p. 145). Thus, technically and 
methodologically, cost is arbitrary. Both ABC and absorption costing are acceptable 
methods but with similar information the choice of allocation techniques produces 
different results. Equally, within a costing technique, there is considerable choice: e.g. 
the choice between machine hours or direct labour hours can affect the end-result in an 
allocation base in an absorption costing system. Thus cost involves subjective choices 
between methods and within methods. For telecommunications regulation this 
arbitrariness becomes political and makes cost a complicated concept: e.g. it is a 
premise of TSLRIC and net costing that the regulator knows how to run an efficient 
network - even better than ‘a’ dominant incumbent. The assumption that they can see 
and comprehend all information when making costing decisions is tenuous.  
 
The preceding discussion illustrated the choice and arbitrariness of a complex 
range of technical costing issues affecting telecommunications, especially joint and 
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common costs, transfer pricing, and cost allocation and apportionment. The next section 
illustrates this complexity by reflecting on theories of cost, particularly within 
economics that assumes cost is a simple, objective measurement. Arbitrariness and 
choice within costing exists at the technical and theoretical levels with consequences at 
methodological, technical and political levels. Different economic presentations of cost 
theory involving arbitrariness and choice have interpretive and critical theory 
implications.  
 
B Management Accounting Cost Theory.  
 
The problem with ‘cost’ is that cost information is incomplete (Abdala, 2000; 
Bjornenak, 1997), situation-specific (Whittington, 1994), organisation-specific 
(Bromwich & Hong, 2000), biased (Thirlby, 1973), subjective (Buchanan, 1969), 
political, and constructed (Cave, 1997; Christensen & Demski, 1995; Covaleski & 
Dirsmith, 1988a; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988b; Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Samuel, 2003; 
Faulhaber, 1995; Ghertman & Quélin, 1995; Heald, 1996; Lucas, 2003; Major & 
Hopper, 2005, Hopper & Major, 2007; and Stern & Holder, 1999). The range of 
paradigmatic research on cost and regulation matches broader epistemological and 
ontological debates in the accounting discipline,56 but particularly the management 
accounting literature on the inherent choice and arbitrariness of cost. 
1 Arbitrariness and Choice within Economics and Cost 
 
Economic regulatory theory employing the traditional “economic sacrifice” 
definition of cost denotes the interrelationship between economics and costing. In 
telecommunication economics, most costs are fixed relating to the setup and 
maintenance of infrastructure. Hence, the MC (the change in total cost resulting from 
producing an additional unit of output) of a telephone call is virtually zero in most 
                                                 
56
 See Chapter four for details of epistemological and ontological debates in accounting. 
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cases: only when the network is congested is it equal to the opportunity cost (the cost of 
the best alternative foregone) of a ‘dropped’ call. This has implications for 
interconnection access pricing as public interest regulatory theorists argue that access 
should be priced at MC (Kahn, 1988; McNamara, 1991; Scapens, Gameil & Cooper, 
1983; Laffont & Tirole, 1991; and Gasmi et al, 2002). Technically, this peak-load 
pricing is considered economically efficient as:  
Marginal cost includes the opportunity cost of fixed capital investment and this 
opportunity cost is zero during the off-peak period and reflects fixed costs during 
the peak period in an optimally designed system … Marginal costs should vary 
according to the time of demand (McNamara, 1991, p. 96).  
 
Below examines various economic theorisations of cost, beginning with positivism as 
an example of economic extremity, transaction cost economics (TCE), and agency 
theory.   
(a) The ‘Objectivity’ of Positivism and Cost: Focusing on Production Costs to the 
Exclusion of Other Costs 
 
Positivism presumes ‘costs’ are ‘universal’.57 Cost is a concrete concept 
discovered independent of human interaction: it is ‘the’ measure of economic sacrifice, 
a universal truth.58 Positivism focuses on the costs of production: however, treating 
costs as a measurable, observable phenomenon (Williamson, 1985; 1996) in an 
abstracted, experiment-controlled manner produces a dichotomy between practice and 
research (Chua, 1986, p. 607). Common areas of positivist research into cost include:  
1) Empirical research works using observable data as a proxy for cost 
(Blalock, 1971; Kerlinger, 1973; Firestone & Chadwick, 1975). The focus 
is on generating law-like statements deduced from choices and 
explanatory variables.  
 
2) Mathematical modelling of the implications of accounting policy choices 
regarding cost, in an abstracted environment to generate best-fit models 
                                                 
57
 See Chapter four for greater detail of the theoretical influences of positivist approaches to research.   
 
58
 This is similar to other aspects of the accounting system, including profit, revenue, and assets. In 
considering the interface between law, regulation, and cost, cost is objective, factual information for 
the legal process. The regulator is an information processor and plays no evaluative role, and the 
regulator is objective, and there is no morality implicated. Regulation is the application of rules to 
factual evidence. 
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that explain and predict the results of regulatory systems (Embrechts, 
Furrer & Kaufmann, 2003; Oughdi, Caminada, Lamrous & Morin, 2005; 
Lally, 2004a; Lally, 2004b) 
 
3) The implications of different costing methods on businesses, including the 
impact of agency cost (Whittington, 1994). 
 
 
Much positivist research addresses technical accounting issues regarding GAAP 
and regulation alongside economics. Here research into full cost allocations and 
common costs is important (Cohen & Loeb, 1982; Balachandran & Ramakrishnan, 
1981; Loehman & Whinston, 1971; and Zimmerman, 1979). Some literature concerns 
international telephony and the Accounting Rate System (Collins, 2000; de Fraja & 
Valbonesi, 2001; Madden & Savage, 2000; Madden & Savage, 2001; and Tang, 2001; 
2003) and there is growing work on pricing policies by regulators of networked 
industries, particularly, the debate between ‘cost-plus’ and ‘price-minus’ pricing 
methodologies (see, Nwaeze, 1998; Abdel-khalik, 1988; Bowen, 1981; Bryan & 
Hwang, 1997; Gordon, 1974; Joskow & Schmalensee, 1986; Landon, 1990; Nwaeze, 
1997; Sappington, 1980; and Teets, 1992). In particular, Nwaeze applied a cost-plus 
pricing model on electricity utilities in the United State finding “considerable 
alignment” between the market and book value of the regulated utilities (Nwaeze, 1998, 
p. 570).  
 
Some economists argue that the positivist focus on the costs of production 
arbitrarily excludes costs associated with economic exchanges. Thus, TCE focuses on 
how institutions minimise the transaction costs of producing and distributing goods and 
services. 
(b) Arbitrariness and Choice: Why Exclude the Cost of Exchange from Cost? 
Transaction Cost Economics 
 
 For TCE, the cost of transaction is significant. Coase argued that there are costs 
of using the ‘price mechanism’ with consequences for whether firms or markets will 
 - 94 - 
perform particular functions (1937, p. 386). Williamson popularised the term, TCE, by 
extending the economic focus on demand and supply to consider a broader range of 
transactions and the costs of institutions (Williamson, 1996). In short, production costs 
only illustrate part of the costs facing a firm. TCE agrees that organisations’ seek cost 
minimisation but sees a firm’s total cost as a combination of production and transaction 
costs. Production costs tend to be easy to define and measure compared to transaction 
costs, which represent the costs of coordination. Williamson notes that transaction costs 
include: 
… ex ante economic costs of: (1) search and information cost, (2) drafting, 
bargaining, and decision costs, and (3) costs of safeguarding an agreement. Ex 
post economic costs include: (1) costs of measuring input, (2) costs of measuring 
output, (3) monitoring and enforcement costs, and (4) adaptation and haggling 
costs (Williamson, 1985, quoted in Lajili & Mahoney, 2006, pp. 574-575). 
 
TCE holds that organisational choice and form is a critical component in the total 
economic cost of an organisation. Thus, TCE provides theoretical insight into the role 
of demand, technological uncertainty, and physical, human, and site asset specificity 
(Williamson, 1985; Krickx, 1995):  
The fundamental idea is that contractual difficulties can be anticipated when 
opportunistic agents engage in frequent transactions in an environment of 
sufficient (demand and/or technological) uncertainty to surpass bounded 
rationality capabilities. The contractual risk of some opportunistic agents utilising 
asymmetric information to their advantage … is high … (Lajili & Mahoney, 2006, 
p. 575). 
 
TCE incorporates issues of markets, organisational structure, bureaucracy, and trust. It 
is relevant to telecommunications, particularly in relation to network development, 
interconnection, and technological innovation: e.g. as networks grow the complexity of 
the software that runs them increases. Increased software needs require purchasing more 
software licenses but these transaction costs are often excluded. Equally, implementing 
new technology is assumed to reduce an organisation’s costs but Cordella and Simon 
argue that the transaction costs may increase as the amount of information processed by 
an organisation increases (1997; Cordella, 2001; 2006). 
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 Thus TCE illustrates how traditional economic costing has a limited perspective 
on the costs confronting an organisation. However, TCE is criticised for excluding the 
measurement uncertainty that affects the choice of organisational form (Barzel, 1982; 
Eisenhardt, 1985). In contrast, agency theory emphasises information asymmetry, 
manipulation, and divergent interests in cost measurement.  
(c) Arbitrariness and Choice: The Costs of Information Asymmetry and Divergent 
Interests 
 
Work on the principal-agent model and costs emphasises how measurement 
uncertainty influences organisational form (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and the role of 
information asymmetry (Lajili and Mahoney, 2006, p. 575). Agency theory criticises 
traditional economics and TCE for assuming that information in markets is perfectly 
symmetrical and it argues that the degree of uncertainty and information asymmetry in 
transactions is an important cost component (Eisenhardt, 1985). 59 
 
Accounting research using agency theory tends to focus on information 
asymmetry and supplementary financial accounting disclosures (Whittington, 1994) or 
management accounting systems, namely ABC (Bromwich & Hong, 1999; Bromwich 
& Hong, 2000). Whittington examines the use of current cost accounting [CCA] in the 
UK to regulate utilities. In the early 1980s, UK companies could voluntarily produce 
CCA (under SSAP 16) but only regulated utility companies (including British Gas, 
regional electricity companies, water companies, and the British Airports Authority) 
produced CCA reports. The Byatt Report, 1986, recommended CCA as appropriate for 
State-owned enterprise regulation as the ‘current cost’ “represented the cost that would 
be faced by a hypothetical new entrant to the industry”. 
                                                 
59
 In the incorporation of TSLRIC for interconnection and net costing for the KSO, this is recognition of 
the agency theory problem of information asymmetry and bias. In particular, by regulating TSLRIC 
and net costing, elements of bias are arguably removed. More importantly, to counter-balance aspects 
of the information asymmetry problem, the regulation, the Telecommunications Commissioner, has 
the power to make the final determination with respect to costing information.  
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[C]urrent cost operating profit represented the surplus the such an entrant could 
earn from operations and current cost of the assets employed represented the costs 
of creating the business in a competitive market (Whittington, 1994, p. 89). 
 
Whittington attributes the continued use of CCA by regulated utilities to regulatory 
insistence on price-cap rather than rate-of-return regulation. In the ‘judgemental 
process’ of price-cap regulation, rate-of-return regulation is merely one of several 
factors considered by regulators – others allow for innovation and efficiency 
improvements (Whittington, 1994, p. 90). Whittington concludes that CCA suits a 
price-cap regulatory model as it appropriately accounts for rate of return without being 
‘overwhelmed’ by allowable returns to investors (Whittington, 1994, pp. 99-100). In 
short, Whittington argues that CCA represents how regulated utilities can calculate their 
inherent rates of return to counter-balance the information asymmetry of the regulation 
process.  
 
Bromwich and Hong (2000) examine OFTEL’s insistence upon ABC and 
accounting separation of British Telecom [BT]. They attribute BT’s comprehensive 
complex hierarchical current costing system (informed by ABC) to accounting 
separation (attributing fully articulated costs to network components).  In short: 
the essential objective of this system is to use accounting to separate those 
components of the network which are regulated from those deemed to be 
competitive or potentially competitive (Bromwich & Hong, 2000, p. 161). 
 
Under BT’s “Long Run Incremental Cost Methodology [LRIC]”, fully allocated costs 
are assigned to cost pools to derive LRIC and short run average cost. In “a compromise 
between practice and theory”, BT’s model does not accord with accepted incremental 
cost theory, as it is not based on a fully optimised network and it makes little allowance 
for technical change. Consequently, Bromwich and Hong raise serious accounting 
concerns surrounding BT’s model. This includes the treatment of non-separable costs 
and joint costs of network components, which results in single cost drivers distorting 
costs of a cost pool. This notes the difficulties of implementing ABC in complex 
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networked industries: although BT’s system was a ‘good practical attempt’ its many 
problems “reduce the integrity of the costs produced” (Bromwich & Hong, 2000, p. 
178). This ABC example demonstrates how choice and arbitrariness affect costs 
produced and presented.  
 
These three examples of economic approaches to cost (positivism, TCE, and 
agency theory) illustrate the degree of choice and arbitrariness within the economic 
measurement of cost. The positivist focus on the costs of production leads to TCE 
challenging the arbitrary exclusion of the costs of exchange, whereas agency theory 
proponents accuse TCE of excluding the costs of information asymmetry and divergent 
interests. However, all these economic approaches seek the absolute true presentation of 
cost. Scapens challenges this notion of absolute truth, and traces the shift from 
production costing to a conditional model. The next section considers Scapens’ critique 
to establish a framework to consider costing from an interpretivist and critical 
perspective. 
 
C Conventional Management Accounting Cost Theory: A Critique of the 
Economic Approaches to Cost: “Different Costs for Different Purposes” 
 
Scapens examines the changing ‘conventional wisdom’ of management 
accounting (1985, p. 8). Prior to World War Two the focus was on ‘cost accounting’ 
and determining costs, “with particular emphasis on product costing and the control of 
direct labour, direct materials and overheads” (Scapens, 1985, p. 9). ‘Full’ cost was the 
predominant aim and cost accounting focused on methods of cost identification, 
allocation, and absorption.  
 
Clarke’s 1923 economic study of cost identified “great opportunities for … 
arbitrary and fictitious notions of cost, through the ‘necessity’ of apportioning items, 
“even if there was no scientific basis on which to do it” (1980, p. 268). Clarke stated: 
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If cost accounting sets out, determined to discover what the cost of everything is 
and convinced in advance that there is one figure which can be found and which 
will furnish exactly the information that is desired for every possible purpose, it 
will necessarily fail, because there is no such figure. If it finds a figure which is 
right for some purposes it must necessarily be wrong for others (Clarke, 1980, p. 
268).   
 
Vatter reinforced this: 
 
There is no one cost which will fit all purposes any more than there is a single 
wheel which will fit watches, motor trucks, and railway trains … [a cost 
accountant] must be able and willing to secure the kind of date which management 
may require for the many and varied purposes cost data may serve. He must 
determine how total costs behave at various levels of production for the product. 
He must be able to determine differential costs where the situation demands their 
use ... The mere grinding out of figures according to a stereotyped plan is not cost 
accounting and should not be referred to as such (Vatter, 1980, p. 268-269). 
 
 
Following World War Two the focus shifted to rendering “cost information, in 
particular, and accounting information, in general … appropriate to the needs of users” 
(Scapens, 1985, p. 9). Horngren distinguishes between the ‘era’ of cost accounting and 
the ‘era’ of management accounting: 
In an exaggerated sense, the cost accountants main mission might have been 
depicted as the pursuit of absolute truth, where truth was defined in terms of 
getting as accurate or precise costs as possible … [While in management 
accounting] the theme of ‘different costs for different purposes’ was stressed – a 
preoccupation with finding conditional truth (Horngren, 1975, 9-10). [Emphasis 
added]  
 
For Scapens the move to the ‘conditional truth’ model in management accounting 
implies that different costs are needed for different purposes; that accounting 
information depends on the information needs of users. Then: 
once the decision model is postulated the conditional truth approach implies that 
the appropriate information can be determined by deductive reasoning, i.e., truth 
can be attained (Scapens, 1985, p. 22). 
 
Scapens’ thesis is that the more economically sound (theoretically) the concept of cost 
becomes, the more subjective it is. Here it is important to clarify what is the ‘cost’ 
concept under scrutiny. The NZ regulator is tasked with determining relevant costs but 
within this there is a distinction between cost as an accounting tool and an economic 
device. In accounting, historical or embedded costs modified by depreciation charges 
measure consumption. Economic theory argues that pricing based on historical costs 
 - 99 - 
fails to match economic costs and prices leading to inefficient resource allocation. 
Hence regulators look to forward-looking economic theory to give industry participants 
efficient signals for entry, investment and innovation. Economic cost is about 
opportunity cost. Atkinson et al argues that firms make decisions based on prices and 
forward-looking economic costs in dynamic industries like telecommunications (1997). 
Theoretically: 
forward-looking economic costs are the costs which would be incurred if a new 
service were to be provided (with the least-cost, most efficient technology currently 
available), or avoided if an existing service’s provision were to be terminated, 
assuming that all inputs of the firm can vary freely (thus the term ‘forward-looking’ 
or ‘long-run’). Considering the long-run economic cost ensures that the firm recovers 
all of its costs, not only operating and maintenance costs (which vary in the short 
run), but also fixed investments costs, necessary inputs in the provision of the service 
(which are not variable in the short run) (Benitz et al, 2002, p. 23).  
From a theoretical regulatory perspective, it is accepted that forward-looking long-run 
incremental costing is the interconnection pricing rule; paradoxically, there is little 
consensus amongst economic theorists, regulators, and industry participants as to how 
to measure costs.60 The issue of subjectivity arises due to necessary assumptions on 
how to measure costs involving opportunity cost, the cost of capital, and the net present 
value of future returns. Moreover, as Scapens argues, the more economically sound the 
cost, the greater the subjectivity. 
The conditional truth model does not include the cost of information provision 
and the uncertainty in practical decision-making. Demski and Feltham, recognise the 
critique of ‘conditional truth’: 
First, truth – even if desirable – cannot be obtained without incurring a cost. 
Measurement consumes resources … Second, users operate in an uncertain world 
and explicit recognition of uncertainty casts doubt on the concept of a true cost, 
which implicitly presumes a certain world … Third, the concept of a true cost 
(whether conditional or absolute) is likely to be both illusory and irrelevant in a 
multiperson world (Demski & Feltham, 1976, pp. 7-8). 
 
                                                 
60
 As an example, the US Federal Communications Commission [FCC] is required to apply forward-
looking economic cost methodologies to determine the universal service cost. In their analysis, the 
FCC concluded that the Cost Proxy Model, the Benchmark Cost Model 2, and Hatfield Model all 
displayed tremendous promise as a regulatory model. In consultation, though, thee FCC developed 
and adopted its own model, known as Hybrid Cost Proxy Model. As can be see, there is tremendous 
scope for dispute at the methodological level, surrounding measurement of cost. 
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An unavoidable question all researchers face is how to interrogate and make sense of 
social phenomena like cost, which involves understanding their construction and their 
political consequences. Cost theory recognises the social constructionist aspects of cost, 
costing, and cost measurement, under the maxim, ‘different costs for different purposes’ 
(Scapens, 1985). However, cost is still referred to as a measure of “economic sacrifice”, 
as though objectively real (see the economic discussion above). A key tension within 
accounting and cost remains a quest for objectivity. Cost as a concept exists – things do 
cost - the point is that in the theory of cost there are different costs for different 
purposes. The accountant’s notions of cost and their techniques for representing cost 
questions whether ‘true cost’ representations exist. Thus, the representation presented 
by the accountant is always partial (Morgan, 1988): e.g. at a simple level, accounting 
fails to incorporate all costs into its systems – externalities like pollution are 
traditionally excluded. This reinforces the argument that accounting is socially and 
political constructed, and accountants and accounting actively construct reality 
(Morgan, 1988, pp. 482-483). 
1 Legal Recognition of the Conditional Truth Thesis: ‘Different Costs for 
Different Purposes’ and Telecommunications Law 
 
There has been limited acknowledgement of the conditional nature of 
accounting information by the judiciary. The Supreme Court in US (Federal 
Communications Commission [FCC]) v Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company 
of Virginia [1996] 516 US 415 affirmed the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concerning the FCC’s attempts to prevent cross-subsidisation: 
Whether or not it would be possible to prevent cross-subsidization through such 
rules, if the FCC were given adequate resources to monitor [local exchange 
carriers] effectively, that approach does have significant disadvantages, such that 
Congress could reasonably choose a cross-ownership bar instead. The regulatory 
task of containing cross-subsidization through accounting rules is decidedly 
complex. The inherent subjectivity of cost accounting issues that would have to be 
addressed under a regulatory approach, the ongoing possibility of evasion of, and 
litigation over, accounting rules set by the FCC, and the need for substantial 
auditing resources sufficient to prevent evasion all support Congress’s choice of a 
simpler approach to the problem of unfair cost-shifting (p. 418).  
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The Supreme Court acknowledged the inherent subjectivity of cost accounting, 
reinforcing the ‘conditional truth’ of the accounting process. However, law seemingly 
ignores these subjectivities within ‘cost’: the Supreme Court acknowledges the 
‘conditional’ nature of accounting challenges the legal process. In fact, this may refute 
Napier and Noke’s claim that accounting is subordinate to the law: law may be 
subordinate to accounting due to the limitations of the legal process (Napier & Noke, 
1992, pp. 31-32). 
 
Law rarely recognises the inexact nature of ‘cost’, and with the complexity of 
telecommunications, this poses significant challenges for the legal process. Urbanski 
comments on the USA experience:  
Let us start at the end. You are in a court of law sitting next to your lawyer, and 
there they are – the jury. They are a box of strangers who hold your company’s 
future or your life in their hands. What are they likely to think about antitrust and 
corporate America? First, given the background of most jurors, they are going to 
be overwhelmed by any of the stuff we have heard today because I am too. They 
are going to be overwhelmed by the economic, industrial, and policy issues 
presented to them. They are, in short, likely to have some sort of bewildered glaze 
over their eyes that each of us had when we first read the Telecommunications Act 
1996. 
 
One juror, interviewed after listening to an antitrust case, put it this way: ‘I 
thought I just got off the plane in Tokyo. Everything looked and sounded 
Japanese. I was totally lost”. Again, the analogy to the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act is wholly appropriate. Jurors in antitrust cases … will focus on what they think 
is important, not what is important to your business, or what may be significant, or 
even relevant, in legal terms (Urbanski, 1996, paras 25-26).  
 
The interface of law and accounting in telecommunications regulation provides a 
challenging environment for accountants, lawyers and regulators. It combines the 
complexities of: 
a) Costing, characterised by choice, arbitrariness, and conditionality at 
methodological, technical, and political levels; 
 
b) The legal process characterised by the necessity of processing 
information from various sources, where that information is often 
conflictual; and 
 
c) Regulation, particularly regarding the range of stakeholders and 
political interests, and the difficulty of determining its focus. 
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So, why consider the interface of law and accounting? Law and accounting are 
not objectively real, as both are subjective, socially constructed institutions. Thus, their 
interface is a construction and is an arena for the clash of two constructions. Further, 
neither law or accounting exist in a vacuum; they do not exist independent of society 
but incorporate, rely upon, use, adopt, act, and require society (Lloyd, 1983; Morgan, 
1988). Thus, a theoretical approach recognising the socially constructed nature of cost 
and regulation is required. The next section considers the interpretivist (choice) and 
critical theory (power and meaning) implications on cost.  
 
D Cost and Interpretivism and Critical Theory: Recognising the Socially 
Constructed Nature of Cost 
 
 Interpretivist theory recognises the socially constructed nature of cost, and how 
‘regulation’ and ‘cost’ become local and particular. Its focus is on the construction of 
cost, and the meanings, rituals, and symbols associated with costing. The researcher 
recognises that ‘truth’ is constructed, and a claim relevant to one social group may not 
be relevant to others. Thus, accounting and cost are cultural practices, and ‘cost’ and 
‘costing’ are contingent upon human practice and interaction. As Crotty argues there are 
no absolute or valid interpretations of cost, but conditional, cultural, and local 
interpretations that are ‘useful’, ‘liberating’, ‘fulfilling’, or ‘rewarding’ (1998, pp. 47-
48). Interpretivist management accounting research considers the systems and rituals 
surrounding the production of costing information, as in budgeting, or on behaviour that 
flows from accounting information and accounting decisions.  
 
 Critical theory recognises the inter-subjective objectivity of cost but argues that 
historical and material conditions prevent people recognising this and playing an active 
role in constructing meanings attributed to cost. The critical theorist does not take the 
existing affairs for granted but makes judgments and seeks change. Central to this is a 
belief that ‘cost’ and ‘costing’ are powerful and political: 
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Accounting practice is no longer seen as a neutral, benign technology reporting the 
facts of organizational life. Rather accounting practice is interested, problematic, 
and shapes the context in which it operates (Ross, 1995, p. 151).  
 
Thus, cost is seen as a tool for maintaining power relationships within society; the 
discourse of costing creates and sanctions conceptions of ‘truth’ to the detriment of 
some sectors in society; and it dehumanises human beings and society by reducing 
social relations to measurable entities - if it cannot be counted it is excluded. Thus 
critical theory argues that: 
[a]ccounting [and therefore, costing] has been created and developed to 
accomplish various desired objectives and, therefore, it is not based on 
fundamental laws or absolute precepts (Catlett, 1960, p. 44). 
 
In a management accounting context, Puxty continues:    
 
Management accounting is a set of social practices that delineate the space within 
which the activity of the workforce might be made visible and susceptible to 
rational calculation ... [It] is an instrument within an enterprise that facilitates the 
exploitation of, and extraction of surplus value from, its employees by the 
capitalist interests that, through management control the accounting system 
(Puxty, 1993, 4).  
 
1 Interpretive and Critical Theory Research into Cost and Regulation 
(a) The Challenge of Creative Accounting 
 
McBarnett and Whelan argue that the greatest challenge facing regulators is 
‘creative accounting’, defined broadly as including acts of direct fraud and flagrant 
breaches of accounting standards (McBarnet & Whelan, 1991; Hawkins, 1994; 
McBarnet & Whelan, 1994; 1999a; 1999b; McBarnet, 2006). However, they point to 
more subtle attempts by regulated entities ‘playing the system’, ‘subverting’ and 
passively resisting regulatory systems, including calling the regulator’s bluff by taking 
litigation to exhaust under-funded regulatory budgets. ‘Creative accounting’ is often 
difficult to identify. Law is inherently subjective: ‘creativity can still be perfectly legal’, 
as loopholes exist. McBarnet and Whelan argue that in seven years of investigations 
(1989-1996) by the UK’s Financial Reporting Review Panel, no case went to court. 
This queries the apparent ‘might of the law’ (McBarnet & Whelan, 1999a, pp. 69-76; 
 - 104 - 
Baxt, 1970; Chandler & Edwards, 1994; Walker, 1996; Napier, 1998; Ardern & Aiken, 
2005). 
(b) The Failure of Regulatory Communication 
 
Regulatory conversations mark the discursive space “where communicative 
interactions that occur between all involved in the regulatory” process occur (Black, 
2002a, p. 163). Black argues that they may reveal power struggles over interpreting and 
implementing regulation, and close attention to discourses may reveal “significant 
interdependencies, power dispersal, and fragmentation” (2002a, p 194).  Regulatory 
conversations pose a significant challenge to regulators (Black, 2002a, pp. 170-171). 
Regulatory communication within command and control-type regulation increases the 
likelihood of instrument, information, knowledge and implementation failure, and 
regulatory capture due to the regulatee providing the information to the regulator 
(Black, 2002a, pp. 2-3). The TA, particularly, requires considerable regulatory 
conversation surrounding cost. The TA prescribes TSLRIC interconnection pricing but 
provides little detail on how TSLRIC should be implemented. As Major and Hopper 
comment in relation to ABC, there is no such thing as TSLRIC, until the formation of a 
model and the subsequent input of costing information (2005). Thus, the TSLRIC 
model requires significant conversation at methodological, technical, and political 
levels between the regulator and regulatees ranging from education, construction, 
development, running and results. In relation to TSO, similar regulatory conversations 
are necessary in relation to the ‘net costing’ model proscribed by Government, as the 
Act provides little on the mechanisms necessary to construct, develop, and run a ‘net 
costing’ model. Furthermore, at a technical and political level, Telecom ‘must’ provide 
much of the information that forms the basis of the regulator’s determinations. 
Furthermore, despite the practice of legislating for ABC as a specific cost allocation 
model in the UK and Europe, the NZ Government chose not to regulate a cost allocation 
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system (Major & Hopper, 2005). Thus, there is scope for regulatory game-playing and 
dispute between industry players. 
 
The extent of disagreement among regulatees over the regulator’s net cost 
calculation of the TSO under the TA is a useful illustration. Most industry participants 
monitored the development and application of the ‘net costing’ model used by the 
Commissioner to apportion amounts to liable persons (industry participants who 
interconnect with Telecom’s PSTN). In developing the model, the TA required 
extensive consultation with interested participants, involving submission and counter-
submission. Industry participants submitted extensive technical costing information to 
inform the CC’s draft TSO determination, and challenged the CC’s draft determination 
with further submissions and counter-submissions (at methodological, technical, and 
political levels). However, after intensive consultation, industry participants still 
disagreed with the final determination of the ‘net cost’ of satisfying the TSO. A brief 
survey of the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 determinations illustrates the difference 
between regulatees’ estimates and the Commissioner’s estimates of net cost of TSO 
provision: 
1) 2001-2002: Telecom submitted that TSO net cost was $425 million. 
Following complaints by industry players about the method of calculation, 
the Commissioner reconstituted the formula. Telecom subsequently 
revised the TSO cost figure to $408 million per annum. TelstraClear 
submitted that the TSO net cost was $214 million. The Commissioner 
determined that the annual net cost of the TSO was $73.4 million.  
 
2) 2002-2003: Telecom submitted that the TSO net cost was $215.5 million. 
The CC disagreed, determining a $56.8 million annual net cost for the 
TSO. 
 
There is considerable disparity between these figures: while it is in Telecom’s 
competitive and financial advantage to inflate the cost of TSO provision, there is still a 
major gap between Telecom’s estimates and the Commissioner’s final figure. 
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Furthermore, TelstraClear continues to contest the model: it annually submits that in 
calculating the net cost of the TSO, the CC should consider: 
a) The profits Telecom generates from commercially viable customers under 
the TSO; 
 
b) Monopoly rents that Telecom extracts by way of TSO cost recovery; and  
 
c) The competition impact of the TSO and the TSO funding mechanisms. 
 
This illustrates the need for communication between parties concerning cost 
accounting information at the methodological, technical, and political levels. Equally, it 
demonstrates the command and control nature of NZ’s regulatory model, and the scope 
for regulatory capture due to the regulator requiring information from the regulated. It 
also highlights the discursivity of the regulatory environment based around adversary. 
Black’s call for increased discourse analysis of regulation shifts analysis from the 
institutional process (2002a, p. 195), seeing political regulatory theory as overly process 
oriented (Horwitz, 1989). For Black, discourse analysis may be fruitful as it combines 
the discursiveness of regulation with social science (2002a, p. 196). 
(c) The Dichotomy of the Constructed Nature of Cost and Fact: Uncertainty and 
Subjectivity  
 
The critical examination of the interface of law and accounting examines the 
relationship between facts and cost. The day-to-day practice of law (legal positivism) 
treats accounting as ‘fact’ (Hadden & Boyd, 1992, pp. 57-58; Napier & Noke, 1992, p. 
36). The limits of the techniques of accounting render it impossible to represent ‘true 
cost’, for such a representation does not exist (Poovey, 1998, p. 281): 
‘Facts’ are no longer facts when alternative interpretations are possible; nor do 
they have the same ‘factual’ quality when what is being measured or described is 
not susceptible to precision. ‘Facts’, so regarded, become the pabulum of 
discussion, of argument, or of negotiation. Communication of ‘facts’ is no longer 
merely a process, but the imperfect representation of a situation, an essay in 
persuasion or an act of outright propaganda. The scope for complete objectivity is 
rare (Hussey & Marsh, 1983, p. 154). 
 
 - 107 - 
A lack of ‘factuality’ and ‘objectivity’ are not unique to cost and accounting, but the 
fundamental question revolves around the descriptive noun of ‘fact’, which invokes 
certain notions of truth, objectivity, and correctness. Financial information can produce 
various accounting answers due to the indeterminacy of language (Wittgenstein, 
1974),61 and the role of accountants to work around ‘rules’ (Napier & Noke, 1992). 
Thus, this is a tension underpinning the logic of cost: the quest for objectivity vis-à-vis 
the presentation of a partial and one-sided representation: 
Accountants often see themselves as engaged in an objective, value-free, technical 
enterprise, representing reality ‘as is’. But in fact, they are subjective “constructors 
of reality”: presenting and representing the situations in limited and one-sided 
ways. They are not just technicians practising a technical craft. They are part of a 
much broader process of reality construction, producing partial and rather one-
sided views of reality, exactly as an artist is obliged to produce a partial view of 
the reality he or she wishes to represent (Morgan, 1988, p. 477). 
 
Morgan argues that accountants and accounting are “constructers of reality” with the 
tools of accounting enable competing ‘factual’ ‘pictures’. Broadbent comments on ‘our 
desire’ for accountability: 
In order to make ourselves accountable and ensure due governance, we seek (or 
are forced) to render our actions transparent. The use of accounting in both its 
programmatic and its technological sense is associated with this; alongside this is 
the extensive use of auditing. The deep irony is that the tools that are used are 
themselves not necessarily open and transparent (Broadbent, 2002, p. 445). 
 
The lack of openness and transparency within cost accounting challenges 
telecommunications regulation. To the uninitiated, the designation of ‘cost’ seems 
simple and free from judgment but from a practical perspective it is difficult and unique 
for each firm. Scapens noted the inherent conditionality of management accounting in 
relation to cost, as ‘different costs are needed for different purposes’ (Scapens, 1985, p. 
22). Cost is inherently subjective; the public manifestation of various choices within 
and outside the organisation, reflecting an array of discursive influences including the 
political environment, shareholders, stakeholders, management, and the preparing 
                                                 
61
 Baxter and Chua’s review of management accounting emphasises the critique of the real, 
“problematising the constitution of ‘reality’ by characterising it as a product of ongoing or 
interpretive acts” (Baxter and Chua, 2003, p. 100). 
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accountant(s). All influence ‘cost’. The subjective, constructed nature of cost is a 
recognised accounting and regulatory concern (Pasour Jr., 2004; Thirlby, 1973; 
Buchanan, 1969).62 Pasour Jr. depicts the problems of regulation on a largely ‘cost-plus’ 
model: 
Information problems also prevent regulators from regulating effectively. These 
information problems are rooted in the separation of knowledge and power. That 
is, individuals with decision-making power in the political process do not have and 
cannot obtain the specialized information about demand and supply conditions 
known by producers, consumers, and resource owners … Thus, attempts to set 
prices on the basis of costs are futile because regulators cannot determine the costs 
that influence entrepreneurial choice.  
 
… Cost and revenue calculations and entrepreneurial actions ultimately hinge on 
subjective opinion. Furthermore, in cases in which utility commissions attempt to 
regulate prices, it is likely to be a matter of differences of opinion. Since 
entrepreneurial cost and revenue calculations are based on unique knowledge and 
attitudes toward risk, the validity of over-riding such calculations by the regulator 
is ‘dubious in the extreme’ (Pasour Jr, 2004).  
 
Consequently, the inherent uncertainty and subjectivity of costing poses a serious 
challenge to regulatory systems requiring cost information. Essentially, cost information 
is incomplete, situation-specific, organisation-specific, biased, subjective, political, and 
constructed (e.g., Bjornenak, 1997; Lucas, 2003; Faulhaber, 1995; Christensen & 
Demski, 1995; Stern & Holder, 1999; Abdala, 2000; Ghertman & Quélin, 1995; Cave, 
1997; Heald, 1996).  
(d) Regulation and Costing: Political Subjectivity, and the Social and Institutional 
Creation of Meanings of Cost. 
 
Regarding the interface of regulation and cost, Covaleski et al consider the 
implications of TCE for the de-regulation of utility industries in California and 
associated management control issues (2003). They argue that accounting information 
as a regulatory tool has become increasingly important for identifying anti-competitive 
behaviour or market structures that affect competition (including monopoly, duopoly, 
and oligopoly behaviour) (Covaleski et al 2003; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988a; 1988b). 
                                                 
62
 Buchanan’s work challenges traditional cost theory and points to economists such as Wicksteed, 
Jevons, Davenport, Knight, Robbins, Hayek, Mises (who developed with Hayek, ‘subjectivist 
economics’), and Thirlby as responsible for continuing to develop the subjectivity of cost theory. 
 - 109 - 
In noting the increasing use of accounting for determining regulatory prices, especially 
in relation to TSLRIC pricing, they note the difficulties associated with ‘cost’ in 
telecommunications, due to the presence of substantial joint and common costs.63 
Covaleski et al argue that: 
The question arises, however, as to the efficiencies of accounting information 
serving efficiency seeking versus legitimacy seeking purposes in contentious, 
politically fragmented contexts. As asset specificity increases and the possibility of 
opportunism in strategic transactions becomes heightened - thus exacerbating an 
already contentious context – the instrumental, efficiency seeking role of 
accounting takes on less significance. Commons recognised that his “pecuniary 
calculus of accounting” did not provide optimal, instrumentally efficient solutions 
but perhaps put government in the role of playing a “private nurse” for corporate 
agents. But this “pecuniary calculus of accounting” did, as Merino (1993) 
observed, serve as a system of rationalisation for the ongoing system of economic 
power embedded in oligopolisitc markets of his and indeed our time. The desire to 
avoid the more extreme consequences of high asset specificity in utility contracts, 
such as the divestiture of electric utilities and consequential dramatically increased 
state involvement in the industry, provided an arena within which accounting 
could play a much more variegated role than merely generating instrumental 
efficiency solutions to technical problems (Covaleski et al, 2003, pp. 438-439). 
 
Covaleski et al critique the effects of TCE, demonstrating the limits of positivist 
approaches to costing and regulation of Californian utilities, and point out that that they 
neglect fundamental issues of subjectivity, politics, consensus, and the social and 
institutional creation of meanings of cost.  
 
Major and Hopper explore implementation of ABC at Marconi, a Portuguese 
telecommunications company (2005). Their case study provides insight into technical 
issues concerning ABC, as well as organisational and labour implications. The study 
differs to Bromwich and Hong as it focuses on the implementation of ABC, rather than 
whether it generates accurate interconnection prices. Major and Hopper (2007) note the 
challenge of joint and common costs in telecommunications, and the failure of ABC to 
adequately cope with this issue. The paper provides insights into employee reactions to 
ABC during and after implementation. Most groups involved with regulation 
considered ABC implementation to be successful and favourable but there was 
employee resistance, scepticism from production managers and increasingly 
                                                 
63
 Major & Hopper (2005) note that Bromwich and Hong (2000) mirror this point. 
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accountants, which affected the veracity of the ABC calculations due to “late and 
inaccurate allocations of times to activities”. There are a series of lessons: first, within 
an institution, a lack of goal congruence, training and support, as well as hostility 
towards ABC, particularly by production managers, seriously impacted the cost 
calculation; second, the high degree of common costs within telecommunications may 
result in unreliable and subjective ABC cost calculations; and finally, that internal 
resistance can derail the implementation of ABC. Given that the EU mandates the 
provision of cost information based on ABC, the Marconi experience with ABC and 
subsequent lessons challenge this regulatory approach. It is supposed to reduce the 
scope for subjectivity, disagreement, and the cost of compliance of information 
provision. Major and Hopper’s analysis indicates that it may fail each of these 
regulatory goals, due in part to the social and institutional creation of the meaning of 
cost.  
 
In short, Covaleski et al and Major and Hopper acknowledge the social and 
institutional creation of the meaning of cost, which are organisation, situation, and 
politically specific. Cost and costing methodologies introduce technical, 
methodological, and political choice and subjectivities that challenge the regulatory 
process, if not defeating the regulatory process altogether. 
 
VI CONCLUSION  
 
Accounting and ‘cost’ assumed centrality within the TA 2001. This chapter 
traced the centrality of the interface between law and cost depicting the emergence of 
TSLRIC interconnection and net costing of the TSO through the political process. The 
chapter then problematised the interface of law and accounting by considering the 
theory of cost and detailing the methodological, technical, political shifts from cost as 
technical to political. The key conclusions are: 
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- Law and accounting are intertwined, as the two disciplines increasingly 
come closer together. Law provides a framework for the day-to-day 
practice of accounting and influences its scope. Accounting is a common 
source of information in legal disputes and a powerful media of 
expression. 
 
- The TA requires substantial accounting information, particularly TSLRIC 
interconnection access and the net costing model of the TSO. ‘Cost’, 
assumed a central position within the regulatory framework. 
 
- During the MIT and subsequent Government consideration, TSLRIC and 
the net costing models signified answers to the need for a competitive 
interconnection access regime and provided a regulatory approach to the 
KSO. It demonstrated the role of cost at methodological, technical, and 
political levels.  
 
- Telecommunications provides a rich environment for considering the 
complexities of cost. In particular, interdependencies, shared services, and 
non-market relationships in telecommunications creates challenges in 
relation to joint and common costs, transfer pricing, and cost allocation 
and apportionment. These pose difficulties to any regulatory system. 
 
- Cost traditionally is a measure of economic sacrifice but there are 
elements of inherent choice and arbitrariness to cost: e.g. positivist 
economic approaches focus on the costs of production; transaction cost 
economics argues that this focus excludes costs associated with economic 
exchanges; and agency theorists emphasise that transaction cost 
economics undervalues the role of measurement uncertainty in influencing 
organisational form. 
 
- Scapens’ critical review of cost and economics challenges the notion of 
absolute truth in cost, and recognises the shift from production costing to a 
conditional model of costing based on the maxim of ‘different costs for 
different purposes’. 
 
- Interpretive and critical theory recognises the socially constructed nature 
of cost. The focus of interpretivist research is on the construction of cost, 
and associated meanings, rituals, and symbols, while the critical theory 
research focuses on cost as power and politics. 
 
- Interpretive and critical theory research illustrates the challenge of: 
 
o ‘Creative accounting’ for regulators in identifying creativity.  
 
o Regulatory conversations and communication between parties over 
cost accounting information at methodological, technical, and 
political levels.  
 
o Cost posing as ‘fact’ by the possibility of alternative 
interpretations at methodological, technical, and political levels. 
The inherent uncertainty and subjectivity in costing poses a serious 
challenge to regulatory systems. 
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o That with respect to costing and regulation, there are fundamental 
issues of subjectivity, politics, consensus, conflict, and the social 
and institutional creation of meanings of cost. 
 
 
Chapters two and three introduced the constituent elements of this thesis 
encompassing the disciplines of accounting, law, regulation, economics, and politics. 
This chapter argues that telecommunications regulatory regimes assume a simplistic, 
positivistic notion of cost. The NZ regulatory regime attempted to deal with bias and 
information asymmetry by prescribing TSLRIC and net costing as specific costing 
methods, and by giving the regulator the final decision. Thus, the regulatory regime 
recognised some of the agency theory problem but failed to deal with the core issue of 
establishing cost. For accountants, the establishment of cost is complex, and includes 
issues of arbitrariness, choice, contestability, social and institutional constructionism, 
politics, and subjectivity. Consequently, the thesis examines the interface of law and 
accounting by problematising how cost shifts from the technical to the political in 
telecommunications regulation. Thus, Chapter four reflects on paradigmatic research 
within law and accounting by comparing and contrasting positivism, interpretivism, and 
critical theory and whether they provide sufficient scope of inquiry to examine the 
issues identified in Chapters two and three. Chapter four suggests that current 
paradigmatic approaches are unsatisfactory and that a post-structural approach is more 
appropriate to examine the interface of law and accounting and the use of cost in 
regulating NZ telecommunications.  
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- Chapter Four - 
 
Paradigmatic Research in Law and Accounting 
 
The history of thought and culture is, as Hegel showed with great brilliance, 
a changing pattern of great liberating ideas which inevitably turn into 
suffocating straightjackets, and so stimulate their own destruction by new 
emancipatory, and at the same time, enslaving conceptions. The first step to 
understanding of men is the bringing to consciousness of the model or 
models that dominate and penetrate their thought and action. Like all 
attempts to make men aware of the categories in which they think, it is a 
difficult and sometimes painful activity, likely to produce disquieting results 
(Chua, 1986, p. 601). 
 
I CHAPTER FOUR OVERVIEW 
 
Chapter three demonstrated the scope of the interface of law and accounting, 
illustrating the centrality of cost to telecommunications regulation. The problematising 
of positivist assumptions about costs demonstrated marked contestability at 
methodological, technical, and political levels. The arbitrariness and inherent choice 
within costing is reflected partly in different economic theorisations of cost, including 
positivism, TCE, and agency theory. According to Scapens the more theoretically 
correct the economic cost is, the more subjective the measure becomes. Scapens’ 
critique introduced a conditional costing model, based on the maxim ‘different costs for 
different purposes’. As Scapens introduction of subjectivity is rooted in a critique of 
economics, this was extended to embrace interpretive and critical theory’s recognition 
of socially constructed costs. Thus, costs are not merely technical but political, and 
involve subjectivity, politics, consensus, conflict, and the social and institutional 
creation of meanings. This range of theoretical and practical ‘cost’ critiques poses 
significant challenges for regulation and research, because cost methodologically, 
technically, and politically invokes multiple epistemologies and ontologies. 
Consequently, to interrogate the interface of cost accounting and telecommunications 
regulation it is necessary to justify an appropriate theoretical research framework. 
Chapter four addresses two questions: 
1) Can positivism, interpretivism, or critical theory sufficiently analyse the 
issues identified in Chapters two and three, including telecommunications 
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re-regulation, limitations of economic theories of regulation, the growing 
interface of law and accounting, and the problems of cost becoming a core 
regulatory component? This requires examining parallel research 
traditions in accounting and law, limitations of current paradigmatic 
approaches, and whether positivism, interpretivism, or critical theory are 
epistemologically and ontologically commensurate with the cost critiques. 
 
2)  Why is a post-structuralist form of inquiry more suitable? This requires 
clarification of what is meant by post-structuralism; how this relates to 
accounting, law, and regulation; and whether post-structuralism is 
ontologically commensurate with the cost critiques? 
 
The chapter examines paradigmatic approaches to law, accounting, and 
regulation, especially positivism, interpretivism, critical theory, and post-structuralism, 
to assess their suitability for the focusing questions of the thesis. Within each discipline 
theoretical disputes are widespread: within accounting there is debate between 
prescriptivism and descriptivism (Deegan, 2006, p. 5); in law, jurisprudence embodies 
a debate over law’s role as “… one of the great civilising forces in society” (Lloyd, 
1983, p. iv). This chapter argues that a post-structuralist informed theoretical 
framework provides the most suitable research platform for examining the complex 
interdisciplinary issues under scrutiny.64  
 
The first section argues that positivism, despite being the dominant research 
paradigm in law and accounting, is unsuitable as it promotes assumptions that objects 
are separate from subjects and research can be value-free.65 In contrast, the section 
argues that political processes of accounting, law, regulation, and cost depend on 
human agents, and consequently holding subjects and objects as separate is 
epistemologically and ontologically unsound.  
                                                 
64
 Chapter five introduces Laclau and Mouffe’s DT. 
 
65
 The discussion of positivism and cost in Chapter three presented much of the underlying epistemology 
and ontology.   
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II WHY POSITIVISM IN LAW AND ACCOUNTING IS AN 
INAPPROPRIATE PARADIGM 
 
 The dominant research paradigm within both law and accounting is positivism.66 
Each discipline incorporates positive theory similarly (Chua, 1986; Davies, 2002).67 
Positivist accounting theory [PAT] is related to contractarianism in law theoretically 
and methodologically (compare Watts & Zimmerman’s PAT, 1986, with Million’s 
contractarianism, 1993).68 They share a commitment to an objectivist epistemology, a 
realist ontology,69 ‘value–free research’,70 and the incorporation of neo-classical 
economic axioms like efficiency, agency theory, the contract, rational action, and 
wealth maximisation (Chua, 1986, pp. 605-606; Davies, 20023, p. 46; Millon, 1993, p. 
1378).71 Equally, there is strong interrelationship between positivism and modernism. 
                                                 
66
 Legal positivism is interchangeably referred to as liberal legal theory and contractarianism (Davies, 
2002). 
 
67
 Chua (1986) [accounting] and Davies (2002) [law] outline the core epistemological and ontological 
assumptions underpinning positivist research.  
 
68
 Within contractarianism, individuals are free to contract for what they are willing and able to. This 
reflects the ubiquitous dispute concerning Hobbes’ private citizen (1651) and Rousseau’s social 
justice (1762). The core tenets of contractarianism include shareholder primacy, anti-regulation, 
individualism, and free market (Millon, 1993, p. 1383). Contracts specify all rights and obligations 
(Millon, 1993, p. 1378). In accepting classical Hobbesian social contract theory, citizens acquiesce to 
‘accepted’ State constraints provided that individuals are autonomous and free from external, non-
consensual restraint:  
 
Legal rules that redistribute wealth, mandate particular forms of behaviour, or prevent people from 
making bargains they would otherwise choose to make are presumptively objectionable because they 
interfere with people’s ability to live their own lives according to their own preferences, structuring 
their relationships with others and defining their duties toward them by means of consent (Millon, 
1993, p. 1382). 
 
69
 Social reality exists as an ‘objective reality’ independent of human accounts (Chua, 1986, p. 607). 
There is subject/object dualism and there is ‘truth’ to objects irrespective of human ‘constructions’. 
Positivists recognise little of the socially constructed nature of the world and the role of the 
researcher in research, findings, and presentation (Davies, 2002, p. 36).   
 
70
 Positivists commit to ‘value–free research’, providing technical answers to pre-conceived questions, in 
a value-free account of the world. In a means-end dichotomy, researchers do not comment on ends, 
as ends are ‘value judgments’, and as values are a matter of taste, they cannot be discussed rationally: 
ends are wholly subjective. Thus, researchers technically provide the means to the ends through 
employing scientific methods to rid an individual of subjectivity (Chua, 1986, p. 610; Hart, 1965, p. 
110-125; Davies, 2002, p. 24). 
 
71
 Consequently, as society is a rational enterprise, there is a reliance on expert research. PAT and 
contractarians are ‘experts’. See Millon’s (1993) depiction of contractarianism, which invoke agency 
theory principles from accounting, and PATs depiction of agency theory and the notion of ‘contract’, 
which draws on legal definitions (Moore, 1991). 
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Positivist researchers concentrate on explaining social phenomena, but accept the status 
quo and structures as given.72  
 
 There are three reasons for the inappropriateness of positivism in this thesis:  
a)  First, this research is not about explaining and predicting likely outcomes 
of regulatory use of cost accounting. Although the thesis explains current 
regulation, it is focused on a historical, political, social, and cultural 
mediated depiction of shifting telecommunications regulation. There are 
no pre-conceived ends here: the goal is not to identify the means to 
achieve those ends, the best costing method to achieve a particular 
regulatory goal or how best to measure costs within a particular regulatory 
costing methodology;   
 
b) Second, given the arbitrariness and choice inherent within costing, 
accounting, regulation, law, and their interfaces are socially constructed. 
Hence, it is inappropriate to separate objects from subjects, and deny the 
politically constructed processes of accounting, law, regulation, dependent 
on human actors; and  
 
c) Third, as the ‘political interface’ is vital, the theoretical and 
methodological approach must consider the role of language and rhetoric 
about costs in constructing the social world, subjects’ positions, and their 
identity.  
 
However, before developing these critiques, the influence of positivism on law 
and accounting is outlined: 
a)  The paradigm shift in accounting to positivism was a response to 
normativism. Positivists challenged the evaluative capacity of 
normativism by focusing on explanation and prediction. Watts and 
Zimmerman popularised PAT by claiming it:  
                                                 
72
 These theoretical foundations relate to modernity:  
 
1) This relates to modernity’s acceptance of master and meta-narratives of history, culture 
and national identity, as myths of cultural and ethnic origin are similarly ‘given’ (Cilliers, 
1998, p. 113; Skinner, 2006, p. 4; Wright, 2004).  
2) There is faith in totalising explanations of history, science and culture (Skinner, 2006, p. 
1), and in “Grand Theory” representing and explaining all knowledge. For example, PAT 
searches for law-like generalisations (Chua, 1986, p. 608), and provides the logic behind 
the discourse of representative samples, validity (external and internal), and 
generalisablility. Equally, the logic of contractarianism provides a rationale for ‘all’ 
human action (Millon, 1993). 
3) There is a master narrative of progress through science and technology (Friedman, 2001, 
p. 501). Thus, positivists focus on ‘scientific’ modes of inquiry, such as the hypothetico-
deductive model (Chua, 1986) or hold that accounting and law are ‘like physical science’ 
(see Lloyd, 1983 and Chua, 1986). 
4) Law and accounting replicate Durkheim’s “cult of the individual” (1938; 1952; 1964) 
through rationalism, wealth maximisation, and agency theory (through positive contract 
theory).  
 - 117 - 
…. is concerned with explaining accounting practice. It is designed to explain 
and predict which firms will and which firms will not use a particular method 
… but it says nothing as to which method a firm should use (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986, p. 7).   
 
Positivism became the dominant research paradigm in accounting (Watts, 
1995, p. 299). Agency theory focuses on how accounting can facilitate 
relationships between individuals who provide resources to the 
organisation and those who manage the resources explains the necessity 
for information and controls (Deegan, 2006, p. 218). Important theoretical 
influences within PAT include the Efficient Markets, bonus, debt, and 
political cost hypotheses.   
 
b)  The influence of positivism in law stretches back to jurisprudes including 
Locke (Cotterell, 1992, p. 15). The fundamental notion of legal positivism 
is that “[l]aw is … both prescriptive norm and descriptive fact” (Cotterell, 
1992, p. 8). Law is prescriptive because it specifies how subjects should 
behave, while descriptive because only effective prescriptions affect “the 
way people think or behave” (Cotterell, 1992, p. 10; Hart, 1965, p. 113; 
Himma; 2003, p. 153; Raz, 1992, p. 56).73 For positivists, valid law is the 
sum of a set of social facts: it is a social creation or artefact (Hart, 1965, p. 
92; Adler, 2006, p. 730; Himma, 2004, p. 717). However, legal positivists, 
like their accounting counterparts, maintain a strict conceptual separation 
between law and morality (Hart, 1965, p. 180; Himma, 2004; Sebok, 
2004, p. 30, Austin, 1995, p. 29), e.g. Hart denies, “laws reproduce or 
satisfy certain demands of morality” (1965, pp. 181-182). 
 
The influence of positivism on law and accounting has resulted in a common 
focus on describing a world consisting of objective fact-nets due to an objectivist 
epistemology and realist ontology. However, there are differences over objectivity: 
accounting maintains a strict separation between subject and object whereas legal 
positivists hold that law is an accepted social creation that takes on objective 
characteristics (Davies, 2002, p. 35). However, positivism in both disciplines maintains 
a separation between means and ends, seeing morality and ethics as subjective and 
                                                 
73
 Legal positivism develops legal formalism (the dominant legal doctrine from 1850-1930). Legal 
formalism encapsulates the scientific method of law (Cotterell, 1993, p. 56) and holds that law is 
logical and internally coherent, with legal decisions deducible by formal reasoning (Cotterell, 1993, 
p. 11; Frank, 1970, p. 133). Formalists are indifferent to substantive justice, as “moral standards, 
ethical behaviour and, crucially, questions of justice are eliminated from legal reasoning” (Adelman 
& Foster, p. 3; Cotterell, 1993, p. 58). For a formalist, law is a rational and scientific discourse, as an 
“expression of a conscious desire to understand and control the material world” (Adelman & Foster, 
pp. 2-3). Thus, legal positivism develops legal formalism, as legal positivism theorises from a legal 
system’s viewpoint, while legal formalism theorises the judge’s standpoint (Hasnas, 1995, p. 91). 
Formalists stress the internal coherence of the law (Adelman & Foster, p. 1), while positivists stress 
law’s ultimate source, such as the “rule of recognition” (Hart, 1965, p. 92). Nevertheless, the ‘basic 
function of law’ is the provision of an accountable mechanism for dispute resolution (Cotterell, 1992, 
pp. 58-59).  
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consequently, incapable of rational discussion (Cotterell, 1992, p. 60; Chua, 1986, p. 
60).  
 
Although the influence of positivism is similar, there are three major 
differences: 
1) Legal positivism recognises the prescriptive side of positivism, seeing one 
of law’s functions as prescribing acceptable social behaviour. PAT 
reluctantly accepted this effect (see Arrington & Schweiker, 1993 and 
Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Legal positivists use the prescriptive nature 
of law to demonstrate the descriptive facts about how laws affect social 
behaviour (‘successfully’) (Cotterell, 1992, p. 8). 
 
2) Legal positivism acknowledges social influences on the development of 
law, seeing law as a ‘social artefact’.74 PAT has been less forthcoming, 
requiring the insight of post-positivists.75 Both disciplines incorporate 
objectivism, but slightly differently: successful laws constitute objective 
facts; in accounting, facts ‘exist’ (Hart, 1965; Chua, 1986); and  
 
3)  Despite a common focus on grand theorising (a tenet of modernism), the 
method of deducing these theories is different. PAT is influenced by 
scientific methods of discovery, particularly the hypothetico-deductive 
model and the generation of law-like generalisations (Chua, 1986, p. 608). 
Law, however, is little influenced by scientific methods, and although it is 
interested in grand theorising, this was developed largely devoid of 
methodological focus (see Cotterell, 1992; and Davies, 2002). 
                                                 
74
 There is an historical issue worth recognising. PAT developed as a response to normativism in 
accounting theory. Thus, there is a focus on the status quo. Legal positivism developed, in part, as a 
response to the dominance of the Church on law and natural law, which held that God was the Divine 
source of law. In holding to its modernist tenets, legal positivism held that law was a product of man, 
not God, and thus was more accepting of the social influence on law (Davies, 2002).  
 
75
 Positivism’s link to empirical science continues to be strong, as research is still about discovery, rather 
than ascription of meaning. However, three important ‘post-positivist’ trends challenge “naïve 
positivism”: 
 
1) The theory-laden nature of observation challenges the researcher’s ability to be 
‘objective’ in observation (Chalmers, 1982, p. 24). The researcher’s subjectivity affects 
the ability to mirror observable data as it happens and there are no ‘brute’ facts but 
merely partial observations.  
2) Post-positivists are more comfortable with competing ‘interpretations’ of observable 
data, as competing theories consistent with available evidence may exist; positivists 
should not succumb too readily to the “tyranny of prevailing concepts” (Chalmers, 1982, 
p. 60).  
3) ‘Convenient fictions’ are vital. As not all things are observable, parts of the scientific 
discourse could be unacceptable, such as the theory of gravity. Thus, although it is 
impossible to observe gravity directly, it is possible to observe gravity’s effects. Thus, 
convenient fictions constitute ‘facts’ that are not directly observable (Chalmers, 1982, p. 
129). 
 
These constitute attempts by positivism to move forward and respond to the challenges from different 
paradigmatic and scientific groups. However, the core theoretical framework remains the same and 
remains inappropriate for this thesis.  
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Equally, the epistemological and ontological assumptions of positivism have had 
a strong limiting effect on law and accounting: 
1) Positivism initially provided a strong intellectual stimulus for accounting 
research but its rationality and rhetoric caused concern amongst 
accounting academics (see Arrington & Francis 1989; 1993; Arrington & 
Puxty, 1991; Arrington & Schweiker, 1992; and Chua, 1986). For some, 
positivism stifled accounting research (Christenson, 1983; Sterling, 1990; 
Williams, 1989; Chambers, 1993; and Deegan, 2006) as many accounting 
researchers saw it as the only way to research (Deegan, 2006, p. 256), e.g. 
consider the dominance of positivist accounting journals in the USA 
(Arrington & Schweiker, 1993); it restricted acceptable research methods 
and topics (Deegan, 2006, p. 258) by failing to accept that some methods 
are only applicable for certain topics, and finally, it judged other 
paradigmatic research by PAT criteria, irrespective of the underlying 
epistemology or ontology (Deegan, 2006, p. 259). Thus, PAT is critiqued 
as scientifically flawed; a dead philosophical movement (Christenson, 
1983, p. 7); imperiously dictatorial; empty and commonplace; a cottage 
industry; wasted effort (Sterling, 1990, pp. 97, 121, 130, 132); as logically 
incoherent (Williams, 1989, p. 459); marred by oversights, inconsistencies 
and paradoxes; and responsible for turning back the research clock 1000 
years (Chambers, 1993, pp. 1, 22). Christenson comments that: 
 
We are told … that ‘we can only expect a positive theory to hold on average’ 
… By arguing that their theories admit exceptions, Watts and Zimmerman 
condemn them as insignificant and useless (Christenson, 1983, p. 18). 
 
Sterling continues: 
 
[PAT] cannot rise above giving the same answers because it restricts itself to 
the descriptive questions … What are the potential achievements [of PAT]? I 
forecast more of the same: twenty years from now we will have been 
inundated with research reports that managers and others tend to manipulate 
accounting numerals when it is their advantage to do so (Sterling, 1990, p. 
130).  
 
Tinker, Merino and Neimark (1982) and Tinker (1988) examined the 
normative origins of PAT, and Arrington and Schweiker argue that 
researchers, including positivists, use rhetoric: 
 
Even the most strident of positivists cannot advance knowledge claims about 
accounting without a great deal of rhetorical effect. Why? The answer to that 
question resides in carrying out the implications of Watts & Zimmerman’s 
(1986) correct claim that ‘empirical research is not a question of discovering 
facts about accounting and auditing’ (p. ix). The indeterminacy of ‘facts’ of 
accounting relates to rhetoric through recognition of the linguistic character of 
knowledge … Language, not ‘facts’, is thus the empirical stuff of knowledge. 
This simple, all too obvious, fact – that knowledge can only be linguistic – 
avoids a great deal of confusion and a bit of scholarly pretence about the 
nature of accounting knowledge (Arrington & Schweiker, 1993, p. 516) 
[Emphasis in original].  
 
In response, Watts and Zimmerman conceded certain arguments; they 
confessed to PATs normativity (Arrington & Puxty, 1991, p. 33) and that 
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positivist research cannot be value-free (Deegan, 2006, p. 256) given the 
self-interest paradox: 
 
Researchers choose the topics to investigate, the methods to use, and the 
assumptions to make. Researchers’ preferences and expected payoffs 
(publications and citations) affect their choice of topic, methods, and 
assumptions (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990, p. 266). 
 
b)  Despite liberating law from the effects of the Church, legal positivism has 
also been constraining, particularly by separating morality and law. It is 
criticised for its ‘scientific’ view of law and for ignoring influences like 
history, politics, public policy, and coercion (Frank, 1970; Cotterell, 1992; 
Cohen, 1935; Davies, 2002). Critics claimed that positivism downplayed 
the role of ‘man’ in creating and interpreting law (Cardozo, 1990; Davies, 
2002) and law could not be neutral due to the influence of politics, 
society, and economics (Frank, 1970; Cohen, 1935; Davies, 2002). 
Millon’s communitarianism criticises legal positivism for subordinating 
interested stakeholders: shareholder wealth maximisation requires 
employees, the environment, and the community to be conceptualised in a 
manner enabling the corporation to maximise wealth irrespective of 
broader social costs. Millon argues:  
 
… life chances should not depend entirely on accidents of birth and 
bargaining power: people are entitled to more out of life than what they can 
pay for (Millon, 1993, p. 1383).  
 
Equally, ‘efficiency’ is incomplete: 
 
References to efficiency simply beg the underlying question of why efficiency 
should provide the sole normative criterion. As a society, we have not 
embraced the market as a totalising model for the definition of rights and 
responsibilities (Millon, 1993, p. 1386). 
 
In summary: 
 
[j]ustice does not require endorsement of the existing distribution of wealth 
and bargaining capability (Millon, 1993, p. 1386).  
 
  
 These critiques noting the ‘stifling’ effect of positivism provide three reasons for 
rejecting positivism as an appropriate paradigm for this thesis. 
 
A Evaluating Positivism and the Interface of Law and Accounting 
 
Watts and Zimmerman are merely Hobbes in drag (attributed to Arrington by Williams) 
 
First, the research goal is not to explain and predict seeing “accounting [a]s 
teleological action” (Arrington & Puxty, 1991, p. 31), but rather “the relation between 
accounting action and human interests” concerns this thesis (Arrington & Puxty, 1991, 
p. 31). The desire is to analyse and challenge the interface of law and accounting 
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exemplified in the adoption of cost accounting as a regulatory tool. Second, PAT’s view 
of ‘accounting as teleological’ justifies the move from positivism, as this thesis focuses 
on the arbitrariness and choice inherent within cost. It maintains that costing, 
accounting, regulation, law, and their interface is socially constructed and it is 
inappropriate to separate objects and subjects. Third, ‘social facts’ are rhetorically and 
discursively constructed, and accounting, law, and regulation play a vital role in the 
rhetorical construction and maintenance of social facts. Positivist methodology sadly 
does not accept such a position despite telecommunication regulation being political. 
This is particularly with respect to the public good nature of telecommunications, where 
in a communitarian sense, the regulatory environment guarantees a universal level of 
service provision to those that would otherwise not have access to telecommunications 
services. Society may not have access to this level of service provision without 
regulation, and this reinforces Millon’s claim that “people are entitled to more out of 
life than what they can pay for” (1993, p. 1383).  
 
 In summary, the preceding sections identified the theoretical tenets of PAT, 
noting links to modernism, legal positivism, and contractarianism. The critiques of 
positivism demonstrated its inappropriateness for this thesis. Communitarian 
approaches suggest that a socially oriented theoretical framework might be suitable; 
consequently, the theoretical underpinnings of interpretivism need examination. 
 
III WHY INTERPRETIVISM IN LAW AND ACCOUNTING IS AN 
INAPPROPRIATE PARADIGM 
 
Interpretivism generates ‘in-depth’ social and cultural understandings of social 
phenomena. There is an ‘interpretivist’ influence in this thesis but interpretivism is 
rejected as a theoretical framework because it avoids normative propositions and 
judgment (Crotty, 1998). Interpretivist research seeks understanding by describing 
‘what is’ (verstehen) and its tools provide a unique examination of social phenomenon. 
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For interpretivists, ‘verstehen’ refers to social constructionism, an epistemological 
assumption that subjects construct the meaning of objects. For Crotty, constructionism: 
is the view that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is 
contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction 
between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an 
essentially social context (Crotty, 1998, p. 42) [emphasis in original]. 
 
Constructionism is not creationism (subjectivism) and it does not deny that objects 
exist, but rather that subjects construct meaning: 
Meaning does not inhere in the object, merely waiting for someone to call upon it 
... the world and objects in the world are indeterminate … actual meaning emerges 
only when consciousness engages with them … We need to remind ourselves here 
that it is human beings who have construed it as a tree, given it the name, and 
attributed to it the associations we make with trees (Crotty, 1998, pp. 42-43). 
 
Human beings construct meanings as they engage with the world they are interpreting, 
so ‘meaning’ is both “objective” and “subjective”: 
The world and objects in the world may be in themselves meaningless; yet they are 
our partners in the generation of meaning and need to be taken seriously ... 
objectivity and subjectivity need to be brought together and held together 
indissolubly. Constructionism does precisely that (Crotty, 1998, p. 43-44). 
 
 
Consequently, no true or valid interpretation exists, but rather there are a 
multitude of interpretations: “useful”, “liberating”, “fulfilling”, or “rewarding” 
interpretations (Crotty, 1998, pp. 47-48). Interpretivists seek understanding by 
“examining culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-
world” (Crotty, 1998, p. 66). Culture is a key theoretical tenet, for “without culture we 
could not function … [c]ulture is best seen as the source rather than the result of human 
thought and behaviour” (Crotty, 1998, p. 53):  
It is clearly not the case that individuals encounter phenomena in the world and 
make sense of them one by one. Instead, we are all born into a world of meaning. 
We enter a social milieu in which a “system of intelligibility” prevails … a 
“system of significant symbols”. For each of us, when we first see the world in 
meaningful fashion, we are inevitably viewing it through lenses bestowed upon us 
by a culture. Our culture brings things into view for us and endows them with 
meaning and, by the same token, leads us to ignore other things. The social 
constructionism we are talking about here is all-encompassing and we need to be 
careful not to restrict its ambit … All reality, as meaningful reality, is socially 
constructed. There is no exception (Crotty, 1998, p. 54).   
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Ontologically, Crotty acknowledges that constructionism is both realist and relativist. It 
is consistent with realism for not denying existence, hence positivist researchers that 
contrast ‘constructionism’ with ‘realism’ “are wide of the mark” (Crotty, 1998, pp. 63-
64). Equally, constructionism is relativist as claims to “‘the way things are’ are really 
just ‘the sense we make of them’” (Crotty, 1998, p. 64). Thus, a socially constructed 
world is realist and relativist, as “different worlds constitute for them diverse ways of 
knowing, distinguishable sets of meanings, separate realities” (Crotty, 1998, p. 64).   
 
The most common strands of interpretivist research include ethnography, 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, and action research: 
a) Ethnography focuses on the meaning of experience, which requires an 
exploration of culture, and interaction through symbolic interactionism. 
Ethnographers interact through understanding ‘significant symbols’ that 
humans share and through which they communicate. Thus, through 
dialogue, researchers can become aware of individual and social group 
perceptions, attitudes, and feelings. Crucially, in considering ‘what is’, 
culture is not questioned, nor criticised, due to the risk of cultural 
relativism. An ethnographic researcher seeks to observe as closely as 
possible, and become an insider, compiling ethnographic material through 
various methods, including dramaturgical; games; negotiated-order; 
labelling; and grounded theory (Crotty, 1998, pp. 76-78).  
 
b) Phenomenology “… is a reflective enterprise, and in its reflection it is 
critical” (Larrabee, 1990, p. 201), encouraging us to return to the ‘things 
themselves’, those phenomena present in our consciousness. Predominant 
phenomenological schools include the Hegelian (1807), Husserlian 
(1931), and Heideggerian (1954). Hegel’s “dialectical phenomenology” 
understands phenomena as ‘conscious experience’, whereby exploring our 
understandings provides a means of grasping the “absolute, logical, 
ontological and metaphysical Spirit behind phenomena” (Hegel, 1807). 
Husserl’s “transcendental phenomenology” challenges the researcher to 
take the intuitive experience of phenomena present in conscious 
experience and extract the essential features of experience (Husserl, 
1931). Finally, Heidegger’s “existential phenomenology” relates to 
“Dasein” (1954), where phenomenology is a technique to apprehend the 
Being behind all beings.76 The main phenomenological dispute concerns 
epistemology (Hegel) and ontology (Heidegger).77 Phenomenology 
                                                 
76
 Chapter five discusses ontology and the ontic. 
 
77
 Heidegger argued that philosophy was more fundamental than science itself. For Heidegger, 
phenomenology is a metaphysical ontology, as: 
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concerns consciousness: when the mind “knows” something, it embraces 
the object. In directing consciousness towards the object, consciousness 
shapes the object. 
 
c) Hermeneutics is the study of theories of interpreting texts (Crotty, 1998). 
Key theorists include Schleiermacher (1998), Dilthey (1910), and 
Heidegger (1971). Schleiermacher concentrated on ‘understanding’ 
human texts and communication, as reading text is similar to listening to a 
speaker (Crotty, 1998, p. 93). Dilthey “relat[ed] interpretation to all 
historical objectification”, in that historical consciousness characterises 
our world and us within the world (Dilthey, 1910, p. 4). Interpreting text 
involves a mediated understanding “of articulating what is expressed in 
the work” (Dilthey, 1910, p. 11). Heidegger’s ‘phenomenological 
hermeneutics’ shifts the focus to “existential understanding” (Heidegger, 
1962, pp. 62), as a more ‘authentic’, direct, and unmediated way of being 
in the world. In challenging positivism, Heidegger’s existential 
hermeneutics argues that texts cannot be examined through scientific 
methods, as texts are “conventionalised expressions of the experience of 
the author” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 363). Consequently, interpreting texts 
illuminates something about social context and allows the reader to share 
the author’s experiences (Heidegger, 1971, p. 13). 
 
d)  Action research focuses on increasing social science knowledge, by 
aiming to improve strategies, practices, and knowledge with researchers 
and institutions reflectively solving problems. Rapoport argues that:  
 
Action research aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in 
an immediate problematic situation and to the goals of social science by joint 
collaboration within a mutually acceptable ethical framework (Rapoport, 
1970, p. 499). 
 
This definition emphasises the collaborative nature of action research, as 
well as the potential ethical challenges of action research. Different 
theories include participatory action research, action science, and co-
operative inquiry (Reason & Bradbury, 2006)  
 
 
Therefore, interpretivists seek a culturally mediated understanding of objects, 
subjects, and their interaction in socially constructing the meaning of their world. 
Ethnography, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and action research provide research 
platforms that allow researchers to gain this deep understanding of the social world.  
There are subtle differences between interpretivism within law and accounting. 
Both have a common focus on understanding within a social and cultural context. 
                                                                                                                                               
being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy … Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be 
the theme of ontology, and it our way of giving it deconstructive precision. Only as phenomenology is 
ontology possible (Heidegger, 1962, p. 60).  
 
Husserl accepted that philosophy was a scientific discipline. For Husserl, Heidegger’s work is “neither 
ontology nor phenomenology, but merely abstract anthropology” (Husserl, 1970, p. 79). 
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However the adoption of universal principles such as justice, ‘best’, and community 
within legal interpretivism import an evaluative dimension largely absent from 
interpretivist work in accounting (Davies, 2002). These evaluative principles of justice, 
best, and community are not ‘critically evaluative’, but evaluate whether law serves 
community political and social ends (Dworkin, 1996). As Chapter three indicated, 
interpretivist management accounting research focuses on understanding the 
implementation and effects of tools and techniques in a social, cultural, organisational, 
or institutional context. Baxter and Chua’s review of ‘alternative management 
accounting research’ 1976-1999 draws out interpretive research trends (2003):78  
a) The non-rational design school focuses on questioning presumptions of 
rationality in organisational choice, arguing that organisational goals are 
unstable, that the search for alternatives to problems is local and limited, 
and that the process of analysis and choice may be politically motivated, 
incrementally routinised by procedures, or more fortuitous than 
considered (Baxter & Chua, 2003, p. 98);  
 
b) The naturalistic approach focuses on investigating management practice in 
its “everyday” organisational context. Baxter and Chua consider this 
fragmented research due to a proliferation of research examining unique 
tools and techniques (2003, p. 99); 
 
c) Institutional theory focuses on socially-generated rules to explain 
collective behaviour through sociology and organisational theory. It 
concentrates on developing “cognitive and cultural explanations of 
institutions, focusing on the meaning and accomplishment of various rules 
that structure behaviour in organisations and society” (Baxter & Chua, 
2003, p. 100); and  
 
d) Finally, Giddens’ structuration theory conceptualises the interconnection 
between individual agency and the reproduction of social structures. 
Within management accounting, “accounting systems are seen as ways of 
regularising organisational functioning across time and space” (Baxter & 
Chua, 2003, p. 101).  
 
Consequently, interpretivist management accounting research focuses on understanding 
the contextual implementation and effects of tools and techniques. While there is an 
evaluative dimension, it concentrates on the implementation of tools in relation to 
                                                 
78
 Given the focus on problematising cost-based accounting regulation, Baxter & Chua’s (2003) 
categorisation of alternative management accounting research serves a useful purpose, representing 
relevant epistemological and ontological research traditions. 
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underlying theory or context rather than examining whether the accounting technology 
‘best’ serves the ends of the context.  
 
Legal interpretivism differs in that it focuses on the act of interpretation 
when applying law. The key legal interpretivist is Dworkin (1977; 1982; 1983; 
1984; 1985; 1986; 1996). Law focuses on constructing legal rights and duties to 
best justify communal political practices. Dworkin argues that interpretation is 
fundamental to the nature of law and its application requires sensitivity to 
applicable values (Brink, 2001). The ‘act of interpretation’ in legal interpretivism 
concentrates on:  
a) What determines legal rights and duties? Interpretivism is about the nature 
of law. It views the propositions of law as true as they reflect a 
community’s political or social practices; 
 
b) What determines the content of the law? The focus is on examining and 
explaining the current legal state; 
 
c) The interpretive practice of law: “The interpretivist says that it is in virtue 
of the fact that our rights and duties ought to flow from past political 
decisions that they flow from them; or that, more abstractly, legal duties 
ought to be determined by social practices that they do” (Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy). 
 
Thus, Dworkin provides a rich framework for considering legal practice, the legal 
community, and the interrelationship between law, cultures, and society. However, as 
the following section explains, interpretivism is inappropriate for this thesis.  
 
A Evaluating Interpretivism and the Interface of Law and Accounting 
 
Crucially, the interpretivist paradigm accepts the socially constructed nature of 
reality. The cultural and historical mediation of accounting and cost, the 
telecommunications regulatory environment, and interested actors are important to this 
thesis. Interpretivism is an important break from positivism but it still has an 
overwhelming focus on understanding ‘what is’ at the expense of broader evaluation: 
e.g. interpretivist accounting tends to concentrate on understanding (and evaluating) the 
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implementation of an accounting technology but may not examine its normative aspects 
(Baxter & Chua, 2003). Equally, though legal interpretivism recognises the link 
between law and politics, the ends of politics are left unexamined (Davies, 2002).  
Given the desire to examine both means and ends and to examine the political, 
interpretivism is not an appropriate research paradigm. Specifically, it has four 
limitations: 
1) The social construction thesis requires social actors to be constantly 
negotiating meanings attributed to objects and subjects. This implies that 
social actors engage in continuous reflection and monitoring of their 
conduct. In short, this is idealistic and perhaps impossible. Social 
groupings change and negotiate new meanings to the social world but this 
tends to be ad hoc and gradual (Crotty, 1998, p 80). This thesis examines 
how power imbalances and politics attack the construction of new 
meanings centred on cost. Some social groupings are ignored or excluded, 
and meanings are challenged when it is politically convenient; 
 
2) The double hermeneutic problem illustrates that reality expressed in the 
language of social actors is problematic as interpretivists can only 
interpret the interpretations of others. As Mead’s ethnographic research in 
Samoa illustrated, there are limits to how individuals interpret their social 
world, which can produce misleading research (Mead, 1928; Mead 1972). 
This research seeks in-depth understanding of the social landscape 
surrounding telecommunications regulation, cost, and the interface of law 
and accounting, but it wishes to break this ‘hermeneutic circle’ to engage 
in evaluation and critique;79  
 
3) Interpretivism fails to acknowledge the role and power of institutional 
structures. Interpretivists should be more interested in the historicity of 
structures, and not merely the structures that social actors believe they 
created. This thesis wishes to reflect on the genealogy of 
telecommunications regulation in NZ and cost accounting as structures, 
and the political and rhetorical construction of concepts by social actors 
(be they lawyers, accountants, regulators, or industry players); and 
 
4) Hence, interpretivism is seen as inherently conservative by avoiding 
judgment, and possible sources of social change. Moreover, it can only 
account for the present without providing an account of historical change, 
whereas the forthcoming genealogical and political analysis of 
telecommunications regulation will examine the various influences on 
social change.  
 
 
                                                 
79
 See Chapter six for the logics of critical explanation which ‘resolve’ the problem of the double 
hermeneutic. 
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 The preceding sections canvassed the theoretical tenets of interpretivism, the 
implications of social constructionism, and interpretivist research methods. While 
accounting and legal interpretivist research reflects the socially constructed nature of 
ideas, its focus on understanding and lack of judgement renders it inappropriate for this 
thesis. This suggests that critical theory may provide a better framework. This is 
examined below.  
 
IV CRITICAL THEORY 
 
Society is only present in human action, and human action always expresses and 
uses some or other social form.  Neither can, however, be identified with or reduced 
to the other (Chua, 1986, p. 610). 
 
Critical studies in law and accounting share similar theoretical foundations. 
Chua depicts critical theory tenets as: 
a) Human beings have unfulfilled inner potentialities:  
 
… every state of existence, be it an individual or society, possesses 
historically constituted potentialities that are unfulfilled. Everything is 
because of what it is and what it is not (its potentiality) … human potentiality 
is restricted by prevailing systems of domination which alienate people from 
self-realisation. These material blockages operate both at the level of 
consciousness and through material economic and political relations (Chua, 
1986, p. 619). 
 
Structural and social restrictions include our taken-for-granted beliefs 
about acceptable social practices, ideologies, and through “rules governing 
social exchange and [wealth distribution]” (Chua, 1986, p. 619).  
 
b) “Social reality is, thus, both subjectively created and objectively real” 
(Chua, 1986, p. 620). Although subjects can construct reality, objects 
appear ‘objectively’ separate as subjects forget (or are prevented from 
remembering) that they play an active role in constructing meaning. 
 
c) Human intention, rationality, agency, and truth are critically analysed as a 
product of their historical and material context (Chua, 1986, p. 620). Chua 
argues that: 
 
Reality as a whole, as well as each particular part, is understood as developing 
out of an earlier stage of its existence and evolving into something else. 
Indeed, every state of existence is apprehended only through movement and 
change, and the identity of particular phenomenon can only be uncovered by 
reconstructing the process whereby the entity transforms itself (Chua, 1986, p. 
620). 
 
d) There is a focus on identifying power and power imbalances:  
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Fundamental conflict is endemic to society. Conflict arises because of 
injustice and ideology in the social, economic, and political domains which 
obscures the creative dimension in people (Chua, 1986, p. 622).  
 
e) Critical analysis identifies and challenges domination and ideological 
practices, through historical, ethnographical and case study: 
 
Thus, like the interpretive researcher, it is accepted that social scientists need 
to learn the language of their subject/object. The process of coming to an 
understanding is also agreed to be context-dependent as social scientists are 
necessarily immersed in and engaged with their socio-historical contexts. 
However, critical researchers argue that interpretation per se is insufficient. It 
cannot appreciate that the world is not only symbolically mediated, but it is 
also shaped by material conditions of domination. Language itself may be a 
medium for repression and social power (Chua, 1986, p. 621). 
 
There is an over-arching concern with social change by demonstrating that objectivity 
and social norms are products of domination and ideology.  
1 Critical Theory and Methods 
 
Critical scholars focus on de-reifying the ‘taken for granted nature’ of social life 
and institutions: e.g. Sherer and Arrington (1989) identified and critiqued the embedded 
masculinity in calculating accounting income. This de-reification exposes inequality 
and injustice within accounting in an effort to transform accounting. Critical research 
employs research methods to unpack the ‘taken for granted’ nature of social order, 
structures, and practices, by highlighting how social structures and practices dominate 
and alienate social actors from realising their full potential (Kincheloe & McLaren, 
1994, p. 140). Therefore, critical theorists employ interpretivist research methods 
including ethnography, participant observation, interviews, discourse analysis, 
grounded theory, and case studies but the intended analysis differs. Common critical 
theory research methods include: 
a) Historical analysis is used to unpack historical conditions of social reality 
so as to understand social concepts and the effects of a set of historical and 
social conditions (Chua, 1986, p. 620).  
 
b) Dialectical analysis uncovers oppressive forces in society by exposing 
contradictions in the reasoning of opposing forces. Through the dialectic 
of opposition, individuals and groups become aware of oppressive forces 
and can challenge the existing state of affairs.  
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c) Ideology critique examines the economic, social, cultural, and political 
conditions of ‘political’ statements and actions to identify the effects of 
dominant ideologies on social life. In particular, it aims to expose the 
embedded nature of dominant ideologies in everyday situations and 
practices. Ideology critique penetrates everyday reality to reveal the 
‘fundamental conflicts of interest’, inequities and oppression that are 
endemic to the existing social order (Chua, 1986, p. 621). 
 
 
The following section focuses on the disciplinary application of critical theory.  
 
A Critical Accounting 
 
Critical accounting challenges the dominant view that accounting is “an 
objective, value-free, technical enterprise, representing reality ‘as is’” (Morgan, 1988, p. 
477). Critical accountants argue that accounting: 
a) developed as a tool for the maintenance and continuation of the power 
relationships within society; 
 
b) is a social and technical process in ‘itself’; 
 
c) is subject to contextual and cultural variation between accountants and 
accountings; and  
 
d) discourse creates and sanctions conceptions of ‘truth’. 
 
In illustrating the norm-shaping potential of accounting, critical accounting research 
questions the “very foundations of accounting knowledge” (Neimark, 1990, p. 105). 
Critical accountants aim to: 
[t]ear accounting from its foundations in modernist/Enlightenment ontology and 
epistemology and to situate accounting in the world of lived experience as both a 
product of social construction and as an architect of social experience (Neimark, 
1990, p. 106). 
 
In demonstrating the powerful discourse of accounting, critical accountants expose how 
accounting dehumanises human beings by reducing social relations to measurable, 
countable entities, by excluding them from measurement, or by ignoring broader social 
and environmental issues.  
In critiquing the positivist paradigm and practice of accounting, critical accounting 
argued that:  
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accounting, far from being a practice that provides a neutral or unbiased 
representation of underlying economic facts, actually provides the means of 
maintaining the powerful positions of some sectors of the community (those 
currently in power, and with wealth) while holding back the position and interests 
of those without wealth. These theorists challenge any perspectives which suggest 
that various rights and privileges are spread throughout society – instead they 
argue that most rights, opportunities and associated power reside in a small (but 
perhaps well-defined) elite (Deegan, 2006, p. 456). 
 
Consequently, critical accounting developed diverse challenges to accounting, 
accountants, and their social and political effects:  
a)  Critical accountants demonstrate that partisan nature of accounting by 
examining the role of accounting in constructing and legitimising 
structures and the social. Researchers “seek to highlight, oppose, and 
change the perceived role of accounting in supporting the privileged 
positions of some people in society (Deegan, 2006, p. 458; Baker & 
Bettner, 1997; Hines, 1988; 1991, Hopper et al, 1995; Rieter, 1995); 
 
b)  Critical accountants challenge “the legitimacy of neoclassical theories of 
interests” (Arrington & Puxty, 1991, p. 34) by demonstrating the influence 
of social theory debates including “welfare economics, the sociology of 
professions, and social, moral, and political philosophy” (Arrington & 
Puxty, 1991, p. 34):  
 
Instead of assuming a basic harmony of interests in society which permits an 
unproblematic view of the social value of accounting reports, a political 
economy of accounting would treat value as essentially contested, with 
accounting reports operating in specific interests (e.g. of elites and classes) 
(Cooper & Sherer, 1984, p. 218). 
 
Political economy demonstrates that accounting is interested and a 
contestable social practice (Tinker, 1980, Tinker, Merino & Neimark, 
1982, Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Armstrong, 1985, Neimark, 1986; 
Arrington & Francis, 1988, Lavoie, 1987);  
 
c) Marxist critical accountants illustrate that accounting is a powerful tool for 
the maintenance and enhancement of power and wealth of capital. Marxist 
research suggests that power and wealth are unstable and owners of 
capital act to protect their privileges, power, and wealth. (Bryer, 1993; 
1994; 1995; 1999a; 1999b; Chiapello, 2003; Cooper & Taylor, 2000; 
Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996; Macve, 1981; 1999; Marsden, 1997; 1998; 
1999; Puxty, 1986; 1991; Tinker, 1980; 1985; 1999; 2001; 2005);  
 
d) Critical social and environmental accountants like Gray, Owen and Adams 
argue that social and environmental accounting is often guilty of accepting 
the status quo and failing to examine structural and social equities (Gray, 
Owen & Adams, 1996, p. 47). This ‘passive acceptance’ reinforces the 
status quo (Puxty, 1991; Hopper & Powell, 1985). Critical accountants 
question social and environmental ‘interventions’ arguing that they are 
‘captured and subverted’ by the corporate world (Tinker & Gray, 2003);  
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e) Various critical accountants interrogate the interrelationship between 
social practices and accounting (primarily from a non-Marxist 
perspective). Particular social issues and practices examined include: 
 
i) Deep Ecologists concentrate on the trade-off between “economic 
performance and ecological damage - they question the morality of 
systems that justify the extinction of species on the basis of associated 
economic benefits” (Deegan, 2006, p. 464; Birkin, 1996; 2000; 
Maunders & Burritt, 1991; Milne, 1996; and Gray, Owen & Adams, 
1996); 
 
ii) Feminists argue that accounting maintains and reinforces the 
masculine, e.g., by favouring success over cooperation and respect 
(Sherer & Arrington, 1993; Lehman, 1988; Cooper, 2001; Carnegie, 
McWatters & Potter, 2003);  
 
iii) Accounting legitimises and maintains particular political ideologies. 
Mouck (1992) argues that the ‘ultra-conservative’ politics of PAT 
supported those in political power. Cooper and Sherer (1984) note the 
link between ‘economic consequences analysis’ and the hesitation in 
adopting accounting regulation. The interests of shareholders and 
managers were favoured at the expense of society as a whole (e.g. 
Thompson, 1978 and Burchell et al, 1980 studied the motivations 
behind research into inflation accounting). Hopper et al (1995) notes 
the tendency of the focus of research to shift as the views of the 
powerful change (also see Hopper & Powell, 1985); and 
 
iv) Accounting education is critiqued for promoting capitalism and 
corporate capture (Collison, 2003). The ‘gatekeeper’ approach of 
accounting journals is criticised for ensuring that published research is 
acceptable to dominant social groups (Arrington & Francis, 1989; 
Arrington & Puxty, 1991; Mouck, 1992; Tinker, Lehman, & Neimark, 
1991).    
 
This general overview of critical accounting provides the framework to consider 
the interventions of critical management accounting, which concentrates on the use of 
accounting techniques in controlling the social, cultural, and environmental. Baker and 
Bettner comment: 
Accounting’s capacity to create and control social reality translates into 
empowerment for those who use it. Such power resides in organisations and 
institutions, where it is used to instil values, sustain legitimising myths, mask 
conflict and promote self-perpetuating social orders. Throughout society, the 
influence of accounting permeates fundamental issues concerning wealth 
distribution, social justice, political ideology and environmental degradation. 
Contrary to public opinion, accounting is not a static reflection of economic 
activity, but rather is a highly partisan activity (Baker & Bettner, 1997, p. 293).  
 
In particular, Puxty critically analyses management accounting as:   
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… a set of social practices that delineate the space within which the activity of the 
workforce might be made visible and susceptible to rational calculation … [it] is 
an instrument within which an enterprise that facilitates the exploitation of, and 
extraction of surplus value from, its employees by the capitalists interests, through 
management, control the accounting system (Puxty, 1993, p. 4). 
 
In developing Puxty’s argument, Baxter and Chua’s categorisation of ‘alternative 
management accounting research’ identified three strands of critical accounting work: 
1) The radical alternative links management accounting research to “the 
politics of emancipation”, drawing upon Marx, the Frankfurt school, and 
labour process theory. This research focuses on highlighting “the role of 
management accounting in the creation and perpetuation of an unequal 
society” (Baxter & Chua, 2003, p. 99). 
 
2)  Foucauldian archaeologies generate “new histories”, which are “‘the 
social and organisational practices and bodies of knowledge’ that enable 
particular management accounting technologies to emerge at given times 
and places”. Work on ‘discipline’ and ‘docility has been used to “deliver 
provocative constructions of management accounting control” (Baxter & 
Chua, 2003, p. 101). 
 
3)  Latour’s actor-network theory concentrates on “understanding accounting 
technologies in the context of networks of human and non-human 
‘actants’” (Baxter & Chua, 2003, p. 102). 
 
Baxter and Chua deduce a set of common critiques in critical management accounting 
research, including criticisms of: 
a)  Means-end reasoning: “severing the connection between organisational 
goals and management accounting practices” (Baxter & Chua, 2003, p. 
102); 
 
b)  The real: “problematising the constitution of ‘reality’ by characterising it 
as a product of ongoing or interpretive acts” (Baxter & Chua, 2003, p. 
103); 
 
c)  Accounting’s impotence: “management accounting technologies cannot be 
separated from the formation and exercise of power in organisations and 
society” (Baxter & Chua, 2003, p. 104); 
 
d)  Accounting change: challenging “purposeful and predictable change” 
(Baxter & Chua, 2003, p. 105); and 
 
e)  Bodiless forms of management accounting practice: “to appreciate the 
roles of particular organisational participants in constituting and 
conveying the technologies of the craft” (Baxter & Chua, 2003, p. 107). 
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Consequently, critical accounting, generally, and critical management accounting 
research, specifically, provides a foundation for this thesis. Equally, the next section 
examines the scope of critical theory in law. 
 
B Critical Legal Studies 
 
One must start by knowing what is going on, by freeing oneself from the mystified 
delusions embedded in our consciousness by the liberal legal world view  
(Freeman, 1981, p. 1229). 
 
Critical legal studies [CLS] argue that law: 
a) developed out of the power relationships within society;  
 
b) supports the interests of those that form law; and 
 
c) legitimises society’s injustices.  
 
Law is not neutral or value free and attempts to disguise its political nature (Cotterell, 
1992, p. 136), as the rhetoric of equality, rights, and the rule of law rationalises the 
existing political order. CLS challenges legal judgment as logically flawed and biased. 
CLS sees law as legitimising social injustices through a ‘mask’ of beliefs and 
prejudices. Law is an instrument of oppression used by the wealthy and powerful to 
maintain the hierarchy, particularly through the protection of property rights. Thus, CLS 
seeks to delegitimate and demystify the law, as legal discourse reifies social and 
political relations between people (Cotterrell, 1992, p. 136). CLS deconstructs the 
ideological base of law, focusing on the indeterminacy of legal language, the 
relationship between law and society, and the discursive power of ‘law’ (Cotterrell, 
1992, pp. 134-137).  
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1 CLS: Beyond Realism  
 
Legal realism challenged the ‘syllogistic reasoning’80 of legal formalism,81 
arguing that judges actively make decisions. Realists challenge the scientific nature of 
law by demonstrating the fallibility of syllogism: law is more than applying logic as 
judges must take particular views on the law (Frank, 1970, p. 126). Realists argue that 
various factors influence judges including relevant histories, public policy, colour, and 
odour (Cotterell, 1992, p. 64); and that legal reasoning is not neutral as the political, 
social, and economic environment influences judges (Frank, 1970, p. 136; Cohen, 1935, 
p. 107). Davies argues, “judges simply [cannot] step outside of their own social 
conditioning” (2002, p. 175), as law is ‘made’. Cardozo emphasises the human element 
in the interpretation and construction of law (1990, p. 99). However, CLS is “beyond 
realism” (Davies, 2002, pp. 174-176), as CLS incorporated ideology to deconstruct 
legal doctrine. The following overview examines CLS.  
2 CLS Movements 
 
CLS focuses on the political and ideological motivations underpinning law, 
examining the relationship between law and liberalism (Davies, 2002, pp. 167-169; 
Cotterrell, 1989, pp. 210-211). CLS scholars identified “various Liberal atrocities 
committed against everyone from law students to minorities” (Austin, 1993, p. 2), as the 
law: 
… reflects ideological struggles among social factions in which competing 
conceptions of justice, goodness, and social and political life, get compromised, 
truncated, vitiated, and adjusted (Altman, 1986, p. 217). 
 
Consequently, CLS scholars, like critical accounting, developed a plurality of 
epistemological and ontological interventions including feminist legal studies, critical 
                                                 
80
 A form of reasoning using syllogisms to draw conclusions from a series of premises, where syllogisms 
are arguments made over several parts, in which two or more statements assumed to be true lead to a 
conclusion. 
 
81
 See the link between positivism and formalism above.  
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race theory, post-structuralism, and Marxist analyses (Boyle, 1985; Brosnan, 1987; 
Goodrich, 1993; Kennedy, 1983; 1998; More, 2003; Tushnet, 1991; 2005). For 
example: 
a) Feminist jurisprudence challenges the political, economic, and social 
equality or inequality of gender through distinct interventions: traditional; 
radical; Black; lesbian; and post-modern (Davies, 2002, p. 205; Cotterell, 
1992, p. 121).  Traditional feminism, e.g. asserts that law should ensure 
equal opportunities as females are as rational as males; Black feminists 
celebrate and challenge differences between women, culture, and men 
(Crenshaw, 1989; MacKinnon, 1991; Galbraith, 2000); and radical 
(Marxist) feminists challenge the gender inequality and power imbalance 
from the male class dominating the female class (MacKinnon, 1983a; 
1983b; 1987; 1989; Harris, 1989; Wittig, 1992). However, feminists 
commonly: 
 
(i) identify and demonstrate how patriarchy shapes the content of law 
(Davies, 2002, pp. 198-199), including the patriarchal Human Rights 
discourse or the ‘reasonable man’ on the Clapham omni-bus 
(Graycar & Morgan, 1990). 
 
(ii) challenge objectivity and impartiality of a judge’s perspective 
(Davies, 2002, p. 198; Kingdom, 1999), such that, in tort law, judges 
are experts at applying the reasonable middle-aged, greying, white 
male test (Todd, 2001, p. 309). 
 
(iii) challenge gender-based distinctions and promote equal recognition 
of women’s rights (Davies, 2002, pp. 199-203). 
 
(b)  Critical race theory challenges law’s role in maintaining and supporting 
racism and segregation, and the rhetoric of white mythology and ‘white 
supremacy’ at the expense of persons of colour (Davies, 2002, p. 257, 
originally conceived by Derrida, 1982). Critical interventions include: 
historical racism: slavery, emancipation, and the effects of colonialism 
and post-colonialism; whiteness: objectification and reification of ‘white’; 
economic segregation: inequality of opportunities; and race 
consciousness: dehumanising and objectification of difference (Davies, 
2002, pp. 271-272). Critical race theorists focus on:  
 
(i) identifying how jurisprudence includes explicit or implicit 
assumptions about race (Davies, 2002, p. 271; Fanon, 1965): e.g. 
Aquinas’ Classical Naturalism did not regard persons of colour as 
equal before God and the law (Cotterell, 1992, p. 204).  
 
(ii)  challenging the objectivity and impartiality of judges (Young, 1990; 
Flagg, 1993), reflected in the profession’s domination by greying, 
middle-aged, white males (Harris, 1993).  
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(iii) evaluating law’s role in perpetuating racial and ethnic inequality and 
stereotypes, by challenging anti-discrimination laws for reifying 
racial separation and inequality. 
 
In summary, CLS challenges law, its processes, and legal positivism and theory. 
Consequently, critical accounting can learn from CLS, due to its historicity, theoretical 
traditions, and common ‘objectives’. The following section considers the interface of 
law and accounting from a critical perspective. 
 
C Critical Legal Studies and Critical Accounting 
 
Moore argues that comparing CLS and critical accounting is appropriate as law 
and accounting are similar professions with similar histories, they are tools of social and 
organisational control, and “the two professions have been overwhelmingly white, 
overwhelmingly male, and middle to upper-middle class” (Moore, 1991, pp. 765-766). 
Moore argues that the success of CLS has important insights for critical accounting, as 
CLS “has become the most powerful and divisive phenomenon since the 1930s in 
American academic law” (1991, p. 763). Moore details six observations about critical 
accounting in comparison to CLS: 
1) Critical accounting and CLS criticise the realist epistemology that a 
‘reality consists of a world out there’ (1991, p. 774), but critical 
accounting “suggests no serious or consistent consequences for its critique 
… the critical attacks have placed nothing major at stake” (1991, p. 775). 
In contrast:  
 
… CLS makes clear what is at stake in this battle over reality: control over 
social ‘facts’, and control over the US Constitution (Moore, 1991, p. 775). 
 
2) Accounting’s application of Foucault is “politically conservative” (1991, 
p. 773); 
 
3) Deconstruction is not ‘a toy’ or ‘a game’; such concepts are used for 
“strategic convenience” (1991, p. 778), warning against deconstruction for 
the sake of deconstruction, due to the nihilistic critique of deconstruction 
(1991, p. 775).  
 
4) Both law and accounting need to better critique the inherent ‘positivist’ 
assumptions in contract and contract theory (1991, p. 779).  
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5) CLS is “much more aggressive in pointing to the consequences of the 
various theoretical stances” (1991, p. 780). Moore develops three 
examples: 
 
a) “Daily-life-of-the-law exposé”: CLS scholars have “go[ne] to the 
street to unmask what effects existing jurisprudence has on … 
everyday, individual lives” (Moore, 1991, p. 781), including studies of 
the perpetuation of racial discrimination, how defining the ‘family’ 
detrimentally affects freedom for women, collective bargaining, and 
the patriarchal views embedded in definitions of rape and other sexual 
crimes. 
 
b) “Maverick posture within the profession”: CLS scholars ‘take no 
prisoners’, as CLS scholars “see no difference between the standard 
legal theory they oppose and the institution that created it” (Moore, 
1991, p. 782). 
 
c) “Radical political program”: The CLS “program is anti-pure-
capitalism and anti-hierarchical, quite experimental and often highly 
spiritual” (1991, p. 782). The development of ‘alternative programs’ is 
troubling for CLS, “but CLS does attempt to reach out and does 
engage many of its members in fighting concrete injustices” (Moore, 
1991, p. 782).  
 
6) Consequently, the differences between CLS and critical accounting 
include: 
 
a) “[T]he traditionally polite and stewardly attitude of its professionals” 
(Moore, 1991, p. 783);  
 
b) “The hopelessly indirect social-science prose style of accounting 
research” (Moore, 1991, p. 783); 
 
c) “The effects of accounting may seem to be far more diffuse and far 
less dramatic … [t]here are no media stars in accounting” (Moore, 
1991, p. 783); and 
 
d) “[A] lack of Critical self-declaration of community” (Moore, 1991, p. 
783). 
 
Moore’s call to arms for critical theorists including critical accountants is worth 
supporting. However, in unpacking Moore’s presentations of the nature of accounting 
and law, and by moving beyond ‘superficial similarities’, there are three core 
differences between law and accounting that challenge Moore’s analysis: 
1) In interdisciplinary research, differences are crucial: Moore argues that 
law and accounting are theoretically similar, as “both claim as their base 
highly elaborated, identifiable bodies of written and unwritten rules of 
judgment and conduct” and operate under a precedent-based system 
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(Moore, 1991, p. 766). For Moore, disciplinary sources of rules (GAAP, 
statute, cases) are subject to similar judgment processes, with the auditor 
and judge ‘objectively applying’ relevant rules to concrete cases to arrive 
at an “impartial disposition” (Moore, 1991, p. 766).  
 
However, there is little equivalence between the judgment processes of 
judges and auditors. While the auditor rhetorically lends credibility to 
accounting, judges and auditors exercise different roles for different 
purposes within significantly different contexts. Consequently, by 
focusing on the superficial similarity of ‘judgment’, Moore mystifies the 
interface of law and accounting. 
 
2) The Critical Audience: Moore argues that CLS is clear about what it 
wants: control over social ‘facts’ (1991, p. 775). Moore criticises critical 
accounting for not defining its critical audience. However, this criticism is 
overly simplistic, as CLS appeals to democracy, particularly in relation to 
public law. This is more complex for accounting, despite constructing the 
accounting profession as serving a public function. As Cooper and Sherer 
argue: 
 
A critical approach to accounting … starts from the premise that problems in 
accounting are potentially reflections of problems in and of society and 
accordingly that the latter should be critically analysed (Cooper & Sherer, 
1984, p. 184). 
 
Critical accountants acknowledge that critical analysis is not enough on its 
own (Baker & Bettner, 1997, p. 305; Owen, Gray, & Bebbington, 1997, p. 
183; Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1997, p. 63; Gray, 2002a; 2002b), as  
 
… while critical accounting scholars have illuminated the partisan functioning 
of accounting, we have been less successful in transforming accounting (and 
social) practices (Neu & Cooper, 1997,  p. 1).    
 
However, the better comparison is between critical accounting and 
‘private law’ CLS scholarship, where there is little recourse to 
‘democracy’. While there is ‘public’ space and ‘public interest’ in 
accounting, accounting’s public forum is limited, as ‘public’ information 
is aggregated, technical, numbers-based, and representative, and there is 
little access to the decisions that accounting and auditors make in the 
pronouncement of the financial reports. Equally, despite law being ‘more 
open’ than accounting, many CLS scholars criticise attempts to ‘privatise’ 
the law (Kennedy, 1998, p. 465; Kelman, 1987).82  
 
3)  Differences in Public Awareness: Moore argues that “the effects of 
accounting may seem to be far more diffuse and far less dramatic [in 
comparison to law]” (Moore, 1991, p. 783). However, although 
accounting is regularly in the media with profit announcements, share 
market activity, and scandals, the day-to-day practice of law is not in the 
public’s attention. Comparatively, the public tends to have more 
knowledge of law (particularly criminal) than accounting, despite the 
widespread use of accounting discourse like budgeting, pricing, and profit, 
                                                 
82
 Even under the positivist ‘rule of law’ citizens are entitled to know, access, and understand the 
implications of law (Fuller, 1964; Dicey, 1959). 
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and that much of our lives are judged and measured by accounting. Thus, 
CLS is more in the public psyche, irrespective of accounting holding a 
powerful role in daily life.  
 
Critics claim that accounting is experiencing a “crisis of representation” 
(Morgan, 1988; Macintosh, 2002). Financial catastrophes such as Enron 
and WorldCom challenge the ‘myth of objectivity’ by demonstrating that 
accountants are ‘constructors’ of a ‘partial’, ‘particular’ reality (Craig & 
Amernic, 2004). However, the history of accounting failure suggests that 
the public has short memories. Moore acknowledges the common 
misconception that law is about words and accounting is about numbers 
(1991, pp. 765, 766). Numbers reinforce the technical, objective image of 
accounting, as challenging numbers is difficult. Hines links this to the 
‘profession’: 
 
Since the objectivity assumption is the central premise of our society … a 
fundamental form of social power accrues to those who are able to trade on 
the objectivity assumption. Legitimacy is achieved by tapping into this central 
proposition because accounts generated around this proposition are perceived 
as ‘normal’ … The very talk, predicated on the assumption of an objective 
world to which accounting have privileged access via their ‘measurement 
expertise’, serves to construct a perceived legitimacy for the profession’s 
power and autonomy (Hines, 1991, p. 328). 
 
Accounting is deceptively simple. The public face of accounting is the tip 
of the iceberg with the ‘real’ accounting process concealed from public 
view (Hopwood, 1990). McBarnet comments: 
  
It is a technique of creative compliance to search for anything that can be 
construed as an authoritative rule, construct structures that comply with it in 
form but use it in unintended or unanticipated ways, then point to the rule to 
claim to merely complying with what the authorities expressly required … 
Such practices are routine (McBarnet, 2006, p. 5).  
 
Bratton states: 
 
… practitioners often take advantage of GAAP’s rule structures when they 
design aggressive structures (Bratton, 2004, p. 23). 
 
Although law is about gaining strategic advantage much of the adversarial 
judicial process is open to public scrutiny. This differs to accounting and a 
general comparison between law and accounting based on perceived 
similarities is unhelpful and potentially misleading: e.g. the public 
discourse surrounding Enron illustrates a marked degree of ‘surprise’, 
talking of fraud and ‘gaming the system’ (McBarnet, 2006, p. 6). Senator 
Thompson argued: 
 
The real scandal here may be from not what is illegal, but what is totally 
permissible. If the GAAP allow the bookkeeping shenanigans that have been 
reported in the press then we should all go into the derivative business. It 
seems that all too often the name of the corporate game is to conceal the true 
financial situation of the company while doing the minimum amount of 
disclosure to avoid legal exposure (Senator Thompson, US Senate, 2002, in 
McBarnet, 2006, p. 6). 
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Thus, there are differences in the processes of accounting and law, as 
accounting is concealed through categorisation, representation, 
summation, and aggregation. Publicly, accounting is comparatively less 
contestable. However, accounting is internally adversarial: e.g. accounting 
concepts like assets, liabilities, and capital are subjective, value-laden 
choices. The evidence of adversary is lost in translating accounting to the 
technical categories and formal presentation of a set of accounts. Of 
course there are examples of public contestation of accounting figures 
particularly around ‘costs’ of various ‘civil’ projects, but the degree of this 
contestation is reduced from the public contestation of law and legal 
processes. 
 
While law and accounting are similar, the subtle differences are made worse, not 
attenuated, by the existence of superficial similarities (Sperber, 2003, p. 2). To engage 
in informed debate concerning the lessons that CLS can teach critical accounting, it is 
necessary to consider the impact of these differences. Consequently, it is difficult to 
compare CLS to critical accounting, as these differences require significant translation 
between the two disciplines and critical movements. 
 
Thus, in this spirit and in evaluating Moore, there are two CLS insights for 
critical accounting:  
1) CLS research focuses comparatively more on the ‘problem’ and less on 
methodology than critical accounting. Moore criticises critical accounting 
for placing nothing major at risk (Moore, 1991, p. 775), arguing that the 
pre-occupation with methodology results in “[t]he hopelessly indirect 
social-science prose style of accounting research” (Moore, 1991, p. 783). 
Critical accounting is preoccupied with methodological issues (in response 
to PAT), and consequently is less focused on problem. For law, there is a 
plethora of research, but a dearth of research processes or methodology 
(also, to its detriment), as CLS research focuses more on the problem.  
 
2)  CLS has failed to maintain a critical stance (Davies, 2002, p. 193; Boyle, 
1985). For Goodrich, CLS failed in its ‘radicalism’ because it focuses on 
“a reality whose object is defined by the citation of other critical legal 
texts” (1993, p. 420):  
 
The politics of legal critique are the politics of a particular profession, a 
questioning of the law of law, and also a questioning of our place within and 
responsibility for the tradition. The marks of politics in the discourse of 
critique are neither familiar nor obvious: they do not relate directly to a 
specific content or program but rather to an ethics; they do not belong directly 
to a given tradition but rather to a necessarily ambiguous and potentially 
subversive place or space in the legal academy … The politics of reason is not 
simply a local politics; it is oppositional, fragmentary, and frequently obscure 
(Goodrich, 1993, p. 422). 
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Fischl argues that CLSs failure to provide realistic alternatives to the 
dominant legal world-view resulted in its downfall (Fischl, 1992, p. 779). 
Many commentators argue that CLS lost its impetus through assimilation 
into the legal mainstream (Tushnet, 1992, Davies, 2002). The discussion 
above noted positivism’s acceptance of the social influence on law, which 
was the original political motivation of CLS: i.e. although CLS succeeded 
in identifying the limitations of the realist epistemology underpinning 
legal positivism and in holding the law is politics, once these insights were 
accepted by the mainstream, the politics of CLS ‘died’ (Ellickson, 2000, 
p. 525).83 Thus, as Davies comments, “[n]ot having anything substantial to 
argue over then, except the question of degree, the CLS debate with the 
academy has been defused” (2002, p. 194).   
  
Critical theory’s focus on criticality and the explicit analysis of ideology, 
politics, and power informs this thesis, but as the following section explains critical 
theory is an inappropriate paradigm for this thesis. 
 
D Evaluating Critical Theory and the Interface of Law and Accounting 
 
Despite the empirical focus on politics, ideology, historical and material 
conditions, and the identification of power and domination, this thesis’ theoretical 
framework is not ‘pure’ critical theory, but rather a post-structural, post-Marxist DT, 
justified by a mix of theoretical, methodological, and personal reasons:  
a)  Critical theory, particularly Marxism, supports modernity. Willmott et al 
argue that at the ontological level, “[critical theory’s] ideal is the expertly 
designed, perfectly ordered and controlled world” (1992, p. 70). 
Postmodern criticisms demonstrate that the world is not particularly 
ordered (see Arrington & Francis, 1989; Hoskin, 1994; Montagna, 1997). 
Wickramsinghe and Alawattage argue, “[t]here are fragmentations, 
differences and complexities which cannot be captured by the ontology of 
modernism” (2007, p. 478). 
 
b)  Critics argue that critical theory fails to account for contemporary society 
(Arnold, 1998). Epistemologically and ontologically, critical theory 
interventions promote singular universals such as labour, gender, or race, 
posing a politics of progressive social change where the universal goal is 
agreed upon and the movement seeks the necessary change to achieve that 
particular ends. This portrays an over-simplified ‘picture’ of a complex 
world (this is a controversial debate in accounting see Neimark, 1990; 
                                                 
83
 Tushnet argues this over-stated the death of CLS, commenting that: 1) “those who wrote important 
articles early in the career of critical legal studies continue to do so” and 2) “major components of 
critical legal studies have become the common sense of the legal academy” (Tushnet, 2005, pp. 99-
100). 
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Hoskin, 1994; Armstrong, 1994; Grey, 1994, Miller & O’Leary, 1994; 
Froud et al, 1998; and Arnold, 1998).  
 
c)  The double hermeneutic problem methodologically challenges critical 
theory. In particular, how does a critical theorist adopt a critical position 
while still being located in a particular cultural and historical context 
(interpreting the interpretations of others)? (Sarker & Pfeifer, 2006, p. 
249). Sarker & Pfeifer explain: 
 
… from a broader philosophical or sociocultural perspective, the problem is 
not necessarily one of bias. It may also reflect a clash between a scientific and 
a commonsense interpretation of human beings. In the case of such a clash, 
social and ethical issues are at stake, since the basic question is, Who is 
entitled to define the nature of human beings: the scientists or the people 
themselves? In this form, the methodological, ethical, and social problems of 
the double hermeneutic will continue to be a significant theme … Sarker & 
Pfeifer, 2006, p. 249). 
 
d)  Personally, I am sympathetic with the critical theory project, agreeing with 
Cooper and Hopper’s qualities of critical research (2006): 
 
We did not want to [in defining critical accounting] constrain new approaches 
but instead articulate a broad church that not only included critiques of 
mainstream research but also work which stressed holism, dynamic socio-
economic and historical contexts, the centrality of power and conflict, a 
broader set of constituencies than managers and capital markets, scepticism of 
absolutist beliefs in ‘scientific’ research methods and active engagement by 
researchers (Cooper & Hopper, 2006, p. 4). 
 
Equally, I appreciate the Marxist project, although the economic 
deterministic aspects of structural Marxism, particularly Althusser, 
convince me less. However, this multi-faceted, interdisciplinary study 
(with different disciplines and interested parties including law, accounting, 
regulation, society, industry, government, social welfare, the public 
interest, accountants, lawyers, and regulators) requires a more open 
theoretical framework.   
 
e)  I read post-structuralism as being a form of critical theory: I believe I am a 
critical theorist. However, many critical theorists disagree with this (see 
the debate between Neimark, 1990; Hoskin, 1994; Armstrong, 1994; and 
Grey, 1994, and the debate between Miller & O’Leary, 1994; Froud et al, 
1998; and Arnold, 1998). In short, the post-Marxist, post-structural 
aspects of DT are appealing to me. Due to my unease over singular 
universals, economic determinism, and class reductionism, I enjoy the 
theoretical insights of DT for its challenge and development of critical 
theory, Marx, and structure.  
 
To justify the development of Laclau and Mouffe’s DT, the chapter recognises the 
implications of post-structuralism, recognising post-structural research in law, 
accounting, and regulation.  
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V THE CALL TO POST-STRUCTURALISM  
 
A Definition: What is Post-structuralism? 
 
 Defining post-structuralism is difficult:  
It is best referred to as a movement of thought - a complex skein of thought - 
embodying different forms of critical practice. It is decidedly interdisciplinary and 
has many different but related strands (Peters & Wain, 2002, p. 61). 
 
Post-structuralism’s self-reflexive discourse is aware of the “tentativeness, the 
slipperiness, the ambiguity and the complex interrelations of texts and meanings” (Lye, 
1996, p. 1). Post-structural detail is particular or local, characterised as a political 
philosophical reaction to the ‘scientific’ pretensions underpinning “structuralism” and 
the modernist norms of ‘truth’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘progress’.  
 
There is widespread confusion between post-structuralism and post-modernism 
(Peters, 1996; Jaworski & Coupland, 1999). This thesis employs a simple dichotomy: 
the object of post-modernism is modernism;84 the object of post-structuralism is 
structuralism.85 Thus, where structuralism and modernism intersect, post-structuralism 
overlaps with post-modernism but they are separate movements. However, post-
structuralism should not convey homogeneity due to the array of ‘post-structural’ 
strategies in response to the structuralism characterising the work of Lévi-Strauss, 
Althusser, Lacan, and Barthes. In fact, there is ‘contestation’ over the appropriate term 
for the ‘movement’:  
a) Poster (1989) argues that “post-structural theory” names an American 
practice. 
 
b) Frank (1988) argues that ‘neo-structuralism’ would emphasise the 
continuity with structuralism. 
 
                                                 
84
 See the discussion of modernism above. 
 
85
 Milner defines structuralism as:  
 
 … as an approach to the study of human culture, centred on the search for constraining patterns, or 
structures, which claims that individual phenomena have meaning only by virtue of their relation to other 
phenomena as elements within a systematic structure (Milner, 1991, p. 61). 
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c) Harland’s ‘super-structuralism’ (1987) captures all theorists identifying 
with structuralism and post-structuralism. 
 
d)  For Sturrock, ‘post’ is an important signalling device:  
 
Post-structuralism is not ‘post’ in the sense of having killed structuralism off, 
it is ‘post’ only in the sense of coming after and of seeking to extend 
Structuralism in its rightful direction (Sturrock, 1986, p. 137). 
 
Peters and Wain argue further: 
 
Poststructuralism, then, can be interpreted as a specifically philosophical 
response to the alleged scientific status of structuralism … and as a movement 
which … sought to decentre the ‘structures’, systematicity and scientific 
status of structuralism, to critique its underlying metaphysics and to extend it 
a number of different directions, while at the same time preserving central 
elements of structuralism’s critique of the humanist subject (Peters & Wain, 
2002, p. 61). 
 
Finally, Machin and Norris comment: 
 
‘Post-structuralist’ is a non- or even an anti-name ... the name pins the writer 
down, makes it possible to speak specifics, and offers a bootstrap by which 
talk about the new theory can raise itself above talk about the old. But this 
name also begs the question of another, previous name: ... ‘structuralism’ ... 
Structuralism offered criticism its last chance to make a science out of 
theorising literature … we have the equally graphic ‘post-structuralism’, a 
term that seems not to name what we do in the present at all, but rather to re-
name structuralism itself, as what we used to do in the past. It provides a post 
to which structuralism is then hitched, confining it by means of the shortest 
tether that language has to offer (Machin & Norris, 1987, pp. 1-2). 
 
 Post-structural ‘interventionist’ strategies identify power, recognising ‘micro-
processes of power’ to “reveal the possibilities of resistance” (Newman, 2001, p. 160), 
and invite the reconsideration of text to identify new or suppressed meanings. Critics 
accuse post-structuralism of advocating nihilism or relativism but this is rare, as post-
structuralists challenge the assumption that it is possible to separate what anything “is” 
outside of culture and history (Crowther, 2003, p. 35; Rose, 1984). Thus, post-
structuralism employs provisionality, standpoint analysis, and ‘strategic essentialism’ to 
demonstrate and understand how different viewpoints radically alter what something 
philosophically “is”. The following section considers the development of post-
structuralism in accounting. 
 - 146 - 
1 The Development of Post-structuralism in Accounting  
 
 Post-structuralist work within the accounting literature continues to develop 
incorporating Foucault, Derrida, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Baudrillard, and Laclau and 
Mouffe (Loft, 1986; Knights & Collison, 1987; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; 1993; 1994; 
1998; Hopper et al, 1987; Hoskin & Macve, 1988; Arrington & Francis, 1989; 1993; 
Arrington & Puxty, 1991; Arrington & Schweiker, 1992; Francis, 1994; Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 2003; Arrington, 1997; Macintosh et al, 2000; Macintosh & Shearer, 2000; 
Arrington & Watkins, 2002; Watkins & Arrington, 2007; Hopper & Macintosh, 1993; 
Spence, 2007). In particular, as DT incorporates elements of Foucault (genealogy) and 
Derrida (deconstruction), relevant accounting work includes:  
a)  Foucauldian research incorporates both archaeology (Hopwood, 1987; 
Hoskin & Macve, 1986, and Hoskin & Macve, 1988) and genealogy 
(Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Macintosh, 1994). Miller & O’Leary’s 
reconsideration of the history of the development of standard costing and 
budgeting is considered an exemplar of Foucauldian accounting research. 
Miller & O’Leary argue, genealogically, that the ‘origin’ of accounting 
can be traced through historical events such as: 
 
the political objectives of states, historical contingency, particular national 
conditions, and the development of related disciplines (Miller & O’Leary, 
1987, p. 238). 
 
Of relevance is Loft’s (1986) study of the emergence of cost accounting in 
the UK, as it demonstrates how professional accounting associations 
helped to establish the management accounting discourse as accepted. 
Similarly, Hopwood’s (1987) study illustrated the ‘proactive’ role of 
accounting in shaping an organisation, which constitutes an important 
aspect of the empirics of this thesis; and 
 
b) Derrida’s deconstruction is a powerful tool due to the rhetorical process of 
accounting research (Arrington & Schweiker, 1992). In implementing 
Derrida’s deconstruction strategies, Arrington & Francis (1989) 
deconstruct Jensen’s (1983) attempt to found a PAT, employing ‘aporia’, 
hierarchal reversal, ‘differance’, and supplementarity (further work 
includes Macintosh, 2002; Devine et al, 2004; McKernan & Kosmal, 
2007). Deconstruction challenges accounting ‘truth’ claims by 
highlighting the assumed nature of accounting knowledge and the ability 
to expose and highlight the effect of these assumptions on accounting 
 - 147 - 
information. This strategy helps to examine how interested parties used 
‘accounting’ (as a political signifier).86  
 
There is increasing recognition of post-structural insight within accounting, and the 
next section demonstrates the growing impact of post-structuralism on regulatory 
theory.  
2 Law: Post-structuralism and Regulation  
 
There are four reasons for the development of post-structural regulatory 
research:  
1) Regulation is increasingly linked to democracy (Black, 2000b);  
 
2) The discursive nature of regulation involves rhetorical and language 
analysis (Davies, 2002);  
 
3) As the size of ‘civic society’ increases (as Western Governments roll-back 
the provision of State services and regulation) there are alternative 
regulatory pressures (such as decentred regulation) (see Black, 2002a; 
Morgan & Yeung, 2007); and  
 
4) The collapse of the traditional public/private divide caused ‘power’ and 
‘politics’ to become decentralised (Morgan & Yeung, 2007): e.g. the 
Government’s ‘responsible re-regulation’ policy increased the extent of 
regulatory communication.  
 
Black (2002b) considers the complexity of the concept of regulation from a politico-
legal perspective by acknowledging the politics of regulation. Regulation is a political 
and ideological concept, and hence it is often defined according to process or by 
function (Morgan & Yeung, 2007, p. 1):87 e.g. Hood et al define regulation: 
… any control system … must by definition contain a minimum of the three 
components … There must be some capacity for standard-setting, to allow a 
distinction to be made between more or less preferred states of the system. There 
must also be some capacity for information-gathering or monitoring to produce 
knowledge about current or changing states of the system. On top of that must be 
some capacity for behaviour-modification to change the state of the system (Hood 
et al, 2001, p. 23). 
 
                                                 
86
 See the discussion of deconstruction and genealogy and its relationship with hegemony in Chapter five, 
which argues that DT’s integrated reading helps in understanding the interface of law and accounting 
in telecommunications regulation, and the formation of antagonistic political identities. 
 
87
 Chapter two illustrated that ‘public interest’ regulation tends to rely on administrative processes. 
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Regulation is a complicated concept: narrow definitions concentrate on State attempts 
to influence social behaviour; wide definitions argue that it is any form of social control 
imposed by the State or social institutions (Morgan & Yeung, 2007, p. 2). Black 
illustrates the complexity of ‘regulation’: 
‘Regulation’ is not a concept that travels well, in either a centred or ‘decentred’ 
form. As any who have attempted to study ‘regulation’ outside of English-
speaking countries will aware, there is often no parallel work or even concept, that 
that does not mean that the social activity to which the term ‘regulation’ is used to 
refer does not exist (Black, 2002b, p. 2). 
 
Post-structural regulatory research compares centred with decentred regulation. 
Centred regulation has many forms (heavy-handed, State-driven regulation, State-based 
‘command and control’ regulation, and less interventionist models that correct ‘market 
failure’), “assum[ing] the State to have the capacity to command and control, to be the 
only commander and controller, and to be potentially effective in commanding and 
controlling” (Black, 2002b, p. 3). However, as Black explains, this traditional 
‘command and control’ regulation is problematised as:  
poorly targeted rules, rigidity, ossification, under- or over-enforcement, and 
unintended consequences … Its failings are variously identified as including the 
following: that the instruments used (laws backed by sanctions) are inappropriate and 
unsophisticated (instrument failure), that government has insufficient knowledge to 
be able to identify the causes of problems, to design solutions that are appropriate, 
and to identify non-compliance (information and knowledge failure), that 
implementation of the regulation is inadequate (implementation failure), and that 
those being regulated are insufficiently inclined to comply, and those doing the 
regulating are insufficiently motivated to regulate in the public interest (motivation 
failure and capture theory) (Black, 2002b, pp. 2-3). 
 
 
Critics argue that multiple sites of ‘governance’ challenge traditional State-
based hierarchy and social organisations such as non-Governmental organisations 
extend beyond providing alternative spaces in civil society to fill a social and regulatory 
gap left by modern Western States withdrawing from social welfare services, impacting 
on the State’s ability to sustain much-needed social services (Carter & Molisa, 2005, p. 
8). Consequently, critics argue for the Foucauldian-influenced decentred regulation, 
which embraces a wider set of ‘regulatory’ techniques than the ‘rules, sanctions’ 
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approach of ‘command and control’ regulation (Black, 2002b; Roberts, 2005; Parker et 
al, 2004; and Morgan & Yeung, 2007). The premises of decentred regulation include: 
1) Complexity: emphasis on causal complexity and the complexity of 
interactions between social actors. Regulation is intricate as “actors are 
diverse in their goals, intentions, purposes, norms, and powers” (Black, 
2002b, p. 4). 
 
2) Fragmentation of power, control, and knowledge: no actor has the 
information to solve all social problems within a regulated industry, as in 
an autopoietic sense, decision makers, regulators, and regulatees construct 
their environment in their own image, or “through their own cognitive 
frames”. This notion of power reflects Foucault’s governmentality. 
 
3) Autonomy: actors will act and develop in the absence of government 
intervention. Foucault argues that as regulation is “the conduct of 
conduct”: a) regulation produces unintended outcomes; b) regulatory 
forms may have to vary depending on regulatee’s attitude towards 
compliance; c) no single actor dominates the regulatory process due to 
their limited knowledge and the autonomy of others; and d) “the 
autonomy of the actor will to an extent render it insusceptible to external 
regulation” (Black, 2002b, p. 7). 
 
4) Fragmentation and autonomy result in complex “interactions and 
interdependencies” between social actors and government (Black, 2002b, 
p. 7). 
 
5) The collapse of the social-political public/private distinction means that 
governance may happen in the absence of formal legal structures and is 
broader and localised than under a centred model of regulation. 
 
The increased decentred regulatory instruments move State hierarchy to 
‘heterarchy’, where “the State does not have the monopoly of authority but shares it 
with other institutions and actors in the regulatory process (Bartle & Vass, 2007, p. 17). 
In NZ, examples of decentred regulation in telecommunications include informal 
consumer boycotts of Telecom, local consumer protests organised by the Te Horo 
Telecom Users’ Group and the Strath Taieri Community Board, social and 
environmental reporting, and alternative reporting awards for annual reports. 
Consequently, there is a developing field of post-regulatory theory invoking decentred 
and post-structural ideas (see, Teubner, 1986; 1987; Veld et al, 1991; Foucault, 1991; 
Rose & Miller, 1992; Teubner et al, 1994; Rhodes, 1997; Rose, 1999; 2000; Black, 
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2002a; 2002b; Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Parker, 2000; Morgan & Yeung, 2007). In 
particular, Black calls for increased discourse analysis of regulation to “facilitate a 
better understanding of regulatory processes” (2002a, p. 195). Black considers the main 
challenge to be methodological (2002a, p. 196), but this thesis proposes that the 
examination of discursive strategies in the institution and interpretation of the 
regulatory framework answers these methodological concerns.  
 
In short, post-structural theory provides space to consider the complexity posed 
in this thesis. First, post-structural theory provides space to examine internal political 
events and an integrated, external political overview. Second, given the discursive 
focus, it examines the adversarial processes of cost construction in accounting at 
methodological, technical, and political levels (Chapter three), the adversarial nature of 
the political process in the construction, institution and implementation of new 
telecommunications regulation (Chapter two), and its ontological focus provides 
flexibility in order to conduct interdisciplinary research.  
 
VI CONCLUSION  
 
Traditional research paradigms do not provide the necessary theoretical 
framework to undertake this inter-disciplinary research. In considering and critiquing 
the parallel development of positivism, interpretivism, and critical theory in accounting 
and law, the chapter presented general limitations of the existing research paradigms.  
Key conclusions include: 
- PAT is related to legal contractarianism in the theoretical and 
methodological focus on explaining and predicting phenomena, the 
commitment to ‘value–free research’, and the incorporation of neo-
classical economic bases (Chua, 1986, pp. 605-606). 
 
- In accepting the status quo and structures, positivism is related to 
modernism.  
 
- Positivism is not appropriate as the goal of this research is not to explain 
and predict outcomes, particularly by demonstrating the arbitrariness and 
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choice inherent within cost and the social construction of costing, 
accounting, regulation, and law.  
 
- In interpretivism, subjects and objects socially construct meanings. 
Interpretivists seek to understand the ‘historically-situated and culturally 
derived’ interpretations of the social world. Interpretivist management 
accounting research understands the contextual implementation and 
effects of tools and techniques. In law, interpretivism constructs legal 
rights and duties to best justify communal political practices and focuses 
on what makes the law what it is. 
 
- Interpretivism is not appropriate, as it is inherently conservative, cautions 
against the exercise of judgment, and it ignores the power of institutional 
structures. 
 
- Critical theory in law and accounting challenges the existing state of 
affairs through unpacking restrictive conditions and demonstrating that 
objectivity and social norms are products of domination, ideology, politics 
and power. In particular, critical theorists illustrate the role of law and 
accounting in maintaining power relationships within society, and the 
discourse of law and accounting creates and sanctions conceptions of 
‘truth’ to the detriment of others in society.  
 
- Critical theory informs the thesis, but it is inappropriate as its politics of 
social change is problematic. The assumption that a single universal 
signifier leads to change overly simplifies the complexity of politics and 
tends to be dichotomous. 
 
- Post-structural theory is an appropriate theoretical framework due to its 
focus on politics at the local and particular.  
 
- Post-structuralist work within the accounting literature reflects the 
linguistic turn in accounting. In particular, Foucauldian research examined 
the capacity of accounting to shape social norms at discursive and 
organisational levels, while Derridean research challenged ‘truth’ claims 
within accounting.   
 
- Legal research, particularly regulatory research, increasingly incorporated 
post-structural theory, particularly due to the discursive nature of the legal 
process, the increasing size of ‘civic society’, and challenges to the 
traditional public/private divide (Morgan & Yeung, 2007). 
 
Chapter five builds on post-structuralism proposing that Laclau and Mouffe’s 
post-Marxist DT provides a theoretical framework to analyse the political 
tensions over the incorporation of cost accounting as the central focus in 
telecommunications regulation. 
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 - Chapter Five - 
 
Discourse Theory 
 
I CHAPTER FIVE OVERVIEW 
 
Chapter four concluded that traditional paradigmatic research in law and 
accounting was inappropriate for this thesis as it failed to account for many interested 
parties, conflicting political motivations, and the interdisciplinary interface. The focus 
on the discursive construction of ‘cost’ and ‘regulation’ rejected positivism as it 
separates subjects from objects. The political historicity of telecommunications 
regulation and the conflictual nature of costing led to the rejection of interpretivism for 
its narrow focus on ‘what is’ and ‘judgment’. Critical theory was rejected due to the 
combination of the interdisciplinary focus, the lessons from Moore (1991), and personal 
discomfort with political interventions constructed on single universals. Although 
influenced by interpretivism and critical theory, Chapter four argued for post-
structuralism to interrogate the interface of law and accounting in telecommunications 
regulation. Chapter five argues for the incorporation of Laclau and Mouffe’s post-
structural, post-Marxist DT as its theoretical base (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987; 2001; Ross, 
1988; Laclau, 1990; 1994a; 1994ba; 1996b; 2006; Norval, 1996; Torfing, 1999; Butler, 
Laclau & Zizek, 2000; Howarth, 2000; Howarth et al, 2000; Marsh & Stoker, 2000).88 
In introducing DT (with insight from Glynos & Howarth, 2007) the chapter develops 
four reasons for invoking DT: 
a) The complicated, multifaceted empirics require a flexible theoretical 
framework. DT re-invigorates the political by looking internally within 
law, accounting, and regulation and examining the external effects of the 
political process. This provides resources to consider the phases of 
telecommunications re-regulation, including the regulatory genealogy, the 
regulatory institution of cost accounting, and the political strategies 
employed in regulatory interpretation and implementation. In illustration, 
Figure 5.1 depicts the messiness of the interconnected, political situation 
towards the end of the light-handed regulatory phase (the late 1990s). The 
signifier “light-handed regulation” captures regulatory issues in NZ 
                                                 
88
 Appendix 4 considers the limitations and critiques of DT. 
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including the Telecom v Clear litigation, Telecom’s dominance, limited 
CC resources, and the difficulty of litigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.1: Problematisation: Genealogical Accounts of Telecommunications Regulation 
In response, the Labour-led Government legislated sector-specific 
regulation in telecommunications. Figure 5.2 illustrates the transition from 
light-handed regulation, through the introduction of cost-based regulation 
in the form of TSLRIC for interconnection access pricing and net costing 
for the TSO.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.2 – Institution: Re-regulating telecommunications 
 
The final empirical phase concentrates on the implementation of the TA, 
as depicted in Figure 5.3.  
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Fig 5.3 – Contestation: Implementing and Interpreting the new Telecommunications Act 2001 
The empirical phases from problematisation to institution to contestation 
requires a two-part empirical analysis in Chapter seven: part one analyses 
the rhetorical arguments presented for and against the institution of 
TSLRIC and net costing by interested parties (see Table 2.2 which 
describes how TSLRIC and net costing are seen to ‘resolve’ NZ’s 
regulatory problems); part two examines the contestation over the 
meaning of TSLRIC and net costing as there was very little guidance as to 
the implementation and design of these cost concepts. Figure 5.3 depicts 
the interest in unpacking the meaning of the concepts.  
 
Given the complex empirical environment, as depicted in Figures 5.1, 5.2, 
and 5.3, the DT theoretical framework provides the flexibility for a 
theorised reading of the re-regulation stages and an examination of the 
overall re-regulation. In particular, DT responds to the theoretical critiques 
developed in Chapters two, three, and four. Chapter two illustrated that no 
regulatory theory captured the complexity of NZ’s regulatory history: a 
good regulatory theory is interdisciplinary and considers the economic, 
historical, and political (Horwitz, 1989). DT’s flexibility in incorporating 
the economic, historical, political, and discursive insights provides a 
comprehensive regulatory account. Chapter three argued that cost 
accounting challenges the regulatory system given the role of accounting 
at technical, methodological, and political levels. DT’s integrated 
theoretical components including hegemony, condensation, 
overdetermination, and rhetoric identify, examine, and critique the 
political strategies employed in interpreting and implementing the cost-
based regulation without being solely beholden to economic, historical, or 
political analysis (Horwitz, 1989).   
 
b)   Disciplines are epistemologically bound and incommensurate (Hviding, 
2003, p. 43) which poses methodological, epistemological, and 
ontological challenges for interdisciplinary research. Devenney 
acknowledges that all disciplines are “conservative”: 
 
Disciplines police institutional boundaries in defining appropriate objects of 
study, in authorising methodological principles and in legitimising accredited 
subjects as their agents (Devenney, 2002, p. 176).  
 
As DT is suspicious of the role of epistemology, the thesis does not 
consider epistemological peculiarities to disciplines like law, accounting, 
and politics (Hviding, 2003, p. 43). But by focusing on ontology and the 
ontic, DT moves through the bounded nature of epistemological, 
interdisciplinary inquiry (Hviding, 2003). DT operates at the ontic level 
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and its inter-relation with ontology: this chapter introduces the 
cornerstones of an ontology of negativity (Glynos, 1999, p. 3). As cost is 
the central regulatory device in the TA and cost has methodological, 
technical, and political implications, the political analysis shifts to the 
ontological as a way of interrogating the uses of cost in accounting, law, 
and regulation. The thesis concentrates on meanings: why was cost chosen 
for regulating telecommunications? What does cost-based regulation 
signify? How was discourse centred on the nodal point of ‘cost’? How is 
cost rhetorically used in regulation?  
 
b) Accounting, law, and regulation are discursive. The opportunity to 
examine the regulatory process (incorporating accounting, law, 
economics, public policy, and politics) from problematisation to 
institution to interpretation is a unique empirical site, particularly due to 
the call for the discursive analysis of regulatory processes.89 The focus on 
the discursive construction of social practices, the scope for contestation, 
and the employment of rhetorical strategies enables fuller appreciation of 
the complexity of the social and political landscape of telecommunications 
regulation by providing space to examine multiple actors, political 
strategies, and goals. Other critical interventions, such as Marxist 
critiques, would tend to exclude community members from the struggle as 
universal signifiers create opposition and are dichotomous. DT’s political 
regulatory picture is comprehensive and complex.    
  
d) Finally, ‘politics’ exists: 
 
Post-structuralism … is immanently political. This is because [post-
structuralism] challenges the discourses and theoretical coordinates through 
which we normally approach politics, thus allowing new political meanings 
and practices to be conceived … We can say, then, that a post-structuralist 
approach to politics points always to a certain void that makes social and 
political identities indeterminate (Newman, 2005, pp. 153-154). 
 
The political is always implicated, as “some sort of shadowy underside of 
politics” (Devenney, 2002, p. 176).  Mouffe comments: 
 
By ‘the political’ I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in 
human relations, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in 
different types of social relations. ‘Politics’, on the other side, indicates the 
ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seeks to establish a 
certain order and organise human co-existence in conditions that are affected 
by the dimension of ‘the political’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 101).  
 
Law, accounting, and regulation are political, and this thesis unpacks the 
political interface of law and accounting as conceived by 
telecommunications regulation. 
 
  
                                                 
89
 There have been calls for the articulation of DT in law, accounting and regulation, as DT politicises 
that which is considered traditionally non-political. In particular, Laclau acknowledges the 
importance of articulating DT to accounting (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003, p. xi), and Black has 
argued for increased discursive analysis of regulation to facilitate better understandings (2002, p. 
195). 
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DT research in law and accounting tends to examine macro-political issues, like 
critiques of justice, rights, and disciplinary foundations (Mitchell et al 1998; Hines, 
1988; 1989; 1991; Morgan, 1988; Perelman, 1963; Coombe & Cohen, 1999; Coombe, 
1998; Goodrich, 1993; Taibi, 1992; Wicke, 1991; and Butler et al, 2000). This thesis 
articulates DT by examining the interface of law and accounting at meso- and micro-
levels focusing on the everyday use of accounting concepts like cost in shaping 
telecommunications regulation.90 Given that “post-structuralism constructs social 
realities by exploring the issues of ‘micro-politics of power’” (Wickramsinghe & 
Alawattage, 2007, p. 482, Kosmala & Herbach, 2007; Fogarty, 1996; and Thomas & 
Davies, 2005), this thesis investigates the formation of political identities characterised 
by antagonism and uncertainty at numerous levels, including the discursive enunciation 
of standpoints and perspectives by actors, and then, moves to consider the political 
strategies at the level of reception post the enactment of legislation analysing the 
contestation over interpreting and implementing the regulation.   
 
DT is a political democratic theory grounded in post-analytical philosophy, post-
structuralism, and psychoanalysis that theorises the ‘drawing together’ of complex, 
disparate groups in the ‘name’ of a political goal. DT incorporates various theoretical 
developments in an interconnected political structure, and this chapter introduces these 
constituent elements, highlighting their relevance for interrogating the interface of law 
and accounting.  
 
II LACLAU AND MOUFFE’S THEORY OF DISCOURSE AND POLITICS 
 
It is our social nature to try to close and reify structures. However, Laclau and 
Mouffe challenge the systematicity of structures based on the ontological assumption 
that subjects and objects are open and never fully constituted, thus there is a failure to 
                                                 
90
 This differs to Preston & Vesey (2008) who hold that law finally decided the shape of US utility 
accounting.  
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completely close structure due to the limits of language and structuralism. In 
understanding this core DT component, the theoretical components of the critique of the 
‘systematicity’ of systems follow. 
 
A Deconstructing the Systematicity of Systems 
 
Structure is a central tenet of Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis of the social world. 
DT does not deny structure and systems.91 However, DT does question structuralist 
tendencies to hold systems as self-evident and complete, arguing that structures are 
inexorably open despite the human ‘need’ to tendentially close systems for fixity. 
Laclau argues that there must be something outside to define what is inside a system 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 125). The social structure, e.g. ‘family’ is commonly 
understood as the elements Mother-Father-Brother-Sister. However, while the elements 
represent the ‘family’ structure, the label ‘family’ is not within but external to the 
system. Thus, if an external meaning defines the ‘system’, the ‘system’ is not a ‘system’ 
in a closed sense. This external element makes the ‘system’ possible (illustrating 
potential limits) and it makes the ‘system’ impossible (it is impossible to close the 
‘system’ due to the external ‘other’). Chapter three’s critique of economic costing and 
the critique of the arbitrariness of positivism, TCE, and agency theory illustrate this 
challenge. The positivist focuses on the cost of production to the exclusion of the costs 
of exchange and agency. To exist, Laclau and Mouffe argue the positivist cost structure 
requires external elements of the costs of exchange and agency to exist. This critique of 
the systematicity of structures provides the core to the DT intervention. There are six 
main points:  
1)  As meaning within a system requires an external element this 
demonstrates the limits of the system. In seeking to close a system, this is 
temporary and artificial for the external element is both within and outside 
of the system (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 125). Thus, in regulating a 
                                                 
91
 Epstein’s characterisation of DT as denying structure misreads the theoretical framework (Epstein, 
1998, Torfing, 2005). 
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TSRLIC interconnection access regime, the original failure to regulate 
interconnection constituted a limit of the light-handed regulatory regime.  
 
2) External elements are antagonistic and provide identity to the system 
(Laclau, 2001, pp. 8-10). Structural linguistics holds that elements within 
systems constitute a system of pure differences. However, Figure 5.4 
illustrates that as the external element antagonises and provides identity, 
there is no longer a system of pure differences, as the antagonistic element 
subverts identity (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 125). In understanding the 
costs of production, the costs of labour, materials, and overheads 
constitute ‘cost’. However, economics recognises different components of 
cost excluded by focusing on the cost of production, including the costs of 
agency and exchange. As these are external to the costs of production, 
they are antagonistic, but they aid in identifying cost, and consequently 
are incorporated into the system of costs. The system of costs, though, is 
open, as there may be other elements of cost not represented within the 
system. Thus, the system is now a system of difference and equivalence: 
internal elements possess their external opposition in common. In simple 
terms, the antagonistic elements of different aspects of cost (production, 
exchange, agency) are all present within each specific type of cost 
(positivism, TCE, and agency), and there are other external elements of 
cost (such as politics or the social, organisational and institutional 
construction of meaning), which continue to antagonise the elements 
within the system rendering the system ‘open’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.4: External elements constitute antagonism to structures  
 
Laclau and Mouffe explain: 
 
But if … the social only exists as a partial effort for constructing society – that 
is, an objective and closed system of differences – antagonism, as a witness of 
the impossibility of final suture, is the ‘experience’ of the limit of the social. 
Strictly speaking, antagonisms are not internal but external to society; or 
rather, they constitute the limits of society, the latter’s impossibility of fully 
constituting itself (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 125). 
 
3) The production of antagonism creates relations of equivalence (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001, p. 128). As any social formation can develop equivalence 
there is no a priori communitarian identity but rather any sense of 
community is built on a system of equivalences. Figure 5.5 illustrates the 
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production of equivalence: antagonisms result in actors in the social space 
trying to incorporate antagonisms in a form of hegemonic politics. As 
more social groups attach significance to the antagonism it becomes 
increasingly empty of particular meaning: e.g. legal concepts like justice, 
human rights, ethics, and the public interest (as critiqued in Chapter three) 
‘allow’ each social group to have their own ‘take’ on the concept. In 
particular, social groups understand the public interest as the ‘public 
good’, ‘public welfare’, ‘general interest’, ‘common interest’, as the 
democratic majority, as an administrative function, or as captured by the 
regulated. Collectively, each of these articulations makes it more difficult 
to grasp what is meant by the term to the point that it arguably is an empty 
signifier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.5: The production of antagonism creates relations of equivalence 
 
Laclau and Mouffe state: 
 
… certain discursive forms, through equivalence, annul all possibility of the 
object and give a real existence to negativity as such … As the social is 
penetrated by negativity – this is, by antagonism – it does not attain the status 
of transparency, of full presence, and the objectivity of its identities is 
permanently subjective … the impossible relation between objectivity and 
negativity has become constitutive of the social (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 
128-129). 
 
4)  Social order is contingent and ‘menaced’ by its dislocation and 
antagonism, as antagonisms name the lack (Laclau, 1996a, p. 53). In an 
effort to dispel the antagonism, internal signifiers to a system attempt to 
‘name’ the antagonism, and that signifier begins to signify that which is 
lacking within the entire system. Consequently, the signifier no longer 
names a particular of the system, but it is an ‘empty signifier’, empty of 
any specific content. It is thus detached from the system and names the 
antagonism (that which threatens the formation of the system). In terms of 
economic cost, then, the costs of exchange name the lack within the costs 
of production, and TSLRIC and net costing represent the lack within light-
handed regulation for telecommunications.  
 
5)  The empty signifier names the absent fullness of any society or 
community, as that present within a community are equivalences and 
differences, but what is absent is that which is common to every identity. 
Empty signifiers are necessary for any society as they provides the basis 
for social objectivity (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 9). Laclau argues: 
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Politics is possible because the constitutive impossibility of society can only 
represent itself through the production of empty signifiers (Laclau, 1996a, p. 
53). 
 
 Consequently, legal concepts like ‘justice’ or ‘human rights’ and an 
accounting concept like ‘substance over form’ may be empty signifiers. 
These concepts exist in an ontic sense, as each individual can read a 
particular meaning into the signifier: i.e. ‘justice’ means to treat like cases 
similar, but this is developed by demonstrating how each case is or is not 
similar, rather than having a specific meaning.  
 
6) This is tied to Gramsci’s hegemony, as a hegemonic element names the 
lack within a system. Thus, hegemony (the lack) demonstrates the limits 
of the system providing the system with identity (Laclau, 1996a, pp. 90-
92). For DT, the theory of hegemony is built on the necessity of both 
antagonism and equivalences. Antagonism names the societal lack, 
defining the political frontier (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 125), while 
identifying and naming of equivalences leads to the system naming the 
antagonism (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 128). Although, Gramsci’s notion 
of “wars of position” had the ultimate goal of incorporating as many 
particulars into the social space as is possible, Gramsci presents hegemony 
as static (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 15). Laclau and Mouffe argue that given 
the fluidity of antagonisms and equivalences, the political frontier must 
logically be capable of movement and social actors must be able to take 
various positions. Consequently, hegemony is a flexible concept.  
 
However, a truly ‘empty signifier’ is probably only possible in theory, as 
practically, there are remnants of meaning within any claimed ‘signifier’ 
and particulars will attempt to define the ‘empty signifier’ for their own 
purposes. For politics, as the signifier is not purely empty there is always 
the possibility of a ‘newer’, ‘better’ antagonism ‘more accurately’ 
defining the lack. 
 
In DT, hegemony is the process of drawing equivalent ‘signifiers’ together to increase 
the chains of equivalence. The following discussion considers the central concept of 
equivalence: 
i) The more extended a chain of equivalence, the less ‘pure’ content is 
attached to the empty signifier: e.g. consider a movement against 
imperialism, with the theoretical possibility of all social actors being 
incorporated into the chains of equivalence. For an anti-imperialistic 
movement to allow chains of equivalence to reach all social actors, then 
the anti-imperialism movement must be devoid of any ‘particular’ 
meaning as some social actors support imperialism. At this extreme level, 
it would seem that the system would be closed as the empty signifier 
includes all particulars (the equivalent of the whole or the universal). 
Thus, the logic of equivalence allows movement between the end of 
extreme particularity and absolute universalism (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 
p. 127). Equally, cost is a relatively simple concept when confined to the 
costs of production, but with the addition of the cost of agency and 
exchange, the concept becomes ‘more’ open. Then, in creating ‘chains of 
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equivalence’ to the notions of cost developed in the interpretive and 
critical theory sections, this incorporates subjectivity, politics, consensus, 
conflict, and the social and institutional creation of meanings of cost into 
the signifying system. The meaning of cost becomes less clear the more 
and more extended becomes the chain of equivalence.  
 
ii)  The more extended the chain of equivalence the less pure are particular 
demands (as each struggle is totally enclosed within itself). The movement 
of the frontier changes the definition of the enemy, and consequently, this 
leads to different actors being incorporated into the hegemonic movement 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 127). As an example, consider the process of 
submissions to the MIT. If the MIT received only one submission, it is 
likely that this submission would be understood and well represented 
within the final report. However, the more submissions received, the less 
likely it is that all submissions are fully understood and represented within 
the final report, despite the final report being accorded with the status of 
summarising and representing the entire submission process. 
 
ii)  With hegemony, the empty signifier is contextual and changes, and it 
moves with changes in political frontiers. There is no a priori empty 
signifier. However, in what may seem contradictory, DT asserts the 
necessity of an empty signifier; the necessity for both difference 
(antagonism) and equivalence (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 9; Laclau, 1996a, 
p. 38). So, where does the empty signifier come from? One particular 
takes the position and articulates the empty signifier for the remainder of 
particulars. However, to name the lack and develop a political function, 
the articulating particular needs to shed its core aim (Laclau, 1996a, p. 
39). If a ‘particular’ signifier of an environmental group occupies the 
position of empty signifier, e.g. it needs to reduce its particular 
environmental identity as much as possible, operating as an incarnation of 
society’s lack per se. Marx’s description of communism illustrates that 
communism was not a particular that was part of society but rather it was 
the incarnation of precisely the lack in society (Marx & Engels, 2002, 
pp.50-51). Thus, the history of hegemonic struggles between and within 
groups is the history of the negotiation of their identity and the struggle 
for the articulation of the lack (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 125). The 
empty signifier constitutes what is lacking in society, involving relations 
of power, representation, and politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv) In relation to power, DT assumes unevenness within the social, 
presupposing dominance at the counter-hegemonic level. Thus, the 
negotiation of the lack between particulars is not a fair or even process, 
but power does not negate the articulation of the lack. It still requires 
negotiation between the demands of the particular, and one particular 
taking the articulating position by diminishing their own particular 
demands to define the lack. The moment of articulation is a moment of 
Core Empirical Concept: Floating/Empty Signifier: a signifier that attempts to 
name the lack in a social system. It is a signifier that attempts to empty itself of 
particular content, so that various particular contents can be read into the signifier. 
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power and consensus. This is the nodal point of a hegemonic movement, 
and is the product of the social forces (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 8). 
 
v) Representation is key to the hegemonic process as there is constant 
negotiation between the heterogeneous ‘particulars’ and the representative 
element. This is the place of rhetoric (Laclau, 1996a, p. 97). The lack in 
society is catachresissical by naming the unnameable:92 e.g. sector specific 
regulation is presented as correcting the failures of the light-handed 
regulation, or more specifically, TSLRIC and net costing name the ‘lack’ 
of the light-handed regime by providing ‘solutions’ to the perceived 
problems of a lack of a dedicated interconnection access regime and the 
KSOs distortion of interconnection prices.  
 
This discussion has introduced the central components of the critique of the 
‘systematicity’ of structures, the logic of equivalence, and ‘hegemony’. For DT, the 
theory of hegemony provides the theoretical justification for the ‘universal’. Between 
the particular and universal there is polarity, as one does not supersede the other. In DT, 
‘universals’ are politically produced: Figure 5.6 demonstrates that for the creation of a 
universal, one of a set of particulars must take on a universal task (which is 
incommensurable to the particular), representing the absent fullness of society and 
resulting in antagonism (Laclau, 1996a, pp. 34-35): e.g. in considering the ‘best’ 
approach to interconnection, Chapter three discussed various pricing options including 
‘bill and keep’, revenue sharing, wholesaling, or cost-based pricing mechanisms. In the 
ensuing debate, TSLRIC emerged as the preferred regulatory approach, and 
consequently, took on the universal task of representing the failure of interconnection 
under the light-handed system. However, in the act of representing the ‘universal’, this 
‘TSLRIC’ particular creates antagonisms precisely due to its failure to fully constitute 
the failure of the light-handed approach.  
                                                 
92
 The logic of hegemony invokes the historicity of the ‘universal’ and the ‘particular’: In ancient 
philosophy, the universal (the form) was more important than the particular (a corruption of the 
universal). The universal was necessary and rational, as the particular was an irrational simplification 
(Laclau, 1996a, p. 22). In medieval philosophy, the particular related to knowledge, placing the 
universal, the unknowable, in an eschatological narrative: God was universal; man was particular. 
For Laclau, this resulted in a Eurocentric view of the world with the privileging of the agent in 
history and incarnation, the Enlightenment, and the equivalence of religion with civilisation (1996a, 
p. 23). Modernity replaced God with reason, with thought equating with universalism. Incarnation 
was discarded, as was the incommensurability of the particular to the universal. For example, Marx’s 
‘particular’ concept of the working class has, within itself, the universal roots of human emancipation 
(Laclau, 1996a, pp. 24-25). 
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Fig 5.6: The relation of the universal and the particular  
 
Consequently, there is no a priori universal, but rather a series of particulars, one of 
which, in a contingent act, takes the place of the universal. However, in taking the 
universal ‘place’ it is impossible to erase the traces of the ‘particular’ (Laclau, 2001, p. 
11).93 Therefore, despite presenting the ‘universals’ of the Telecom v Clear case and the 
Baumol-Willig pricing rule as ‘representing’ the failure of light-handed regulation, 
Telecom’s dominance, litigation difficulties, Telecom’s sale, and the KSO (amongst 
others) ‘contaminate’ the signifier as alternative reasons for the failure of the light-
handed approach. The Telecom v Clear failure represents a ‘particular’ problem within 
light-handed regulation, as it is impossible to erase the ‘particular’ meaning in its role as 
a ‘universal’ signifier. Consequently, as universals are contextual, temporary and 
partial, this explains why there are no natural universals in DT. 
 
Furthermore, hegemony relies upon a notion of metaphorical displacement and 
metonymy: i.e. the rhetorical element of DT requires tropological logic: in order for 
rhetoric to be possible logic must cross the figural. Freud argued that it is never possible 
to have a pure literal signifier or a pure literal signified: DT holds that within one 
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 This differs to Kantian transcendentalism, as there is no transcendental intervention. 
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signifier there are several potential signifieds. By crossing logic (a one-to-one relational 
meaning) with the figural, the figural meaning holds that the connection between two 
terms is metaphorical or catachresical. Lacan’s notion of metonymy is a notion of pure 
continuity, in that it is a method for saying less than what you need to say, the process 
of displacing meaning, such as ‘sailboat to ship’ and ‘pint of beer to pint’. In a similar 
manner, this is the process of ‘cost’ within positivism representing only the ‘costs of 
production’. Although one hegemonic message may represent several constitutive 
particulars, within the hegemonic message there is the constant presence of all tropes 
(possibilities). This is metaphorical displacement. However, hegemony does not 
privilege metaphor or metonymy, as it is not a logic of pure continuity or pure metaphor 
(it is not about erasing differences), but rather it is about creation and the political. For 
Laclau and Mouffe, catachresis is the process of naming the unnameable, and thus, an 
empty signifier is always catachresical in representing absent fullness (hegemony). 
However, any representation for the absent fullness is metaphorical. For DT, then, 
metonymy, metaphor, and catachresis are representative and constitutive of the 
openness of society.  
 
However, the core question remains: How does DT develop our understanding 
of the interface of law and accounting characterised by the use of accounting 
information in the regulation of telecommunications? DT is heterodoxical due to the 
pluralistic strands of theory read for a particular purpose. As a methodological 
articulation, Chapter six introduces Glynos and Howarth’s logics of critical explanation 
(2007) premised on five ontological DT assumptions: i) social objects are meaningfully 
constructed; ii) social objectivity is contingent, relational, and contextual, iii) discursive 
exteriors partially constitute and potentially subvert; iv) identity is articulatory, and v) 
dislocation is an internal element to social totalities. In the following sections, existing 
DT research in law and accounting is examined by illustrating each ontological 
 - 165 - 
assumption,94 how each step develops existing accounting and legal research, and how 
these assumptions are appropriate for this thesis. The next section develops an 
understanding of the first ontological assumption, which relates to DT’s concept of 
discourse. For DT, all social arrangement and organisation is meaningful, based on a 
reading of social constructionism.  
 
B Assumption One: Objects and Practices are Discursively Constructed  
 
DT investigates the way in which discourses constitute social reality so that 
“[t]he discursive can be defined as a theoretical horizon within which the being of 
objects is constituted. In other words, all objects are objects of discourse, as their 
meaning depends upon a social constructed system of rules and significant differences” 
(Howarth et al, 2000, p. 3). This is an explicit rejection of the positivist subject-object 
duality. Laclau and Mouffe explain: 
This totality which includes within itself the linguistic and the non-linguistic, is 
what we call discourse, but what must be clear from the start is that by discourse 
we do not mean a combination of speech and writing, but rather that speech and 
writing are themselves but internal components of discursive totalities … Every 
social configuration is meaningful … it establishes a system of relations with other 
objects, and these relations are not given by the mere referential materiality of the 
objects, but are, rather, socially constructed. The systematic set of relations is what 
we call discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987, p. 82) [emphasis in original]. 
 
Howarth et al emphasise the centrality of discourse:  
At this lower level of abstraction, discourses are concrete systems of social 
relations and practices that are intrinsically political, as their formation is an act of 
radical institution, which involves the construction of antagonisms and the 
drawing of political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. In addition, 
therefore, they always involve the exercise of power, as their constitution involves 
the exclusion of certain possibilities and a consequent structuring of the relations 
                                                 
94
 There is a developing accounting literature incorporating DT (Mouck, 1995; Macintosh & Shearer, 
2000; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; Lehman & Okcabol, 2005; Everett, 2003; Solomon & Darby, 
2005). Gallhofer and Haslam’s (2003) Accounting and Emancipation provides a comprehensive 
account of DT and accounting. In the acknowledgements, Gallhofer and Haslam note Laclau’s 
interest in the articulation of DT to accounting (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003, p. xi). Equally, there are 
many studies in both law and accounting that consider the constituent elements of DT (For law, see 
Barenberg, 1994; Bartlett, 1990; Bender, 1993; Boyle, 1985; Brewer, 1988; Brosnan, 1987; Carlson, 
1999; Cummings & Eagly, 2001; Feldman, 1991; Fink, 2004; Jacob, 1995; Litowitz, 2000; Moore, 
1989; Mootz, 1993; 1998; Rubenfeld, 1989; Scallen, 1995; Weisberg, 1986; Wetlaufer, 1990; and 
Zlotnick, 2001. For accounting, see Birkin, 1996; 2000; Boland Jr, 1996; Boyce, 2002; 2004; 
Cooper, 1995; Jönsson & Macintosh, 1997; McPhail, 1999; Macintosh, 2004; Mattessich, 2003; Neu 
& Taylor, 1996, Neu & Simmons, 1996; Neu, Cooper & Everett, 2001; Sotto, 1997; and Unerman & 
Bennett, 2004). Consequently, there is considerable literature providing a foundation upon which to 
construct a DT intervention into the interface of law and accounting. 
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between different social agents. Moreover, discourses are contingent and historical 
constructions, which are always vulnerable to political forces excluded in their 
production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond their control 
(Howarth et al, 2000, pp. 3-4). 
 
However, this does not reduce everything to discourse or deny the existence of the 
world: 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do 
with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism 
opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, 
in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether 
their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or 
‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive 
field. What is denied is not that objects exist externally to thought, but rather 
different assertions that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any 
discursive conditions of emergence (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 108). 
 
Thus, as law, accounting, and regulation exist as social structures the discursive focus 
of DT moves past their reified status to unpack the discursive construction of the 
disciplines: they exist as objects due to the discursive structure. Although similar to the 
interpretivist and critical theory critique of positivism (Arrington & Francis, 1989; 
Arrington & Schweiker, 1992; Shearer & Arrington, 1993; Tinker, 1988), DT develops 
this by examining the contingent and relational nature of social meanings, structures, 
and practices through dislocation, disruption, and change within social structures, 
practices, and meanings.  
 
 There is emergent critical discourse analysis research in accounting (Arrington 
& Francis, 1989; 1993; Arrington & Schweiker, 1992; Gallhofer, Haslam, & Roper, 
2001; Hines, 1988; 1989; Lehman, 1992; Lehman & Tinker, 1987; McCloskey, 1985; 
1990; Mouck, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Okcabol & Tinker, 1990; Reiter, 1998; Shearer & 
Arrington, 1993; Tinker, 1988; and Williams, 1989). However, by theorising an 
inclusive ‘discourse’ where all social configurations are meaningful and discursively 
constructed, DT develops existing literature: 
a) Consider Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, which defines 
“discourse – language use in speech in writing – as a form of “social 
practice” (1995, p. 258; in accounting, Gallhofer, Haslam & Roper, 2001; 
Owen, Swift, & Hunt 2001; in law, Silverstein & Urban, 1996; Pether, 
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1999). DT challenges the narrowness of Fairclough’s definition of 
discourse, as the sophisticated linguistic focus on speech and writing is a 
limited aspect of discourse and ignores the broader social context. The 
under-theorised social theory limits the scope of the discursive inquiry and 
increases the likelihood that the researcher is caught in the problem of the 
double hermeneutic.    
 
b) Consider discourse within archaeology, where Foucault institutes a series 
of strategies through which to understand discursive structures (in 
accounting, Hopwood, 1987; Chapman, Hopwood & Shields, 2006; in 
law, Hunt & Wickham, 1994; Beck, 1996). In particular, Foucault talks of 
formation rules covering objects, subjects, concepts, and strategies within 
the archive (2003, p. 409). These rules operate as a judgment mechanism 
for the truth/falsity of serious speech acts: to make a serious speech act, 
the statement must conform to the rules. Foucault argues “… a proposition 
must fulfil complex and heavy requirements to be able to belong to the 
grouping of a discipline, before it can be called true or false” (1970, p. 
60). But Foucault fails to account for changes in the archives, as it fails to 
account for speech acts that fall outside the rules. Within the archive, there 
is no theorisation of external speech acts, but logically Foucault requires 
the external as he expects archives to shift over time, given genealogy. 
Thus, Foucault’s discursive is unclear. DT critiques Foucault’s discourse 
as artificial by providing a comprehensive approach to discourse including 
both the linguistic and non-linguistic, as well as theorising interventions 
and alternatives. In particular, the act of instituting social discourse creates 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and is historically and materially contingent 
(Howarth et al, 2000, pp. 3-4). 
 
Consequently, the theorised, discursive intervention into the social world within DT 
develops accounting and law by not artificially drawing boundaries around the 
discursive and the extra-discursive (Fairclough) and by theorising the constitutive 
outside of discourse (Foucault).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The subsequent section argues that social meanings are contextual, relational, and 
contingent by examining structural linguistics and rhetoric. DT’s approach to discourse 
and politics challenges structural linguistics by depicting the logical impossibility of 
How is ‘discourse’ relevant to the empirical analysis? 
 
In the empirical analysis, the discursive examination moves beyond the ‘linguistic’ 
presentation of ‘cost’ to examine broader political strategies employed at the first level by 
interested parties in the MIT and then to examine at the second level the rhetorical 
strategies employed in implementing and interpreting the TA 2001. Further, DT theorises 
changes in social conditions, enabling us to theorise and examine the changes in social 
conditions from pre-TA, to the institution of the TA, to the enactment of the TA. 
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closing structures through introducing concepts of ‘insiders’, ‘outsiders’, and the 
constitutive outside. This post-structural critique suggests that rhetorical analysis is 
important in DT by arguing that the external element that names structures is 
metaphorical and politically, rhetoric is ontological, particularly in relation to 
metonyms. 
 
C Assumption Two: Social meanings are contextual, relational, and contingent 
 
 In articulating the challenge to structural linguistics and the dual role of rhetoric 
(both metaphorically and metonymically) in DT, the political nature of social meanings 
are contextual, relational, and contingent.95  
 
1 The Challenge to Structural Linguistics 
 
For de Saussure, language is an anti-representationist, structural system, 
independent from the world:  
But what is language? … It is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a 
collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to 
permit individuals to exercise that faculty (de Saussure, 1959, p. 9).  
 
Figure 5.7 depicts the key component of language: the ‘sign’ constituting the signified 
and the signifier (de Saussure, 1959, p. 66). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.7: De Saussure’s sign 
                                                 
95
 Structural linguistics in accounting focused on the identification of the unique symbols and rules of 
accounting. In particular, Belkaoui noted that particular accounting symbols identified accounting 
concepts: certain numbers and words, like ‘debits’ and ‘credits’ are accepted symbols with special 
accounting significance. Equally, there are grammatical rules which formalise the structure of the 
accounting language, particularly in relation to the construction and dissemination of accounting data 
(see Belkaoui, 1978; Belkaoui 1995).  
Signifier = Sound 
Image 
 
Signified = Concept 
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De Saussure deduces three assumptions about structural language: 
 
1) The sign is arbitrary: “[t]he bond between the signifier and the signified is 
arbitrary … the linguistic sign is arbitrary” (de Saussure, 1959, p. 67). 
There is arbitrariness to the signified, as words change meaning (concept) 
over time: e.g. “wicked” formerly meant evilness while more recently 
“wicked” means cool. There is arbitrariness at the level of the signifier, as 
nothing ‘attaches’ the word (the letters) to the concept itself. Languages 
developing different sound images to explain a similar concept illustrates 
the lack of a natural connection between concepts and sound images: 
examples include the English “brother”, the French “frère”; the English 
“water”, the French “eau”. For de Saussure arbitrariness means “it is 
unmotivated … in that it actually has no natural connection with the 
signified” (1959, p. 69). 
 
2) Language is form, not substance: 
 
Language can also be compared with a sheet of paper: thought is the front and 
the sound the back; one cannot cut the front without cutting the back at the 
same time; likewise in language, one can neither divide sound from thought 
nor thought from sound … Linguistics then works in the borderland where the 
elements of sound and thought combine; their combination produces a form, 
not a substance (de Saussure, 1959, p. 113). 
 
Structural linguists hold that language is all about form, where the 
composite sign represents a closed system of meaning.  
 
3) Language is a system of differences. De Saussure argues that “[l]anguage 
is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results 
solely from the simultaneous presence of the others …” (de Saussure, 
1959, p. 114). Thus:  
 
… in language there are only differences. Even more important: … in 
language there are only differences without positive terms (de Saussure, 1959, 
p. 120). 
 
This is central to DT, as meaning is relational. In order to comprehend a 
sign, individuals must comprehend the relational differences. To 
understand the sign ‘mother’, I need to understand the relation of ‘father’. 
Wittgenstein argued that a term’s intelligibility is wholly defined by the 
totality of its differences (1983; Staten, 1984). Accounting is prime 
example of the relations of difference in language: the very manner in 
which accounting is taught instructs this presentation. One of the core 
accounting devices is the accounting equation: Assets = Liabilities + 
Equity. This is all about relations of difference: to understand what assets 
are, individuals need to understand what they are not, which includes 
Liabilities and Equity. 
 
 
To develop a theory of politics, DT problematises de Saussure’s structural 
linguistics: 
 - 170 - 
a) Structuralism presupposes that to have structure (such as language), it is 
necessary to have limits to the structure. Post-structuralism focuses on 
challenging the limits of a system: e.g. for social and political ‘order’, it is 
differentiated to something external such as ‘disorder’. DT holds that in 
order to claim the existence of a ‘system’, it needs to be differentiated 
from what it is not. However, as this is an infinite process, one cannot 
incorporate all meanings into a system: 
 
The critique of structuralism involved a break with this view of a fully 
constituted structural space; but as it also rejected any return to a conception 
of unities whose demarcation was given, like a nomenclature, by its reference 
to an object, the resulting conception was of a relational space unable to 
constitute itself as such – of a field dominated by the desire for a structure that 
was always fully absent. The sign is the name of a split, of an impossible 
suture between signified and signifier (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 113). 
 
By definition, a system is always totality less one, as that ‘one’ illustrates 
what the system is not (Miller, 1991, p. 17). Consequently, post-
structuralism critiques structural linguistics for the logical impossibility of 
closing structure and for the need to have something external to identify a 
structure. As discussed earlier, the positivist focus on the costs of 
production excludes costs of exchange and agency, but the existence of 
these elements threatens the structure of positivist cost. 
 
b) Lacan challenges de Saussure’s presentation of sign by challenging the 
self-enclosed presentation of the sign and the subservient nature of the 
signifier (1989, pp. 126-160). The main political motivation for this shift 
is in identifying the subject and subjectivity. Lacan reverses de Saussure’s 
sign arguing that it should signal the domination of the signifier over the 
signified, as represented in Figure 5.8: 
 
 
 
 
or 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.8: Lacan’s challenge – domination of the signifier over the signified 
 
In psychoanalysis, Lacan’s reversal of the sign aids the search for 
subjectivity in that the sign is representative of an impure meaning 
explained by the presence of the signifiers (Lacan, 1989, p. 139).96 
                                                 
96
 Lacan argued that language and symbolic, cultural elements play a core role in the formation of the 
sense of self. For Lacan, this is the the ego. Thus, he ties a reformed version of de Saussure’s sign to 
subjectivity. If language was a system of differences, where meaning is negatively construed, by 
understanding what it is not in relation to what it is, then the ‘sign’ represents that ‘thing’ by standing 
in its place. The sign is not the thing itself. For Lacan, what the sign attempts to represent the 
signified, is always displaced. Thus, for Lacan, this affected the subject as well: like the displacement 
within language, the subject is never complete, as they shift from one signifier to the next, unable to 
fully articulate the signified. In tying subjectivity to language, this presents the view that the subject 
is the subject of the process of signification, in that through the order of signs, symbols, 
representations and images, the individual is formed as a subject (Lacan, 1988). 
Signifier 
Signified 
S 
s 
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Laclau and Mouffe argue that meaning is constructed through signifiers: 
i) Society is an open structure: individuals accept society’s existence, but 
it is not possible to identify society. This is similar to profit in 
accounting: profit is a constructed, intangible object; profit is accepted 
as existing, but it is not identifiable. 
 
ii) Lacanian psychoanalysis demonstrates the possibility for multiple 
significations and meanings, as dominated by the signifier, but equally 
it enables the attachment of multiple signifieds to a central or master 
signifier, as depicted in figure 5.9: 
 
S 
 s  s s s s s s s s s s 
Fig 5.9: Multiple signifieds attached to a master signifier 
 
Figure 5.6 enables Laclau and Mouffe to describe the empty signifier 
as a central component of hegemonic politics. An empty signifier is 
where so many particular signifieds are attached to a signifier that it 
has no particular meaning and represents all particulars. The simple 
question, “what is cost?” illustrates this. The different nature of cost 
within positivism, interpretivism, and critical theory all represent 
particular signifieds attached to the master signifier ‘cost’. Equally, 
there are contrasting disciplinary depictions of cost: economic, 
political, social, and accounting.  
 
iii) By human nature, social beings seek to close the structure of society 
for sanctity and safety, but this is both possible and impossible as it is 
necessary to always have something external to society in order to 
close the ‘system’: thus, society is always open: 
 
… in discourse theory the social field can never be closed, and political 
practices attempt to ‘fill’ this lack of closure. As Laclau puts it, “although 
the fullness and universality of society is unachievable, its need does not 
disappear: it will always show itself through the presence of its absence”. 
In other words, even if the full closure of the social is not realisable in 
any actual society, the idea of closure and fullness still functions as an 
(impossible) ideal (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 8).  
 
In DT, the gap between the necessary and the impossible is politics, 
that social space where social actors struggle to attempt to close the 
system.97 Cost is an open concept, but to render the concept usable 
social actors will try to provide a closed definition to cost. Thus, social 
actors do not dwell on the inherent arbitrariness and openness within 
cost (as ‘cost’ attempts to represent something ‘real’). 
 
                                                 
97
 Also, note Holdcroft (1991). This introduces the axis of language in relation to de Saussure’s structural 
linguistics. That is, language is a combination of the paradigmatic (or associative) or syntagmatic. 
DT uses this axis of language to argue that the syntagmatic element comprises the relations of 
difference, while the paradigmatic elements comprise the relations of equivalence, which constitute a 
vital component of political hegemony. 
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DT’s critique of structural linguistics is the genesis for a theory of politics as the 
inexorably open nature of structures provokes a political struggle to close the open 
system. But always an element of openness remains. Thus, social meanings are 
contextual, relational, and contingent.  
 
The recognition of the linguistic turn in accounting and law is the first step for 
DT. The linguistic turn moves past the ‘factual’, ‘objective’ presentation of law and 
accounting to see the products of accounting and law, the figures, numbers, reports, 
judgments, and statements as texts, with accountants and lawyers as the authors of the 
text, auditors and judges as critics, and users as readers (Macintosh, 2000, p. 23; 
Davies, 2002). While the realist turn in law suggested this approach, this was a 
significant shift from the traditional accounting focus on accounting as information, as 
required by economics. Here, accounting is a narrative (Macintosh, 2002, p. 23). The 
post-structuralist critique concentrates on understanding how language and language 
games work to produce meaning (rather than the structural linguistic concentration on 
the reflection of meaning). Thus, both the languages of law and accounting are 
challenged: accounting does not ‘reflect’ economic reality, but accounting is actively 
producing meaning; law does not ‘reflect’ justice and the rule of law, but law is 
actively engaged in constructing this meaning (this is the subject of increased 
discussion in accounting and law, see Macintosh et al, 2000, Macintosh, 2002; Arnold, 
Hammond & Oakes, 1994; Goodrich, 1987; Davies, 2002). The critique demonstrates 
that legal and accounting constructs like justice and cost are not neutral or objective 
constructs, “representing reality as is” (Morgan, 1988, p. 478), which challenges the 
incorporation of cost accounting into telecommunications regulation. Although 
developed as a critique of linguistics, Laclau and Mouffe shift the focus to society, as a 
post-structural theorisation of politics in society, given the open nature of social 
systems. The political motivation, human nature, is to close these open systems. 
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Equally, the Lacanian intervention drives the failure of language to the failure of the 
subject, in that subjects are unable to achieve closure in attempts to identify their 
subjectivity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the following section examines the central political role for rhetoric. The 
struggle to close systems is a rhetorical task.  
2 Rhetoric  
 
Rhetoric operates politically constitutively and ontologically, drawing on a 
philosophical tradition including Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and Nietzsche. Nietzsche 
acknowledged the fundamental role of rhetoric in constructing ‘knowledge’: 
What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, 
anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which became poetically 
and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned and after long usage seem to 
a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths are illusions of which one has forgotten 
that they are illusions; worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect 
the senses; coins which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of 
account as coins but merely as metal. 
… 
Only by forgetting that primitive world of metaphors, only by the congelation and 
coagulation of an original mass of similes and precepts pouring forth as a fiery 
liquid out of the primal faculty of human fancy, only by the invincible faith, that 
this sun, this window, this table is a truth in itself: in short only by the fact that 
man forgets himself as subject, and what is more as an artistically creating 
subject: only by all this does he live with some repose, safety and consequence 
(Nietzsche, 1964, pp. 180, 184). 
 
 
 For Aristotle, rhetoric permeated all thought (1947), as philosophy 
metaphorically makes the unfamiliar familiar. Quintilian’s examination of metaphor 
argues for two forms: 
a) The transfer of meaning through one word to another (metaphor); and 
How is the ‘challenge to structural linguistics’ relevant to the empirical analysis? 
 
In contesting the ‘shape’ and in implementing the new regulatory framework, we analyse 
the struggle to achieve social closure through the processes of law, accounting, and 
regulation. In particular, we examine how social actors struggle to ‘identify’ with the new 
regulatory mechanisms. This analysis exposes the contingency of the political process (in 
the arbitrariness and openness of the disciplines and cost more specifically), but also 
exposes the contingency of the subject, as subjects seek to identify with the new 
regulatory system. Consequently, we see a political struggle to achieve closure. 
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b) The attachment of meaning with one word to another where there is no 
appropriate word (catachresis). 
 
Quintilian argued the existence of catachresis indicated that language is empirically 
poorer than the world’s richness, as it calls upon us to name that which society does not 
know. The rhetorical lack between the limits of language and the object/thing illustrates 
the impossibility of language to name everything: consider energy source names: Watt, 
Doethgan, and Bohr. Laclau and Mouffe argue that modernity marginalised the 
rhetorical tradition by concentrating on the Platonic philosophy concerned with truth 
and reality (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). However, the social need for language and 
communication accepts the existence of rhetoric. For Laclau and Mouffe, rhetoric 
ontologically justifies the social lack. 
 
Rhetorical tools are important in constituting social meaning and politics. 
Metaphor, (from the Greek, metaphora) ‘a figure of speech where one thing is used to 
designate another, thus making an implicit comparison’, represents the transfer of 
quality. Metonymy (from the Greek, metanoma and the Latin pars pro toto) is the use 
of a single characteristic to identify a more complex entity in the substitution of one 
word for another with which it is associated. NZ examples include that the “Beehive” is 
a metonym for Parliament and “Crown” is a metonym for the monarchy. Metonymy 
works by contiguity rather than similarity: the presentation of food on a dish results in 
referring to food as a ‘dish’. However, the rhetorical distinction between metaphor and 
metonymy is important. In metonymy, there is no transfer of quality: there is nothing 
dish-like about food. Rather, metonymy invokes a domain of usage and an array of 
associations, while metaphor picks a set of meanings, transferring them to a new 
domain of usage (Laclau, 2001, p. 8). Catachresis is the incorrect or improper use of a 
word. Table 5.1 demonstrates forms of catachresis, illustrating how each example 
violates language norms: 
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Table 5.1: Examples and Forms of Catachresis 
Form of catachresis Example 
a) Using a word to denote something 
radically different from its normal meaning. 
“‘Tis deepest winter in Lord Timon’s 
purse” from  Shakespeare, Timon of 
Athens 
b) Using a word to denote something for 
which, without the catachresis, there is no 
actual name. 
“a table’s leg” 
c) Using a word out of context. “Can’t you hear that? Are you blind?” 
d) Using paradoxical or contradictory logic. Creating an illogical mixed metaphor.  
Eg. “To take arms against a sea of 
troubles...” – Shakespeare, Hamlet 
 
 
Laclau and Mouffe argue that catachresis illustrates the lack within the structure of 
language. When faced with a situation when there is no ‘name’ (the impossible), the gap 
is filled by whatever resource is available (the possible): this is the function of politics 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 127).  
 
Thus, rhetoric operates ontologically as hegemonic interventions represent 
metonyms by which a “particular group takes up demands articulated by contiguous 
groups … or extends one set of demands into adjacent spheres” (Howarth & Griggs, 
2005, p. 11); it operates politically, as attempts to temporarily close systems are 
metaphorical involving the “creation of meaningful totalities via the disarticulation and 
replacement of previously existing formation” (Howarth & Griggs, 2005, p. 11). Social 
meanings are contextual, relational and contingent as the ‘temporary’ closure of systems 
indicates the impossibility of permanently closing systems.  
 
There is a strong rhetorical tradition in law and accounting (Arrington & 
Schweiker, 1992; Arrington & Francis, 1993; Hines, 1988; 1991; 1996; MacCormack, 
2005; Frug, 1992; Mertz, 2007). However, much of the focus of rhetorical analysis is at 
the epistemological level (Johnson, 1995; Quattrone, 2000; Arrington, 2004) explaining 
‘how’ accounting constructs, persuades and silences. DT, in the Heideggerian fashion, 
argues that the focus should ontologically and ontically be on meaning. Rhetorical 
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analysis focuses on strategies employed, meanings attributed, and explanations, 
developing existing literature through focusing on the political in a shift away from 
structural law-like generalisations and elements. The post-structural focus is on the role 
of rhetoric in driving social interaction and change. As Mouck (1995) explains “post-
structuralist social theory, accordingly, can be seen as a powerful tool for attacking the 
reductionistic and deterministic perspectives associated with neoclassical economics 
and economistic accounting theory” (p. 78).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philosophically, rhetoric refers to the lack as understood through the 
Heideggarian-informed ‘negative ontology’. 
3 A Note on the Implications of the Negative Ontology 
   
DT holds that signifying structures are irreducibly open, due to the lack. This 
requires a particular perspective on ontology: the ‘negative ontology’, premised on 
negation and impossibility. DT develops Heidegger’s concept of the ontic (1962).98 
Although ‘ontic’ and ‘ontology’ share the same Greek root (‘being’) they represent two 
concepts (Bhaskar, 1987). Ontology is the philosophy of Being as discussed by classical 
scholars such as Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle. Heidegger’s different conception of 
ontology concentrates on the meaning of ‘being’: “Dasein”. The ‘ontic’ describes 
physical or factual existence, as opposed to the nature or properties of that being. This 
philosophical turn allows Heidegger to differentiate between the ontic as an adjective 
                                                 
98
 Heidegger presupposed an ontological significance that distinguishes ontological being from mere 
“thinghood” of an ontic being. This is where the notion of Dasein arises, as a being that is capable of 
ontology, that is, recursively comprehending properties of the very fact of its own Being. 
How is ‘rhetoric’ relevant to the empirical analysis? 
 
Text of documents and interviews are subject to rhetorical analysis where the role of 
metonyms and metaphors operate at the ontical level, focusing on the employment of cost 
in telecommunications regulation. The focus is on how the ontological dimension informs 
the employment and use of tropes in the analysis of discourse, examining the substitution 
of metaphors, as a means of understanding the logic by which interested parties struggled 
to ‘create’ and ‘operationalise’ a workable framework, given the incentives of the various 
players to ‘use’ the system for their own advantage. 
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referring to “real being” and ontology, which attempts to distill essences or structures 
from Being. For DT, ontic meaning is crucial. Ontological analysis presupposes the 
ontic explicitly analysing the moments of ontic existence, and for DT, this is where 
ontic moments acquire (or are attributed) meaning: ontic existence requires explanation, 
not expansion or combination. As there are infinite differences and different points of 
view, it is impossible to have a complete description of Being. Rather, in order to have a 
point of view, there needs to be another position. In summary, DT is concerned with 
meanings, operating at the ontic level and the analysis of objects as specified by 
ontological presuppositions.  
  
In developing the relationship between ‘discourse’, the openness of social 
systems, and rhetoric, Laclau and Mouffe shift focus to the construction of politics 
through hegemony, deconstruction, and genealogy. In particular, when a metaphor 
claims to ‘name’ the gap in an open system, this is hegemonic. However, any ‘name’ 
representing the ‘lack’ creates another ‘name’ excluded from the signifying system. 
Thus, a hegemonic metaphor partially constitutes and partially subverts itself. The next 
section develops the post-Marxist influences of DT. Laclau and Mouffe take 
Luxemburg and Gramsci’s work on hegemony, and intertwined with rhetorical logic, 
develop an account of politics. This section notes the link to deconstruction and 
genealogy. This reading of Marxism requires Laclau and Mouffe to challenge the 
traditional economic determinism and class reductionism inherent in Marxist theory.  
 
D Assumption Three: Discursive Exteriors that Partially Constitute also 
Potentially Subvert  
 
DT is post-Marxist, recognising the contingency, arbitrariness and limitations of 
Marxist theory99 in terms of class reductionism (through critiquing Luxemburg) and 
                                                 
99
 Laclau and Mouffe argue that this movement in the history of Marxism is a movement from class 
essentialism to discourse tracing the political philosophy of the classical Marxism right through to 
Gramsci (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, pp. 98-99). 
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economic determinism (through critiquing Gramsci) (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, pp. 98-
99). Laclau and Mouffe argue that class is less useful for analysing contemporary 
society pointing empirically to the development of ‘new social movements’ including 
sexuality (queer movements), ethnic, religious, national identities, and unions (1987, p. 
97). Yanarella argues that Laclau and Mouffe rework Gramsci’s ideological hegemony 
to provide a post-Marxist view of hegemonic articulation which incorporates a 
deconstructive logic of extravagance with a post-structuralist reading of Althusser’s 
logic of overdetermination (1993, p. 69). Consequently, Laclau and Mouffe’s critique of 
Marxism targets the ontological privileging of the working class as the agent of 
historical transformation, representing an unacceptable ‘essentialism’: ‘class’ identifies 
with a particular agent while identifying with the ‘universal’ of human emancipation, 
such that the particular of ‘class’ possesses the roots of universality. Thus, Laclau and 
Mouffe critique Marx’s conception of the working class as a “social identity” through 
challenging the Marxist understanding of economic processes:  
To assert . . . that hegemony must always correspond to a fundamental economic 
class is not merely to reaffirm determination in the last instance by the economy; it 
is also to predicate that, insofar as the economy constitutes an insurmountable 
limit to society’s potential for hegemonic recomposition, the constitutive logic of 
the economic space is not itself hegemonic (Yanarella, 1993, p. 69).  
 
Thus, the post-Marxist movement in DT thematises hegemonic politics informed 
by unfixity, the deferral of social identity, and excesses in symbolic articulation 
(Yanarella, 1993, p. 69), as discussed in the following section. 
1 Hegemony 
 
Hegemony is the central concept in Gramsci’s work (1971, pp. 55-56), and for 
DT, hegemony is democracy (Laclau, 2001, p. 7). It is “dialectic” rather than 
“deterministic” as hegemony attempts to recognise the interdependence and the 
autonomy of hegemony, culture, and ideology (Fraser & Bartky, 1992, p. 175). 
Hegemony is ‘the discursive face of power’:  
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It is the power to establish the ‘common sense’ or ‘doxa’ of a society, the fund of 
self-evident descriptions of social reality that normally go without saying. This 
includes the power to establish authoritative definitions of social situations and 
social needs, the power to define the universe of legitimate disagreement, and the 
power to shape the political agenda (Fraser & Bartky, 1992, p. 179).  
 
 
Although Gramscian hegemony refers to rule by consent through moral and 
intellectual authority or leadership, groups can form alternative viewpoints in 
opposition. In Gramsci’s Italy, e.g. there was tension between the industrialists and the 
peasantry, referring to the ‘hegemony of the proletariat’ as counter to the dominant 
hegemony (Gramsci, 1926). This ‘hegemony of the proletariat’ is defined as the “social 
basis of the proletarian dictatorship and of the workers’ State”:  
… the proletariat can become the leading and the dominant class to the extent that 
it succeeds in creating a system of class alliances which allows it to mobilize the 
majority of the working population against Capitalism and the bourgeois State … 
this means to the extent that it succeeds in gaining the consent of the broad peasant 
masses … (Gramsci, 1971, p. 443). 
 
 
Counter-hegemonies have a certain degree of power in their ability to 
‘influence’ the dominant hegemony. Gramsci recognised that a multitude of diverse 
counter-hegemonies are less successful in influencing the State through ‘divide and 
rule’. For the working class to achieve hegemony it needs to build a ‘network’ of 
‘alliances’ with other social minorities. These new coalitions should respect the 
movement’s autonomy so that each group contributes to the development of a strong 
counter-hegemonic movement. 
 
For Gramsci, the organic intellectual is central to developing counter-
hegemonies: ‘organic’ as they are free from the pervasiveness of the dominant 
hegemony. Organic intellectuals help to develop the consciousness of capitalist 
contradictions and its pervasiveness in everyday life, operating as a type of strategist by 
problematising the dominant hegemony and aiding the development and direction of the 
counter-hegemony. 
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Hegemony is a contingent process of readjustment and re-negotiation, as 
dominant groups attempt to accommodate counter-hegemonic concerns by amending 
the dominant hegemony. Thus, the constitution of hegemony is inherently flexible, 
capable of taking many forms and positions to counter threats. Gramsci notes that 
accommodation results in a more complete dominant hegemony in quashing threats 
posed by counter-hegemonic movements.  
 
However, an ‘organic crisis’ may develop where the dominant group begins to 
disintegrate creating an opportunity for a lesser class to ‘break the shackles’ of its class 
limitations and build a strong counter-hegemonic movement capable of challenging the 
existing order and replacing the previous hegemony. The key to ‘revolutionary’ social 
change in modern societies does not depend, as predicted by Marx, on the spontaneous 
awakening of critical class consciousness but upon the prior formation of alliances of 
interests, an alternative hegemony, with a developed, cohesive worldview of its own 
(Williams, 1992, p. 27). 
2 Developing Gramscian Theory 
 
Although Gramsci attempts to remove Marxist economic determinism from the 
theory of hegemony, Gramsci invokes class essentialism by limiting the revolutionary 
counter-hegemonic capacity to the ‘working class’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 65-71). 
Laclau and Mouffe, argue: 
… We will thus retain from the Gramscian view the logic of articulation and the 
political centrality of the frontier effects, but we will eliminate the assumption of a 
single political space as the necessary framework for those phenomena to arise. 
We will therefore speak of democratic struggles where these imply a plurality of 
political spaces, and of popular struggles where certain discourses tendentially 
construct the division of a single political space in two opposed fields. But it is 
clear that the fundamental concept is that of ‘democratic struggle’, and that 
popular struggles are merely specific conjunctures resulting from the 
multiplication of equivalence effects among the democratic struggles. 
 
… we have moved away from two key aspects of Gramsci’s thought: (a) his 
insistence that hegemonic subjects are necessarily constituted on the plane of 
fundamental classes; and (b) his postulate that, with the exception of interregna 
constituted by organic crises, every social formation structures itself around a 
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single hegemonic centre … these are the two last elements of essentialism 
remaining in Gramscian thought (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 137-138). 
 
 
In DT terms, hegemonic practices are an exemplary form of political activity 
that involves the articulation of different identities and subjectivities into a common 
project. This radicalises Gramscian hegemony: 
Thus, hegemonic practices presuppose a social field criss-crossed by antagonisms, 
and the presence of elements that can be articulated by opposed political projects. 
The major aim of hegemonic projects is to construct and stabilise the nodal points 
that form the basis of concrete social orders by articulating as many available 
elements – floating signifiers – as possible (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 15). 
 
 
Hegemony, then, is the central concept of DT.100 A hegemonic signifier 
constructs those inside and those outside: it names that which partially constitutes and 
potentially subverts. For DT, hegemony possesses the following political conditions: 
1) The unevenness of power is constitutive of it: power and freedom are 
correlative;101  
                                                 
100
 Hegemony and deconstruction are different sides of the same coin (Laclau, 1993; 1996a; Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001). For Derrida, there is always something lacking, something always outside (Derrida, 
1978a, pp. 351-370), and this is expressed in two ways: a) that which recognises and makes visible 
its legislating force; and b) that which conceals its legislating force under objective and natural 
sciences, such as structural linguistics (Derrida, 1992; Derrida, 1995; Derrida 1997a; Derrida, 
1997b). Derrida claims that deconstruction recognises, identifies, and makes visible the concealed 
legislating forces: 
 
Derrida generalises the concept of discourse in a sense coincident with that of our text … ‘The 
substitute does not substitute itself for anything which has somehow existed before it, henceforth, it 
was necessary to begin thinking that there was no centre, that the centre could not be thought in the 
form of a present-being, that the centre had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a 
sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This was the 
moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a 
centre or origin, everything became discourse – provided we can agree on this word – that is to say, a 
system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely 
present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain 
and the play of signification indefinitely’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 112, quoting Derrida, 1978a, p. 
280). 
 
Derrida provides DT with important theoretical and analytical tools for the analysis and development of 
politics (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002; Howarth and Torfing, 2005). 
 
101
 DT develops this notion of power from Foucault’s genealogy. Laclau and Mouffe are critical of the 
artificial distinction of Foucault’s archaeology, referring to the duality in the rigidity of the discursive 
and the non-discursive (Stäheli, 2004, p. 232), but Laclau and Mouffe incorporate Foucault’s 
genealogy to develop a complex notion of power (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 107, see Derrida, 
1978a; 1992). For Foucault’s genealogy, power is unavoidable and always present, based on 
domination, as opposed to liberal conceptions of power that concentrate on structural definitions of 
power such as the State and the judiciary. Foucault concentrates on identifying alternatives to 
dominant discourses, distinguishing ‘origin’ from ‘emergence’. Genealogy concerns itself with the 
moment of emergence, rather than History’s focus on origins. With genealogy, any order is 
contingent, and politically, we seek to identify the emergent from non-realised possibilities. Thus, 
genealogical inquiry focuses on examining what made the emergence of a particular discursive 
formation possible at the expense of, or concealing, other different possibilities. Foucault’s 
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2) The dichotomy between universality and particularity is superseded;  
 
3)  Hegemonic politics is the production of a tendentially empty signifier that 
maintains the incommensurability of the universal to the particular. 
However, it does enable the particular to ‘represent’ the universal. 
 
4) Generalisation of representation as a condition of the constitution of a 
social order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In developing Black’s (2002b) problematisation of regulatory communication, 
hegemony, deconstruction, and genealogy reveal regulatory power struggles over 
interpreting and implementing regulation. In particular, the framework provides space 
to consider the political games from the regulated and regulator perspective. In 
particular, DT challenges law’s claim to ‘justice’ by unpacking the assumptions 
underpinning the term. For DT, justice constitutes a universal ‘empty signifier’ applied 
to particular situations. However, how does one apply a universal rule to individual 
particular cases? Justice refers to the right to be just in treating alike cases in a similar 
manner. However, to operate the rule, there are two further specifications not evident in 
the rule: what is it to be ‘similar’? How should they be treated?  
 
Gramscian accounting research is increasing with twenty-three articles since 
1990: five articles comprehensively articulate Gramscian theory (Gallhofer and Haslam, 
2005; Ferguson et al, 2005; Catchpowle et al, 2004; Spence, 2007; Alawattage and 
Wickramasinghe, 2006). Catchpowle et al identify the central role of accounting in the 
process of capitalism determining the relationship between the capitalist, labour and 
                                                                                                                                               
genealogy reclaims the position of an ontology of difference (tropological difference) or catachresis 
(naming the nameless). This is an emancipatory politics, in the sense of naming that outside of the 
system. DT takes the genealogical ontology of difference and conceives that an ethos requiring that 
structures are irreducibly open requires an ontology of lack (Glynos, 1999).  
Core Empirical Concept: Hegemony: this is a form of politics where a 
particularity articulates the ‘floating signifier’ for various disparate social groups, 
taking on an (impossible) universality which is incommensurable with the particular. 
Hegemony, then, is the central concept of DT. A hegemonic signifier constructs 
those inside and those outside: it names that which partially constitutes and 
potentially subverts. This radicalises Gramsci’s hegemony, and relates to empty 
signifiers.  
- 
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social activity, as well as how accounting plays a ‘mediatory’ role between the State 
and capital. In relation to human capital accounting is employed as a disciplining tool 
encouraging “quantity and abstraction” and “competitive accumulation” (Catchpowle et 
al, 2004, p. 1055). Spence, from a DT approach, examines the radical and emancipatory 
intent internal to the social accounting project. The paper acknowledges the role of 
business in shifting the hegemonic focus away from inquiry and critique. For Spence, 
emancipatory social accounting operates to actively expose the contradictions of current 
hegemony. This suggests that:  
hegemony is politics … We cannot stand outside of hegemony or power, nor 
should we want to. A radical political project can be constructed through 
antagonism and the hegemonic construction of the ‘movement’ or the ‘people’ as a 
historical actor. It is a countervailing power that is needed, but not a counter-
hegemonic one (Spence, 2007, p. 12). 
 
Consequently, accounting literature is increasingly embracing the DT approach to 
hegemony.  
 
Equally, hegemony is used in law: Litowitz is critical of Gramsci for suggesting 
that there is a single ‘hegemony’ to law, arguing for the adoption of Laclau and Mouffe: 
there are hegemonies: parts of law that are more fundamental and unquestioned, 
parts which are becoming challenged, parts which authorize the dominant culture, 
parts which offer liberation to the subordinate. Law … incorporates contradictory 
discourses about equality, justice, and persons (Litowitz., 2000, p. 530; Mattei, 
2003; Rajagopal, 2003).  
 
Kennedy constructs a picture of “liberal hegemony in law schools” by drawing on the 
examples of denial of tenure to CLS scholars at Harvard, Yale, and Minnesota Law 
School (Kennedy, 1983; 1998). The clashes between critical and liberal legal theorists 
escalated to the extent that Harvard was labelled “the Beirut of legal education” (Austin, 
1998, p. 2). However, the discursive focus of this thesis invites rhetorical, hegemonic, 
genealogical, and deconstructive analysis to examine the strategies, effects, and aims of 
the regulation, industry players, Government, lawyers, accountants, and the use of cost 
accounting information in the regulatory process. This thesis develops hegemonic 
literature by linking the hegemonic project to deconstruction and genealogy.  
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While the combination of rhetoric, hegemony, deconstruction, and genealogy 
account for why there is a need to ‘fill’ the lack in social systems, the core political 
question remains: how do political actors articulate that ‘thing’ which ‘fills’ the social 
lack? This is a subtle, important movement from traditional political analysis in 
accounting by tying the role of structures to the role of subjects in articulating and 
invoking politics. Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis focuses on politics by examining the 
process of articulating the ‘social’ lack. To examine ‘articulation’, DT introduces 
condensation and overdetermination to explain the political effects of the rhetorical 
tools of metaphor and metonyms.   
 
E Assumption Four: Articulatory Practice 
 
Laclau and Mouffe introduce the psychoanalytic in their development of a 
political framework. In relation to politics, DT recognises the role of the subject. If 
social structures are open, and are only tendentially closed, the social actors themselves, 
are open, and seek to tendentially close their identity. This draws on the Lacanian 
subjectivity developed above, tying subjectivity to language. Lacan presents the view 
that the subject is the subject of the process of signification: through the order of signs, 
symbols, representations and images, the individual is formed as a subject (Lacan, 
1988). For DT, there is a subjective link between the metaphoric and metonymic 
processes of articulating hegemonies, Freud’s conceptualisation of condensation and 
displacement, and Althusser’s development of overdetermination. In the construction of 
nodal points, condensation operates metaphorically by making the dissimilar similar, 
How is ‘hegemony’ relevant to the empirical analysis? 
 
In relation to the rhetorical analysis, hegemony is the process by which interested parties 
draw together. In relation to TSLRIC and net costing, we see disparate groups with 
common understandings join together. In particular, we see how TSLRIC and net costing 
become representative of the failures of light-handed regulation. Equally, though, in 
analysing the interpretation and implementation of the Act, we reveal regulatory power 
struggles over the regulation. 
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while displacement (overdetermination) operates metonymically by concealing the 
primary identity of that ‘dissimilar’. 
1 Overdetermination/Representation/Condensation 
 
The main focus of Freud’s psychoanalytic inquiry was the unconscious escapism 
evident in dreams, jokes, and errors mediated through condensation and displacement. 
Condensation refers to creation at the manifest level (dream content) and is the 
equivalent of metaphor relating to the process of convergence, synthesis, construction, 
and fixation that leads to signification at the manifest level of some or many things at 
the latent level (dream thoughts). Displacement refers to condensation at both the 
manifest level and the latent level of the dream, and is the equivalent of metonymy. For 
Freud, there is displacement at the level of the conscious and the unconscious, as well 
as between events at the latent and the manifest levels. 
 
Freud explains the ‘Dream of the Botanical Monograph’:102 
 
Thus ‘botanical’ was a regular nodal point in the dream … the elements 
‘botanical’ and ‘monograph’ found their way into the content of the dream 
because they possessed copious contacts with the majority of the dream-thoughts, 
because, that is to say it, they constituted ‘nodal points’ upon which a great 
number of the dream-thoughts converged, and because they had several meanings 
in connection with the interpretation of the dream.  The explanation of this 
fundamental fact can also be put in another way: each of the elements of the 
dream’s content turns out to have been ‘overdetermined’ - to have been 
represented in the dream-thoughts many times over (Freud, 1900, pp. 388-389). 
 
Freud continues: 
 
Among the thoughts that analysis brings to light are many which are relatively 
remote from the kernel of the dream and which look like artificial interpolations 
made for some particular purpose.  That purpose is easy to divine.  It is precisely 
they that constitute a connection, often a forced and far-fixed one, between the 
dream-content in the dream-thoughts; and if these elements were weeded out of 
the analysis the result would often be that the component parts of the dream-
content would be left not only without overdetermination but without any 
satisfactory determination at all. 
… 
If that is so, a transference and displacement of psychical intensities occurs in the 
process of dream-formation, and it is as a result of these that the difference 
between the text of the dream-content and that of the dream-thoughts comes about.  
                                                 
102
 The content of the dream is as follows: “I had written a monograph on an (unspecified) genus of plant. 
The book lay before me and I was at the moment turning over a folded coloured plate.  Bound up in 
the copy there was a dried specimen of the plant” (Freud, 1900, p. 386). 
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The process which we are here presuming is nothing less than the essential portion 
of the dream-work; and it deserves to be described as ‘dream-displacement’ 
(Freud, 1900, pp. 416-417). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DT employs two elements: nodal points and overdetermination. The nodal point 
refers to the point of condensation, where the existence of signification at the manifest 
level represents multifarious latent connections. In DT, the more open the point of 
condensation, the greater the number attached to signification. Overdetermination refers 
to the representation of a signified many times over, to the point where it is not possible 
to identify the primary source for meaning. Nodal points and overdetermination are 
vital to politics as political discourse is the articulation of nodal points representative of 
a multiplicity of heterogeneous factors, akin to the metaphor in rhetorical philosophy. In 
politics, the aim is to construct nodal points that make the dissimilar similar. For 
Laclau, this illustrates the limitations of representation:  
The conditions for a perfect representation, would be met, it seems, when the 
representation is a direct process of transmission of the will of the represented, 
when the act of representation is totally transparent in relation to that will. This 
presupposes that the will is fully constituted and that the role of the representative 
is exhausted in its function of intermediation  
… 
So, the idea of having a perfect representation involves logical impossibility ... 
The problem, rather, is that representation is the name of an undecidable game that 
organises a variety of social relations but whose operations cannot be fixed in a 
rationally graspable and ultimately univocal mechanism … As a result, the need to 
‘fill in the gaps’ is no longer a ‘supplement’ to be added to a basic area of 
constitution of the identity of the agent but, instead, becomes a primary terrain. 
The constitutive role of representation in the formation of the will, which was 
partly concealed in more stable societies, now becomes fully visible (Laclau, 
1996a, pp. 97, 98-99).   
 
Core Empirical Concept: Displacement: no identity is pure and uncontaminated, 
as meanings and identities incorporate traces of other identities. This logic shows the 
relational character of the social, and demonstrates the difficulty of identifying ‘the’ 
meaning or identity attached to a concept. 
Core Empirical Concept: Condensation: the fusing together of different elements 
to temporarily halt the development of competing significations. It is this 
‘temporary’ nature that illustrates that the particularities of signifiers (their diversity) 
still contaminate the condensed signifier.  
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For DT, this relates to Althusser’s overdetermination. Laclau and Mouffe argue 
that overdetermination relates to the constitution of the social as a symbolic order: 
“Society and social agents lack any essence and the regularities merely consist of the 
relative and the curious forms of fixation which accompany the establishment of a 
certain order” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 98). Politically, then, nodal points 
(condensation) make the dissimilar similar (like metaphor), while overdetermination 
(displacement) conceals the primary identity of that ‘dissimilar’ (like metonym).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The role of the subject is often overlooked in accounting and legal research, as 
there is a dearth of literature concerning the role of accounting, law, psychoanalysis, 
and the subject. Legal literature explores the gap between the ‘collective norm’ 
approach and individual subject positions in law (see Goodrich 1993, Carlson, 1999). 
Althusser theorises that ideology fills this gap:103 i.e. the call to ideologies is an 
articulation of the gap between socially constructed concepts and our individual subject 
positions. 
2 Articulation 
 
Politics is the study of articulatory attempts to close systems: 
                                                 
103
 See the discussion of Althusser and ideology in Chapter six. 
Core Empirical Concept: Overdetermination: Like metonyms, overdetermination 
works through displacement to conceal the primary identity of the dissimilar. In 
some ways, overdetermination unpacks nodal points.  
How are ‘condensation’, ‘displacement’ and ‘overdetermination’ relevant to the 
empirical analysis? 
 
Condensation is the process by which multiple signifieds are applied to a signifier at the 
institution stage. In this empirical analysis we note how TSLRIC and net costing came to 
represent all the failures of light-handed regulation. At the implementation and 
interpretation stage, we see how these meanings are displaced and overdetermined as 
groups struggle over the meaning of the terms, unpacking the nodal points. 
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[DT] investigates the way social practices systematically form the identities of 
subjects and objects by articulating together a series of contingent signifying 
elements available in a discursive field (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 7). 
 
Howarth et al acknowledge the paradox of ultimate contingency and the partial fixity of 
meaning: “If all social forms are contingent, if the ‘transition from “elements” to 
“moments” is never complete’ how then is any identity or social formation possible?” 
(Howarth et al, 2000, pp. 7-8). In answer, Laclau and Mouffe turn to nodal points: 
The impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there have to be 
partial fixations – otherwise, the very flow of differences would be impossible. 
Even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning. If the social 
does not manage to fix itself in the intelligible and instituted forms of a society, the 
social only exists, however, as an effort to construct that impossible object. Any 
discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest 
the flow of differences, to construct a centre. We will call the privileged discursive 
points of this partial fixation, nodal points. 
… 
The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points 
which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds 
from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of 
every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001, pp. 112-113). [Emphasis in Original]. 
 
“Nodal points are … privileged signifiers or reference points … in a discourse that bind 
together a particular ‘chain of significance’” (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 8). Laclau 
introduces ‘empty signifiers’ (representations absent of any particular meaning) by 
recognising that the need for social “fullness and universality” does not disappear: “it 
will always show itself through the presence of its absence” (1996a, p. 53): 
Thus, the articulation of a political discourse can only take place around an empty 
signifier that functions as a nodal point. In other words, emptiness is now revealed 
as an essential quality of the nodal point, as an important condition of possibility 
for is hegemonic success (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 9). 
 
Moments of condensation and displacement are the realm of politics for Laclau and 
Mouffe in that the institution of ‘new’ social practices excludes alternatives. 
 
 
 
There is very little accounting research incorporating the psychoanalytic, 
articulation, or overdetermination. Classic ideology critiques in accounting are the 
closest form of research (see Mitchell et al 1996; Hines, 1988; 1989; 1991; Morgan, 
Core Empirical Concept: Nodal Point: an attempt to partially fix a discourse by 
offering a potential ‘meaning’. It is precisely the attempt at partial fixation or 
centring of a discourse. These bind together ‘chains of equivalence’. 
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1988). Legal research incorporating DT tends to concentrate on macro-legal issues such 
as justice, rather than micro-legal processes (see Perelman, 1963; Coombe & Cohen, 
1999; Coombe, 1998; Goodrich, 1993; Taibi, 1992; Wicke, 1991; and Butler et al, 
2000). There is considerable scope to develop this critique in both law and accounting. 
Derrida’s undecidability provides a pertinent example: consider the judge deciding the 
guilt of a person charged with a crime. A judge determines whether someone commits a 
crime as depicted in legislation. However, there is a gap between the general legislative 
rule and the particular case: the application of the rule to the case is not demonstrative, 
for if inscribed in the rule, the rule becomes particular and not general. For DT, each 
particular case illustrates the ontic as there is a gap between the rule and the concrete 
application of individual cases. In determining the case, the judge undertakes an act of 
articulation – filling the gap. This gap is the sphere of the judicial, and application is an 
act of articulation. The articulation is a rhetorical, unavoidable moment through the 
invocation of metaphor: as adapting the general to fit the particular is the equivalent of 
making the dissimilar similar.  
 
However, politically, there is a problem as ‘a’ subject, the judge, completes the 
articulation. The judge assesses the appropriateness of the general law to the particular 
event. Thus, in a paradoxical moment, the judge must intervene by deciding if the law 
applies to the particular case, as any law could be self-enclosed in that it does not apply 
to this particularity. Thus, law is the moment of exception. Kelsen discusses this further 
in relation to juridical positivity (Kelsen, 1943). The terrain of undecidability creates the 
necessity for the decision moment: there is no a priori reasoning to support the 
contention that the general incorporates the particular. The decision moment represents 
a moment of subjectivity incorporating the distance between undecidability and the 
necessity of making a decision. Consequently, the decision moment is always 
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ambiguous as in attempting to close a partially constituted system this exposes the 
structural societal lack.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, DT provides a unique way of interrogating the interface of law and 
accounting as its theoretical framework analyses the levels of politics in the 
construction of ‘cost’. As there are different costs for different purposes, DT 
interrogates the construction of cost: the ‘cost’ calculation is a rhetorical process; 
exclusions from the ‘cost’ calculation invites genealogical analysis; and a particular 
‘cost’ calculation is an act of articulation. Secondly, any particular cost presented to the 
Telecommunications Commissioner is a nodal point as costing is an articulatory 
practice. Consequently, cost is empty of significance in filling the void from various 
potential options. Finally, in determining the appropriate cost to be applied to a 
particular ruling, the Telecommunications Commissioner is articulating a metaphor to 
fill the gap between the rule and the particular concrete case, as there is a gap between 
the theory and practice of cost (as discussed in Chapter three). Thus, as each particular 
case invokes the ontic, this gap is the sphere of the political, and the choice and 
construction of cost (the application) is an act of articulation. 
 
The final ontological assumption relates to politics and democracy. For DT, 
politics is the process of examining, identifying, and exposing the contingent nature of 
social relations. Dislocation is both creative and disruptive.  
How are ‘articulations’ and ‘nodal points’ relevant to the empirical analysis? 
TSLRIC and net costing were largely open for interpretation, as the Government 
provided little guidance as to the meaning of the terms. Thus, we trace how interested 
parties attempt to institute and articulate the meaning of the terms. ‘Cost’ is a technical, 
methodological, political, and rhetorical act. We examine the meanings attached by 
interested parties to TSLRIC and net costing. 
 
Nodal point analysis then focuses on how TSLRIC and net costing come to represent the 
failures of the light-handed regulation, by examining how interested parties attach more 
meanings to what TSLRIC and net costing represent.  
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F Assumption Five: Political subjects: Dislocation. 
 
For Laclau and Mouffe, antagonistic relations threaten discursive systems. 
Through the logic of equivalence and difference, the existence of an identity cannot be 
integrated into an existing system of differences. The “logic of equivalence” functions 
“by creating equivalential identities that express a pure negation of a discursive 
system”, while the “logic of difference consists in the expansion of a given system of 
differences by dissolving existing chains of equivalence and incorporating those 
disarticulated elements into an expanding order” (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 11). This 
plays an important political role in social antagonism: 
Each signifier constitutes a sign by attaching itself to a particular signified, 
inscribing itself as a difference within the signifying process. But if what we are 
tying to signify is not a difference but on the contrary a radical exclusion which is 
the ground and condition of all differences, in that case no production of one more 
difference can do the trick. As, however, all the means of representation are 
differential in nature, it is only if the differential nature of the signifying units is 
subverted, only if the signifiers empty themselves of their attachment to particular 
signifieds and assume the role of representing the pure being of the system – or, 
rather, the system as pure Being – that such signification is possible. What is the 
ontological ground of such a subversion, what makes it possible? The answer is: 
the split of each unit of signification that the system has to construct as the 
undecidable locus in which both the logic of difference and the logic of 
equivalence operate. It is only by privileging the dimension of equivalence to the 
point that its differential nature is almost entirely obliterated – that is, emptying it 
of its differential nature – that the system can signify itself as a totality (Laclau, 
1994, pp. 170-171). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, for DT, politics is contingent: 
 
… the actions of subjects emerge because of the contingency of those discursive 
structures through which a subject obtains its identity (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 13).  
 
Dislocation is “the process by which the contingency of discursive structures is made 
visible” and is disruptive and creative:  
Core Empirical Concept: Logic of Difference: a discursive strategy to expand the 
scope of a nodal point, by incorporating seemingly disparate or oppositional 
signifiers into a nodal point to expand the order. 
Core Empirical Concept: Logic of Equivalence: a discursive strategy by creating 
equivalences so as to collapse differences within a discursive system. Here, different 
identities are constructed as being linked and even identical. 
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This ‘decentring’ of the structure through social processes such as the extension of 
capitalist relations to new spheres of social life shatters already existing identities 
and literally induces an identity crisis for the subject. However, dislocations are 
not solely traumatic occurrences. They also have a productive side. ‘If’, as Laclau 
puts it, ‘on the one hand they threaten identities, on the other, they are the 
foundation on which new identities are constituted. In other words, if dislocations 
disrupt identities and discourse, they also create a lack at the level of meaning that 
simulates new discursive constructions, which attempt to suture the dislocated 
structure. In short, it is the ‘failure’ of the structure, and as we have seen of those 
subject positions which are part of such a structure, that ‘compels’ the subject to 
act, to assert anew its subjectivity (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 13).  
 
 
 
Dislocations create new opportunities for antagonism forming the conceptual 
underpinning of DT: “[t]he moment of antagonism where the undecidable nature of the 
alternatives and their resolution through power relations becomes fully visible 
constitutes the field of the ‘political’” (Laclau, 1990, p. 35). Howarth et al explain: 
At the outset, social antagonisms introduce an irreconcilable negativity into social 
relations. This is because they reveal the limit points in society in which meaning 
is contested and cannot be stabilised. Antagonisms are thus evidence of the 
frontiers of a social formation … [Antagonisms] show the points where identity is 
no longer fixed in a differential system, but is contested by forces which stand 
outside – or at the very limit – of that order. In doing so, their role is formative of 
social objectivity itself. As they cannot be reduced to the pre-constituted interests 
and identities of social agents, the construction of antagonisms and the institution 
of political frontiers between agents are partly constitutive of identities and of 
social objectivity itself … In Lacanian terms, antagonisms disclose the lack at the 
heart of all social identity and objectivity … ‘The limit of the social must be given 
within the social itself as something subverting it, destroying its ambition to 
constitute a full presence. Society never manages fully to be society, because 
everything in it is penetrated by its limits, which prevent it from constituting itself 
as an objective reality’. It is this central impossibility which … makes necessary 
the production of empty signifiers, a production which in turn makes possible the 
articulation of political discourses, of partial fixations of meaning  
… 
They insist that social antagonisms occur because social agents are unable to attain 
fully their identity. Thus, an antagonism is seen to occur when ‘the presence of 
[an] “Other” prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from 
full totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution’. This ‘blockage’ of 
identity is a mutual experience for both the antagonising force and the force that is 
being antagonised (Howarth et al, 2000, pp. 9-10). 
 
 
Laclau and Mouffe note that “[a]ntagonism is the ‘constitutive outside’ that 
accompanies the affirmation of all identity” (Laclau, 1990, p. 183):  
… antagonism constitutes the limits of every objectivity, which is revealed as 
partial and precarious objectification. If language is a system of differences, 
antagonism is the failure of difference; in that sense, it situates itself within the 
limits of language and can only exist as the disruption of it – that is, as metaphor ... 
Core Empirical Concept: Dislocation: as both creative and disruptive, dislocation 
is the process by which the contingency of discursive structures is made visible. In 
particular, dislocations result from the ‘failure’ of structures 
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Antagonism, far from being an objective relation, is a relation wherein the limits 
of every objectivity are shown – in the sense in which Wittgenstein used to say 
that what cannot be said can be shown (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 125).  
 
Laclau acknowledges that although omnipresent, antagonism is not necessarily evident, 
arguing that there are sedimentations of potential antagonistic conflict: 
… many relations and identities in our world do not seem to entail any denial: the 
relationship of a postman delivering a letter, buying a ticket to the cinema, having 
lunch with a friend in a restaurant, going to a concert (Laclau, 1990, p. 33).  
 
However, what is important for Laclau is that all relationships and activities are 
implicitly antagonistic:104 
The moment of sedimentation … entails a concealment. If objectivity is based on 
exclusion, the traces of the exclusion will always be somehow present … The 
moment of antagonism where the undecidable nature of the alternatives and their 
resolution through power relations becomes fully visible constitutes the field of the 
‘political’ …  (Laclau, 1990, pp. 34-35).  
 
Antagonism, then, plays a constitutive role in democracy through its interrelationship 
with hegemony, as hegemony is the “type of political relation by which a particularity 
assumes the representation of an (impossible) universality incommensurable with it” 
(Laclau, 2001, p. 5). In illustrating the contingency of politics, Laclau explains that: 
Democracy is suspended in an undecidable game between metaphor and 
metonymy: each of the competing forces in the democratic game tends to make as 
permanent as possible the occupation of the empty place of power; but if there was 
no simultaneous assertion of the contingent character of this occupation, there 
would be no democracy.  
… 
This incompletion of the hegemonic game is what we call politics. The very 
possibility of a political society depends on the assertion and reproduction of this 
undecidability in the relation between the universal and the particular … 
democracy is the only truly political society … there is only hegemony if the 
dichotomy universality/particularity is constantly renegotiated: universality only 
exists incarnating – and subverting – particularity, but, conversely, no 
particularity can become political without being the locus of universalising effects. 
Democracy, as a result, as the institutionalisation of this space of renegotiation, is 
the only truly political regime (Laclau, 2001, pp. 8-10) [Emphasis in original]. 
 
Thus, politics is the process of trying to ‘fill’ the universal through a particular 
hegemonic claim with a tainted, particularised universality; but equally, this illustrates 
the universalisation of the particular – a ‘double contamination’ (Laclau, 2001, p. 11):  
The two central features of a hegemonic intervention are, in this sense, the 
contingent character of the hegemonic articulations and their constitutive 
                                                 
104
 Norris critiques this, arguing that this reduces the political descriptive capacity of antagonism (2002, p. 
559). 
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character, in the sense that they institute social relations in a primary sense, not 
depending on any a priori social rationality. 
… 
Hegemony means contingent articulation; contingency means externality of the 
articulating force vis-à-vis the articulated elements, and this externality cannot be 
thought of as an actual separation of levels within a fully constituted totality 
because there is no externality at all (Laclau, 1996a, p. 90-92) [Emphasis in 
original]. 
 
Consequently, dislocation theorises political activity through integrating 
contingency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The Politics of Discourse Theory and Research Paradigms 
 
 DT rejects the simplistic political analysis suggested by positivism (as discussed 
in Chapter four) arguing against the search for scientific law-like generalisations and 
political analysis focusing on hypothesis testing, and challenges ‘naïve’ truth deduced 
from the objectivist epistemology. Further, DT challenges rationalism inherent within 
the conceptions of both PAT and contractarianism by arguing against the presumption 
that social actors have pre-given interests or preferences. It is uncomfortable with a 
social system that equates politics with the calculation of ‘economic self-interest’. In 
particular, DT argues that the problem of the systematicity of the systems (the failure to 
fully constitute structures) as well as the historical, social, and cultural contingency of 
social systems challenges the essentialist characteristics of the ‘self-interest’ model.  
How are the ‘logic of equivalence’, ‘logic of difference’ and ‘dislocations’ relevant to 
the empirical analysis? 
 
Hegemonic success is the ability to attach an increasing number of signifieds to a 
signifier, so as to empty the signifier of particular content. Therefore, we trace how 
through the logic of equivalence increasing numbers of signifieds are attached to 
signifiers to conceal confusion and contestation within the signifier. 
 
The logic of difference is a discursive strategy to incorporate oppositional signifiers into a 
nodal point in order to expand the order and dispel opposition, by incorporating these 
disarticulated elements into the expanding signifier. 
 
Dislocation examines how interested actors succeeded in sedimenting TSLRIC as the 
new regulatory practice in interconnection and net costing for the TSO. Consequently, the 
empirical chapters analyse potential dislocatory moments prior to the institution of the 
MIT, before moving to examine the ways in which interested parties begun to formulate 
the discourse around ‘cost’. 
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 The DT rejection of positivism draws “critically” upon critical theory, social 
constructionism, and interpretivism (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 5). DT criticises 
interpretive political analysis that separates the social constructed world from the 
political actions of individuals within systems. Equally, DT is not concerned merely 
with understanding how social actors understand their social world, but holds that 
“meanings, interpretations, and practices are inextricably linked” (Howarth et al, 2000, 
p. 6). DT concentrates on examining the contingency and relational nature of social 
meanings, structures, and practices by concentrating on the dislocation, disruption, and 
change within social structures, practices, and meanings.   
 
Therefore, DT requires the critical literature discussed in Chapter four as this 
provides the first step in the identification of power and politics. DT develops a 
theorised intervention at both the internal and external levels of politics, arguing that 
politics is ‘present’. The examination of the political implications of accounting is a 
common theme in critical literatures in law and accounting (Chua, 1986; Kennedy, 
1983), but critical scholars argue that critical analysis is not enough on its own (In 
accounting, Baker & Bettner, 1997; Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1997; Gray, 2002; In law, 
Davies, 2002; Goodrich, 1993; Boyle, 1985; Brosnan, 1987). However, both critical 
schools are challenged for failing to ‘put things at risk’; for failing to draw out the 
implications of political critique: e.g. Brosnan critiques CLS’s attacks on legal 
positivism through which law operates, arguing 
CLS … has not succeeded in forming, or perhaps even laying the foundations of, a 
radical critique of [Liberal Legal Theory] … (Brosnan, 1987, p. 263). 
 
Moore, in accounting, argues that:  
[Critical accounting] suggest[s] no serious or consistent consequences for its critique … 
the critical attacks have placed nothing major at stake (Moore, 1991, p. 775). 
 
DT critically reads critical theory and challenges Marxist theory in its post-Marxist 
movements. This chapter demonstrated the DT criticism of class reductionism and 
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economic determinism within Marxism. The post-structuralist critique of language 
deconstructs the class essence within Marxist analysis and invites a contingent reading 
of ideology (in contrast to the fixity of class ideology) (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 6-7). 
Consequently, DT politics involves the examination of historical and social change, 
conceived around the political concepts of hegemony, antagonism, and dislocation.  
 
III CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter articulated DT as the theoretical framework to examine the 
interface of law and accounting, as depicted by the regulation of NZ 
telecommunications. DT theorises and explains political ‘realities’ and movements, 
including societal complexity, the multiplicity of actors and organisations, and the 
drawing together of seemingly disparate groups in the ‘name’ of a political goal. The 
chapter argued that the focus on interrogating the discursive construction of social 
practices is appropriate for this thesis given the range of discourses: law, accounting, 
regulation, public policy, politics, and economics. The discursive focus invites 
rhetorical, genealogical, and deconstructive analysis to examine the strategies, effects, 
and aims of the regulation, industry players, Government, lawyers, accountants, and the 
use of cost accounting information in the regulatory process. The chapter concludes 
that: 
- The complicated nature of the empirics requires a flexible theoretical 
framework. As DT looks both internally to the processes of law, 
accounting, and regulation, as well as examining the external effects of the 
political process, DT re-invigorates the political. 
 
- In considering the interface of several disciplines, DT’s focus on ontology 
and the ontic provides a way to move through the bounded nature of 
epistemological inquiry (Hviding, 2003). DT, given its theoretical 
articulated nature, enables the researcher to consider a broad range of 
research questions in relation to the intersection of law, accounting, 
costing, regulation, and telecommunications. 
 
- Accounting, law, and regulation are discursive practices making the focus 
on the linguistic turn attractive. Law, accounting, and regulation are 
linguistic practices, concentrating on the act of persuasion through the 
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employment of various rhetorical strategies. Law and accounting present 
many examples that illustrate the limits of language and the scope for 
contestation. 
 
- The political is always implicated, as “some sort of shadowy underside of 
politics” (Devenney, 2002, p. 176). Law, accounting, and regulation are 
intimately political and this thesis unpacks the political in the interface of 
law and accounting as conceived by telecommunications regulation. 
 
- Laclau and Mouffe’s model of political interaction holds that i) social 
objects are meaningfully constructed; ii) social objectivity is contingent, 
relational, and contextual, iii) discursive exteriors partially constitute and 
potentially subvert; iv) and identity is articulatory, and v) dislocation is an 
internal element to social totalities. 
 
Consequently, Chapter six articulates DT as a research methodology and 
identifies appropriate research methods by examining the logics of critical explanation 
developed by Glynos and Howarth. Chapter six develops Glynos and Howarth’s social, 
political and fantasmatic logics as a methodological approach in response to the 
perceived normative and methodological limitations of DT. 
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- Chapter Six - 
 
Research Methods and Methodology: 
Discourse Theory and the Logics of Critical Explanation 
 
I CHAPTER SIX OVERVIEW 
 
Chapter five introduced Laclau and Mouffe’s DT - a political theory of 
democracy theorising and explaining political ‘realities’ and movements embracing 
societal complexity, multiple actors and organisations, and the drawing together of 
seemingly disparate groups in the ‘name’ of a political goal. Chapter five presented five 
ontological assumptions framing the DT intervention: i) social practice articulates and 
contests discourses that constitute social reality given that all social arrangements and 
organisations are meaningful; ii) social meaning is political as it is contextual, 
relational, and contingent via the process of articulation and the impact of rhetoric; iii) 
discursive exteriors partially constitute and potentially subvert by focusing on the 
construction of politics through hegemony, deconstruction, and genealogy which 
illustrates rhetorical attempts to close open systems and demonstrates that any ‘name’ 
representing the ‘lack’ (closure) creates another ‘name’ excluded from the signifying 
system; iv) political actors articulate that which ‘fills’ the social lack, thus DT focuses 
on politics by examining the act of articulating the latter; and v) politics is the process 
of examining, identifying, and exposing the contingent nature of social relations, as 
antagonistic relations threaten discursive systems, and dislocation is both creative and 
disruptive. This chapter examines the research methodologies and methods employed in 
this theoretical depiction of DT through three questions: 
1)  What are the methodological limitations of DT? Why do these challenge 
traditional research methods? 
 
2)  How do Glynos and Howarth’s (2007) logics of critical explanation 
provide an analytical framework for the development of DT in relation to 
the interface of law and accounting? 
 
3)  What research methods will be used? Are interviews and document 
analysis an appropriate combination of methods? What methods of data 
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analysis will be used? What does DT’s dislocation and rhetorical 
redescription provide to analyse the data? 
 
This chapter introduces Glynos and Howarth’s logics of critical explanation and 
social, political, and fantasmatic logics as an answer to the normative and 
methodological criticisms levelled against DT. Finally, the chapter discusses interviews 
and document analysis as data collection methods and dislocation and rhetorical 
redescriptions as approaches to such analysis. 
 
The first section considers the role of methodology in DT, which challenges 
traditional research methods and methodologies due to its articulated nature and 
negative ontology. The logics of critical explanation are claimed to answer these 
methodological challenges.  
 
II IMPLICATIONS OF DISCOURSE THEORY ON METHODOLOGY 
 
The highly articulated nature of DT (in its range of theoretical influences) 
challenges the traditional use of empirics, research methods, and analytical 
methodologies. Research methodology must be commensurate with DT’s negative 
ontology particularly when “no signifying structure can ever succeed in closing in on 
itself – it is irreducibly open” (Glynos, 1999, p. 3). DT is not a theory of application; 
but rather ‘concrete’ cases provide opportunity for theory development. Glynos 
suggests: 
… the discourse analyst’s starting point is not the mapping of pre-constituted, 
positively-defined, theoretical categories (rational self-interested ends, structural 
functions, competing lobbying interests, juridico-political forms of economic 
relations, typologies of democracies, forms of identities, etc) onto the socio-
political landscape, and then invoking tools from corresponding idioms to conduct 
an analysis … When dislocation and failure become ontologically foundational, 
the idioms with which we describe and analyse political phenomena change 
modality … Discourse theory’s anti-essentialist stance is thus maintained by 
adopting an ontology of lack, this being a direct consequence of taking seriously 
the constitutive nature of discourse in human practices (Glynos, 1999, p. 5). 
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For DT, the researcher identifies instances of dislocation and hegemony to study 
mechanisms employed by political actors to ‘repair’ the rift:  
Political analysis, from a discourse-theoretic point of view, then, includes the 
study of the strategies and tactics deployed in constructing universalising chains of 
equivalence and/or in disrupting them. The important thing to keep in mind … is 
that discourse theory’s ‘resting place’ … is not a positively determined substance, 
but instead the very failure of the discursive substance to ever achieve final closure 
– in short, it takes dislocation as constitutive (Glynos, 1999, pp. 5-6). 
 
In DT, “no strong methodological conclusions can be drawn from its negative 
ontology” (Glynos, 1999, p. 8). Thus, the theory does not predetermine analytical 
categories and “it can be fruitful to supplement [DT] with methods from other 
approaches to discourse analysis” (Phillips & Jorgenson, 2002, p. 24). The focus on 
contingency suggests that “meaningful analytical insight can only come from 
thoroughly detailed studies of concrete cases” (Glynos, 1999, p. 8). Laclau suggests 
that: 
… these are tools that the researcher can decide ad hoc to use in each case for 
pragmatic reasons … [T]hey are not unified in an established and orderly system 
of procedures called ‘methodology’ (Laclau, 1991). 
 
The concrete case is vital. Glynos concludes: 
 
In summary, we could say that discourse-theoretical efforts are informed by the 
fundamental insight that discourse is constitutive of, and thus internal to, human 
practices and that any adequate understanding of political phenomena must take it 
into account. It holds fast to a strong thesis which claims that any political 
explanation that omits to take discourse’s constitutive nature misses an 
opportunity to capitalise upon an important contribution that today’s philosophical 
resources make possible … Again to dispel a potentially fatal misunderstanding: 
discourse theory is not at all suggesting the abandonment of so-called empirical 
approaches. After all, it cannot escape engaging with the empirical world … 
Instead it is urging abandonment of certain outdated ontological presuppositions 
that still inform mainstream social sciences, without ignoring the considerable use-
value attaching to its many methodological insights (Glynos, 1999, p. 10)  
 
However, DT has methodological limitations.  
 
A Filling the Gap: Articulating a Method for Discourse Theory 
 
Critics allege two general deficits in DT: normative and methodological. The 
normative challenge results from a perceived ‘lack’ in the theory. Critchley argues: 
If the theory of hegemony is simply the description of a positively existing state of 
affairs, then one risks emptying it of any critical function, that is, of leaving open 
any space between things as they are and things as they may otherwise be. If the 
theory of hegemony is the description of a factual state of affairs, then it risks 
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identification and complicity with the dislocatory logic of contemporary capitalist 
societies … The problem with Laclau’s discourse is that he makes noises of both 
sorts, both descriptive and normative, without sufficiently clarifying what it is that 
he is doing. This is what I mean by suggesting that there is the risk of a kind of 
normative deficit in the theory of hegemony (Critchley, 2004, 117). 
 
The methodological challenge is that while DT provides an interesting description of 
the world, this ‘redescription’ does not reflect on causality and explanation:  
(a) Discourse theory must demonstrate the analytical value of discourse theory in 
empirical studies that takes us beyond the mere illustration of the arguments and 
concepts. (b) It must address the core topics and areas within social and political 
science and not be content with specialising in allegedly ‘soft’ topics such as 
gender, ethnicity, and social movements. (c) It must critically reflect upon the 
questions of method and research strategy (Torfing, 1998, p. 198). 
 
In response recent work, particularly at the University of Essex’s Department of 
Government, has developed a method for applying DT, namely, the logics of critical 
explanation:  
… I elaborate a method of articulatory practice [a logic of explanation] that avoids 
the difficulties surrounding the mechanical application of ‘formal-abstract’ theory 
to ‘real-concrete’ events and processes. 
… 
As against empiricism, discourse theorists maintain that there can be no 
unmediated access to the ‘real-concrete’. Indeed, the very idea of ‘accessing’ the 
‘real-concrete’ presupposes a gulf between the subject and object of knowledge, 
which objective knowledge somehow bridges. Instead, following Heidegger’s 
critique of classical epistemology, it is better to conceive of the subject as ‘always 
already’ within a world of meaningful objects and practices, and to conceive of the 
norms of that world as providing the criteria for subjects to identify objects in the 
first place (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 88-90). In contrast, in order to counter the 
problems of logical derivation or theoretical subsumption, the employment of 
abstract tools to explain concrete objects requires a work of theoretical elaboration 
that articulates concepts and logics which are, initially at least, located at different 
levels of abstraction, focused on different levels of analysis, and drawn from a 
variety of theoretical problematics (Howarth, 1998, pp. 316, 321-322). 
 
Glynos and Howarth trace five movements in developing the “logics of critical 
explanation” (Howarth, 2000; 2002; 2004; Glynos, 1999; Griggs & Howarth, 2007; 
Howarth & Glynos, 2007).  
 
B The Five Movements: Developing the Logics of Critical Explanation 
 
Glynos and Howarth stress the importance of ‘problematisation’ as the starting 
point for social inquiry. For Foucault, problematisation is “the development of a domain 
of acts, practices, and thoughts that seem … to pose problems for politics” (Foucault, 
2000, 114), and it concerns “a movement of critical analysis in which one tries to see 
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how the different solutions to a problem have been constructed; but also how these 
different solutions result from a specific form of problematisation” (Foucault, 2000, 
118-119). Empirical DT research should address present problems rather than focusing 
on technique or method-driven research as in positivist or normative research. Through 
DT, the researcher considers historical and discursive practices that constitute practices 
and institutions in a particular context. It is a species of critical theory, seeking to 
critique by rejecting a fact-value separation and highlighting the implications of ethics 
and ideologies bearing upon the problem under examination: 
The notion of discourse … has its distant roots in what can be called the 
transcendental turn in modern philosophy – i.e., a type of analysis primarily 
addressed not to facts but to their conditions of possibility. The basic hypothesis is 
that the very possibility of perception, thought and action depends on the 
structuration of a certain meaningful field which pre-exists any factual immediacy 
(Laclau, 1993, p. 431). 
 
Consequently, there is a double transcendental turn in DT. The first is hermeneutic: at 
the epistemological level, facts and meanings are attached; at the ontological level, they 
are constitutive of the social world. Consequently, conditions of possibility and 
impossibility illustrate the post-structural critique of meaning and subject, namely that 
there is an inherent lack of the subject and subject experience within systems of 
meaning. The logics of critical explanation examine the conditions and dislocations that 
allow for meanings (at the hermeneutic level) in the moment of constitution and for 
subjects (at the ideological/ethical level) to emerge, shift, or change.  
 
This study focuses on why TSRLIC, cost-plus pricing for interconnection and 
net costing for the TSO were chosen as methods for regulation in NZ, and how cost 
information is used in the regulatory process for interconnection and TSO costing. 
However, despite ‘cost’ being a problematic concept, as Chapter three illustrated, it is 
increasingly a regulatory tool despite incorrect assumptions that it is  ‘objective’ within 
economics and law. ‘Cost’ is a common feature of public discourse, representing a 
powerful social logic measure. The presumption is that the public comprehend what is 
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identified as cost – it is a figure – and numbers are a powerful means of representation. 
Politically, cost is a powerful rhetorical and ideological mechanism, as society holds a 
notion of objectivity of cost, whilst tending to distinguish between aspects of personal 
‘life’ where cost is and is not acceptable. Recent NZ examples of public debates where 
cost has been prominent include Transmission Gully (too expensive, not worth it),105 
the construction of Stadium NZ (cost debate),106 drug purchases (the Herceptin debate, 
too expensive),107 and tax cuts.108 These examples demonstrate the political and 
fantasmatic strength of the logic of cost. Liberal neo-classical economics incorporates 
the pillars of utility and demand, with the powerful measure of individuated 
“willingness and ability to pay”. However, public cost discourse only recognises one 
aspect of this measure, namely cost, which in a public sense, measures willingness to 
pay, but excludes the ‘ability to pay’. In public works projects and capital investment 
decisions, cost represents a collective measure. Consequently, the political logics of 
cost are explicitly a mechanism for rhetoric (that convinces that this costing is better 
than alternative costings and that this cost is worth it). However, the cost discourse is 
complex and political. Issues include: what does the ‘costing’ include? How is ‘cost’ 
represented? Is the ‘cost’ realistic? What is valued? What is excluded? Can it be 
effectively costed? Is there a greater good at work? Equally, with public work cost, 
rhetoric tends to include the Not-in-my-Backyard (NIMBY) and the Build-absolutely-
nothing-anywhere-near-anyone (BANANA) effects. Thus, Chapter three demonstrated 
                                                 
105
 Transmission Gully concerns the construction of a third road out of Wellington, given that the current 
State Highway One is a dangerous and busy stretch of road. 
 
106
 As host of the Rugby World Cup 2011, this debate concerned the proposed construction of a “Stadium 
NZ” to host the final of this competition. 
 
107
 Herceptin is a breast cancer drug. Most jurisdictions fund Herceptin for twelve-months following the 
detection of breast cancer. Initially, Pharmac (the NZ drug buying agency) declined to purchase 
Herceptin due to the cost, and then decided to supply for a nine-week period (sighting a particular 
study that suggested there were no extra benefits following nine weeks of use and cost).  
 
108
 Despite a period of sustained economic growth and record government surpluses, the Labour-led 
Government refused to cut taxes for nine years, until 2008. Rhetorically, the Government could not 
afford it as it was too costly. 
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that cost is a present problem, and to address this, the thesis draws on the ‘logics of 
critical explanation’.  
 
Second, Glynos and Howarth introduce retroduction. In philosophy, induction 
and deduction are problematic. In induction, the problem is referred to as the 
‘inductivist turkey’: consider the following story: 
A turkey is fed grain on day 1 at 6 am. The turkey is fed grain on day 2 at 
6 am. The turkey is fed grain on day 3 at 6 am … the turkey is fed grain 
on day 364 at 6 am.  
 
Through principles of induction, namely taking observable phenomenon and inducing 
general axioms, on day 365 the turkey would be fed grain at 6 am. Unfortunately, on 
day 365, the turkey loses its head and is served as Christmas Day dinner (Russell, 1912, 
p. 63). Induction is limited because individuals cannot observe what cannot be seen, and 
hence there is the possibility that the next observation could disprove the general axiom. 
Equally, there is a subsumption problem within deductivism that construes particular 
statements from general axioms. There are problems from subsuming phenomena into 
pre-existing categories: there is no way of testing whether pre-existing categories or 
particular observations are correct. All deduction is susceptible to scepticism due to 
these limitations. Glynos and Howarth (2007) suggest retroduction is a possible 
solution. Hanson explains: 
1. Some surprising phenomena p1, p2, p3 … are encountered.  
2. But p1, p2, p3 … would not be surprising were a hypothesis of H’s type to 
obtain. They would follow as a matter of course from something like H and 
would be explained by it.  
3. Therefore there is good reason for elaborating a hypothesis of the type H; for 
proposing it as a possible hypothesis from whose assumption p1, p2, p3 … 
might be explained (Hanson, 1958, pp. 86-87). 
 
Retroduction is a means of making phenomena intelligible, “amount[ing] to … 
observing a fact and then professing to say what … it was that give rise to the fact” 
(Sayer, 1986, p. 116). This challenges the constraint of the double hermeneutic, which 
denotes the limits imposed by discourse analysts engaging in interpreting self-
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interpretations of actors. To avoid criticisms of detachability or subsumption, Glynos 
and Howarth argue that the researcher should ‘pass through’ the self-interpretations of 
subjects under investigation, as they are not objects, and self-interpretations may be 
misleading, being particular, partial, interpretive, and ideological. The scope to 
examine phenomena retroductively through the social, political, and fantasmatic logics 
in combination with tools of rhetoric provides a theorised intervention through the 
double hermeneutic: it is the combination of identifying the social landscape, 
examining how the social landscape was instituted, what alternatives were excluded, 
and the associated ideologies that justifies this methodological approach. This thesis 
examines retroduction, seeing the incorporation of ‘cost’ as the central regulatory tool 
in the TA 2001 as a ‘fact’, and studying ‘what gave rise to’ this ‘fact’ by focusing on 
the questions: why was TSLRIC, cost-plus pricing for interconnection and net costing 
for the TSO chosen as the methods for regulation, and how was cost information used 
in the regulatory process for interconnection and TSO costing?   
 
 
 
 
Third, Glynos and Howarth introduce logics. Laclau discusses the notion of a 
formalised content of the explanans resulting from the retroductive exercise. Logics 
provide a mechanism to understand rules that govern a particular practice, as well as the 
ontological presuppositions incorporated in both objects and subjects. As a unit of 
explanation, logics interrogate the ‘essence’ of rules governing practices, as well as 
practices themselves. However, it is not only the existence of the rules and practices that 
are of interest, but also, at the ontological level, what rules have to be like to 
materialise, and what rules allow objects and subjects to be. Glynos and Howarth claim 
three forms of logics pertinent for this examination: social, political, and fantasmatic.  
 
Core Empirical Concept: Retroductive Logic: means to make phenomena 
intelligible by observing a fact and then examining the historical, social, cultural, 
and political circumstances and events giving rise to its institution.  
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Social logics examine the rules, practices, concepts, categories, and sedimented 
social practices that structure social interactions and relations (Howarth, 2004). 
Ontologically, social logics provide a space for characterising social relations through a 
strongly contextualised reading of the social landscape. However, this is the limit of 
social logics, akin to the limits of Foucault’s archaeology. Laclau explains that: 
‘Social logics consist in rule following’ and so involve ‘a rarefied system of 
statements, i.e. a system of rules drawing a horizon within which some objects are 
representable while others are excluded. We can thus speak of the logics of 
kinship, of the market, even of chess-playing (to use Wittgenstein’s example) 
(Laclau, 2005, p. 117).   
 
The social logic provides an explanation of the historicity of social practices in the 
critical theory sense of inter-subjective objectivity. It examines their absorption into 
day-to-day practices or taken-for-granted regimes of social norms. 
 
In terms of social logics, a strength of management accounting research has 
been the consideration of rules and practices that help reproduce cost discourse,109 e.g. 
for ABC, absorption costing, balanced scorecard, responsibility accounting, Cost-
Volume-Profit analysis, variance analysis, budgeting, and cost control; and the 
institutions within which these techniques occur e.g. CIMA, educational institutions, 
professional bodies, and interrelationships between the sub-disciplines of accounting. 
Such research represents examples of Glynos and Howarth’s social logics.  
 
 
 
Political logics consider the space where the emergence, institution, and 
constitution of new norms, rules, and social practices are publicly contested. Political 
logics refer to the public contestation and political struggle leading to the institution of 
particular practices and relations over competing representations of the social (Howarth, 
2004; Howarth, 2000). In DT, concepts like articulation, moments, elements, nodal 
                                                 
109
 See the discussion on cost and accounting in Chapter three. 
Core Empirical Concept: Social Logic: rules, practices, concepts, categories, and 
sedimented social practices that structure social interactions and relations identified 
through a strongly contextualised reading of the social landscape. 
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points, empty signifiers, the logic of equivalence and difference, and dislocation provide 
insight into political contestation and attempts to close social systems. Political logics 
have three elements: a) explanations of events leading up to moments of dislocation that 
expose the radical contingency of sedimented social practices; b) identification of 
‘political’ struggles over what discourse to institute (to cover over the exposed 
contingency) through the logic of equivalence; and c) illuminating (in a genealogical 
sense) struggles excluded or marginalised through the logics of difference. 
 
When employing political logics, the task is to identify dislocatory moments in 
the historical landscape of cost, costing, and cost techniques that disrupt and 
institutionalise sedimented social practices. In contrast to social logics, this goes beyond 
describing rules and practices to identifying the events leading to disruption, and 
political struggles over the institution of social practices and relations. This canvasses 
elements of disruption, dislocation, and attempts to articulate sedimented practice, as 
discussed in Chapter five. The three general ‘political logic’ questions include: 
a) What events led up to the re-regulation of telecommunications? At the 
time of ‘re-regulation’, which discourses made possible the institution of 
TSLRIC for interconnection and net costing for the TSO? 
 
b) What were the political tensions and struggles that took place over the 
institution of TSLRIC and net costing? What were the competing claims 
of interested parties?  
 
c)  Which political interests within the struggles succeeded over others? How 
did this occur? What political interests within struggles were marginalised 
or excluded as a result of the institution? 
 
The first four chapters examine dislocation and political logics by giving a genealogical 
account of telecommunications regulation; the complexities of regulation and the 
inherent lack within regulatory theory; the theoretical and practical interface between 
law and accounting; the technical, methodological, and political levels within cost 
accounting information; the socially constructed, arbitrary, and subjective nature of 
costing, and contestation over the terms accounting, law, regulation, and cost within 
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different research paradigms. This illustrates the scope for contestation over the 
institution of cost-based regulation at the interface of law and accounting examined in 
the thesis: namely why include cost-based regulation in the TA 2001 and what was the 
scope for contesting the implementation and interpretation of the Act? 
 
 
 
 
 
Fantasmatic logics consider how subjects are ‘gripped’ by ideologies to maintain 
social practices, providing a bridge between the ontic, i.e. regions of existence, and the 
ontological, i.e. categorical presuppositions of existence, through a mediated process of 
reflection. The fantasmatic theorises their constituent elements at the subject-ideological 
level as the sedimentation of social practices drawing on Zizek and Lacan. This ‘logic’ 
explains and potentially critiques how subjects are ‘gripped’ by ideological 
presuppositions and pathologies that sustain their identity, and are attached to political 
and social logics (Howarth, 2004). Ideology ‘closes’ the radical contingency at the 
centre of the political struggle. Equally, the fantasmatic provides a space to consider 
how ideology allows a subject to enjoy a ‘good’ life, while suppressing the 
inauthenticity and impossibility of closing the contingency. This interrogation enables 
the identification of the exclusion of ethical and alternative ways of living. As Althusser 
explained: 
ideology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that it “recruits” among the 
individuals (it recruits them all), or “transforms” the individuals into subjects (it 
transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called 
interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most 
commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: “Hey, you there!”  
 
Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the 
hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree 
physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognised that 
the hail was “really” addressed to him, and that “it was really him that was hailed” 
(and not someone else) (Althusser, 1994, pp. 130-131).  
 
 
Core Empirical Concept: Political Logic: the space in which the emergence, 
institution, and constitution of new norms, rules, and social practices are publicly 
contested. This includes the public contestation and political struggle that lead to the 
institution of particular practices and relations over other representations of the 
practice.   
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Fantasmatic analysis shifts the focus from the social and political (from focusing 
on the sedimentation and institution of cost) to the subject, by examining how the social 
landscape is sustained in the subject. What is it about cost (TSLRIC and net costing) 
that makes it so persuasive? Why does cost ‘grip’ us? Why do lawyers and economists 
not accept the constructed nature of ‘costing’? In psychoanalytic terms, what ideologues 
attach to cost, enabling the radical contingency of cost to be covered over? What, in 
other words, enables subjects to ‘mis-recognise’ the nature of cost as ‘objective’, as 
opposed to radically contingent? How does this mis-recognition allow subjects to enjoy 
“their thing” and what pathologies flow from this mis-recognition? In answering these 
questions, Glynos and Howarth point to Lacanian psychoanalysis, as an ideology 
critique that enables critical theory to be mobilised in critical explanation. Such 
analyses concentrate on demystifying and defetishising critiques to expose the irrational 
basis of such ideologues (and hopefully ridding cost of some of its power to ‘grip’ us) 
and to expose their partisan nature.  
 
There are limited examples of this ideology critique in cost or management 
accounting, e.g. Scapens’ (1985) conditional truth critique of the absolute truth notion 
within economic cost, Covaleski et al’s (2003) criticism of the subjectivity of TCE in 
US utilities regulation, and Major and Hopper’s study (2005) of the fragmented 
implementation of ABC in Portuguese telecommunications. Elsewhere within the 
accounting literature there are examples of ideology critique, e.g. questioning the ability 
of professions to serve the public interest or establish coherent (epistemologically 
stable) conceptual frameworks; on accounting’s neoclassical economic foundations; and 
the role of experts in reproducing disciplinary power (see, Mitchell, Sikka, and Wilmott, 
1996; Hines, 1988; Hines, 1989; Hines, 1991; and Arrington & Francis, 1989). Equally, 
criticisms of the rationality and rhetorical effects of the positivist paradigm within 
accounting is a form of fantasmatic research (see Arrington & Francis 1989; Arrington 
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& Puxty, 1991 Arrington & Schweiker, 1992; Arrington & Francis, 1993; and Chua, 
1986; Christenson, 1983; Sterling, 1990; Williams, 1989; Chambers, 1993; and Deegan, 
2006). Their general characteristics are the exposure of rhetorical strategies employed to 
achieve a semblance of rationality and reasonableness within argumentation and 
highlighting the hidden social and political consequences of such strategies in 
accounting. Thus, fantasmatic logics expose the contradictions, the results and excluded 
alternatives mobilised by claims of “objectivity”, “truthfulness”, and “the greater good”. 
 
 
 
 
Fourth, Glynos and Howarth return to articulation, which is related to the 
identification of nodal points (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 112-113). For Howarth et 
al, these are “privileged signifiers or reference points (‘points de capiton’ in the 
Lacanian vocabulary) in a discourse that bind together a particular ‘chain of 
significance’” (2000, p. 8). When researching empirical material, articulation is the act 
of judgment that connects a heterogeneous set of logics that explain phenomena at the 
social, political, and fantasmatic level. Articulation links the logics within their context 
to provide a coherent account explaining the single problematised phenomena. This is 
executed by focusing on two empirical questions identified at the top of p. 208. The 
theoretical discussions within Chapters two, three, and four provide the theoretical 
context for the empirical analysis. They include a genealogical account of 
telecommunications regulation; the complexities and limitations of existing regulatory 
theory; the interface between law and accounting; the technical, methodological, and 
political levels within cost accounting information; and the contestation between 
different research paradigms. This embedded articulation constitutes a response to 
Torfing’s alleged methodological deficit. 
Core Empirical Concept: Fantasmatic Logic: by focusing on the subject, this 
provides space to examine how subjects are ‘gripped’ by ideologies that allow social 
practices to continue. The fantasmatic theorises the constituent elements at the 
subject-ideological level, by explaining and potentially critiquing how subjects are 
‘gripped’ by ideological presuppositions and pathologies that sustain their identity, 
and are attached to the political and social logics. 
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Finally, Glynos and Howarth consider ‘critique’ i.e. recognising the “contestable 
character of your own projections, by offering readings of contemporary life that 
compete with alternative accounts, and by moving back and forth between these two 
levels” (Connolly, 1995, p. 36). The employment of political and fantasmatic logics 
intrinsically enables the possibility of critique, especially when a moment of dislocation 
(leading to the institution of new social practices) is penetrated by radical contingency. 
Thus, dislocatory moments make the ‘lack’ visible. By identifying attempts to cover 
over this radical contingency, along with ideological attempts to close the lack within 
subjects, this reveals excluded and marginalised possibilities. This provides the basis for 
critique and takes DT beyond descriptivism, addressing Critchley’s allegations of a 
normative deficit in DT.   
 
 Therefore, after examining the constituent elements of the logics of critical 
explanation, the next section considers the empirical methods used in the thesis. In 
particular, it discusses interviews and document analysis as methods of data collection, 
as well as identifying the approach to data analysis, particularly in relation to 
dislocation and rhetorical redescription. 
 
III RESEARCH METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
A Research Methodology: Collection and Analysis of Data 
 
There is nothing outside the text (Derrida, 1976, p. 158). 
 
It is so convenient that we have language:  We can ask people what they see, 
think, feel … and they’ll tell us! (Boree, 2004) 
 
 
For DT, there is a need to understand (Norval, 2000), particularly society’s 
failure to fully constitute itself based on the ontology of lack. This ‘understanding’ is 
multifaceted, and for the DT, the research aim is to experience, explore, and engage in 
the social, cultural, and political setting that constitutes the research site. Empirical 
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research focuses on developing an intimate knowledge of discourses (accounting, law, 
and regulation), the social and political interfaces between the professions, actors, and 
regulatory process, and identifying moments of dislocation (contention, acceptance, 
argument, dispute, disagreement, agreement, agitation, concession, judgment, comment, 
and questioning), as these events constitute the space in which the political institution 
and constitution of social practice occurs. A DT researcher should employ various 
qualitative research methods to gather broad data (Howarth et al, 2000). Consequently, 
this study employs focused, unstructured interviews and document analysis.110  
1 Documents 
 
May describes the use of document analysis in social research: 
 
Documents, as the sedimentations of social practices, have the potential to inform 
and structure the decisions which people make on a daily and longer-term basis; 
they also constitute particular readings of social events (May, 1997, pp. 157-158). 
 
Howarth recognises that documents provide important non-reactive, linguistic research 
data in DT and comments on common difficulties of archival research and DT, 
including the ‘construction of a documentary archive’: 
… it is possible to treat all data as text … Discourse theory needs … to guard 
against charges of linguistic reductionism, in which practices are merely the 
effects of texts, while … it must not conceive texts as purely epiphenomenal – as 
the effects of more objective and deeply rooted logics … Derrida suggests there 
are no fully saturated contexts, as the traces of signifiers are always detectable in 
innumerable other contexts. Instead, the researcher is compelled to make decisions 
about the appropriate level and degree of contextualisation and must establish the 
limits of any particular project. The key principles underpinning these decisions 
are that they must be explicit, consistent, and justified (Howarth, 2004, pp. 336-
337). 
 
Importantly, in this study, all information is publicly available and accessible. 
An integral part of the ‘democratic’ process of NZ’s Parliament is that Government 
documents within the legislative process are publicly available, either on Government 
websites or in the Parliamentary Library. The key sites for documentary material 
include: 
                                                 
110
 It should be noted that there is an experiential element to the thesis, given my previous employment as 
a regulatory lawyer. See the validity discussion below. 
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a) The MIT website (<www.teleinquiry.co.nz>), which contains an archival 
record of the MIT’s terms of reference, the Issues Paper, Draft Report, and 
the Final Report, as well as all submissions to the MIT. 
 
b) The MED website and library (<www.med.govt.nz>), which contain 
archival records of various ‘official’ media statements, background 
documents on the telecommunications industry, and information about the 
regulatory regime prior to the MIT; 
 
c) The Parliamentary Library, which contains an archival record commerce 
select committee’s consideration of the Telecommunications Bill, 
submissions to the committee, the Officials Report on submissions, and 
the select committee report; 
 
d) NZ Parliamentary website (<www.parliament.govt.nz>), which contains 
various archival records of parliamentary consideration of the 
Telecommunications Bill;  
 
e) Hansard, which contains an archival record of Parliamentary debates 
within the House of Representatives. Relevant debates include the first 
reading of the Telecommunications Bill on Wednesday May 9, 2001; the 
second reading on Tuesday, November 27, 2001, and the third reading and 
subsequent passage of the Bill on Tuesday, December 18, 2001; and 
 
f) The CC website (<www.comcom.govt.nz>), which contains an archival 
record of data gathering by the CC in the early implementation stages of 
the Telecommunication Act; the entire TSLRIC process including 
submissions, and the draft and final determinations; and records of the 
annual TSO net costing process including building the model, 
submissions, and the draft and final determinations; as well as other 
documents including special interest papers and commissioned research. 
Note that the CC removes commercially sensitive information from these 
publicly available documents. 
 
These public-source documents provide an important record of key events in the 
historical, social, political, and fantasmatic institution and implementation of cost-based 
regulation of telecommunications. Equally, interviews were invaluable.   
2 Interviews 
 
Focused, unstructured interviews were used to collect data. For Howarth, 
interviews constitute linguistic, reactive research:  
For an approach that stresses the importance of subjectivity in explaining social 
reality, and which seeks to provide ‘thick descriptions’ of events and processes … 
in-depth qualitative interviewing is an important way of generating primary texts 
(Howarth, 2004, p. 338). 
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The scope and inter-disciplinary nature of this project lent itself to interviews with 
various interested parties. Howarth provides some insight on interviews in relation to 
DT:  
In short … we are confronted with the difficulty of validating and corroborating 
what is said in interviews, of analysing information which we believe either to be 
true or false, and of accessing information what remains deliberately or 
unintentionally hidden … comparing different sorts of data (quantitative or 
qualitative, primary and secondary) and different types of method (for example, 
interviews and textual analysis) to see whether they support one another … is 
useful in validating evidence obtained during interviews. Moreover, material 
which is shown to be false, distorted, or partial can and ought to be analysed 
precisely because of their inaccuracies and concealments … they may themselves 
constitute important windows ‘into actors’ understandings and interpretations of 
events. Hyperbolic representations, omissions, over-wording, slips, and unusual 
collocations thus constitute valuable points of condensation in an interview, which 
require closer inspection and analysis … Finally, it is important to acknowledge 
the limits of information gleaned from interviews … and thus to supplement 
interview data with other sources such as primary documents … secondary 
interpretations, interviews from different places of enunciation, and so on 
(Howarth, 2005, p. 339).   
 
Finally, Howarth raises important points about the role of the interviewer: 
 
… a critical reflexivity about one’s theoretical assumptions and research project, 
while adopting an ‘ethos of openness’ to the other, are useful ways of guarding 
against the temptation to reduce the other’s discourse to familiar and self-serving 
purposes. In short, it is to view the dialogical relationship between interviewer and 
interviewee as … an encounter in language with all the attendant difficulties post-
structuralists have noted about communication in general (Howarth, 2005, pp. 
339-340). 
 
Although an interview with predetermined questions is an appropriate research 
technique, allowing interviewers opportunity to speak more freely enhances the 
potential for richer, more informative material (Fontana & Frey, 2000, p. 652). 
Nevertheless, as with all interviews it is impossible to avoid leading and limiting 
discussion. May suggests that for general exploratory, phenomenological, or 
ethnographic work, focused, unstructured interviews are the most appropriate (May, 
1997, p. 112). Their characteristics include flexibility and meaning (Pahl, 1995, p. 197) 
that encourages greater qualitative depth by allowing:  
interviewees to talk about the subject in terms of their own frames of reference. By 
this, I mean drawing upon ideas and meanings with which they are familiar. This 
allows the meanings that individuals attribute to events and relationships to be 
understood on their own terms (May, 1997, p. 113).  
 Twelve interviews were conducted, ranging from 42 minutes to 163 minutes. 
They were of a focused, unstructured nature, and were tape recorded for subsequent 
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transcribing. Limited notes were also made during the interviews. Those interviewed 
represented a broad range of interested parties and ‘non-elites’, including a senior 
adviser in the Telecommunications Commission, lawyers, academics, accountants, and 
broader political spokespeople.  
 
B The Mix of Research Methods 
 
 The combination of interviews and document analysis is common in DT (Barros 
& Castagnola, 2000; Bastow & Martin, 2003; Clohesy, 2000; Griggs & Howarth, 2002; 
Howarth, 2000; Howarth & Griggs, 2007; and Stavrakakis, 2000). Two studies by 
Howarth and Griggs are particularly relevant to this study, due to their link to 
regulation:  
1) In a study of the rhetoric employed in “Freedom to Fly” in the UK, the 
authors examined “official public discourse”, including media statements, 
interviews of elite actors, articles in national newspapers, in-depth 
interviews, as well as analysis of the consultation process about aviation 
expansion 2000-2003 (Howarth & Griggs, 2007). 
 
2) A study of the campaign against the building of the second runway at 
Manchester Airport, studied the ‘volvos and vegans’ alliance, examining 
how local residents and ‘direct action’ protesters combined in a ‘counter-
hegemonic’ campaign. The empirical material included official public 
discourse, such as media statements and newspaper articles, as well as in-
depth interviews with key actors (Griggs & Howarth, 2002). 
 
Thus, the combination of official public discourse and in-depth interviews is commonly 
employed in empirical DT research. The next section concentrates on explaining how 
the data was analysed in light of DT and by considering the role of dislocations and 
rhetorical redescriptions.  
 
C Analysis of Data 
 
The focus of textual analysis in DT is to “locate and analyse the mechanisms by 
which meaning is produced, fixed, contested, and subverted within particular texts” 
(Howarth, 2004, p. 341). These DT logics include the logics of equivalence and 
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difference, the production of floating and empty signifiers, iterability, and the tools of 
rhetoric. Textual analysis is the principal method here to analyse data. Silverman argues 
that: 
What does it mean to approach texts for what they are? … [D]iscourse analysis 
focuses on how different versions of the world are produced through the use of 
interpretive repertoires, claims to ‘stakes’ in an account, and constructions of 
knowing subjects (Silverman, 1994, p. 826). 
 
The document and interview empirics were largely analysed as a single data set. 
Bourdieu argues that the analysis of talk (both interview and documentary material) 
should extend beyond linguistic analysis, i.e. as if they were constructed in a linguistic, 
hermeneutically sealed universe (1992). For Bourdieu, positioning involves explaining 
the position of the speaker in terms of class, ethnicity, gender, and occupation. By 
concentrating on the speech act the research will overlook this detail (May, 1997, p. 
127). 
  
In discourse, that which is said is only part of the story. What is not said, how it 
is said, non-vocal elements, setting, and context are equally important. Feminist 
interview techniques, e.g. emphasise that interview analysis should focus not only on 
motivations and reasons, but also on social identities and their construction within the 
social settings in which people live and work (Smith, 1988). In DT, the analytical focus 
moves beyond the performativity of the speech itself, to how discourses order a domain 
of reality with repercussions beyond those understood or intended by the speaker. Such 
discourse can ‘silence’ certain voices by constructing channels of communications that 
authorise only certain persons to speak in particular ways (Wetherall & Potter, 1988). 
 
Qualitative document analysis starts with the idea of process, or social context, 
and views the author of the document as a “self-conscious actor addressing an audience 
under particular circumstances” (May, 1997, p. 173). The analytical task is a ‘reading’ 
of the text in terms of its symbols, and includes deconstruction, interpretation, and 
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reconstruction. It is an inherently flexible process, enabling the researcher to consider 
not how meaning is constructed, but how these meanings are developed and employed. 
Of importance is the divorce between the author’s intended meaning (in writing text) 
and the reader’s received meaning (in reading the text). Thus, any text is full of 
potential readings.  
 
Furthermore, given the ability to observe events leading to a decision, it 
provides a comparative ability to analyse how the document represents the events that it 
describes and closes off potential contrary interpretations by the reader. In short, from a 
critical-analytic standpoint, it is possible to analyse the ways a text attempts to stamp its 
authority upon the social world it describes. In relation to the research questions 
underpinning this study, it was important to trace the particular characterisation of the 
social world by understanding what information was excluded from decisions by the 
CC, and the particular characterisations of events and people according to certain 
interests. 
 
Although an emphasis on intended and received meaning is important, analysis 
also examined content meaning. The connection between the signified and the signifier, 
and particularly, the connection between signifieds and an empty signifier is vital in DT 
analysis. In certain ways it is akin to semiotics (May, 1997, p. 173). However, semiotics 
tends to hold that language is a complete system, whereas DT holds the “absent 
fullness’ of any system. Howarth provides insight into the ‘legitimate and illegitimate’ 
employment of the logics of DT in conducting textual analysis: 
… a fully fledged analysis would have to describe and analyse the array of micro- 
and macro- practices – both ‘linguistic’ and ‘non-linguistic’ – that produced such 
divisions and conflicts, in which the textual analysis constitutes an internal 
component of the wider enterprise. In short, the narrow textual analysis of official 
documents, public statements, newspaper reports, party political manifestos … 
constitutes only one aspect of a fully fledged discursive analysis. It needs always 
to be supplemented with in-depth interviews, thick descriptions of practices and 
institutions, historical reconstructions of phenomena drawing on a range of 
empirical data, and so forth (Howarth, 2004, p. 342). 
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The following section considers the nature of the empirical material in this PhD, 
describing the mechanics of the analysis of empirical material and the two 
methodological techniques employed. 
 
D Analysing the Empirical Data: Dislocation and Rhetorical Redescription  
 
Empirically, this thesis addresses how governments seek and achieve forms of 
ideological protection for the introduction of a new Telecommunication’s regulatory 
regime. In concentrating analysis principally on the “official public discourse” of the 
‘re-regulation’ of Telecommunications, it concentrates on: why did a cost-plus pricing 
model (namely, TSLRIC) for interconnection, and net costing for the TSO become the 
basis for regulating telecommunications in NZ? The second empirical level considers 
the implementation and introduction of the ‘rules of regulation’ encapsulated by the 
TA, by focusing on how cost accounting information is used in the regulatory process 
by accountants, lawyers, and regulators. Analytically, the thesis concentrates on the 
analysis of dislocation and the construction of nodal points and rhetorical redescription.  
1 Dislocation and Constructing Nodal Points 
 
The empirical questions lend themselves to the DT notion of dislocation i.e. 
attempts by political actors to articulate a ‘new’ discourse centred on particular nodal 
points. In this case, the focus is on how actors construct the debate around the nodal 
point of ‘cost’. As Chapter five notes, dislocation is the process by which the 
contingency of discursive structures is made visible, and is both disruptive and creative 
(Howarth et al, 2000, p. 13). Laclau notes that: 
If on the one hand they threaten identities, on the other, they are the foundation of 
which new identities are constructed (Laclau, 1990, p. 39). 
 
Identifying dislocations is challenging, and there are limitations surrounding the 
recognition of dislocatory moments, including: 
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1) The subjectivity of actors (what may appear to the researcher to be a 
dislocatory moment for one group in a political struggle may have a 
counter-effect on other groups); 
 
2) With hindsight, it may be easy to diagnose ‘dislocatory’ events, but at the 
time it may have been difficult for actors to recognise such events; 
 
3) Another political group may identify differently with events that appear 
dislocatory to one group of political actors. 
 
4) A dislocatory moment does not necessarily lead to change, as noted in the 
Gramscian notion of revolution. A dominant hegemony may withstand 
pressure from a counter-hegemonic force, and accommodate or suppress 
the forces of challenge; and 
 
5) The search for dislocations may appear to be the search for origins. In 
genealogical terms, the emphasis is on identifying moments where options 
existed and choices were made to the demise of other potentialities. 
 
Stavrakakis acknowledges this difficulty in his overview of the theory of 
dislocation when studying the emergence of ‘Green’ ideology: 
A theory of dislocation … focuses on the element of negativity inherent in human 
experience, on the element of rupture and crisis threatening and subverting our 
social – ideological – forms, the field of social objectivity … [the] theory of 
dislocation belongs to a type of theorisation and political analysis which is based 
on the assumption that understanding social reality is not equivalent to 
understanding what society is … but what prevents it from being. What prevents it 
from being what it promises to be is the force of dislocation; which is also – this is 
the crucial part for the analysis developed here – what generates new ideological 
attempts to reach this impossible goal (Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 100).  
 
At the political logic level, dislocation results in actors seeking to construct a ‘new’ 
discourse centred on certain nodal points, in an attempt to exclude certain alternatives, 
and sediment new social practices (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 9). This thesis examines how 
interested actors succeeded in sedimenting TSLRIC as the new regulatory practice in 
interconnection and net costing for the TSO. Consequently, the empirical chapter 
analyses potential dislocatory moments prior to the institution of the MIT and examines 
how interested parties began to formulate the discourse around ‘cost’. The data are 
analysed through social, political, and fantasmatic logics. 
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2 Rhetorical Redescription (Paradiastole) 
 
The empirical questions focus on rhetoric, how actors articulate the 
metaphorical element of ‘cost’ in agitating for costing methods, and the implementation 
and application of the TA. Rhetoric, for discourse theorists, is a constitutive aspect of 
social reality, and is an important part of understanding and explaining social 
phenomena: “discourse theorists view tropological movements as an essential 
dimension of all social relations” (Howarth & Griggs, 2005, p. 10).  
 
In rhetorical and linguistic terms, a ‘redescription’ names moves that change a 
concept in alternative respects, and includes several variants: reconceptualisation (a 
revision of meaning), renaming (a change of the name), re-weighting (a shift in 
significance) and re-evaluation (an alteration of the normative implication). In 
particular, this study employs the Quintilian rhetorical strategy of paradiastole, which 
refers to de-valuing or re-valuing the normative tone or the increasing or decreasing 
significance of the concept in question, to affect the ‘acceptability’ of a concept 
(Howarth & Griggs, 2005, p. 11). Quintilian’s The Orator’s Education provides advice 
on presenting factual narratives, particularly the role of the attorney in persuading a 
court of law. Quintillan describes the technique as the restating of facts: 
but not all in the same way; you must assign different causes, a different state of 
mind and a different motive for what was done (Skinner, 2002, p. 183). 
 
Of particular interest for DT is the substitution of a rival (yet neighbouring) evaluative 
term “that serves to picture an action no less plausibly, but serves at the same time to 
place it in a contrasting light”. Thus “you must try to elevate the action as much as 
possible by the words you use: e.g. prodigality must be more leniently redescribed as 
liberality, avarice as carefulness, negligence as simplicity of mind” (Howarth & Griggs, 
2005, p. 11). For Quintilian: 
the essence of the technique may thus be said to consist of replacing a given 
evaluative description with a rival term that serves to picture the action no less 
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plausibly, but serves at the same time to place it in a contrasting moral light. 
You seek to persuade your audience to accept your new description, and thereby 
to adopt a new attitude towards the action concerned (Skinner, 2002, p. 183).  
 
However, for Quintilian, this is more than merely substituting one word for another: 
“For no one supposes that the words prodigality and liberality mean the same thing; the 
difference is rather that one person calls something prodigal which another thinks of as 
liberality” (Skinner, 2002, p. 183).  
 
Consequently, redescriptions are omnipresent in political thought and in the 
political use of concepts, which are commonly controversial and contested. Accepting 
this omnipresence as a condition for understanding political thought and conceptual 
change requires studying redescriptions. These should be, in principle, appreciated as 
signs of political creativity and innovation, even if it is impossible to predict what uses a 
particular redescription might eventually lead to. For Laclau and Mouffe, redescriptions 
play a significant role in the creation, maintenance, destabilising, and disruption of 
hegemony and democracy.  
 
 In the search for the employment of rhetoric, “discourse theorists need to guard 
against charges of textual and linguistic reductionism, and they need to deal with 
rhetorical forms at the appropriate levels of abstraction” (Howarth & Griggs, 2005, p. 
10). The categories of rhetoric, metaphor, metonymy, and catachresis are important for 
the ontology of DT, as well as being a means of analysing textual and linguistic events. 
For the ontology of DT, hegemonic interventions are essentially a metonymical 
operation by which a “particular group takes up demands articulated by contiguous 
groups … or extends one set of demands into adjacent spheres” (Howarth & Griggs, 
2005, p. 11). Further, attempts to close systems could be metaphorical, as they involve 
the “creation of meaningful totalities via the disarticulation and replacement of 
previously existing formation” (Howarth & Griggs, 2005, p. 11).  
 - 222 - 
 
Thus, the text of documents and interviews will be subject to rhetorical analysis, 
where the role of metonyms and metaphors operate at the ontical level, focusing on the 
employment of cost in telecommunications regulation. I focus on how the ontological 
dimension informs the employment and use of tropes in the analysis of discourse, 
examining the substitution of metaphors to understand the logic by which interested 
parties, telecommunications competitors, advocates (lawyers), regulators 
(Telecommunications Commission), and the Government and its agents, struggled to 
‘create’ and ‘operationalise’ a workable framework, given the incentives of each player 
to ‘use’ the system for their own advantage.  
3 Empirical Analysis: Validity 
 
The logic of critical explanation seeks to understand the ontical interpretations 
of social actors at the social, political, and fantasmatic level. DT seeks to identify the 
nodal points and nuanced rhetorical strategies employed by different actors in 
constructing and sedimenting new discourses subsequent to disruptions and 
dislocations. This focus on subjectivity renders the use of coding and other technical 
linguistic analysis inappropriate, as they attempt to import ‘objectivity’ into the research 
process.  
 
There is a strong experiential aspect to this research: first, my working 
background as a regulatory lawyer, and second, my active engagement with the research 
as a political actor. Both inform the research process. A personal benefit to this work is 
knowledge gained when I worked in this environment, working for Chapman Tripp, 
specialising in competition law and telecommunications regulation. Consequently, I 
have familiarity with organisations and institutions involved in this project, including: 
a) law firms (including Chapman Tripp, Russell McVeagh, Bell Gully, and 
Buddle Findlay); 
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b) telecommunications companies (including Telecom, TelstraClear, Citilink, 
and Vodafone);  
 
c) regulatory institutions (the CC and the Telecommunications 
Commissioner);  
 
d) accounting professionals (including Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG, and Deloittes, as well as accounting expert witnesses); 
and 
 
e) other interested parties (Telecommunication Users Association of New 
Zealand [TUANZ], the Ministry of Economic Development, and 
interested economists and economic institutions).  
 
On reflection, this experience provides invaluable background information, as well as 
helping to gain access to key sites. Equally, I am a political actor involved in the 
research process. This research represents my interpretation of the political environment 
surrounding the interface of law and accounting in the regulation of 
telecommunications. There are two key components, then, to this research. First, as the 
reader, you are invited to consider my empirically and theoretically grounded opinion of 
the interface of law and accounting. You may disagree; you may agree. Second, in 
terms of validity, my document analysis concentrates on the process identified in 
Chapter two derived from: the MIT establishment, terms of reference, the MIT issues 
paper, submissions, MIT draft report, submissions, counter-submissions, MIT final 
report, Government response to MIT report, Telecommunications Bill, First Reading, 
Second Reading, submissions to the Commerce select committee, select committee 
report, Third Reading and enactment of the TA. Hegemonically, the thematic analysis 
includes: 1) what rhetoric was employed by Government agencies? 2) How have 
interested parties responded to this rhetoric? 3) How have Government agencies and 
interested parties shifted their position? 
 
To analyse the rhetoric of Government agencies, and to ensure a comprehensive 
data set, I collated all statements in respect of telecommunications regulation from the 
MIT, MED, CC, Government, and other agencies from 1995, as well as various 
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regulatory comments from 1987. This was then closely analysed for consistent themes, 
resulting in the identification of four themes at the social logic level in respect of 
TSLRIC and interconnection and two themes for net costing and the TSO.  
 
There were three parts to the analysis of the responses of interested parties. First, 
there was a close reading of MIT and select committee documents. Upon identifying 
‘official’ themes, I physically read the submissions to the MIT and select committee. 
The goal was to confirm the appropriateness of the general themes and gather evidence 
from submissions as to actual rhetorical arguments employed in relation to the themes, 
as well as identifying coalitions, partnerships, and strategic alliances between interested 
parties.   
 
The data set for the first empirical question on the institution of TSLRIC and net 
costing in the TA 2001 consists of publicly available documents, including two sets of 
submissions by interested parties to the MIT (as identified in Chapter two), cross 
submissions, three reports of the MIT (Issues Paper, Draft Report, and Final Report), 
the Government response to the Final Report, submissions and reports submitted to the 
Commerce select committee, the Commerce select committee report, media releases, 
and Parliamentary debates on the Telecommunications Bill. This is supplemented by 
interview data, which primarily provided background information and helped to clarify 
political motivations for interested parties. The reports helped in the identification and 
analysis of the emergent themes and was supplemented by two documents: first, Arthur 
Andersen reviewed and summarised all submissions to the MIT (the discrepancy 
between what Arthur Andersen claimed to be stated in individual submissions and the 
text of the submissions themselves was intriguing); second, the Officials’ Report on the 
Commerce select submissions, which summarised all the submissions received, and the 
themes, in relation to the actual contents and clauses of the Telecommunications Bill. 
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These themes were verified by interviewee responses. This resulted in over 2,000 pages 
of printed and photocopied material from the submissions about the use of cost. 
 
In relation to the second empirical question concerning implementing and 
interpreting the TA 2001 and the employment of rhetorical strategies by interested 
parties in the implementation, application, and use of ‘cost’ and ‘cost information’ in 
the regulatory process, the smaller data set combined publicly available documents, 
supplementary interviews, and industry experience. Upon enactment, the 
Telecommunications Commission embarked on a learning process concerning TSLRIC 
and net costing and published a series of Commission reports and commissioned 
research. All this material was available on the CC’s website. Following this initial 
learning process, the Commission published a set of preliminary frameworks for 
TSLRIC and net costing and invited submissions. These submissions and the 
Commission’s Draft and Final Determinations are publicly available providing 1,500 
pages of data for analysis. Similar analytical approaches were applied so as to identify 
themes and evidence of the themes, and interviews confirmed the veracity of the 
themes. 
 
IV CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter focused on articulating the Glynos and Howarth’s logics of critical 
explanation as a methodological platform to consider the interface of law and 
accounting as constructed by the incorporation of costing as a central component of the 
telecommunications regulatory regime. In particular, this involved the characterisations 
of the social, political, and fantasmatic logics. The research methods employed to gather 
empirical material include interviews, document analysis, and an experiential element 
founded on personal experience as a regulatory lawyer. Finally, by considering 
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dislocation and rhetorical redescription, the chapter details the approach to data 
analysis. Key conclusions include: 
- Empirical analysis in DT concentrates on the ‘concrete case’ as an 
opportunity to develop DT, as opposed to DT providing a set of 
theoretical tools to be applied to particular social settings. The key 
decision criterion with respect to DT and research methods is a question of 
commensurability. Given the focus on openness or the failure of closure 
(the negative ontology) and the highly articulated nature of DT, research 
methods may be incommensurate. There are alleged normative and 
methodological deficits within DT. First, Critchley (2004) criticises DT 
for failing to clarify if it focuses on description or critique, especially, as 
focusing on description risks emptying DT of any critical function. 
Second, Torfing (1998) challenges DT for providing ‘interesting’ 
redescriptions but failing to reflect on causality and explanation.  
 
- Glynos and Howarth (2007) developed the logics of critical explanation as 
a methodological approach to the development of DT, as well as providing 
a response to the normative and methodological deficits within DT. There 
are five movements in the logics of critical explanation: 
 
o Problematisation: a concrete empirical case in DT concentrates on 
a present problem, as opposed to technique or method-driven 
research that often constitutes positivist or normative research. 
Thus, the present problem examined is the contestation and 
institution of cost-based regulation (TSRLRIC and net costing) in 
NZ’s regulatory model for telecommunications.   
 
o Retroduction: due to the limitations of induction and deduction, 
retroduction concentrates on identifying a social fact and then 
examining what gave rise to it. In short, this thesis concentrates on 
TSLRIC and net costing-based regulation as social facts, and then 
examines the political contestation surrounding institution and 
implementation. 
 
o Social, political and fantasmatic logics: 
 
 Social logics examine the rules, practices, concepts, categories, 
and sedimented social practices that structure social 
interactions and relations. Management accounting research 
considers the rules and practices that make possible the 
reproduction of cost discourse.  
 
 Political logics consider the space in which the emergence, 
institution, and constitution of new norms, rules, and social 
practices are publicly contested. There are limited examples of 
this work in management accounting literature, but the focus of 
this study is on why TSLRIC and net costing were instituted as 
sedimented social practices during the contestation over the 
shape of the regulatory regime and then during implementation 
post the enactment of the TA 2001. 
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 Fantasmatic logics consider how subjects are ‘gripped’ by 
ideologies to allow social practices to continue. In particular, 
the focus of this inquiry is ‘what is it about cost (TSLRIC and 
net costing) that makes it so persuasive’? 
 
o Articulation: articulation is related to the identification of nodal 
points, which are privileged signifiers or reference points in a 
discourse. As an example, ‘cost’ becomes a privileged reference 
point in contestations over the shape of the new regulatory 
framework. Glynos and Howarth, partly as a response to Torfing’s 
criticism, argue that it is important to link the logics within their 
context in order to provide a coherent account to explain the single 
problematised phenomena. In this capacity, each chapter of this 
thesis constitutes part of the context, in relation to regulation, 
telecommunications, cost, the interface of law and accounting, and 
paradigmatic disputes within and between the disciplines.  
 
o Critique: given the focus on political and fantasmatic logics, there 
are many opportunities for critique. In particular, careful 
examination of the social, political, and fantasmatic landscape 
should identify moments of dislocation (leading to the institution 
of new social practices), penetrated by radical contingency. These, 
dislocatory moments make the ‘lack’ visible. This study 
concentrates on the identification and examination of multiple 
dislocatory moments.  
 
- The thesis employed document analysis and interviews with a strong 
experiential element. For DT, document analysis is an important form of 
non-reactive, linguistic research data. In this study, all documents are 
publicly available and accessible. The study used focused, unstructured 
interviews, given their potential for greater qualitative depth and 
flexibility. Interviews constitute a form of linguistic, reactive research 
 
- The tools of data analysis employed include dislocation and rhetorical 
redescription. By examining how actors construct the debate around the 
nodal point of ‘cost’, the empirical questions lend themselves to the DT 
notion of dislocation. In particular, I seek to examine how interested 
actors succeeded in sedimenting TSLRIC as the new regulatory practice in 
interconnection and net costing for the TSO. Equally, the empirical 
questions examine rhetoric, and how actors articulate the metaphorical 
element of ‘cost’ in the agitation for costing methods, and in the 
implementation and application of the TA 2001. 
 
Thus, this study examines meanings attached to accounting information in its 
construction, development, presentation, contestation, argument, and in the decision 
making process. Cost is an ontic tool, as there are different costs for different purposes. 
Finally, the act of application (determining the cost to apply to a particular situation) is 
an articulatory practice, which is a rhetorical technique. This is the interface of DT at 
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the interface of law and accounting. In relation to the re-regulation of 
telecommunications, this thesis investigates the formation of political identities 
characterised by antagonism and uncertainty at numerous levels, including the 
discursive enunciation of standpoints and perspectives by actors at the first instance, 
and then considers the micro-politics at the level of reception post the enactment of 
legislation by analysing the contestation over interpreting and implementing the 
regulation.   
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- Chapter Seven - 
 
Empirical Data and Analysis: TSLRIC Pricing and Net Costing of TSO 
 
I CHAPTER SEVEN OVERVIEW 
 
Chapter six introduced the logics of critical explanation as a methodological 
approach to consider the complexity of telecommunications re-regulation. This 
empirical chapter explores the dichotomy between the ‘simplistic’ story of a new 
regulatory framework (as presented by media and Government agencies) and the 
multiple layers of contestation in the re-regulation stages: from problematising light-
handed regulation, to disputing the nature of the new framework, through to 
contestation over the institution and implementation (as identifiable in public 
documents) of TSLRIC and net costing as legislated in the TA 2001. Equally, at the 
interface of law and accounting, there is the dichotomy between the legal framework’s 
adoption of the ‘simple, objective’ cost as a central regulatory tool and the multiple 
layers of contestation over cost at the technical, methodological, and political levels and 
the lack of recognition of problems associated with cost and costing including 
arbitrariness, choice, subjectivity, politics, conflict, and the social and institutional 
creation of meanings of cost (as discussed in Chapter three). The basic re-regulatory 
story is deceptively simple: political parties acknowledged serious problems with 
telecommunications under the ‘light-handed regulatory’ system; the newly elected 
Government established the MIT to recommend telecommunications regulatory 
changes; the Government agreed with most of the MIT recommendations (detailed in 
Chapters two and three); the TA 2001 became law requiring TSLRIC for 
interconnection pricing and net costing for the TSO; and the Telecommunications 
Commissioner commenced implementing the Act. However, in contrast, Chapter five 
developed three figures, Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 to illustrate the complexity and scope 
for contestation throughout the ‘re-regulatory’ phases. In particular, the causes of the 
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failures of the light-handed regulatory system were disputed and ranged from the 
dominant incumbent to the CC to the judicial process to the regulatory framework itself. 
Equally, in relation to the institution of TSLRIC for interconnection pricing and net 
costing for the TSO, there was dispute over the appropriateness of a cost-based pricing 
mechanism, the form of cost-based pricing regulation, and the relationship of the TSO 
to interconnection. Finally, in relation to interpreting and implementing the TA 2001, 
there was dispute as to the approach, modelling, meaning, and calculation of both 
TSLRIC and net costing. Thus, the analysis identified various parties interested in the 
objectives and shape of the regulation,111 contestable regulatory frameworks, various 
costing methodologies and methods, and different strategies, effects, and aims of 
interested parties in articulating, implementing, and developing the regulation. 
Consequently, the chapter returns to the two empirical questions: 
a) Why did TSLRIC, a cost-plus pricing model, for interconnection, and net 
costing for the TSO become the basis for regulating telecommunications 
in NZ? How did actors discursively construct their political identities in 
relation to cost? 
 
b) How and why were the ‘rules of regulation’ encapsulated by the TA 
implemented and introduced focusing on how cost accounting information 
was used in the regulatory process by accountants, lawyers, and 
regulators? How was ‘cost’ employed rhetorically in interpreting and 
implementing the TA 2001? 
 
 
The social, political, and fantasmatic logics, illustrated in Chapter six, provide a 
framework to interrogate the phases in re-regulating telecommunications, as well as 
examining the re-regulatory process as a whole.112 Chapter two examined two aspects 
of the first phase of re-regulation, by illustrating the genealogy of telecommunications 
                                                 
111
 See Appendix 5 for a full list of submissions to the MIT and the Commerce select committee. 
 
112
 This chapter examines the rhetoric and agitation in institution and implementation, thereby illustrating 
how TSLRIC and net costing came to represent the failures of light-handed regulation. Chapters two 
and three illustrated how the light-handed regime raised interconnection issues, due largely to the 
Telecom v Clear litigation and Telecom manipulating the interconnection price by charging KSO 
costs. Consequently, in the institution and implementation of TSLRIC (resolving interconnection 
pricing) and net costing (resolving KSO and interconnection pricing manipulation), there is a degree 
of ‘repetition’ in the analysis as the political rhetoric employed by interested parties tended to 
overlap as parties represented the issues as connected 
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regulation in NZ and the influence of economic theory on the application and 
development of different regulatory frameworks. This characterised the complex failure 
of the light-handed regulatory system from economic, legal, social, and political 
perspectives, and problematised the political management of competition law, the state 
of telecommunications in NZ, and Telecom’s pseudo-regulatory role. Chapters two and 
three identified the Government’s response to the failure of ‘light-handed regulation’, 
by detailing the shift to sector-specific telecommunications regulation, and by 
recognising the institution of cost-accounting as a core component of 
telecommunications regulation. Chapter three argued that this provided a significant 
challenge for effective legal regulation by identifying cost accounting information’s 
centrality at technical, methodological, and political levels and demonstrating the 
socially constructed, arbitrary, and subjective nature of costing. In short, the sub-text of 
Chapter three is that the TA would be incredibly complex to interpret and implement, 
due to the range of ‘political’ strategies that interested parties could employ in 
contesting ‘cost’ within the regulation. Chapter seven builds on the empirical and 
theoretical discussion by examining contestation at the ‘institution’ and the 
‘implementation’ phase. At the institution phase, the focus is on examining how 
TSLRIC interconnection pricing and net costing for the TSO became the regulatory 
approach within the TA, whereas, the thesis concentrates on the contestation over the 
implementation and interpretation of TSLRIC and net costing at the implementation 
phase.  
 
This empirical analysis divides into three parts. Part I employs retroduction to 
examine how TSLRIC interconnection pricing and net costing for the TSO became 
regulatory approaches in the TA,113 i.e. central regulatory drivers. This Part examines 
what gave rise to the facts of TSLRIC and net costing (in social logics, the social 
                                                 
113
 As explained in Chapter six, retroduction concentrates on identifying a social fact and then examining 
what gave rise to the social fact. It is opposed to deduction and induction.   
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landscape of telecommunications regulation is characterised by TSLRIC and net 
costing), concentrating on political contestation over the sedimentation of TSLRIC and 
net costing, at the expense of alternative approaches (political logic). The rhetorical 
analysis examines how TSLRIC and net costing were articulated within the discourse 
focusing on signifiers attached to TSLRIC and net costing and how these signifiers 
shaped the ensuing contestation over the content of the TA 2001. This analysis draws 
on DT concepts of dislocation, articulation, rhetoric, deconstruction, genealogy, 
condensation, overdetermination, hegemony, relations of equivalence and difference, 
and nodal points. Part II examines how the Telecommunications Commissioner 
implemented and interpreted the processes of the TA and the political contestation over 
TSLRIC and net costing. This also involves rhetorical analysis, as TSLRIC and net 
costing constitute the social space. However, the social space is not fully articulated as 
the Government legislated TSLRIC and net costing in name only, providing little 
guidance or detail on how these concepts were to be interpreted and implemented. 
Consequently, there remains room for political contestation over the approach, 
modelling, meaning, and calculation of these cost concepts. This invokes two levels of 
rhetorical analysis: first, interested parties articulate and agitate specific meanings of 
TSLRIC and net costing for regulation purposes; and second, these common condensed 
signifiers (presented in Part I of the empirical analysis) are displaced in the contestation 
over implementation. Finally, Part III, a form of auto-critique, employs fantasmatic 
logics to explain and critique how political actors were ‘gripped’ by certain ideological 
presuppositions of ‘costing’. The contestation that marks the process of institution, 
implementation, and interpretation exposed the elements of subjectivity, judgment, 
arbitrariness, choice, information asymmetry, and politics inherent within the costing 
process. In DT terms, this exposed the ‘radical contingency’ of both TSLRIC and net 
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costing. However, the ideologies identified within the empirical analysis of Part I and II 
help smooth over and cover the radical contingency of the regulatory framework.  
 
PART I: RETRODUCTION: DISLOCATION AND ARTICULATION  
 
In following Glynos and Howarth’s logics of critical explanation, I employ 
retroductive logic. This requires the observation of a fact and investigating what gave 
rise to it (Sayer, 1986, p. 116). Chapter three demonstrated the centrality of cost in the 
TA. For retroduction, TSLRIC interconnection pricing and net costing of the TSO are 
‘facts’ in telecommunications regulation. Thus, Part I examines attempts by political 
actors to articulate a ‘new’ discourse, i.e. how actors construct nodal points around 
‘cost’. Equally, the empirical analysis focuses on how actors rhetorically articulate the 
metaphorical element of ‘cost’ in the agitation for costing methods: Part I investigates 
the formation of political identities characterised by antagonism and uncertainty at 
numerous levels, including the discursive enunciation of standpoints and perspectives 
by actors in relation to ‘cost’ and the institution of the telecommunications regulatory 
environment.114 In particular, this examines dislocatory moments by which cost came to 
represent a way forward from light-handed regulation (as depicted in Chapter three), 
how ‘cost’ rhetorically came to represent an ‘answer’ to regulatory failings of light-
handed regulation (specifically, TSLRIC and net costing), the hegemonic incorporation 
of criticisms of TSLRIC and net costing and alternative regulatory approaches through 
the logic of difference, and how TSLRIC and net costing were ‘emptied’ of specific 
                                                 
114
 The analysis recognises the extended consultation process. In this, time plays a role in the construction 
of nodal points. To recognise the impact of time, there are two boundaries within the empirical 
analysis. First, the MIT commenced when the Government released the terms of reference on 
February 2000 and the concluded with the presentation of the Final Report in September 2000. The 
“Parliamentary process” captures the time from the release of the MIT’s Final Report through to the 
Government enactment of the TA in 2001. 
 - 234 - 
content so as to represent a broader ‘answer’ to the regulatory issues through the logic 
of equivalence.115 
 
A “Ideological Cover” 
 
Chapter two depicted the increasing public and political disquiet about Telecom 
and telecommunications up to the 1999 General Election particularly concerning high 
‘monopoly’ profits, slow technology ‘rollout’, and ‘light handed regulation’ (Patterson, 
1998, p. 148). The Labour Party campaigned deftly, promoting change in 
telecommunications, without necessarily articulating the shape or scope of that reform. 
The Labour Party’s general strategy of ‘responsible re-regulation’ championed change 
in pursuit of consumer benefits and industry efficiency. Patterson argues that this was a 
successful strategy that played on the negative public perception of the 
telecommunications industry (1998, p. 138). However, election campaigning 
demonstrated marked disagreement over the ‘best’ regulatory regime. Thus, in a 
landscape characterised by public discontent with Telecom, the newly elected Labour-
led coalition Government had a political mandate for change in telecommunications, but 
there remained an element of ‘uncertainty’.116 Howarth and Griggs argue:  
For various reasons, many governments in liberal democratic societies, even those 
with large parliamentary majorities enjoying considerable popular support, are 
often reluctant to pursue public policies they think are desirable and justifiable. 
The fear of a media backlash, the threat of intense political protest, the importance 
of a particular set of constituencies, or just a generalised cautiousness, may 
conspire to impede the adoption of programmes that from an external perspective 
seem inevitable (Howarth & Griggs, 2007, p. 23). 
 
After nine years in opposition, uncertainty could have intensified for the newly elected 
government. But note the paradox: the Government had popular support for industry 
change, but uncertainty surrounded the ‘appropriate’ form of change and the ‘newness’ 
                                                 
115
 Chapter five identified that the ‘logic of equivalence’ was a discursive strategy to collapse differences 
within a discursive system, by constructing different identities as being linked and even identical. 
The more extended a chain of equivalence, the less content is attached to the empty signifier. 
 
116
 Note that “change in telecommunications” was one of Labour’s pledge card promises in the 1999 
Election. 
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of the Government (Howarth & Griggs, 2007, p. 23). Thus, the Government chose to 
circumvent the paradox by shifting the focus, in the interim, to an ostensibly 
independent government agency by creating an ‘independent’ MIT.117 The government 
sought ideological protection in delivering the election promise of telecommunications 
change from a mere five months earlier, but diverted media and other public attention 
from itself to the MIT by requiring the MIT to investigate and recommend what form of 
regulation should be introduced.  
 
As Chapter three illustrated, in establishing the MIT the Government focused on 
the ‘communications revolution’ and was careful not to blame the ‘light-handed 
regulatory’ system or Telecom for the stunted development of competition in 
telecommunications. There are two important points: first, the previous Labour 
Government (the Fourth Labour Government) instituted the original light-handed 
regulation; and second, as Ergas comments, successive Governments had “staked 
substantial political capital on the virtues of the regulatory regime” (1995). Therefore, 
Labour did not wish to lay blame (as it created the original regulatory regime). In 
rhetorical terms, the Government shifted the focus from regulatory failure to the need 
for developing a vibrant, competitive telecommunications environment and tied this to 
the ‘critical need’ for telecommunications participants to interconnect fairly and 
efficiently with existing networks.  
 
However, this should not be interpreted as a situation where the Government 
had no ‘clue’ as to the best regulatory direction. Indeed, they appeared to have a clear 
set of regulatory goals, but opted for the MIT’s ideological cover to pursue their desired 
regulatory goals: 
                                                 
117
 Note that in NZ, the NZ Labour Party is traditionally conceived as the peoples’ party, particularly in 
relation to workers, and thus, the use of Ministerial Inquiries is a traditional Labour approach to 
regulatory change. It is a seen as a way of guaranteeing a mandate.  
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1) In the MIT’s broad terms of reference, the Government provided specific 
directions for areas that ‘required’ investigation: e.g. the Telecom v Clear 
interconnection dispute and the judicial approval of the “Baumol-Willig” 
rule concerned the Government (MED, 1999). Hence, the Government’s 
terms of reference for the MIT required “investigat[ing] and … 
comment[ing] on … the environment for telecommunications network 
access and interconnection”. Given increasing public disquiet about 
telecommunications, this sends two messages: a) the existing 
interconnection system was unfair and inefficient; and b) it was important 
that regulation provided for a better interconnection system (Gilbertson, 
2001, p. 5); and 
 
2) In relation to the TSO, the Government had a plan in mind. There was 
very little public and political contestation over the KSO process. The 
MIT considered the best regulatory arrangements for the KSO and 
recommended maintenance of the status quo, arguing against any 
regulatory cost recoupment mechanism. Most interested parties supported 
this. However, the Government thought differently arguing that the TSO 
clouded interconnection agreements and pricing, and instituted a 
regulatory mechanism separately accounting for the cost of the TSO, with 
the right for Telecom to independently recoup a proportion of the cost of 
satisfying the TSO.  
 
However, the Government was careful not to appear to unduly curtail the MIT, by 
giving the MIT the appearance of openness with unfettered discretion to consider NZ 
telecommunications regulation: the Government emphasised that the MIT’s process was 
open, and pointed out that the MIT would recommend, what, in the MIT’s opinion was 
the best model for regulation. As Howarth and Griggs argue, this provided the 
Government with some ideological cover for their regulatory intervention while 
drawing media and public attention away from itself to the MIT.  
 
 Thus, the ideological cover generated by creating the MIT afforded the 
Government a level of comfort. The initial articulation of ‘appropriate’ regulation was 
to occur in an ‘independent’ forum where first attempts by interested parties and the 
MIT to articulate appropriate telecommunications regulation are encountered. Two 
levels of logic are at play: public contestation and constitution of approaches to 
interconnection and the KSO issues (political logic); and interested parties articulating 
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the social meaning of TSLRIC and net costing by characterising the practices and 
concepts of TSLRIC and net costing (social logic).  
1 Articulating the Social Logic of TSLRIC  
 
The MIT played an important role in curtailing potential contestation. Despite 
the open terms of reference, the MIT’s Issues Paper (the first comment on the terms of 
reference) limited and shaped the ensuing discussion: e.g. the MIT introduced ‘cost’ and 
‘robust’ as two concepts that shaped the debate (MIT, 2000b): 
1) The MIT highlighted the difference between NZ’s approach to 
interconnection regulation and ‘common’ international models and 
focused on the ‘inefficiencies’ of the current interconnection practice, 
referring in depth to the Telecom v Clear dispute and the “Baumol-Willig” 
rule. The MIT made specific note of the Government’s dislike of the 
“Baumol-Willig” rule. This reinforced NZ’s ‘light-handed’ approach as an 
aberration, which resulted in the “Baumol-Willig” pricing rule distorting 
interconnection.  
 
2) The MIT stressed the broad range of potential options available by 
canvassing the range of interconnection agreements in use, including 
payments for terminating and originating calls, bill and keep; revenue 
sharing, wholesale prices; and cost-based interconnection access. 
 
3) The MIT commented that there was “widespread international agreement” 
that forward-looking cost-based interconnection pricing was the best 
regulatory measure (MIT, 2000b, p. 18). Thus, while recognising that 
various interconnection mechanisms (such as ‘bill and keep’, revenue 
sharing, or wholesaling) existed, the reference to widespread international 
support for the ‘international best practice’ cost-based methods narrowed 
the interconnection debate to cost-based methods.  
 
Thus, from a political logic perspective,118 these movements by the MIT limited and 
shaped public contestation around interconnection. In invoking the imagery of 
‘forward-looking cost as possessing widespread international support’ the MIT 
restricted the space for the emergence and institution of different types of 
interconnection pricing rules. The ostensibly ‘open’ MIT quickly limited the range of 
arguments, determined subsequent discourse, and marginalised competing 
representations of appropriate regulatory interventions. The next section investigates 
                                                 
118
 Political logics consider the space in which the emergence, institution, and constitution of new norms, 
rules, and social practices are publicly contested. 
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how interested parties formed political identities and discursively enunciated their 
position with respect to TSLRIC and the institution of the new telecommunications 
regulatory environment. 
 
The regulatory requirement for an interconnection access regime was widely 
accepted. The major arguments concentrated on how and why TSLRIC provided the 
best methodology for pricing interconnection. TSLRIC, though, is tendentially empty of 
particular content: as Chapter three recognises, it is a costing method in name only – its 
specifics and methodological measurement develop in application. Hence, the empirical 
analysis identifies technical, methodological, and political TSLRIC arguments. Four 
primary nodal points thematise the social logics of TSLRIC: claims it was international 
best practice; robust; transparent; and not the ‘Baumol-Willig’ rule. Being tendentially 
empty of particular content, the signifier ‘TSLRIC’ encouraged interested parties, 
regulators, and the Government to read in various signifieds into the master signifier. In 
rhetorically analysing the submissions and reports, interested parties made a series of 
claims as to what TSLRIC represents. In particular, the signifier, ‘Baumol-Willig’ came 
to represent the most important (in correcting the past failings of light-handed 
regulation) and significant (in representing the degree of change brought by the move to 
TSLRIC) ‘meaning’.119 Thus, Figure 7.1 illustrates the range of signifieds condensed 
into the single signifier representing TSLRIC. 
                                                 
119
 See Chapter two for more detail for details of the Government distancing the TA from the influence of 
the Telecom v Clear case. 
 - 239 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig 7.1: Multiple signifieds attached to the master signifier TSLRIC 
 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the dual signifying function of the “Baumol-Willig” signifier as 
explained above, in that it rhetorically came to signify the failure of the light-handed 
regulatory regime and the movement to TSLRIC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.2: Dual signification: TSLRIC and the failure of light-handed regulation 
 
Consequently, the ensuing analysis examines the politics of the consultation process as 
interested parties, including industry players, the Government and its agents formulated 
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the discourse around themes attributed to ‘TSLRIC’ for interconnection; and the 
contextualised and conflictual nature of this thematic presentation. 
 
 
 
As Laffont and Tirole acknowledge, NZ’s approach to regulating 
telecommunications was both unique (no other jurisdiction regulated 
telecommunications similarly) and extreme (in relying on general competition law in a 
developing market) (2000, p. 34). Consequently, there was marked separation between 
NZ’s ‘light-handed’ regulation and the international norm (where an independent 
regulator governed interconnection access and pricing through forward-looking cost-
based interconnection).120 In particular, CLEAR and the MED pointed to the light-
handed regime being problematic, while the Te Horo Telecom Users Group, TUANZ, 
and the MIT saw its failure to provide a detailed interconnection access regime as 
especially problematic. The MIT aimed to provide a ‘solution’ to the interconnection 
problem and land a significant blow to the “Baumol-Willig” influence that tainted 
interconnection negotiations. Thus, the MIT focused debate on ‘acceptable’ cost-based 
regulation according to international ‘best practice’: 
There is, today, widespread international agreement that interconnection prices are 
most economically efficient if they are based on costs and are forward-looking 
(MIT, 2000c, p. 18). 
 
However, internationally, there is disparity over the ‘best-practice’ cost-based 
regulatory model, and thus, there was considerable debate before the MIT on what 
constituted ‘best practice’ cost-plus pricing rule: international benchmarking, bill and 
keep, or TSLRIC. For many interested industry players, the accepted cost-based pricing 
methodology mattered. In short, ‘bill and keep’ would provide the simplest and 
cheapest interconnection access for industry players, as it is based on reciprocity and 
                                                 
120
 See Chapter two for further details on international best practice regulatory models in 
telecommunications. 
CLAIM 1: TSLRIC AS INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE 
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network equality.121 International benchmarking would remove many information 
collection challenges for the regulator, and focus industry dispute on what constitutes a 
similar telecommunications market. Equally, many industry parties submitted for 
TSLRIC interconnection pricing, as this was the most common methodology employed 
in telecommunications.122 What is intriguing about the use of the ‘best practice’ 
signifier at the MIT level is that each pricing principle considered and recommended 
(TSLRIC, bill and keep, and international benchmarking) were referred at some stage to 
being ‘best practice’ (by interested parties and the MIT). Consequently, it is difficult to 
delineate the label ‘best practice’. However, it does constitute an attempt to ‘sediment’ 
TSLRIC as ‘the’ social practice, by referring to other social contexts: if the majority of 
other jurisdictions accept TSLRIC as the best approach, then NZ should reflect that.  
 
The notion of TSLRIC as ‘best practice’ resulted in several submissions strongly 
supporting the introduction of ‘forward-looking’, long-run incremental costing (e.g. see 
Federated Farmers, TUANZ, IHUG, CLEAR, Don Wallace and Associates, and 
eVentures). The Te Horo Telecom Users’ Group focused on tying cost-based regulation 
to the prime issue of interconnection and competition: 
The key issue for most New Zealand consumers is the questions of competition on 
the local loop … one way [to allow fair competition] would be to adopt a situation 
similar to that which operates in the United States where local loop owners are 
required by regulation to allow competitors to use the lines at the true cost of 
providing that service (Te Horo Telecom Users’ Group, 2000, p. 3). 
 
Te Horo Telecom Users’ Group had been locked in a bitter dispute with Telecom 
throughout the 1990s concerning local call access. Te Horo is a small area in the lower 
                                                 
121
 For a new entrant, network equality and reciprocity with Telecom, technically, would lead to a price 
where the new entrant would pay Telecom the difference in network traffic, based on a ‘marginal 
cost’ equation (without any cost of capital included). Note that bill and keep is a pricing scheme for 
two-way interconnection between two networks under which each network agrees to terminate calls 
originating from another network at no charge. See Chapter two for further details. 
  
122
 Countries implementing a form of LRIC included: the UK, Australia, Hungary, Ireland, Sweden, 
South Africa, the USA, Germany, Hong Kong, Spain, Denmark, Italy, France, Belgium, Brazil, 
Switzerland, South Korea, Peru, the Netherlands, Greece, Mexico, Austria, Romania, and Portugal 
(PWC, July 2003, pp. 21).  
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North Island. Unfortunately for Te Horo residents, all telephone calls to major towns 
and city centres in the vicinity of Te Horo were charged as a toll call. Under the original 
KSO arrangement, free local calls are guaranteed, but due to Telecom’s local call 
boundaries, Te Horo had a very small local call zone. Through the 1990s, the Users’ 
Group supported any attempts to increase telecommunications competition, actively 
agitated against Telecom, and sought Parliamentary intervention. Thus, given the 
increasing propensity for US telecommunications operators to discard ‘local call zones’, 
the US approach was favoured by Te Horo. Similarly, CLEAR reinforced their support 
for TSLRIC:  
There is near universal acceptance that TSLRIC is the most appropriate pricing 
principle for fixed interconnection services provided by an incumbent operator and 
that it provides the clearest economic signals for efficient investment (CLEAR, 
2001, p. 7). 
 
CLEAR unsurprisingly favoured the shift to TSLRIC as they suffered the most under 
the light-handed regime, illustrated in their litigation experiences with Telecom through 
the 1990s. Given the Privy Council decision in Telecom v Clear, it is unsurprising that 
CLEAR would support a substantive shift from the influence of “Baumol-Willig”. 
However, during the litigation, CLEAR supported a ‘bill and keep’ pricing 
methodology as it provided the cheapest interconnection access for a developing 
competitor (Carter & Wright, 1999, p. 2). However, CLEAR now supported TSLRIC. 
Why? CLEAR’s market position was now substantially different (as the second largest 
industry player with approximately eight per cent market share). Network investment 
provides a core reason for CLEAR’s support of the shift to TSLRIC: during the 1990s 
and early 2000s, CLEAR invested heavily in local networks in the central business 
districts of Auckland and Wellington (and Christchurch, to a smaller extent). 
Consequently, as the owner of competing networks in three large city centres, 
CLEAR’s support of TSLRIC envisages the scenario where industry competitors would 
seek interconnection access to CLEAR’s network. TSLRIC provides a better return on 
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their network investment as they would receive a ‘cost of capital’ component in the 
access charge not available under a ‘bill and keep’ scenario.   
 
 There is an interesting dichotomy in submissions on whether TSLRIC 
constituted best practice. With the exception of CLEAR, all TSLRIC submitters were 
small, local new entrant industry players (including IHUG, and eVentures) or industry 
pressure groups (including Federated Farmers, TUANZ, and the Te Horo Telecom 
Users’ Group). However, interested parties with direct TSLRIC experience in different 
jurisdictions (including the US, Australia, and Europe), all submitted that TSLRIC was 
difficult to institute (see Telecom, TelstraSaturn, Vodafone, John Small, and Nortel 
Networks). In particular, Vodafone was heavily critical of TSRLIC pricing pointing to 
several limitations from international experience. They argued that given the range of 
choices inherent to TSLRIC, each jurisdictional model was ‘so’ different that it was 
impossible to consider TSLRIC international best practice (2001, p. 41). Similarly, 
TelstraSaturn drew on ‘significant difficulties’ encountered by its parent company, 
Telstra in the Australian implementation of TSLRIC-based regulation, concerning 
information asymmetry and for regulatory gaming (2000, p. 15). That TelstraSaturn 
challenged TSLRIC is intriguing as the regulatory gaming and information asymmetry 
matched Telecom’s allegations against Telstra in Australia (through its Australian 
investment AAPT): perhaps TelstraSaturn did not wish to face the opposite side of the 
‘TSLRIC coin’ in NZ. International experience of TSLRIC, while economically the best 
practice model for telecommunications regulation, demonstrated that it was a difficult 
regulatory model to implement and control.  
 
Despite this contestation, the MIT’s Final Report concluded that TSLRIC was 
international best practice, recommending it for interconnection access (2000b, p. 65). 
The Government agreed. TSLRIC as ‘best practice’ was a contested nodal point (a 
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privileged signifier) in the interconnection access debate.123 However, this ‘signifier’ 
played a significant role for Government. Given the uniqueness of the ‘light-handed’ 
approach, the right to claim TSLRIC as international best practice (despite contestation) 
because various international jurisdictions considered it the best regulatory approach 
gave important ideological cover to the MIT, the Government and its agents. 
Ideological protection was unavailable under the light-handed approach as it was 
‘experimental’. Equally, as this was the international approach, any future regulatory 
failure would not be the Government’s fault. Similarly, the need for a ‘robust’ 
interconnection pricing methodology became an important signifier for interested 
parties as is demonstrated next.  
 
 
 
TSLRIC costing was presented as “robust”. Robust is a complex word, but in 
the analysis of the submissions, the institution of a ‘robust’ TSLRIC interconnection 
methodology represented the failure of light-handed regulation. In particular, the 
invocation of image of TSLRIC as robust rhetorically constructed the light-handed 
regulatory model as weak, particularly through failing to designate an interconnection 
regime, to prescribe an interconnection pricing methodology, or to provide an 
appropriate dispute resolution forum (due to the Privy Council decision in Telecom v 
Clear). However, it is difficult to reconcile what is ‘meant’ by ‘robust’. Figure 7.3 
illustrates various concepts attached by interested parties to ‘robust’. These are 
competing interpretations of the hegemonic statement, ‘TSLRIC as robust’, and 
included claims that TSLRIC was ‘solid’, ‘appropriate’, ‘real, ‘fair’, and ‘accurate’. 
Equally, some submissions identified ‘TSLRIC as robust’ with a regulatory object: i.e. 
                                                 
123
 A nodal point is a ‘privileged’ signifier, which attempts to partially fix a discourse by offering a 
potential ‘universal meaning’. It is precisely the attempt at partially fixation or centring of a 
discourse, which binds together ‘chains of equivalence’. 
CLAIM 2: TSLRIC AS ROBUST 
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TSLRIC provided a robust methodology, a robust regulatory environment, or a robust 
measurement.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.3: Articulation: The multiple meanings of TSLRIC as ‘robust’  
 
Figure 7.3 demonstrates that ‘TSLRIC as robust’ is a floating signifier, empty of 
particular content.124 Interested parties, regulators, and the Government read in various 
‘definitional’ signifieds, condensed into the single signifier ‘robust’. TSLRIC was 
represented as ‘solid’ by the MED and IHUG (2001, p. 22; 2000, p. 8), ‘appropriate’ by 
Web InterNet (2000, p. 1), ‘fair’ and ‘real’ by TelstraSaturn (2000, p. 10), and 
‘accurate’ by IHUG (2000, p. 8). Similarly, the MIT and David Cunliffe referred to 
TSLRIC providing a more ‘robust’ regulatory environment (Hansard, November 27, 
2001). IHUG argued that TSLRIC provided a robust interconnection methodology 
(IHUG, 2000, pp. 7-8), and the MED stated that TSLRIC would measure ‘solid’ 
interconnection access prices (MED, 2001, p. 23). It is difficult to comprehend what 
interested parties meant by arguing that TSLRIC was ‘robust’, without considering their 
intentions. IHUG, an ISP, required access to Telecom’s PSTN for dial-up Internet. 
IHUG, and other ISPs, advocated through the mid-to-late 1990s against Telecom as 
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 As Chapter five explains, a floating signifier attempts to name the lack in a social system. In this 
example, ‘robust’ as a concept appears to empty of particular content, as interested parties are able to 
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Telecom: a) required ISP customers to use a special number to access the network 
(0869); b) charged ISPs an ‘expensive’ interconnection fee (see Gilbertson, 2001, p. 3); 
and allegedly delayed infrastructure investment and technological rollout (Paterson, 
1998, p. 5). Consequently, in reaction to this treatment by Telecom, IHUG and other 
ISPs agitated for an interconnection methodology like TSLRIC. In particular, IHUG 
associated the introduction of ‘robust’ interconnection pricing with two outputs: 
‘accuracy’ and a solid costing structure: 
IHUG believes that at [sic] a per-minute interconnection charge causes distortions 
in the telecommunications market because it does not reflect the true cost of 
providing interconnection services. This, in turn, encourages game-playing and 
arbitrage by service providers … interconnection charges should be regulated to 
reflect as closely as possible the cost of providing interconnection services … any 
differences in price will be a reflection of bargaining power, not cost. 
… 
This game playing has been encouraged by the failure of the interconnection 
agreements to reflect the economic cost of providing call termination services. 
… 
IHUG considers that introducing an interconnection regime which more accurately 
represents the cost and cost structure associated with interconnection services will 
reduce game playing and costly court battles (IHUG, 2000, pp. 7-8). 
 
 
For IHUG, TSLRIC was a robust methodology providing ‘true cost’, as it reduced 
Telecom’s regulatory games or arbitrage ability. As Figure 7.3 indicates, the ‘robust’ 
signifier implicated ‘fair’ and ‘appropriate’. These relate to the interconnection 
experience under the light-handed regime, where Telecom and an interconnecting party 
would negotiate access pricing. 
  
However, Vodafone and the Business Roundtable challenged the presentation of 
TSLRIC as ‘robust’ as depicted in Figure 7.3. Vodafone challenged TSLRIC as a robust 
cost measurement system due to the need for expert judgement, the difficulty of cost 
allocation, and the challenge of timeliness:  
Second, cost-base pricing involves the allocation of costs. As a significant 
proportion of the costs of telecommunications networks is common to many 
services, allocation of these costs to any particular service is somewhat arbitrary. 
Regulators do not have the information to determine the efficient allocation of 
common costs … Lastly, cost-based pricing requires the regulator to make a range 
of judgements. In determining a cost-based price the regulator must decide what 
costs to include, how to value assets, the cost of capital, etc. As each of these 
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decisions are debatable and can have a large effect on the outcome, parties devote 
significant resources to influence these judgements (Vodafone, 2000, p. 42). 
 
As indicated above, its international experience with TSLRIC resulted in Vodafone 
heavily criticising TSRLIC pricing: Vodafone’s experience as an access seeker and 
access provider in international jurisdictions makes this submission interesting. The 
Business Roundtable, from a strong anti-interventionist position, criticised TSLRIC for 
being openly political, arguing that telecommunications costing was especially difficult, 
due to the existence of common and joint costs, the challenge of isolating relevant costs, 
and the regulatory challenge of trying to understand the information presented to them:  
In our view it is very important that regulators and the regulated resist the 
incessant pressures to politicise prices and investment decisions in 
telecommunications. 
… 
The Commissioner will not be competent to evaluate disputes between experts and 
will not be independent as they will not be indifferent to the effect of any decisions 
on their own role. In any case, neither the views of experts nor regulators should 
carry the day (NZ Business Roundtable, 2000, p. 10). 
 
From an ‘anti-interventionist’ perspective, the Business Roundtable acknowledged the 
challenges of ‘robust’ costing in the regulatory environment. 
 
In a report to the Government, the MED conceded the need for judgment in 
exercising TSLRIC, but played this down, commenting that: 
In assessing efficient costs the regulator usually: 
 
• Values the network at the cost of the technology that would need to be 
deployed today to efficiently provide the required level of service 
 
• Includes a reasonable (risk-adjusted) rate of return on the value of the 
equity held in the network (as determined by the value of the network and 
an appropriate level of debt financing) 
 
• Includes a contribution to the common costs (e.g. management overhead) 
of operating the wider telecommunications network (MED, 2001, p. 27). 
 
This underplays the extent of judgment required in TSLRIC (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 
143), but constitutes an attempt to deflect Vodafone and the Business Roundtable’s 
criticism. In DT terms, this is the logic of difference.125 As Chapter five explains, this is 
                                                 
125
 See Chapter five for more details.  
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a discursive strategy to incorporate oppositional signifiers into a nodal point (robust) in 
order to expand the order and dispel the opposition. Vodafone and the Business 
Roundtable attempted to disrupt the ‘TSLRIC as a robust’ signifier by criticising its 
degree of judgment and discretion. However, in acknowledging but downplaying this, 
the Government effectively silenced the critique, and indeed incorporated the criticism 
within the signifier of TSLRIC as ‘robust’. Equally, the Government “dissolved the 
argument”, and incorporated these disarticulated elements into the expanding signifier 
of TSLRIC by representing TSLRIC as a robust methodology (Hansard, November 27, 
2001; Howarth et al, 2000, p. 11), thereby representing the exercise of judgment in 
TSLRIC as robust. The range of signifiers associated with TSLRIC expanded further 
with the association of TSLRIC with ‘transparent’. 
 
 
Many interested parties criticised the ‘light-handed’ regulatory regime for its 
lack of transparency, criticising Telecom’s ownership of the network, the associated 
perverse incentives, and the influence of the KSO in distorting interconnection prices: 
a)  Web InterNet, eVentures and Arthur Andersen criticised the manner of 
Telecom’s privatisation in 1989, particularly the inclusion of the PSTN in 
the sale. In particular, they pointed to the natural monopoly advantage of 
Telecom holding the network, and Telecom’s perverse incentives of 
maintaining the network, while having to enter commercial negotiations 
with competitors over access to ‘its’ network. Consequently, the 
interconnection process (in terms of information asymmetry and distorted 
prices) was not transparent. 
 
b) IHUG and CLEAR were both concerned with the distortion of negotiated 
interconnection prices and delays over interconnection agreements. IHUG 
noted that the Government’s insistence on adding the KSO to Telecom’s 
Constitution was a divisive factor in relation to negotiating access pricing, 
as Telecom sought to ‘recoup’ a contribution for the cost of satisfying the 
KSO. CLEAR pointed to the protracted negotiations over an 
interconnection agreement with Telecom in relation to the 1990 Ministry 
of Justice contract for telecommunications services and the subsequent 
Telecom v Clear litigation.  
 
CLAIM 3: TSLRIC AS TRANSPARENT 
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Consequently, interested parties argued for ‘transparent’ regulation. However, in 
invoking the imagery of ‘transparency’ and ‘TSLRIC as transparent’, interested parties 
condensed a complex range of significations into the signifier ‘transparency’.126 
a) Telecom argued that a regulated interconnection process is transparent, as 
it is more open and subject to scrutiny than the light-handed regime, 
commenting that: 
 
that the processes by which interconnection prices are negotiated [must be] 
fair and equitable and the methodology by which interconnection prices are 
set [must be] transparent and open to scrutiny.  
… 
Interconnection is perhaps the most significant area of interest within the 
current telecommunications regulatory regime in New Zealand. In Telecom 
New Zealand’s view, interconnection is clearly the key issue to get right. To 
this end, an efficient and transparent process for interconnection between 
networks, and with individual network providers, is vital (Telecom, 2000, p. 
26). 
 
Thus, for Telecom, the prescription of applicable pricing rules for 
interconnection agreements and a dispute resolution process meant the 
proposed regulation is transparent. It is difficult to fully appreciate the 
motivation behind this submission from Telecom. Given that most 
criticism from interested parties was levelled against Telecom, this was a 
subtle but clever submission, in that it constitutes an attempt to shift blame 
for the lack of transparency from itself to the system. In Chapter two, 
Gilbertson argued that Telecom’s directors had a fiduciary duty to profit 
maximise and ‘take advantage’ of the regulatory environment (2001, p. 3). 
In this ‘transparent’ challenge, Telecom argued that it is the Government’s 
responsibility to provide an appropriate regulatory environment. 
 
b) For IHUG, the prescription of TSLRIC pricing increases transparency, as 
there is less scope for regulatory gaming and anti-developmental abuse by 
Telecom (IHUG, 2000, p. 8).127 
 
c) TelstraSaturn, Vodafone, and CLEAR implicated the signifier 
‘transparency’ in that it reflects objectivity and truth, arguing that the 
problem with the previous regulatory environment was that the process 
distorted the ability for interconnection to reflect ‘true, objective’ costs 
(TelstraSaturn, 2000, p. 10; Vodafone, 2000, p. 46; CLEAR, 2000, p. 7). 
Given the challenges for CLEAR, Vodafone, and TelstraSaturn in 
achieving interconnection agreements with Telecom during the 1990s, this 
criticism is both a critique of Telecom and ‘light-handed’ regulation. In 
particular, Telecom allegedly used the ‘light-handed’ system’s 
requirement for entrants to negotiate with Telecom to its advantage, as 
there was no prescribed interconnection method and limited legal support. 
                                                 
126
 As explained in Chapter five, condensation is ‘fusing’ together of different elements to temporarily 
halt the development of competing significations. Thus, the particular content of submissions by 
Telecom, IHUG, Vodafone, Clear, TelstraSaturn, and Web InterNet are all fused and condensed into 
the ‘transparent’ signifier. 
 
127
 See the IHUG discussion in the “TSLRIC as Robust” above. 
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This recognises the dual issues of Telecom’s ability to distort 
interconnection prices and the system that ‘encouraged’ such distortion. 
 
d) Web InterNet conflated transparency with accountability with respect to 
the unequal bargaining positions. They claimed that the open, prescribed 
process provided greater accountability, arguing that with respect to 
interconnection, “[a]s a monopoly, Telecom have an obligation to be 
accountable for their actions” (Web InterNet, 2000, p. 2) Again, this is a 
criticism from a developing industry entrant against Telecom, for its 
pseudo-regulatory role (MIT, 2000d, p. 25). 
 
 
In DT terms, the ability for different signifieds to be attached to ‘transparency’ 
is the “logic of equivalence”, “by creating equivalential identities” (Howarth et al, 
2000, p. 11). In Chapter five, hegemonic success is the ability to attach an increasing 
number of signifieds to empty the signifier of particular content. Therefore, in 
extending ‘transparency’ to refer to regulatory processes, costing methodologies, and 
regulatory intervention, ‘transparency’ is increasingly emptied of particular content. 
Consequently, the openness of transparency as a concept conceals the considerable 
confusion and contestation within the signifier. First, Telecom, CLEAR, TelstraSaturn, 
and Vodafone identified with transparency reflecting a regulatory process, while IHUG 
and Web InterNet suggested that TSLRIC-based interconnection removed Telecom’s 
ability to distort the industry. Thus, the singular signifier ‘transparency’ conflates 
TSLRIC as a costing methodology with TSLRIC as a regulatory process (a dispute 
resolution process for interconnection access), and TSLRIC as a regulatory intervention 
(to correct information asymmetry). Consequently, the rhetorical use of ‘transparency’ 
incorporated each party’s argument. However, submitters criticised each of these 
claims. TelstraSaturn, e.g., was adamant that TSLRIC was not a transparent costing 
methodology. As Black suggests, TelstraSaturn argued that increased communication 
between industry players and the regulator increased the scope for regulatory games 
playing (2002b). TelstraSaturn was: 
… concerned with the requirement that carriers are responsible for carrying out 
TSLRIC modelling of their own … allowing carriers to choose their expert 
consultants also creates additional risks of regulatory gaming and the 
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determination process becoming a lawyers’ and consultants’ picnic (TelstraSaturn, 
2001, p. 18).  
 
Perhaps this reflects Telstra’s ability to play regulatory games in Australia within a 
TSLRIC framework (Lloyd, 2003, pp. 5-6). The National Party (the main 
Parliamentary opposition) criticised the ‘transparency’ of TSLRIC: Warren Kyd, MP, 
claimed that TSLRIC would lead to greater regulatory games playing: 
We do not think this legislation will reduce the cost of calls at all. We think they 
will be very costly. Instead of reducing costs, the incumbents will game with each 
other to do a deal with the regulator, instead of reducing costs (Hansard, December 
18, 2001). 
 
National wanted to score political points by unsettling the ‘much-heralded’ re-
regulation and did not support the Government’s proposed reforms. Similarly, the 
Business Roundtable was heavily critical of claims that TSRLIC would solve 
interconnection problems by providing a ‘transparent’ regulatory process:  
The Draft Report proposes to replace an imperfect system of price discovery 
subject to market disciplines by a system in which a regulatory bureaucrat will 
have wide discretion to set prices according to bureaucratic objectives, perhaps 
using bill and keep, benchmarking largely unverifiable assertions about TSLRIC 
along the way (NZ Business Roundtable, 2000, p. 4). 
 
From an anti-regulatory stance, the Business Roundtable submitted that TSLRIC 
merely shifts the difficulty with the market-regulation system to another imperfect 
system based on judgment and discretion. Thus, in summary, TSLRIC was constructed 
and contested as signifying a transparent costing methodology, a transparent regulatory 
approach, and a transparent regulatory intervention.  
 
Many parties noted that in prescribing TSLRIC, the Government failed to 
prescribe an approach to TSLRIC modelling. Regulatory and economic theory suggests 
that prescribing methodology does not necessarily result in transparent interconnection 
pricing, because although they accept TSLRIC is the best approach, there is almost no 
agreement about how to measure it (Benitz et al, 2002, p. 23). Further, the costing 
information required to generate TSLRIC models is not transparent, given the argument 
developed in Chapter three that cost is a contestable ‘fact’, as certain ‘costs’ are 
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excluded or costs are conditionally true as there are ‘different costs for different 
purposes’. Despite the Government’s claim that TSLRIC provided a ‘robust, 
transparent’ methodology, international experience indicates little consensus on how 
‘cost’ should be calculated under such a model. There are at least three accepted 
approaches to TSLRIC modelling: 1) a ‘top-down approach’ based on full cost 
modelling using the operator’s actual costs; 2) a ‘bottom-up’ model-based approach, 
where operator’s costs are inputted into the model; and 3) a ‘read across’ approach, 
which is a benchmarking approach, based on international comparisons. Telecom, 
CLEAR, and TelstraSaturn submitted a preferred approach to modelling TSLRIC:  
a) Telecom expressed a preference for a ‘read across, benchmarking’ 
approach. In Telecom’s opinion, the high costs and assumption-specificity 
of top-down and bottom-up approaches to modelling TSLRIC are 
unnecessary and inappropriate (Telecom, 2001, p. 17). For Telecom, the 
‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches would require Telecom to provide 
most of the regulatory information. In implementation, Telecom never 
supported a ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ modelling approach. There are 
potentially three reasons: a) Telecom may have been concerned about cost 
of compliance issues, as they would have to collect and present most 
costing information; b) Telecom did not want industry players or the 
Telecommunications Commission to interrogate its costing information, as 
it then becomes contestable; or c) Telecom wanted to maintain its 
information asymmetry position.128  
 
b) CLEAR preferred a top-down, full cost TSLRIC modelling exercise, 
based on adjustments to the operator’s accounts, as it is the interests of all 
industry players to get cost-plus prices as accurate as possible (CLEAR, 
2001, p. 37). CLEAR was interested in basing prices on ‘actual’ cost 
information. They maintained their support for TSLRIC through the 
implementation phase. 
 
c)  TelstraSaturn noted the difficulties and costs associated with top down 
methodologies and submitted that a pragmatic “read across” or “bottom-
up” approach would be most suitable. It argued for interconnect charges 
within a range based, at the bottom end, on the incremental cost of 
providing service and at the top end, on the standalone cost of providing 
the service (TelstraSaturn, 2001, p. 9). TelstraSaturn drew upon Telstra’s 
Australian experience of a top-down TSLRIC approach in this submission 
that, as Chapter two discussed, led to accusations of accounting and 
managerial cross-subsidies against Telstra.  
                                                 
128
 See the discussion in Part II of this chapter concerning the articulation of a TSLRIC model.  
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Arthur Andersen noted that the international consensus was “it is only possible to arrive 
at sufficiently efficient interconnect prices by implementing a costly top-down 
approach, probably supplemented by both model-based methodologies and 
international benchmarking” (2000, p. 29).  
 
However, when instituting the TA, the Government did not provide any detail 
on modelling TSLRIC despite these submissions. Thus, the TA instituted TSLRIC as a 
label without specifying the approach for implementing it. The Government maintained 
that TSLRIC provided a robust, transparent methodology (Hansard, November 27, 
2001) largely due to its control of the public discourse: in particular, the Government 
did not publicly acknowledge the process of ‘creating’ a TSLRIC model or judgments 
in determining the appropriate TSLRIC modelling methodology. The MIT Final Report 
reinforces the confusion, by commenting that in relation to TSLRIC pricing: 
… should a determination on price be required, the determination process is not a 
‘one-way bet’ for access seekers, but rather an objective, open and transparent 
process based on elaborated specific pricing principles (MIT, 2000d, p. 53). 
 
As identified above, the process is unlikely to be transparent due to the need for costing 
information, and ‘naming’ TSLRIC does not constitute an elaborate pricing 
methodology. Consequently, the Government could use this confusion to claim that 
TSLRIC was ‘transparent’ without providing any positive definition of ‘transparency’. 
In short, a transparent regulatory process was better than the opaque ‘light-handed’ 
regulatory system and consequently the Government conflated various interested 
parties into the ‘transparency’ signifier. 
 
 Thus, each rhetorical claim about TSLRIC played an important role in 
developing broad-based support for TSLRIC. Within each rhetorical claim, there are 
various contested and disputed interpretations and meanings, but each interested party 
is invited to interpret TSLRIC as ‘best practice’, ‘robust’ and ‘transparent’. In the 
analysis though, it is evident that the most important rhetorical claim for the 
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Government is that TSLRIC is not the “Baumol-Willig” pricing rule. This is an 
important strategy, as it demonstrates a distinct shift from ‘light-handed’ regulation. It 
constructed the “Baumol-Willig” pricing rule as a metaphor for all that was wrong with 
the ‘light-handed’ framework, as well as constructing a metaphor that TSLRIC is not 
the “Baumol-Willig” pricing rule, and consequently, the past regulatory failures would 
not be repeated.  
 
 
The Labour Government was motivated to score political points against the 
previous National Party Government, as they had not intervened in telecommunications. 
Government rhetoric claimed they were solving previous unresolved problems and they 
were implementing landmark regulation. In particular, the Government noted that the 
Telecom v Clear litigation and the Baumol-Willig pricing rule allowed recoupment of 
monopoly rents. This was a clever metaphor for it rhetorically constructs the National 
Party and those not supporting the regulatory change as favouring monopoly abuse. For 
interested parties including CLEAR, Arthur Andersen, Don Wallace and Associates, 
and eVentures the Telecom v Clear litigation and the “Baumol-Willig” rule were core 
dislocatory moments (Arthur Andersen, 2000, p. 15; Don Wallace and Associates, 
2001, p. 7; and eVentures, 2000, p. 1).129 In particular, the MIT and MED pointed to the 
anti-development and stagnating effects of the decision, while much of the Commerce 
select committee and the Government’s rhetoric and regulation focussed on ensuring 
that Telecom v Clear and the “Baumol-Willig” rule could never happen again. Finally, 
CLEAR noted the stifling effect of the decision on the industry. CLEAR commented:  
[the Baumol-Willig rule] is increasingly regarded as an aberration arising from 
New Zealand’s unique approach to deregulation. 
                                                 
129
 The Privy Council decision constitutes a dislocatory moment, as it demonstrated the limits of the light-
handed regulatory system. It was disruptive, as it came to represent the failure of the light-handed 
regime, and is seen as the genesis of the shift to the TA and the need for an interconnection pricing 
access regime.  
CLAIM 4: TSLRIC AS NOT THE “BAUMOL-WILLIG” PRICING RULE 
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… 
The [Efficient Components Pricing Rule] has been considered, criticised and 
rejected by regulatory authorities, experts and industry in virtually every country 
which has, or is moving towards, a competitive telecommunications environment, 
including the rules’ founders. Regulators in Australia, the US, the UK, Hong Kong 
and Canada have all rejected the Baumol-Willig rule (CLEAR, 2000, p. 189). 
 
Given CLEAR’s interconnection battle with Telecom through the 1990s, it is 
unsurprising that it is highly critical of the “Baumol-Willig” rule. However, although 
Telecom won the right to use the “Baumol-Willig” rule, no interconnection agreement 
actually used it. However, the MIT noted the ‘cooling effect’ of the ‘omni-present’ 
rule. Equally, the “Baumol-Willig” rule was rhetorically presented as the problem with 
‘light-handed’ regulation: the Telecom v Clear case, as a dislocation, demonstrated 
Telecom’s ability to frustrate the regulatory framework, as explained in Chapter two. 
However, in rhetorically constructing “Baumol-Willig” as the failure of light-handed 
regulation the Government did not blame Telecom, the limited CC resources, the 
weakness of the general competition law framework, or the dubious ‘threat’ of further 
Government regulation.130 Instead, the judicial process, particularly the Privy Council, 
and the Telecom v Clear decision, which instituted “Baumol-Willig”, are constructed as 
representing what was wrong with “light-handed” regulation. In legislating for 
TSLRIC, the Government was trying to deliver a decisive anti-“Baumol-Willig” 
message.  
 
Consequently, “Baumol-Willig” developed into a touchstone political issue, and 
was ‘condensed’ at the Parliamentary level as ‘the’ key political object during the select 
committee process and readings of the Telecommunications Bill before Parliament. 
MED comments: 
[The TSLRIC] principle makes it absolutely clear that the BW [“Baumol-Willig”] 
rule cannot be used for interconnection pricing (and means it is unnecessary to 
exclude specifically BW pricing). 
… 
                                                 
 
130
 Chapter two presented these factors as the failure of the ‘light-handed regulatory regime’, according to 
regulatory commentators.  
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Officials do not consider that it is necessary or desirable to ban BW … (MED, 
2001, p. 23). 
 
However, although the MED claimed that it was evident that “Baumol-Willig” could 
not be used in NZ, this was not sufficient for the Commerce select committee. In 
ignoring the MED advice, they specifically named the “Baumol-Willig” rule and 
clarified that it does not apply in NZ (contrary to MIT and MED advice) by inserting 
clause 2 into schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Bill: 
2  Application of Baumol-Willig rule 
 
(1) To avoid doubt, the Baumol-Willig rule does not apply in respect of any 
applicable initial pricing rule or any applicable final pricing principle that 
provides for a forward-looking cost-based pricing method as a possible 
pricing principle such as interconnection where TSLRIC is applied. 
(2) For the purposes subclause (1), the Baumol-Willig rule means the pricing rule 
known as the Baumol-Willig rule as referred to in Telecom Corporation of 
New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd (1994) 6 TCLR 138, PC. 
 
Equally, the select committee inserted clause 60, which abolished appeals to the Privy 
Council pursuant to the Telecommunications Bill. Thus, the issue of Baumol-Willig 
shaped Parliamentary debate, shifting the focus to the failure of political parties, 
particularly the National-led Government of the 1990s, to take the initiative in the 
telecommunications industry. In the third reading of the Bill, David Cunliffe, MP, 
chairperson of the Commerce select committee commented: “… the use of the 
controversial Baumol-Willig rule that had plagued the litigation in this industry for most 
of the last decade, since the Telecom-Clear decision, has once and for all been laid to 
rest as a rule for interconnection pricing”. The Minister for Communications, Paul 
Swain, reinforced this:  
[The Industry] is bolstered by stricter interconnection rules, including the Total 
Service Long-run Incremental Cost pricing rule (TSLRIC), and the outlawing of 
Baumol-Willig pricing---not before time 
… 
For nine years the previous Government sat on its hands and did absolutely 
nothing. It watched as people tried to get access to telecommunications services, 
and it watched them go off to the Privy Council, where a bunch of old lords in 
London decided what we should be doing in our telecommunications industry in 
New Zealand. That Government did not have the fortitude to deal with the 
problem, and watched and fiddled while Rome burned. Once again, the Labour-
Alliance Government has come into this Parliament, after having done the work in 
Opposition, and has introduced a regime that the vast majority of the industry is 
now saying it wants (Hansard, December 18, 2001). 
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Rhetorically, Labour was in a difficult position, but it largely could control the public 
debate as the newly elected Government with popular support. Labour wanted to blame 
the previous National Government for not changing the regulatory regime, and 
acquiescing to Telecom’s dominance and the “Baumol-Willig” rule. But, the new 
Government had to be careful as the Fourth Labour Government had deregulated and 
privatised telecommunications and established the light-handed regulatory regime that 
arguably resulted in the “Baumol-Willig” decision. Hence, the Government sought to 
focus the debate on the failure of the previous National Government to act decisively 
when the real problem occurred (namely, the Telecom v Clear decision), as opposed to 
institutional, regulatory failure.   
 
In summary, there was marked disagreement about the institution of TSLRIC, 
but the Government tried to accommodate and dissolve aspects of counter-hegemonic 
interventions. Thus, the Government and its agents applied the ‘logics of difference’ to 
integrate significant challenges into the ‘signifier’: e.g. the challenges to transparency 
and robust, were closed down by the Government ‘accommodating’ these claims into 
the broad hegemony surrounding TSLRIC – by acknowledging but downplaying the 
scope of judgment in TSLRIC the criticism was diffused. Consequently, Government 
rhetoric claimed broad-based support for TSLRIC, enacting it as the legislative 
methodology for interconnection access. The next section considers how and why the 
Government rhetorically claimed that net costing for the TSO was the appropriate 
regulatory framework, particularly since the MIT and interested parties argued against a 
regulatory cost recoupment mechanism.  
2 Articulating the Social Logic of Net Costing of the TSO 
 
The Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regulations 1999 required Telecom to 
present an annual net costing of the KSO, characterising the social landscape as a 
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sedimented practice for Telecom.131 However, there was little political capital in the 
administrative disclosure requirement, and indeed, little media attention to net costing. 
Following the MIT’s final report, it appeared the net costing process would remain a 
regulatory disclosure requirement. However, the Government’s response to the MIT 
signalled a significant change in regulatory direction regarding the TSO because the net 
costing process became a contested process as Telecom’s competitors would be 
required as ‘liable persons’ to pay a proportional amount in compensation to Telecom 
for satisfying the TSO requirements. Then, net costing of the TSO really mattered. 
However, this approach took many interested parties by surprise. 
 
The KSO is effectively a social welfare instrument (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 
63).132 There are three levels to the social welfare effects of the TSO: 
1) provision of telecommunications services for the blind, deaf, and other 
disabled persons; 
 
2) no discrimination in price or service provision between urban (cheaper) 
and rural communities (expensive); and  
 
3) a general social consensus that communications technology is a form of 
public good (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, pp. 64-65). 
 
However, the KSO proved a difficult instrument to regulate due to a combination of 
factors. First, the KSO guaranteed basic social welfare through a doctrine incorporated 
into the Constitution of a private company (MIT, 2000d, p. 38). Social welfare tends to 
be a function of Governmental agencies not private entities like Telecom. Second, many 
interested parties, including IHUG, Web InterNet, eVentures, Federated Farmers, 
TUANZ, and the Te Horo Telecom Users’ Group argued that the KSO enabled Telecom 
                                                 
131
 Social logics involve a contextualised reading of the rules, practices, concepts, categories, and 
sedimented social practices that structure the social landscape. Thus, in understanding the social 
landscape of regulation with respect to the KSO, the Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regulations 
1999 constitute an important component of the social landscape, as they provide the rules for the 
presentation of the annual net cost of the KSO. 
  
132
 Note that the KSO is a form of universal service obligation. In telecommunications, a universal service 
obligation (USO) is an obligation placed on service providers to ensure that a minimum level of 
standard telephone services, payphones and prescribed services are reasonably accessible to all 
people (Grossman & Cole, 2003, p. 150). 
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to distort interconnection prices (as Telecom recouped KSO costs from its competitors), 
and reduce network investment (as the KSO constituted both a price ceiling and price 
floor) (Economides, 1998, p. 45).133 Business NZ and Federated Farmers argued that the 
failure of light-handed regulation to provide a dedicated access regime encouraged 
Telecom to charge a mark-up to cover KSO provision costs in its interconnection 
agreements (2000, p. 4; 2000, p. 9). Thus, the existing KSO was variously regarded as 
complex, unfair, inappropriate, and a mess (Newberry, 2006, p. 4).  
 
Consequently, while interconnection was arguably the more politically visible 
re-regulation issue, for certain societal groups including rural communities and 
disability communities, the KSO was most important. In their analysis of the KSO, the 
MIT argued that the status quo should be maintained. In part, they did not accept the 
‘distortion of interconnection price’ argument. Further, the MIT held that in the 
commercial sale of Telecom, Telecom’s shareholders had agreed to the burden of the 
KSO at privatisation. Thus, the MIT recommended the maintenance of KSO 
information disclosure (including cost) pursuant to the Telecommunications 
(Disclosure) Regulations 1999,134 unless Telecom could prove that the KSO 
‘unreasonably impair[ed]” its bottom line (in this event the Government could re-
regulate the KSO) (MIT, 2000d, p. 5). However, the Government ignored the MIT 
recommendation. Government rhetoric suggests that it was convinced that the KSO 
clouded interconnection agreements and pricing (despite the MIT suggesting that there 
was no distortion or that the TSLRIC method would remove scope for this). 
Consequently, the Government instituted a regulatory mechanism to separately account 
                                                 
133
 Also, there was concern that urban customers subsidised rural customers, as urban customers paid 
comparatively more than rural customers in relation to the cost of providing urban 
telecommunications services (Hausman & Sidak, 2007, p. 65). 
 
134
 See Appendix 1. 
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for the net cost of the TSO, with the right for Telecom to independently recoup a 
proportion of its cost from liable industry parties.  
 
The annual net costing of the TSO existed prior to the Government instituting it 
and politicising it (cost recoupment) as a core regulatory mechanism. As Appendix 1 
illustrates, Telecom and the Government are familiar with an annual TSO net costing 
exercise (this characterises the rules and practices within their shared social space).  
However, the net costing process was a closed disclosure between Telecom and the 
Government effectively empty of particular content for most industry and interested 
parties. Other industry players had no involvement in the annual net costing exercise, as 
it was a regulatory compliance issue between Telecom and the Government as part of 
Telecom’s privatisation in 1990. However, this exercise ‘suddenly’ emerged as a key 
regulatory issue due to the Government legislating for its cost-recoupment.135 The 
empirical analysis of the cost discourse is more complex than TSLRIC, as there are 
three parties: 
i) MIT: The Government insisted on a comprehensive telecommunications 
inquiry, including a consideration of the KSO. After a full investigation, 
the MIT recommended the maintenance of the status quo, which included 
Telecom providing an annual net costing of the cost of providing the 
KSO. Equally, the MIT concluded that a cost-recoupment process was 
unnecessary as Telecom accepted the burden of the KSO at privatisation, 
and there was an ‘exit clause’ if the KSO became unduly burdensome.  
 
ii) Government: Without warning, the Government rejected the MIT’s 
proposal with respect to the KSO regime, and proposes a cost-recoupment 
framework based upon an annual net costing of the TSO. The Government 
argued that the KSO unduly distorted interconnection pricing, and 
separately accounting for the KSO provision brings more unfettered 
interconnection prices and a more transparent KSO regime. They also 
served to construct the KSO issue as a failure by invoking the image that 
the it distorted interconnection pricing thereby illustrating: a) the limits of 
the light-handed regime by not preventing this distortion; b) the problem 
of Telecom using their market position as network provider and KSO 
provider to recoup KSO costs by increasing interconnection prices; and c) 
                                                 
135
 ‘Suddenly’ refers to the level of surprise, as the MIT had explicitly rejected the need for cost 
recoupment, holding that Telecom had accepted the risks of the KSO at privatisation (see Chapter 
three for more detail). 
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how the “Baumol-Willig” rule, particularly its monopoly profit 
component,136 stunted competition in telecommunications.   
 
iii) Interested Parties: These ‘scrambled’ to articulate a discourse around the 
concept of ‘net costing’. This was restricted to submissions to the 
Commerce select committee. Consequently, comparatively more of the 
focus of select committee submissions was on net costing and cost 
recoupment regimes than TSLRIC interconnection pricing.  
 
Hence, the empirical analysis identified technical, methodological, and political 
arguments in relation to net costing of the TSO, which focused on two complex nodal 
points that thematise the social logics, including that net costing of the TSO is robust 
and transparent; and objective and independent. Figure 7.4 depicts the contestation and 
condensation surrounding net costing of the TSO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.4: Competing articulations of net costing of the TSO  
Consequently, the ensuing analysis examines the politics of the consultation process, 
whereby interested parties formulated the discourse around these competing 
representations of the social landscape of net costing of the TSO, as well as analysing 
the contextualised and conflictual nature of this thematic presentation. 
                                                 
136
 See Chapter two for the definition and effect of the “Baumol-Willig Rule”. 
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Interested parties argued that Telecom used the KSO to distort interconnection 
prices when charging a mark-up to represent the KSO provision cost (see IHUG, Web 
InterNet, eVentures, Federated Farmers, TUANZ, and the Te Horo Telecom Users’ 
Group). Consequently, interested parties and the Government argued that the net 
costing, cost recoupment process was ‘robust’ and ‘transparent’. However, like the 
TSLRIC discussion, both robust and transparent are floating signifiers, capable of 
representing a complex condensation of meanings. In invoking the signifier ‘robust’ and 
‘transparent’, interested parties attached various concepts to ‘robust’ and ‘transparent’ 
including openness and subject to scrutiny. Thus, interested parties, regulators, and the 
Government read in various ‘definitional’ signifieds, condensed into the dual signifiers 
‘robust’ and ‘transparent’:  
a) TelstraSaturn argued that the net costing model improved transparency, as 
the regulated net costing model is subject to scrutiny:  
 
Given that the net cost calculation is prepared by the TSP itself (Telecom, in 
the case of the Kiwi Share), a mechanism to ensure transparency and 
accountability should be found (TelstraSaturn, 2001, p. 53).  
 
In this argument, TelstraSaturn appreciated a contestable regulatory 
mechanism, as opposed to relying solely on Telecom’s calculations of the 
net cost of the TSO, as that calculation was not transparent. 
 
b) Business NZ, CLEAR, and TUANZ claimed that the net costing process 
was transparent as it was open (CLEAR, 2001, p. 8; TUANZ, 2001, p. 7). 
Business NZ commented: 
 
Business New Zealand supports the provisions for independent costing of 
Telecommunications Service Obligations (TSOs), such as Kiwi Share. We 
also agree with a process being put in place where telecommunications 
industry players can contribute to TSO net costs in a more transparent and 
neutral way (Business NZ, 2001, p. 5). 
 
Again, Telecom’s competitors and other industry advocates appreciated 
the removal of the net costing from Telecom, which could abuse the 
process.   
 
However, although CLEAR and TelstraSaturn appreciated the open nature of the TSO 
calculation, they were cautious about the net costing procedure and were concerned 
CLAIM 1: NET COSTING AS ROBUST AND TRANSPARENT 
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with the lack of specificity of the net costing methodology or model. CLEAR argued 
that it “does not consider that the [Telecommunications] Bill provides a framework for 
‘a robust and transparent costing methodology’” (CLEAR, 2001, p. 8). Equally, 
TelstraSaturn cautioned that “[n]o industry funding model for calculating and allocating 
the cost of the Kiwi Share, or any other TSO, will be perfect”, but the “Bill does not 
address the calculation of the cost”. TelstraSaturn noted the difficulty of the calculation 
process, acknowledging that “… in its application and practice [the net costing] will 
likely be fraught by different views on the cost of the Kiwi Share” (TelstraSaturn, 2001, 
p. 53). 
 
Irrespective of these criticisms, the Government claimed that the net costing 
process was transparent by removing Telecom’s ability to charge an unregulated mark-
up on interconnection prices. In the third reading, Paul Swain, Minister for 
Communications, commented that: 
This part of the bill implements a more robust methodology for establishing 
the cost of telecommunications service obligations, such as the Kiwi share, 
including independent assessment by the commissioner. It also provides a 
transparent and competitively neutral mechanism by which other 
telecommunications firms will be required to contribute to Kiwi share 
obligation costs (Swain, 2001c).  
 
The Government sought to remove the TSO influence on interconnection pricing, by 
arguing that Telecom was pricing it with a margin for the KSO, arguing that, 
“[i]ndustry currently contribute to the costs through a premium on interconnection” 
(Swain, 2001b). Thus, the Government, in implicating the rhetoric of the “Baumol-
Willig” rule, removed the ability of Telecom to distort interconnection prices, 
establishing a rhetorical link between the regulatory interventions of TSLRIC 
interconnection pricing and net costing of the TSO.  
 
 - 264 - 
 Consequently, the next section of analysis examines the politics of the 
consultation process, especially Government rhetoric creating “equivalence” through 
signifiers of objectivity and independence.  
 
 
 
Interested parties argued for an ‘objective’ and ‘independent’ net costing 
process. In particular, Federated Farmers and IHUG were concerned about the lack of 
independence in Telecom’s annual net costing of the KSO pursuant to the 
Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regulations 1999. Interested parties argued that 
removing the net costing calculation from Telecom was positive, and would result in 
more accurate, objective costing: e.g. Federated Farmers favoured an objective costing 
process given divergent industry views on the net cost: 
The Federation strongly supports the principle that any net losses to TSPs in 
performing TSOs will be independently costed … while the Federation is aware of 
the arguments in respect to the costs associated with the KSO with wildly differing 
views between Telecom and other industry participants as to the true costs of 
supply, it is important that any obligations on TSPs for the performance of TSOs 
are accurately costed. Currently, there is simply conjecture as to the costs involved 
(Federated Farmers, 2001, p. 16). 
 
Federated Farmers argued that the primary purposes of the TSO were fairness, equity, 
and social welfare, and thus they urged the Government to explicitly tie net costing of 
the TSO to “government social policy objectives”, so the Commissioner would not be 
confused about the costing process’s function. In particular, Federated Farmers and 
Rural Women NZ who represented rural communities advocated strongly for objective 
costing, in the belief that Telecom distorted the cost disparity between providing 
telecommunication services to urban and rural customers.  
 
Most industry players accepted that an ‘independent’, objective calculation 
would be better than the perceived subjective, captured calculation delivered by 
Telecom pursuant to the disclosure Regulations. However, this ignored that Telecom 
would provide almost all the costing information to the Telecommunications 
CLAIM 2: NET COSTING AS OBJECTIVE AND INDEPENDENT 
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Commissioner’s calculation of the annual net cost of TSO provision. TUANZ, though, 
submitted that “[o]ur support assumes that independent evidence will prove 
conclusively that there is indeed a net cost!” (2001, p. 7). TelstraSaturn, TUANZ, 
CLEAR, and Charles River Associates [CRA] were concerned about the regulator’s 
ability to provide objective and independent costs. CRA invoked the imagery of 
‘neutrality’ to reinforce the objective element, arguing that a neutral ‘cost calculation’ 
of the TSO would ideally be competitively neutral, thereby fostering optimal investment 
by Telecom and new entrants. Neutrality and objectivity are synonyms. CLEAR argued 
that overstating network risk would ‘upset’ the neutrality of the calculation (CLEAR, 
2001, p. 8), while CRA claimed competitive neutrality would be difficult, and would 
lead to competitive asymmetry with “perverse and regressive incentives” for both 
Telecom and new entrants. CRA stated that:   
The [net costing approach] was developed in the early 1990s when competition 
was in its infancy. It was designed for a time when the telecommunications 
industry in each country was dominated by a single incumbent. It provides 
preferential treatment for entrants while placing a heavier burden on the incumbent 
to fund service obligations (CRA, 2001, p. 8). 
 
CRA argued that the net costing of the TSO was counter-intuitive to the objective of the 
regulation, particularly ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’ (CRA regularly consulted for Telecom).  
 
Thus, there was disagreement about the institution of net costing, particularly 
the competitive effects of the net cost model, and its lack of specificity and 
methodology. However, the Government was motivated to separate the distortion effect 
of the TSO from interconnection prices, which received industry support.   
 
B The Effect of Articulating the Social Logics of TSLRIC and Net Costing 
 
 Rhetorically, the signifiers of TSLRIC pricing and net costing played a 
significant role in constituting the new regulatory regime. The following discussion 
outlines how the articulation of each signifier captured the relevant debate and assumed 
a position as a hegemonic signifier: 
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a) In DT terms, TSLRIC and net cost are catachresical in that they name the 
absent fullness of the existing order. These signifiers are antagonistic to 
the light-handed regulatory system: i.e. the failure of the light-handed 
regime is tied to the failure of an interconnection regime (the lack of a 
TSLRIC interconnection process) and distortion of interconnection prices 
through the KSO (the lack of a separately regulated method to calculate 
the cost of satisfying the KSO). In particular, Government rhetoric used 
the “Baumol-Willig” pricing rule as a signifier to name the failures of the 
light-handed system. This signifier, as an umbrella term, highlighted 
failures of the judicial process, and Telecom’s ability to distort 
interconnection prices through inflating prices and charging a mark-up to 
represent the KSO provision cost. This historicity marked the shift to 
TSLRIC. 
 
b) In combination, TSLRIC and net costing represent the full regulatory 
failure of the light-handed system, representing the logic of equivalence. 
Both TSLRIC (a failure of interconnection) and net costing (a failure of 
the KSO) are metaphors for individual failures, but the combination 
constitutes a metonym for the failure of the light-handed system, itself tied 
to an interconnection regime failure and distorted interconnection prices 
through the KSO; 
 
c) As floating signifiers, TSLRIC and net costing are tendentially empty of 
particular content: i.e. interested parties, regulators, and the Government 
read in various signifieds into the master signifier. Thus, several signifieds 
are condensed into a single signifier. See Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 as 
illustration. 
 
d) TSLRIC and net costing are further emptied of meaning by presentation of 
the method (TSLRIC and net costing) as methodologies. Thus, there is a 
collapse of method to methodology. This is evident when interested 
parties challenged the signifier, claiming that no methodology was 
prescribed. Here the logic of difference was employed to incorporate these 
concerns within the master signifier.  
 
e) The collapse of method and methodology extended the chain of 
equivalence. By not providing detailed prescriptions of the methodology 
to be employed, those that submitted about methodology were seen to be 
supporting the method. Thus, all potential methodological disputes were 
incorporated into the signifier. 
 
f) The Government was motivated by a political agenda to score points 
against the National Party, the previous Government. The Government 
rhetorically claimed that they were solving problems from the previous 
Government, and were implementing landmark regulation. In particular, 
they noted that the Telecom v Clear litigation and the Baumol-Willig 
pricing rule, allowed the price to recoup monopoly rents. This was a 
clever metaphor, for it rhetorically constructs the National Party and those 
that not supporting the regulatory change as favouring monopoly abuse. 
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Thus, at the political logic level, the combination of dislocatory moments, 
rhetorical framing, and hegemonic signification resulted in the institution and 
sedimentation, at the social logic level, of TSLRIC for interconnection pricing and net 
costing for the TSO. However, the signifiers are tendentially empty of meaning, as the 
legislation had little content or detail on enacting both methods. Thus, consideration 
turns to the political agitation over implementing and interpreting the master signifiers. 
 
PART II: INTERPRETING AND IMPLEMENTING THE ACT 
 
Part II concentrates on the TA’s implementation and interpretation following 
enactment. The TA established the office of the Telecommunications Commissioner, 
and appointed Douglas Webb as the first Commissioner. When requested by an industry 
party, the Commissioner must determine the appropriate TSLRIC price for 
interconnection access. Equally, the Commissioner must calculate the annual net cost of 
satisfying the TSO. However, the regulatory story is more complicated as TSLRIC and 
net costing are names of costing methodologies only and the TA provides little 
guidance, leaving much of the detail to the Telecommunications Commissioner. In 
short, the TA requires the Commissioner to ‘fill in the gaps’ in consultation with 
interested industry players and stakeholders in constructing and employing the TSLRIC 
and net costing models. Thus, given that TSLRIC for interconnection and net costing 
for the TSO are enacted, sedimented social institutions, the analysis shifts to how the 
Commissioner implemented and interpreted the regulatory tools, despite industry 
contestation that sought to facilitate, complicate, or frustrate the regulatory process. 
This analysis examines two rhetorical positions: 1) that TSLRIC is transparent; and 2) 
that net costing is robust and transparent. This involves rhetorical analysis, as TSLRIC 
and net costing constitute the social space. However, the latter is not fully articulated, as 
the Government legislated TSLRIC and net costing in name only. Consequently, there 
was room for political contestation over the approach, modelling, meaning, and 
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calculation of these cost concepts. This invokes two levels of rhetorical analysis. First, 
interested parties articulate and agitate specific meanings of TSLRIC and net costing for 
regulation purposes. This invokes a second form of rhetorical analysis, as interested 
parties rhetorically constructed and articulated attributes to both TSLRIC and net 
costing during the institution phase of the regulation. The analysis examines how these 
common condensed signifiers (presented in Part I of the empirical analysis) are 
displaced with a focus on the employment of rhetorical figures in the ‘ontical’ analysis 
of the role of cost.   
 
 
 
Many interested parties agitated for the introduction of ‘transparent’ TSLRIC 
into the TA. Analysis revealed that the range of signifieds read into ‘transparency’ 
included ‘TSLRIC’ introducing a transparent regulatory process, a transparent costing 
methodology, or a transparent regulatory intervention. In particular, the contestation 
focussed on whether TSLRIC provided a transparent costing methodology or a 
transparent regulatory process. The Government did not clarify or correct any of these 
interpretations of transparency. However, soon after the passage of the Act, the 
Telecommunications Commissioner was asked to provide definitive insight into what 
TSLRIC signalled for the TA requires interconnection access seekers to ‘reasonably’ 
negotiate interconnection terms with Telecom; and, “in the event” that terms are not 
agreed the access seeker may apply to the Commissioner to determine the 
interconnection terms. Interconnection with Telecom’s fixed PSTN under the TA 2001 
is a designated access service, and the primary pricing principle is TSLRIC.  
 
Consequently, the Telecommunications Commissioner had to articulate the 
appropriate methodology for calculating TSLRIC, so the articulated model could be 
CLAIM 1: TSLRIC IS TRANSPARENT 
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applied in particular cases. In essence though, there was no starting point, as the TA 
gave the CC considerable flexibility. Part 2 of Schedule 1 of the TA, defines TSLRIC:  
TSLRIC, in relation to a telecommunications service, - 
 
(a)  means the forward-looking costs over the long run of the total quantity of the 
facilities and functions that are directly attributable to, or reasonably 
identifiable as incremental to, the service, taking into account the service 
provider's provision of other telecommunications services; and 
(b) includes a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs. 
 
The definition is broad, and the CC required considerable ‘establishment’ research and 
consultation to construct the TSRLIC model. Figure 7.5 illustrates the initial phase in 
the contestation, content, model, and articulation of TSLRIC: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.5: Articulating the ‘gap’: the CC’s initial learning phase 2001-2003 
 
The CC issued a series of conceptual working papers around TSLRIC, followed 
by workshops, a conference (in June 2003), and submissions by interested parties. This 
negotiation period was interspersed with the publication of a series of papers on the 
access determination process including A Guide to the Role of the Commerce 
Commission in Making Access Determinations Under the Telecommunications Act 2001 
(CC, May 2002), Application of a TSLRIC Pricing Methodology (CC, July 2002), and 
International Benchmarking Study: A Comparative Review of Interconnection Pricing 
(CC, September 2002). The CC required Telecom to develop its own TSLRIC model, as 
allowed pursuant to the TA, and the CC developed its TSLRIC model in conjunction 
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with an overseas consultancy. Following a draft determination and further submissions, 
the Telecommunications Commissioner determined the appropriate TSLRIC pricing 
methodology with a decision presented 20 February 2004. This was an intensive, 
extended period of time. However, the following analysis concentrates on the complex 
period of contestation over competing articulations of the appropriate TSLRIC model 
by the CC and the industry, leading to the final determination in 2004.  
 
In April 2002, Frontier Economics presented the CC with a commissioned report 
entitled Interconnection Pricing Methodology on appropriate pricing models for 
interconnection and various designated access services. This represented the first 
characterisation of appropriate interconnection pricing principles. Frontier Economics 
recommended: 
1)  Pure bill and keep for data calls and either pure bill and keep or hybrid bill 
and keep for local voice calls; 
 
2)  Forward-looking costs (TSLRIC) for toll-bypass and toll-free 
interconnected calls; and  
 
3)  Forward-looking costs (TSLRIC) for mobile-to-fixed calls (Frontier 
Economics, April 2002). 
 
This caused consternation amongst interested industry parties, resulting in industry 
players being heavily involved in submissions and agitation in constructing the TSLRIC 
model. Interestingly, this debate mirrored submissions by Telecom, CLEAR, and 
TelstraSaturn during the select committee phase prior to the passage of the TA 
(Telecom supported a ‘read across’ benchmarking approach, 2001, p. 17; CLEAR 
submitted for a top-down, full cost TSLRIC model, 2001, p. 37; and TelstraSaturn 
suggested that a pragmatic “read across” or “bottom-up” approach would be most 
suitable, 2001, p. 9).137 Consequently, the Frontier Economic report was subject to 
                                                 
137
 A top-down TSLRIC model analyses how incurred cost (based on re-valued management accounting 
and operational information) varies with respect to changes in volume, while a bottom-up constructs 
the cost of equipment required to produce a given level of output (PWC, 2003, p. 21). 
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increasing dispute, first, on whether TSLRIC was the appropriate mechanism, and 
second, what approach should be taken to modelling TSLRIC:  
1)  Telecom was increasingly concerned about the prospects of a bottom-up 
TSLRIC model, particularly the ability of the Commission to require 
Telecom to provide all costing information, while reserving the right to 
manipulate any aspects of the model. Telecom was concerned about the 
lack of ‘transparency’ and it commissioned two consultants to comment 
on TSLRIC modelling. CRA agreed with the Frontier Economics report, 
while PWC argued that the sole use of a ‘bottom-up’ TSLRIC modelling 
approach would inappropriately distort interconnection prices in the NZ 
context.  
 
i) CRA argued that a pure bill and keep system for voice and data calls 
would provide the greatest long-term benefits to end-users, agreeing 
with Frontier Economics that, in respect of TSLRIC: 
 
Although in theory, setting interconnection charges on the basis of 
forward-looking costs [TSLRIC] may be preferable, in practice there may 
be circumstances in which such an approach would not give best effect to 
the Act (CRA, June 2002, p. 6). 
 
For CRA, TSLRIC pricing sends out inaccurate pricing signals to the 
market, estimating TSLRIC is “costly, time-intensive, and contentious 
and that the accuracy of the calculations is always at question”, and 
any TSLRIC charge will not accurately reflect variations in intra-day 
charges (the cost of interconnection varies with the time of 
interconnection) (CRA, June 2002, p. 6). In this submission, CRA 
criticised the alleged ‘transparency’ within TSLRIC. 
 
ii) PWC had three recommendations: 1) bottom-up models should not be 
used in isolation, as they have an inherent tendency to underestimate 
‘real’ world costs; 2) the use of top-down models provides comfort 
that cost estimates are realistic; and 3) international best practice 
points to the development of top-down and bottom-up models together 
with a reconciliation of the two approaches, as used in the UK, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, France, Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark. 
PWC noted that TSLRIC was an economic cost, reliant on accounting 
information. For PWC, TSLRIC is the cost “incurred today of 
replacing existing equipment’s functionality and capacity” (PWC, July 
2003, p. 13). PWC’s main argument was that a bottom-up TSLRIC 
model would artificially distort interconnection pricing. 
 
2)  TelstraClear disputed the Frontier Economics report, and focused on 
demonstrating that TSLRIC was best for pricing interconnection access, 
arguing that TSLRIC should be used for determining interconnection 
prices for all fixed PSTN services. In particular, TelstraClear argued that:  
 
i)  TSLRIC promotes efficient competition, as access seekers face the 
same costs as an efficient access provider. TSLRIC promotes efficient 
facilities-based competition, as access seekers face the ‘correct’ 
incentives to invest in their own infrastructure or use Telecom’s 
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network. TSLRIC pricing maximises allocative efficiency by 
encouraging resources to be allocated to their most highly valued use. 
TSLRIC focuses on achieving ‘best practice’, and thus promotes 
productive efficiency by supporting least cost production 
(TelstraClear, 2002, pp. 2-5).  
 
ii) TSLRIC optimises dynamic efficiency by providing correct incentives 
for “efficient investment in innovative, higher quality, lower cost 
technologies”. Essentially, TelstraClear argued that TSLRIC should 
provide an appropriate interconnection price that is neither “too high 
or too low” (TelstraClear, 2002, p. 7); and  
 
iii) That irrespective of the obvious complexity of TSLRIC calculations, 
“much experience and knowledge associated with the application of 
TSLRIC has been gained” from implementing TSLRIC in many other 
jurisdictions. In that capacity, the “difficulties associated with 
estimating TSLRIC do not appear to be a defensible reason” for 
adopting an alternative pricing methodology for interconnection 
(TelstraClear, 2002, p. 13). 
 
TelstraClear (as a network service provider), and the second largest 
competitor, wanted TSLRIC interconnection pricing, as they sought a cost 
of capital component to be included in the access price. 
 
3)  Dr Tim Kuypers (for Network Economics Consulting Group [NECG]) 
supported a top-down TSLRIC model reconciled with a bottom-up 
approach, as it was considered international best practice. However, based 
on international experience, NECG provided a series of warnings, 
challenging the transparency signifier. The primary concern was that 
though Telecom’s accounting information is of assistance in implementing 
a TSLRIC model, it should not be used if it cannot be validated (NECG, 
2003, p. 3). Consequently, NECG recommended that if Telecom seeks the 
development of a TSLRIC model utilising Telecom’s cost information 
then it must make all relevant information available for industry scrutiny.  
 
All industry consultation culminated in the release of the Telecommunications 
Commissioner’s Final Determination on 20 February 2004 that determined the 
appropriate TSLRIC pricing methodology. The Telecommunications Commissioner 
discussed a broad range of conclusions regarding TSLRIC pricing methodology. 
1) The CC argued that a bottom-up modelling approach was more likely to 
result in more accurate results for calculating TSLRIC than a top-down 
approach, as it is: 
 
a)  consistent with the TA;  
 
b) generally preferred by overseas regulators and there is growing 
overseas experience of using it in bottom-up TSLRIC models; 
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c) more amenable to estimating forward-looking costs; 
 
d) adopted by the CC for net costing of the TSO; and 
 
e) likely to provide greater transparency, minimise control of inputs by 
Telecom, and avoid needs for an accounting separation framework to 
capture costs as in a top-down model (CC, 2004, p. 20). 
 
2) Particular accounting decisions included: 
 
a)  Traffic-sensitive costs should be apportioned to the core network and 
customer-sensitive costs apportioned to the access network. The 
definition of the core network is important to any TSLRIC modelling 
process, as it drives the scope of costs included in the TSLRIC model 
of designated interconnection access services (CC, 2004, pp. 29-32). 
 
b) The CC adopted a “titled annuity approach” combining both a return 
on capital and a return on capital (depreciation), as most appropriate 
for TSLRIC modelling (CC, 2004, p. 36). 
 
c)  The “total service” aspect of TSLRIC should in principle include all 
services that utilise assets used by the interconnection services. For the 
Commission, ‘the total service’ approach would result in an 
appropriate range of services to allocate the assets’ costs. The “long 
run” is the time horizon where all facilities used to provide services 
are variable and are included in the cost calculations: 
 
Long run refers to a period of time in which all resources are variable. 
That is a period of time sufficient for the firm to be able to alter all the 
inputs it uses to provide the service. In this way, long-run costs include 
the costs of all inputs used to provide the service. Importantly, TSLRIC 
includes costs that, once incurred, are sunk. For instance, the costs of 
assets that have no alternative use once deployed (CC, 2004, p. 57). 
 
d) The cost of shared and common network assets should be allocated 
across services that use the assets to ensure that all services receive an 
equitable allocation of the costs and the risk of under or over recovery 
is minimised. Further, common costs will be allocated across services 
according to each service’s network usage (CC, 2004, p. 64). 
 
e) To determine the total cost of providing a service under TSLRIC, it is 
necessary to determine the efficient level of operating costs. Operating 
costs include both directly and indirectly attributable costs. “For 
example, some maintenance costs may be indirectly related to the 
number of interconnection call minutes” (CC, 2004, p. 65). Only 
‘reasonably identifiable’ indirect costs are incremental to the service. 
Further, Telecom’s actual cost data are useful. However, there are 
concerns surrounding confidentiality, transparency, that may require 
adjustment to remove inefficiencies, and the use of actual data 
involves judgment in the treatment of shared and common costs and in 
assessing justifiable costs of the designated service. As a consequence, 
in modelling interconnection services, the Commission determined 
that operational and maintenance costs and indirect costs should be 
calculated using percentage mark-ups applied to the capital asset base. 
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f) Finally, given the TSO regime, there is a risk of double counting costs 
under the TSO and TSLRIC models. The CC agreed to exclude from 
the TSLRIC model those costs recovered through the TSO. This 
involves adjusting or removing network traffic associated with 
network elements determined to be commercially non-viable and for 
which costs are recovered via the TSO (CC, 2004, p. 76). 
 
 
This is a prime example of the articulation of the TSLRIC model. In DT terms, 
there is a double ontic gap that derives from Derrida’s undecidability between the rule 
(at the universal level) and its application in a particular case in relation to TSLRIC and 
net costing. As the TA was silent on technological and methodological detail, to 
implement the TSLRIC interconnection model the Telecommunications Commissioner 
had to undertake two levels of articulation: first, from the concept to a model, and 
second, from the model to each case. The first articulation (identified in the Final 
Determination above) involved taking the floating signifiers of TSLRIC and articulating 
the model to be employed, by detailing the methodological elements for constructing 
the TSLRIC. The second is the process of taking the generally articulated TSLRIC and 
net costing model and applying them to a particular case. Here, there are two rhetorical, 
unavoidable moments through the invocation of metaphor: the first being the 
articulation of the model; the second the result of applying the model in particular cases. 
There is no a priori reasoning to support the contention that the general TSLRIC 
signifier incorporates the articulated TSLRIC and net costing models, or that the 
TSLRIC model incorporates the particular result in its application. This increases the 
scope for political contestation over interpreting and implementing regulation. 
Consequently, the Government did not legislate a specific TSLRIC, but merely the 
signifier. During two years of extensive consultations, those interested in the TSLRIC 
interconnection pricing model made submissions on how TSLRIC should be calculated 
from legal, accounting, economic, and regulatory perspectives. This dispute illustrates 
the regulator’s difficulties in dealing with the complications and complexities of 
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telecommunications regulation. Thus, two years after beginning the consultation, the 
CC determined the shape of the model, including various important accounting 
decisions. The next is the articulation of the model in a particular case, which requires 
articulating the required accounting information, to determine an interconnection price.  
 
However, the decision moment constitutes, for Derrida, a moment of 
subjectivity due to each particular case involving the adjudicator (the Commissioner) 
undertaking an act of articulation, which metaphorically adapts the general rule to fit the 
particular situation (by making the general similar to the particular). The signifier 
TSLRIC is open and absent of particular content. Thus, the first ontical movement fills 
this gap by instituting a model for calculating TSLRIC. This illustrates the distance 
between undecidability and the necessity of making a decision. In articulating a model 
for TSLRIC, the model is a metaphor for the method of TSLRIC, but is always 
ambiguous, being akin to attempts to close a partially constituted system. Thus, 
although the model for TSLRIC may attempt to close the system, as this is necessary, it 
is punctuated with impossibility. Hence, there is continual agitation from interested 
parties to change the articulated model. The regulators and interested parties are 
engaged in an undecidable rhetorical game.  
 
Furthermore, as Chapter three illustrates there is considerable scope for political 
dispute in articulating the general model to the particular case (the second ontic gap): 
e.g. consider the scope for dispute over apportioning traffic-sensitive costs, appropriate 
rates of capital and capital depreciation, designation of network and interconnection 
assets, identifying and allocating shared and common network assets’ costs according to 
‘usage’, identifying operating costs to include directly and indirectly attributable costs, 
tracing ‘reasonably identifiable’ indirect costs, and identifying and excluding double 
counted costs regarding the TSO. This is an intensely methodological, technical, and 
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political process, fraught with difficulty. The CC is susceptible to the full gamut of 
disputes flowing from the theory of cost, whether from economic, interpretive, or 
critical theory. However, the articulation from the general model to the particular case 
would fill the second ontic gap. To conclude, TSLRIC as a method and methodology is 
effectively empty until the model is constructed and a price is determined. This 
reinforces Major and Hopper’s conclusions regarding the implementation of ABC in 
Marconi in Portugal (2005; 2007). 
 
 
There was an intensely contested ‘conversation’ between the regulator and the regulated 
in constructing the net costing model for the TSO under Part III of the TA (Bowie, 
2001). The Telecommunications Commissioner, pursuant to ss 92 and 93 must 
determine:  
a) the net cost to the TSP for satisfying the TSO;  
b) liable persons (i.e., other telecommunications competitors who benefit 
from the TSP’s compliance with the TSO);  
 
c) the amounts payable by liable persons;  
 
d) whether the TSP has satisfied and complied with the TSO, by satisfying 
minimum service standards and coverage. 
 
However, early evidence following the enactment of the TA indicates that interpreting 
and implementing net costing is difficult. In particular, there was intense industry 
agitation over constructing the net costing model. As all parties that use Telecom’s 
PSTN network could be liable for a proportion of the costs of satisfying the TSO, more 
industry participants are concerned about net costing than TSLRIC. Equally, there is an 
annual net costing exercise, whereas the TSLRIC has been developed and used only 
once since the passage of the TA. Consequently, any interpretation of the net costing 
process (from creating, applying and evaluating the net costing model) by the 
CLAIM 2: NET COSTING IS ROBUST AND TRANSPARENT 
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Commissioner is intensely scrutinised by affected parties. In short, there are three main 
disagreements surrounding TSO practice: 
a) The TSO net costing model. Industry participants expressed significant 
disagreement over the method of calculating the ‘net cost’ of satisfying 
the TSO (Weighted Average Cost of Capital and various CAPM models). 
For industry participants, small changes in the net costing model can lead 
to significantly different costs of satisfying the TSO. For small, new 
entrant competitors, this can have a significant effect on foreseeable 
profitability and success; 
 
b) The results of the application of the net costing model. Industry 
participants (predominantly, Telecom and TelstraClear) disagreed over the 
‘net cost’ of satisfying the TSO (actual costing of TSO compliance). 
Telecom and TelstraClear carry the burden of the TSO cost but face 
different incentives. Given that Telecom was unable to openly seek cost 
recoupment for satisfying the TSO (it was alleged to have used the KSO 
to distort interconnection prices), it is in Telecom’s interests to argue for 
the greatest net cost possible, resulting in a larger cost recoupment 
(Telecom has always carried the cost of the TSO, so the costing exercise is 
effectively an accounting ledger exercise – in many ways, it is not a real 
cost to Telecom but the liable persons’ payments constitute cash revenue). 
On the other hand, given that TelstraClear is one of the largest competitors 
they are liable for a large proportion of the net cost. In the 2002-2003 
annual net costing exercise, TelstraClear were liable for $3,396,393, from 
a TSO net cost of $56.8 million. TelstraClear are motivated to argue for 
the lowest annual net cost possible. Interestingly, Vodafone, as the second 
largest user of Telecom’s PSTN, who were liable for $13,526,650 of the 
2002-2003 annual net cost, remained quiet during the annual net costing 
exercise.   
 
c) Industry participants disagreed over the definition of liable persons and 
their amounts payable. Several actively agitated to be excluded from the 
‘liable persons’ category. Vodafone and TelstraClear argued for a broad 
definition of “liable person” to reflect direct and indirect interconnection. 
CallPlus Limited sought consistency between the TSO determinations for 
2002-2003 and 2001-2002. Counties Power Limited submitted that direct 
interconnection with Telecom’s PSTN was the simplest method. Whoosh 
Wireless, Citylink, BCL, and Vector Communications argued that they 
should not be liable persons, as they are not primarily reliant on 
Telecom’s PSTN. WorldxChange Communications argued for a revised 
definition of liable person to include companies that actually use the 
PSTN and who were excluded from TSO calculations, including dial-up 
Internet service providers (ISP), pure ISPs, and existing liable persons 
who also operate dial-up ISP services (CC, Final Determination, 24 March 
2005). 
 
The CC manages various roles in the annual net costing process. It is complex mix of 
determining the net costing methodology, ‘determining’ cost “facts”, judging the 
 - 278 - 
‘veracity’ of information provided to the CC by interested parties, applying the net 
costing model, determining liability of interconnecting parties, determining the 
amounts payable by liable parties, and adjudicating compliance with the TSO 
requirements. This process requires a considerable ‘judgment’ across ‘questions of 
fact’, ‘law’, and ‘cost at methodological, technical, and political levels’. In political 
terms, there is tremendous scope for contestation and dispute.  
1 Articulating the Appropriate Net Cost Model 
 
The TA and Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regulations 1999 were largely 
silent on the appropriate model for calculating net cost, providing little guidance as to 
how the net cost of TSO provision should be determined.138 The sole Government 
advice was that the Telecommunications Commissioner had largely unfettered 
discretion to construct the most appropriate net costing model: David Cunliffe, MP, 
Commerce select committee Chairperson commented that: “We have clarified the 
telecommunications service obligation through … giv[ing] the Commissioner the option 
of using either weighted or unweighted costing methodologies according to the purpose 
of the bill” (Hansard, 19 December 2001). Consequently, there is a gap between the 
‘universal’ signifier, “net costing”, and the appropriate model to determine net cost in a 
particular case. The notion of the gap is important in the creation of ‘rules’. If the net 
costing ‘rule’ were applicable to the concrete case, say the net costing of the 2002-2003 
period, this would be a concrete rule for that period, which is different to every other 
period. For Derrida, this is not a rule, as a general rule cannot include the particular: 
general rules need articulation to the particular case. Consequently, rules (as concepts 
applicable in various concrete cases) must be applied to particular cases, and this is an 
act of articulation. Thus, the CC had to ‘fill’ the gap, by engaging in significant debate, 
consultation, contestation, before the Telecommunications Commissioner determined in 
                                                 
138
 See Appendix 1 for the Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regulations 1999. 
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2002 that a “simplified Capital Asset Pricing Model [CAPM] model” should be 
employed for calculating the net cost of TSO provision (Lally, 1992; Cliffe & Marsden, 
1992). Table 7.1 below articulates the constituent elements of the “simplified CAPM 
model” 
Table 7.1: The Net Costing Model for the TSO: “Simplified CAPM Model” 
After-tax cost of 
capital (the 
weighted average 
costs of debt and 
equity) 
WACC = ke(1-L) + kd(1-Tc)L Where: 
ke = cost of equity capital 
kd = cost of debt 
Tc = corporate tax rate 
L = leverage ratio 
Cost of Debt (kd) kd = Rf + p Where: 
Rf = risk free rate 
p = premium to reflect marketability and 
exposure to the possibility of default 
Cost of Equity (ke) ke = Rf(1-TI) + øβe   Where: 
TI = average tax rate on interest income 
ø = post-tax market risk premium 
βe = the beta of equity capital  
Beta Equity of 
Capital (βe) 
βe= β [1 + L] 
           1 – L 
Where: 
Βa = the asset beta (the equity beta in the 
absence of debt)  
 
However, its determination caused considerable dispute between industry 
participants and the CC: e.g. in 2004, there was still significant dispute between 
Telecom, TelstraClear, and the CC as to its constitution. PWC, for Telecom, submitted 
that the CC’s reliance upon the CAPM was flawed claiming that Fama and French’s 
research indicated that CAPM estimates are understated (Fama & French, 1993; PWC, 
2004, p. 24). PWC submitted that this resulted in the Commission underestimating the 
reasonable rate of return for providing TSO services by two per cent and cumulatively 
underestimated the TSO weighted average cost of capital [WACC] by more than two 
per cent. 
 
MJA, for TelstraClear, submitted that the CC’s CAPM model was flawed due to 
its domestic focus. MJA stated that a purely domestic CAPM produces higher WACC 
estimates than an international CAPM. MJA submitted that the Commission must 
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consider both an international and a domestic CAPM, on an internally consistent basis, 
and then choose a WACC estimate between the two estimates (MJA, 2004, pp. 5-6). 
 In response, the Telecommunications Commission argued: 
 
a) The Fama-French model constitutes the best-known empirical challenge to 
the CAPM. Fama and French developed an empirical, rather than 
theoretical, model that relates asset returns to a market factor (as done by 
CAPM) as well as to size and book-to-market factors. The CC, however, 
noted that there was no consensus on the implications of the Fama-French 
results with respect to the validity of CAPM (Jagannathan & McGrattan, 
1995; Malkiel & Xu, 1997; 2000): 
 
Since a consensus on the status of CAPM does not currently exist, the 
Commission believes that it would be premature to reject the CAPM as the 
benchmark in setting rates of return. In addition, the Commission notes that 
the betas referred to in Fama and French are equity rather than asset betas and 
thereby reflect leverage differentials across firms (CC, 2005, p. 35). 
[Emphasis in original]. 
  
b) The CC recognised that a domestic CAPM assumes segmented capital 
markets, while an international CAPM assumes capital markets are fully 
integrated. The CC considered NZ’s economy to sit “somewhere in 
between”, while noting a “substantial home bias” for NZ investors. For 
the CC, the international CAPM would be difficult to apply, and 
consequently: 
 
The more complex international CAPM is not suitable for estimating the cost 
of capital in a regulatory setting (CC, 2005, p. 35). 
 
c) Finally, the Commission re-stated the basis for calculating the net cost of TSO 
provision: 
 
The Commission is not aware of any development since its 2001-2002 TSO 
determination that suggests that an alternative approach is warranted. The 
Commission has therefore decided to continue with the simplified Brennan-
Lally CAPM to estimate the TSO cost of capital (CC, 2005, p. 35). 
 
Consequently, there is still marked technical, methodological, and political 
disagreement between the CC and regulated entities over the methodology to determine 
the net cost of TSO provision. This displaces the logic of the net costing exercise 
providing robust and transparent annual net costings of satisfying the TSO. Consider the 
2001-2002 and 2002-2003 annual net costing of the TSO, depicted in Figure 7.6.  
 - 281 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.6: Contestation: Annual net costing figures for 2001-2002 and 2002-2003  
 
 
The striking feature of these disputes is that each party used the same net cost model 
and costing information. This illustrates the technical, methodological, and political 
challenges posed by the interface of law and accounting. There was considerable 
disparity between each party’s estimates of the annual net cost and each year’s net cost 
figures: in 2002-2003, Telecom submitted that the net cost of the TSO was $215.5 
million based on a WACC of 13.1 per cent. PWC submitted to the Commission that 
13.1 per cent was a ‘reasonable estimate’ considering:  
a) Updated revenue information for 2002-2003; 
 
b) The WACC of 10.5 per cent for Telecom Mobile and 14 per cent for Xtra; 
 
c) The unreasonableness of the 6 per cent WACC in the Commission’s draft 
determination; and 
 
d) A two-percentage point margin for asymmetric risk issues associated with 
the CC’s bottom-up estimate of the cost of TSO provision (PWC, 2003).  
 
2001-2002 net cost of the TSO 
 
FACT:  “Simplified CAPM model” provides robust and 
transparent annual net costs of satisfying the TSO. 
 
FACT:  Telecom: TSO cost = $425 million 
 
FACT:  Telecom’s revised TSO cost = $408 million 
 
FACT:  TesltraClear’s TSO cost = $214 million 
 
FACT:  Telecommunications Commissioner Final 
Determination $73.4 million  
 
2002-2003 net cost of the TSO 
 
FACT:  “Simplified CAPM model” provides robust and 
transparent annual net costs of satisfying the TSO. 
 
FACT:  Telecom: TSO cost = $215.5 million 
 
FACT:  Telecommunications Commissioner Final 
Determination $56.8 million  
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The CC disagreed with Telecom and PWC, determining a $56.8 million annual net cost 
for the TSO. They adopted a post-tax WACC of 7.1 per cent. However, they provided 
no justification as to why this was the most appropriate WACC. Net costing is not 
transparent. In summary, in DT terms, this net costing example is a prime illustration of 
the double ontic gap. At the first level, there is the articulation of the “simplified 
CAPM model” to fill the gap left by the signifier “net costing”. At the second level, 
there is the annual articulation of the cost of the TSO when employing the model. Thus, 
each year that the model is defended against criticism from interested parties, 
constitutes a ‘re-iteration’ of the model, and reaffirms the metaphor of “simplified 
CAPM model” for net costing. Equally, in 2002-2003, the articulation of $56.8 million 
is a metaphor for the “simplified CAPM model”.  
 
Therefore, there is still considerable contestation over interpreting and 
implementing the TA. The basic problem remains: TSLRIC and net costing were broad 
signifiers, and little legislative guidance was provided. Thus, the Telecommunications 
Commissioner had to engage in a rhetorical process of ‘filling in the gaps’ in 
consultation with interested industry players and stakeholders. 
 
PART III: FANTASMATIC LOGICS OF COST 
 
Part III of the empirical analysis reflects on the fantasmatic. In particular, by 
reflecting on fantasmatic logics, the thesis explains and critiques how subjects are 
‘gripped’ by ideological presuppositions of ‘costing’ that sustain their identity and are 
attached to the social and political logics of cost. In the empirical analysis the process of 
instituting TSLRIC for interconnection and net costing for the TSO raised serious 
technical, methodological, and political questions. In short, exposing elements of 
subjectivity, judgment, the methodology vs method debate, and information asymmetry 
inherent within costing, exposed the ‘radical contingency’ of both TSLRIC and net 
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costing. However, despite these challenges, four ‘ideological’ themes continued to 
dominate the presentation of TSLRIC and net costing, and helped smooth over the 
radical contingency of the regulation. Therefore, this analysis identifies how cost and 
‘objectivity’; cost and ‘transparency’, cost and the ‘resolution of past disputes’; and cost 
and the ‘public interest’ ideologically functioned to ‘smooth over’ the various 
challenges presented by parties to ‘costing’ at the social and political level.   
 
In the transition from light-handed to sector-specific regulation, there is 
uncertainty and antagonism, as the Government, its agents, the Telecommunications 
Commissioner, telecommunications industry players, and interested parties reconstruct 
their identities in relation to the new regulatory regime. Each interested party had to 
grapple with the role of cost, TSLRIC and net costing within the regulatory system. DT 
recognises the role of the subject, primarily through fantasmatic logic. As explained in 
Chapter five, if social structures are open and only tendentially closed, then social 
actors are open and will seek to tendentially close their identity in relation to social 
structures. Chapter six argued that ideology ‘closes’ the radical contingency at the 
centre of political struggle. As Althusser explained ideology is the ‘transformation’ of 
individuals into subjects through recognition”: i.e. competing representations at the 
social and political environment draw in individuals and helps constitute themselves as 
subjects (1994, p. 131). This is necessary as dislocations, such as the change of 
Government during the 1999 General election, the announcement of a Ministerial 
Inquiry into Telecommunications, and the new TA 2001 disrupts the existing social 
order and, as explained in Chapter six, exposes the radical contingency of social 
relations. As subjects, this makes us uncomfortable, but ideology helps mitigate the 
contingency. 
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In the empirical analysis of transition from light-handed to sector-specific 
regulation, there are four core ‘ideological’ themes: 
1) Objectivity: cost is a powerful discursive mechanism. In particular, given 
that most human beings, on a daily basis, are faced with ‘real costs’, cost 
is often ‘misrecognised’ as being objective, as opposed to contingent. This 
was examined theoretically, particularly in Chapter three. Scapens’ (1985) 
conditional truth critique of the absolute truth notion within economic 
cost, Covaleski et al’s (2003) criticism of the subjectivity of TCE in US 
utilities regulation, and Major and Hopper’s (2005) study of the 
fragmented implementation of ABC in Portuguese telecommunications 
illustrate the clash of objectivity (at the ideological level) and subjects and 
practice. In general, as noted in Chapter three, law and economics fails to 
recognise the inherent arbitrariness and openness of the cost concept by 
assuming it is simple and objective.  
 
2)  Transparency: the light-handed regime as criticised for its lack of 
transparency. In part, Chapter two illustrated various incentives available 
to Telecom to take advantage of the regulatory framework and act in a less 
than transparent manner, particularly regarding interconnection pricing 
and the KSO. Thus, the Government sought to separate the influence of 
the KSO in the distortion of interconnection pricing. The Government, 
despite submissions to the contrary, maintained a separate regulator, cost-
based systems like TSLRIC and net costing, and the regulatory process 
would provide this transparency.  
 
3)  Resolution: the thesis demonstrates the overarching failure of the light-
handed approach. In particular, TSLRIC and net costing were attached, 
ideologically, to the need for re-regulating telecommunications, when the 
failure of the light-handed model was emphasised. In particular, the 
Telecom v Clear litigation, the “Baumol-Willig” rule, and the failure of 
the judicial process to effectively make technical decisions about 
telecommunications were blamed. Accounting was seen as providing 
objectivity and transparency, and thus, resolves power disputes (see, 
Mitchell, Sikka, and Wilmott, 1996; Hines, 1988; Hines, 1989; Hines, 
1991; and Arrington & Francis, 1989). . 
 
4)  Public Interest: much Government rhetoric holds that the new regulation, 
through the ‘cost’ lens, serves the public interest. This draws on a complex 
ideological concept, open for interpretation as explained in Chapter two. 
However, despite contestation over its exact meaning, ‘public interest’ is 
considered to be positive (Meyerson & Banfield, 1955; Downs, 1962; 
Marks, Leswing & Fortinsky, 1972; Horwitz, 1989). 
 
These four ideological elements were overdetermined in social, political and 
fantasmatic logics as they smoothed over the contingency of costing, law, accounting, 
and regulation, and helped political subjects construct and maintain their positions.  
 - 285 - 
II CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter used DT and Glynos and Howarth’s logics of critical explanation to 
empirically examine the complexity and scope for contestation throughout the ‘re-
regulatory’ phases of telecommunications. This provides a theorised ‘critical’ 
intervention for identifying failures of the light-handed regulatory system associated 
with the institution of TSLRIC for interconnection pricing and net costing for the TSO, 
and the post enactment disputes of the TA concerning the approach, modelling, 
meaning, and calculation of each. The social, political, and fantasmatic logics provided 
a framework to interrogate phases in re-regulating telecommunications and the re-
regulatory process as a whole. This had three parts: retroductive logic examined how 
TSLRIC interconnection pricing and net costing for the TSO became the regulatory 
approaches in the TA; rhetorical analysis examined how the Telecommunications 
Commissioner implemented and interpreted the processes of the TA, and the resulting 
political contestation over implementing and interpreting TSLRIC and net costing; and 
finally, as a form of auto-critique, fantasmatic logics explained and critiqued how 
political actors were ‘gripped’ by certain ideological presuppositions of ‘costing’. Key 
conclusions include: 
- The newly elected government sought ideological protection for 
delivering the election promise of telecommunications change by 
deflecting much media and other public attention by establishing the MIT 
to investigate and recommend what regulation should be introduced. 
- Thematically, TSLRIC had four primary nodal points characterising the 
social logics:  
 
o TSLRIC was international best practice: the light-handed 
experiment was unique internationally. Rhetorically, the claim to 
international best practice was important to provide protection to 
the Government should TSLRIC fail to stimulate increased 
competition.   
 
o TSLRIC was robust: the complex signifier represented various 
issues from regulatory frameworks to interconnection 
methodology. The Government recognised both viewpoints to 
expand the chain of equivalence. 
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o TSLRIC was transparent: the Government carefully controlled the 
transparency debate. The prime concern under light-handed 
regulation was that Telecom allegedly inflated interconnection 
prices by incorporating elements of the KSO. TSLRIC was then 
transparent as the regulator set the interconnection price. However, 
the Government did not publicly acknowledge the process of 
‘creating’ a TSLRIC model or the judgments exercised in 
determining the appropriate methodology applied to apply to it; 
and  
 
o TSLRIC was not the ‘Baumol-Willig’ rule: rhetorically, this was 
an important strategy, demonstrating the extent of the shift from 
‘light-handed’ regulation, whilst constructing the “Baumol-Willig” 
pricing rule metaphorically as the reason for the failure of the 
‘light-handed’ framework, as well as constructing a metaphor that 
as TSLRIC is not the “Baumol-Willig” pricing rule regulatory 
failures of the past will not be repeated.  
 
Being tendentially empty of particular content, the signifier ‘TSLRIC’ 
encouraged interested parties, regulators, and the Government to read in 
various signifieds into the master signifier.  
 
- The empirical analysis of net costing identified two complex nodal points 
that thematised the social logics: 
 
o net costing of the TSO is robust and transparent: parties argued 
that Telecom used the KSO to distort interconnection prices by 
charging a mark-up to represent the cost of the KSO provision, 
holding that the net costing process was robust and transparent; 
and 
 
o net costing of the TSO is objective and independent: in particular, 
parties argued that removing the net costing calculation from 
Telecom would result in more accurate, objective costing. Most 
industry players accepted that an ‘independent’, objective 
calculation would be better than the perceived subjective, captured 
calculation delivered by Telecom pursuant to the disclosure 
Regulations 
 
- For DT, TSLRIC and net cost are catachresical as they name the absent 
fullness: they represent full regulatory failure of the light-handed 
regulatory system, representing the logic of equivalence. Both TSLRIC (a 
failure of interconnection) and net costing (a failure of the KSO) are 
metaphors for individual failures, but the combination constitutes a 
metonym for the failure of the light-handed system. Equally, as floating 
signifiers, TSLRIC and net costing are tendentially empty of particular 
content, particularly through the collapse of method (TSLRIC and net 
costing) and methodologies, which extended the chain of equivalence. By 
not providing detailed prescriptions of the methodology to be employed, 
those that submitted about methodology were seen to be supporting the 
method.  
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- Following the enactment of TSLRIC for interconnection and net costing 
for the TSO, the Commissioner implemented and interpreted the 
regulatory tools, despite industry contestation that sought to facilitate, 
complicate, or frustrate the regulatory process. The thesis rhetorically 
examined two positions: 1) that TSLRIC is transparent; and 2) that net 
costing is robust and transparent.  
 
- However, the social space is not fully articulated, as the Government 
legislated TSLRIC and net costing in name only, providing little guidance 
on their interpretation and implementation. Consequently, there remained 
room for political contestation over the approach, modelling, meaning, 
and calculation of these cost concepts: First, interested parties articulated 
and agitated for specific meanings of TSLRIC and net costing for 
regulation purposes; second, although interested parties articulated several 
attributes to TSLRIC and net costing during the institution phase of the 
regulation, these common condensed signifiers were displaced.  
 
- In examining how subjects were ‘gripped’ by ideological presuppositions 
of ‘costing’ attached to the social and political logics of cost, common 
ideologies underpinned the power of ‘objective cost’, the perception that 
cost-based systems like TSLRIC and net costing would provide greater 
transparency to the regulatory process, would resolve the failure of light-
handed regulation, and by invoking the public interest, these changes were 
for the better. 
 
The final chapter considers the implications, limitations, and scope for further research 
that emerges from the previous empirical, theoretical, and methodological analysis.  
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- Chapter Eight - 
 
Conclusions: 
 Research Articulations, Limitations, and Future Research 
   
I RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
 
In examining the regulatory adoption of cost in telecommunications through the 
logics of critical explanation and DT, the thesis makes three prime contributions: 
challenging and developing the interface of law and accounting, developing links 
between DT and its empirical execution through the logics of critical explanation (these 
research method developments apply to law and accounting), and developing an 
integrated, multi-dimensional and multi-perspective approach to regulatory theory. This 
thesis challenges the interface of law and accounting by critiquing the traditional 
conception where accounting provides information for legal processes or is subservient 
to law’s dominance. This overly simplifies the interface. Equally, in examining 
disciplines, it is important to look beyond superficial similarities to unpack the 
differences in how the disciplines interweave. This thesis suggests that the separate 
analysis of disciplines like law and accounting, particularly in a regulatory, commercial 
context is hard, as the agitation, negotiation, and antagonism (the political) renders it 
difficult to analyse the disciplines in isolation. The interface’s starting point is political 
analysis: the three phases of the re-regulation of telecommunications (problematising 
the light-handed regime, instituting a new cost-based regulation, and implementing and 
interpreting the new regime) constituted a complex, multi-disciplinary, multi-
theoretical, and political site of struggle. The re-regulation of telecommunications by 
the Labour-led Government radically shifted the framework from light-handed to 
sector-specific regulation by instituting ‘cost’ as the regulatory driver. This raised two 
research questions: 
1) Why did TSLRIC, a cost-plus pricing model, for interconnection, and net 
costing for the TSO become the basis for regulating telecommunications 
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in NZ? How did actors discursively construct their political identities in 
relation to cost? 
 
2) How and why were the ‘rules of regulation’ encapsulated by the TA 
implemented and introduced, especially how cost accounting information 
was used in the regulatory process by accountants, lawyers, and 
regulators? How was ‘cost’ employed rhetorically in interpreting and 
implementing the TA 2001? 
 
However, underlying these questions is a theoretical, methodological, empirical, and 
political web: the thesis invokes, problematises, and develops different literatures and 
theories including telecommunications, regulation, economics, cost, inter-disciplinarity, 
law, accounting, and research paradigms in law and accounting. More generally, two 
questions informed this ontological shift in examining regulation: 
1) What is the interface between accounting and law? More specifically, what 
is the role of accounting in telecommunications regulation? What is the 
role of cost and cost theory within legal regulation? 
 
This theoretical and empirical question problematised and developed traditional 
conceptions of the interface of law and economics, law and accounting, 
telecommunications, regulation and cost. The second question, in re-invigorating 
political analysis, introduced DT and the logics of critical explanation, making the 
political nature of the interface of law and accounting explicit with respect to the 
employment of cost in telecommunications regulation.   
2)  What are the insights of Laclau and Mouffe’s DT, in moving from costing 
as technical to costing as political? In particular, what insights emerge 
from Glynos and Howarth’s logics of critical explanation? 
 
These questions problematised and developed traditional epistemological research 
frameworks in law and accounting to identify the ‘space’ for DT’s ontological analysis.  
  
In the following analysis, there is a degree of repetition between sections as each 
addresses separate but interdependent issues and disciplines. Thus, the interface 
between law and accounting in regulating telecommunications raised multiple 
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theoretical, empirical, and methodological challenges, framed by the problem that 
relevant research was disciplinary-bound, non-political, and epistemological: 
a) The genealogy of NZ telecommunications regulation illustrated the 
political. In particular, Chicago and Harvard school economics shifted the 
direction of competition law between the free market and consumers 
respectively. Two ideas were developed: the economic regulatory history 
was actually a political history as actors used economics to invoke crises 
and promise better regulatory results; and telecommunications was 
‘political’ for many actors. The analysis of the shift from light-handed to 
sector-specific regulation examined how the new regime ‘answered’ the 
problems of the light-handed approach. In particular, Chapter two 
identified the problems of interconnection access, the KSO, and the light-
handed approach. The Government proposed that TSLRIC, cost-based 
regulation would resolve the interconnection access problem, an annual 
net-costing of the TSO and separate cost-recoupment would remove the 
influence of the KSO from interconnection, and the sector-specific TA 
and Telecommunications Commissioner answered the criticisms of the 
light-handed approach. 
 
b) Existing economic regulatory theory had limited explanatory power in 
isolation, but the disparity and conflict between the accounts illustrated 
that regulatory theory is intimately linked to the social and political. 
Regulatory literature suggests that regulating telecommunications is 
complex due to the degree of network interdependence and the risk of 
technological obsolescence. NZ’s great telecommunications experiment 
(light-handed regulation) failed. The analysis of Chicago and Harvard 
school economics, public interest regulation, and regulatory capture 
illustrated limited parts of the regulatory issues. Horwitz (1989) examined 
economic, historical, and political regulatory theory arguing that economic 
analysis provided insight into measuring outcomes but misconstrued 
origins and processes; the historical approach provided insight into the 
historicity of regulation but lacked analytical tools for considering 
outcomes; and traditional political science politicised the regulatory 
environment but inclined towards process-oriented analysis. This suggests 
that the complexity of regulation both empirically and theoretically results 
from its multi-disciplinary nature, and consequently, this thesis analysed 
regulation at the ontological level, rather than the traditional disciplinary, 
epistemological approach. This develops Horwitz’s analysis that invokes 
structural analysis of the components, challenges, and public interests of 
‘evolutionary’ economic and political demands.  
 
c) The traditional conception of the interface of law and accounting was too 
simplistic: the interface is primarily based around the provision of 
information for the legal process and continues to grow, law and 
accounting are shaped by each other, and the interface is conflictual due to 
law’s traditional domination of accounting and the professional ‘clash’ 
over the growth of accounting. Although a useful starting point, the 
existing literature is disciplinary-bound and epistemological. This thesis 
argues that the interface is political and should be examined at the 
ontological level. Empirically, the complex and multi-faceted interface of 
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law and accounting in telecommunications was examined through cost 
accounting assuming a central regulatory role  
 
d) Both law and economics hold a simple notion of cost: i.e. cost is a simple, 
objective measure of ‘economic sacrifice’. In problematising this 
assumption, from an accounting perspective, the thesis demonstrated the 
levels of complexity to cost at methodological, technical and political 
levels by examining the arbitrariness and choice inherent in the 
construction and presentation of cost. Positivist ‘cost’ identifies the costs 
of production to the exclusion of TCE’s costs of exchange, which 
excludes the agency cost of organisation. Technically, the regulatory 
regime attempted to deal with issues of bias and information asymmetry 
by prescribing TSLRIC and net costing as specific costing methods, and 
by allowing the regulator to make the final decision. However, this relies 
on the regulated providing ‘cost’ information to the regulator. Scapens 
further problematised cost by arguing that the more theoretically correct 
the economic cost is, the more subjective the measure becomes. Scapens’ 
critique introduced a conditional costing model, based on the maxim 
‘different costs for different purposes’ (although this subjectivity is rooted 
in a critique of economics). This insight was extended to interpretive and 
critical theory’s recognition of socially constructed costs. Thus, cost is not 
merely technical but political and involves subjectivity, politics, 
consensus, conflict, and the social and institutional creation of meanings. 
This range of theoretical and practical ‘cost’ critiques poses significant 
challenges for regulation and research, because cost methodologically, 
technically, and politically invokes multiple epistemologies and 
ontologies. 
 
e) The multiple actors invoked in telecommunications re-regulation required 
careful analysis of micro-, meso-, and macro-political and regulatory 
shifts. This involved describing the major telecommunications players, 
particularly Telecom as the dominant incumbent and ‘new’ entrant 
competitors ranging from TelstraClear and Vodafone as more established 
market players through to very small, emerging new entrants. Equally, this 
introduced major political players from Government, political parties, the 
executive, and the MIT. The empirical analysis includes non-
governmental organisations, lobby groups, charities, individuals, industry 
pressure groups, and other social activists. These interested parties have 
various social, economic, and political agendas. To contextualise the re-
regulation of telecommunications, the thesis discussed the Labour-led 
Government’s State re-regulation phase following the State rollbacks 
characteristic of the liberal economic policies of the late-1980s and 1990s.  
 
f) Traditional research paradigms in accounting and law did not provide 
sufficient scope to examine the interface of law and accounting in 
telecommunications. In particular, ontological and interdisciplinary 
challenges were problematic for the traditional epistemological analysis of 
positivism, interpretivism, and critical theory. In light of these limitations, 
the thesis articulated a post-structurally informed DT theoretical 
framework due to its focus on ontological politics at local and macro 
levels.   
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g) The phases of the empirical site required flexibility. DT re-invigorates the 
political by looking internally within law, accounting, and regulation and 
examining the external effects of the political process. This provides 
resources to consider the phases of telecommunications re-regulation, 
including the regulatory genealogy, the regulatory institution of cost 
accounting, and the political strategies employed in the regulatory 
interpretation and implementation. In particular, DT responds to the 
theoretical critiques developed in Chapters two, three, and four. Chapter 
two illustrated that no regulatory theory captured the complexity of NZ’s 
regulatory history: a good regulatory theory is interdisciplinary and 
considers the economic, historical, and political (Horwitz, 1989). DT’s 
flexibility in incorporating the economic, historical, political, and 
discursive insights provides a comprehensive regulatory account. Chapter 
three argued that cost accounting challenges the regulatory system given 
the role of accounting at technical, methodological, and political levels. 
DT’s integrated theoretical components including hegemony, 
condensation, overdetermination, and rhetoric identify, examine, and 
critique the political strategies employed in interpreting and implementing 
the cost-based regulation without being solely beholden to economic, 
historical, or political analysis (Horwitz, 1989).  
 
h) DT responds to the problem of the disciplinary bound nature of 
epistemological analysis by focusing on ontology and the ontic (Hviding, 
2003). As cost is the central regulatory device in the TA and cost has 
methodological, technical, and political implications, the ontological shifts 
is a way of interrogating the uses and meanings of cost in accounting, law, 
economics, and regulation. The thesis concentrates on meanings: why was 
cost chosen for regulating telecommunications? What does cost-based 
regulation signify? How was discourse centred on the nodal point of 
‘cost’? How is cost rhetorically used in regulation? 
 
i) The highly articulated nature of DT challenges the traditional use of 
empirics, research methods, and analytical methodologies. Empirical 
analysis in DT concentrates on the ‘concrete case’ as an opportunity to 
develop DT, as opposed to DT providing a set of theoretical tools to be 
applied to particular social settings. The alleged normative and 
methodological deficits within DT include Critchley (2004) who criticises 
DT for failing to clarify if it focuses on description or critique, especially, 
as focusing on description risks emptying DT of any critical function and 
Torfing (1998) who challenges DT for providing ‘interesting’ 
redescriptions but failing to reflect on causality and explanation. 
 
j)  The thesis uses Glynos and Howarth’s logics of critical explanation as the 
appropriate methodological framework for DT-informed empirical 
analysis. By concentrating on a present problem, the logics of critical 
explanation employ retroduction to identify a social fact and then examine 
what gave rise to it. Social, political and fantasmatic logics provide a 
framework to examine how the social fact came to be: social logics 
examine the rules, practices, concepts, categories, and sedimented social 
practices that structure social interactions and relations; political logics 
consider the space in which the emergence, institution, and constitution of 
new norms, rules, and social practices are publicly contested, and 
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fantasmatic logics consider how subjects are ‘gripped’ by ideologies to 
allow social practices to continue. The empirical analysis articulates and 
identifies ‘nodal points’ (privileged signifiers or reference points in a 
discourse) and given the focus on political and fantasmatic logics, there 
are opportunities for critique and the identification of dislocatory moments 
that lead to the institution of new social practices. Documentary analysis, 
focused interviews, and personal experience in the regulatory environment 
constituted the data set for this study.  
 
k) The empirics examined the meanings attached to accounting information, 
in construction, presentation, contestation, and decision making. Cost is an 
ontic tool, as there are different costs for different purposes; similarly, the 
act of application (determining the cost to apply to a particular situation) is 
an articulatory practice which is a rhetorical technique. This is the DT 
interface of law and accounting: articulation and antagonism.  
 
l) In re-regulating telecommunications, the empirical analysis investigated 
the formation of political identities characterised by antagonism and 
uncertainty at numerous levels, including the discursive enunciation of 
standpoints and perspectives by actors at the first instance, and then, 
secondly, considered the politics at the level of reception post the 
enactment of legislation analysing contestation over interpreting and 
implementing the regulation. This reflects the articulation of social, 
political, fantasmatic logics as developed within the logics of critical 
explanation. In particular, in the institution phase the government sought 
ideological protection in delivering the election promise of 
telecommunications change. However, by requiring the MIT to 
recommend regulatory change, the Government could draw much of the 
media and other public attention away from itself.  
 
m) In relation to TSLRIC cost-plus pricing, interested parties constructed four 
primary nodal points that thematised the social logics including that 
TSLRIC was: international best practice; robust; transparent; and not the 
‘Baumol-Willig’ rule. Being tendentially empty of particular content, the 
signifier ‘TSLRIC’ encouraged interested parties, regulators, and the 
Government to read in various signifieds into the master signifier. The 
analysis demonstrated how the “Baumol-Willig” rule was thrust into a role 
of ‘empty signifier’ representing all that was wrong with the light-handed 
approach. 
 
n) In net costing, the analysis identified two nodal points that thematised the 
social logics, including that net costing of the TSO was robust, 
transparent, objective and independent. This suggested that a net costing 
model would make the interconnection process transparent and would 
provide for a fairer model of TSO cost recoupment. This is the process of 
condensation (through the logics of equivalence).  
 
o) Following the enactment of the TA, the analysis shifted to evaluate how 
the Commissioner implemented and interpreted the regulatory tools, 
despite industry contestation that sought to facilitate, complicate, or 
frustrate the regulatory process. Rhetorically, the thesis examined two 
positions: 1) that TSLRIC is transparent; and 2) that net costing is robust 
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and transparent. However, the social space was not fully articulated, as the 
Government legislated TSLRIC and net costing in name only, providing 
little guidance as to interpreting and implementing the concepts. 
Consequently, there remained room for political contestation over the 
approach, modelling, meaning, and calculation of these cost concepts: 
First, interested parties articulated and agitated specific meanings of 
TSLRIC and net costing for the purposes of regulation; second, although 
interested parties articulated several attributes to both TSLRIC and net 
costing during the institution phase of the regulation, this examined how 
these common condensed signifiers were displaced. 
 
p) Finally, in examining how subjects were ‘gripped’ by ideological 
presuppositions of ‘costing’ attached to the social and political logics of 
cost, four common ideologies predominated: the power of the ‘objective 
cost’; the perceived transparency of cost-based systems like TSLRIC and 
net costing would provide greater transparency to the regulatory process; 
TSLRIC and net costing would resolve the failure of light-handed 
regulation; and by invoking the public interest, these changes were for the 
better. 
 
From this analysis, various observations and lessons are drawn in relation to 
each of the components of this thesis, including the regulation of telecommunications, 
the interface of law and accounting, and the impact of the articulation of DT to the 
interface of law and accounting, as constructed by the TA 2001. 
 
II RESEARCH ARTICULATIONS 
 
As identified, the thesis makes three main contributions: 
 
a)  By instituting political analysis as the starting point for the interface of 
law and accounting, it ontologically focuses on the construction of and 
agitation over meaning between law and accounting. The interface is the 
site of articulatory politics.  
 
b)  DT and the logics of critical explanation provide a methodological 
framework for examining how cost accounting was instituted as central to 
telecommunications regulation by analysing dislocatory moments and the 
rhetorical construction and condensation of standpoints and perspectives 
with respect to TSLRIC and net costing. This led, through rhetorical 
redescription, to the displacement of meanings in interpreting and 
implementing the TA through identifying the unpacking and contestation 
of the key costing ideas. 
 
c)  The post-structural regulatory theory framework develops existing 
regulatory theory by integrating existing insights into alternative research 
pressures (decentred, external regulation) and the challenge of regulatory 
communication with broad-based analysis of regulation acknowledging 
the economic, accounting, law, historic, and political elements of the 
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multi-dimensional and multi-perspectival regulation. This provides space 
for competing theoretical, methodological, and empirical understandings 
of the contested site of regulation. 
 
This framework provides research findings on core components of theoretical and 
empirical material in the thesis, including telecommunications regulation, the interface 
of law and accounting, regulatory theory, DT and the empirics, and research methods. 
 
A Telecommunications Regulation 
 
The telecommunications regulation literature focuses on epistemologically bound 
inquiry, concentrating on economics, history, or politics. Despite Horwitz (1989) 
arguing for integrated telecommunication regulatory accounts, there are few examples. 
Consequently, this analysis of telecommunications answers and develops Horwitz by 
concentrating on ontological, not epistemological, inquiry and is inter-disciplinary. In 
relation to the regulation of telecommunications: 
a) Telecommunications presents a complex regulatory challenge due to 
interdependence and technological change (Laffont & Tirole, 1999). 
TSLRIC and other cost accounting tools are theoretically portrayed, 
particularly by economics, as a regulation problem solver. However, cost 
as the central focus increases the scope of complexity due to the technical, 
methodological, and political levels of cost. Economics, law and 
regulation suffer from the assumed simple, objective nature of cost. Cost-
based regulation of interconnection and TSO might be presented as 
‘solving’ particular light-handed regulation issues, but in practice, cost-
based regulation intensifies problems and creates new regulatory 
complexity. Unfortunately, the underlying problem, the economic 
incentives of the incumbent to dominate the Commerce Act 1986 by 
pursuing their own economic endeavours is largely unchanged under the 
TA. Although Telecom no longer controls the determination of 
interconnection price or the annual net cost of satisfying the TSO, 
competitors must commercially negotiate with Telecom and Telecom 
provides most of the information to the commission. In many ways, the 
TA intensifies the incumbent’s incentives from a methodological, 
technical, and political standpoint.   
 
b) Government rhetoric, in the introduction of the TA, distanced the new 
regime from light-handed regulation. The core failures of the light-handed 
approach drove the adoption of the regulatory mechanisms of the TA, 
primarily focused on interconnection access and the KSO. However, the 
light-handed regime is only partly responsible for the failure of the light-
handed approach. The TA, consequently, is too focused on light-handed 
problems to the extent that the signifier, the “Baumol-Willig” pricing rule, 
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is the main target: e.g. the history of Telecom v Clear resulted in the 
Government explicitly denying the right of appeal under the TA to the 
Privy Council, and naming the “Baumol-Willig” rule as an unacceptable 
pricing rule despite detailing available pricing principles under the TA. 
Consequently, the TA fails to satisfactorily deal with several more 
pressing telecommunications issues, including network investment, anti-
developmental behaviour, and fair pricing as identified in Chapter two.  
 
c) Although the framework and context is different, the TA 2001 is not 
significantly different from the old Commerce Act 1986. Despite the 
sector-specific regulator, the interconnection access regime, and the TSO 
costing process, the TA fails to curtail the underlying economic incentives 
of the incumbent. This confirms my Masters work in law, which held that 
there was little material difference, in effect or essence, between the 
Commerce Act 1986 (general competition law) and the TA 2001 (sector-
specific regulation). The underlying economic incentives to prevent, 
delay, or restrict new entrants from entering the telecommunications 
industry remain under the TA.  
 
d) The MIT identified the failure of the dispute resolution process as a core 
problem under the light-handed approach, primarily due to the inability of 
the court process to handle the complexity of telecommunications 
litigation. The new regime shifts the forum for dispute resolution, initially, 
from the courts to the Telecommunications Commission. However:  
 
i) there is no a priori right to approach the Commission for an 
interconnection price, as there is still a requirement for a ‘reasonable’ 
attempt at commercial negotiation prior to seeking a Commission 
pricing determination. Providing for an a prior right to seek a pricing 
determination from the Commission would curb the anti-
developmental tendencies of Telecom and would reduce the scope for 
regulatory games-playing; 
 
ii)  merely shifting the dispute resolution forum does not reduce the 
complexity of dispute resolution within telecommunications. 
However, the broader powers of investigation are an important 
addition to the regulation given Telecom’s success at challenging the 
CC right to conduct investigations under the Commerce Act 1986. 
Information is an invaluable commodity in the regulation of 
telecommunications; and 
 
iii) the scope for contestation at methodological, technical and political 
levels has increased given the Commissioner’s role. In relation to the 
interconnection dispute, the TA recommends TSLRIC, after receiving 
broad-based support from industry and interested parties who 
submitted to the MIT or the Commerce select committee. However, 
the empirical analysis illustrated that the Government failed to 
theoretically or methodologically define what was meant by TSLRIC, 
and interested players were involved in displacing and challenging 
what was meant by TSLRIC in interpreting and implementing the TA 
2001. Equally, in relation to the KSO, the new TSO provided for the 
annual net costing of the obligations. This is a time consuming 
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process, with considerable scope for argumentation and dispute, as 
was illustrated in the rhetorical analysis post the enactment of the TA. 
The argument is that Telecom, other industry players and interested 
parties all have scope to challenge, question, and develop different 
levels of net costing information at technical, methodological and 
political levels. This increases the scope for dispute.  
 
e) The Government’s objective for telecommunications was “cost efficient, 
timely, and innovative telecommunications services on an ongoing, fair 
and equitable basis to all existing and potential users”. Equally, the TA 
represented ‘landmark’ telecommunications legislation. The ideology of 
‘resolution’ played a strong rhetorical role surrounding the institution and 
implementation of the TA 2001. Unfortunately and unsurprisingly, in the 
ensuing years, the Labour-led Government was dissatisfied with the 
telecommunication ‘re-regulation’ results. In particular, there were two 
recent regulatory shifts. First, in 2005, the Government mandated the 
unbundling of the local loop to allow competitors direct access (for a fee) 
to Telecom’s network to enable them to provide their own 
telecommunications services, as opposed to delivering their service via 
Telecom or wholesaling one of Telecom’s products. This is a more 
extreme form of regulation as it takes elements of control of the network 
away from Telecom (in other words, TSLRIC did not provide the 
interconnection panacea promised and argued for in its institution). Part of 
the reason for this was the contestation over the development and 
application of the TSLRIC model. Second, on 31 March 2008, Telecom 
was legislatively required to separate into three companies (network, 
retail, and wholesale) so that the Government could wrest greater control 
from Telecom, particularly with respect to transparency and information 
asymmetry. Of interest is that these subsequent Government regulatory 
moves are attempts trying to attend to the underlying economic incentives 
of Telecom. Equally, this further regulation suggests that the TA is not 
providing the desired regulatory results and given the political and public 
importance of public goods like telecommunications, there is a lingering 
impression that it is better to be seen to do something rather than 
necessarily work through what you are doing. 
 
f) The Government focus for the TA was the ‘existing and potential users’ of 
telecommunication services, which invokes a confusing mix of regulatory 
theories and approaches including regulatory capture, public interest 
theory, and Chicago and Harvard school economics. Interestingly, despite 
the regulatory focus on end-users, the general public has no standing in 
the Commission, as it is limited to industry lobby bodies. Unfortunately, 
the most likely interested industry party to be detrimentally affected by the 
TA is the consumer or the general public:  
 
i)  NZ cannot simply reverse the degree by which competition was 
stunted under the light-handed regime. Network development is 
expensive and new entrants take time. Consequently, in NZ there are 
only pockets of competitive technologies developing, primarily 
focused where Telecom, per se, does not control the network: e.g. 
Vodafone and Telecom have established competing mobile telephony 
networks;  
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ii) the TA adds new ‘cost of compliance’ issues in telecommunications. 
The TA’s process requires extensive submissions, draft 
determinations, cross-submissions, and final determinations (one 
peculiarity is that Commission staff present draft determinations 
without the input of the Commissioner who is only involved in final 
determinations).  
 
iii) the TA ‘reifies’ the competitor at the expense of the consumer. The 
focus on cost and efficiency results makes entry for new competitors 
easier. While this may result in increased price competition over time, 
there is no regulatory incentive to minimise access costs or to aid 
effective and cost-beneficial network investment.  
 
g) Telecommunications regulation cannot be analysed in isolation. It is a 
complex web of technology, interdependence, accounting, law, 
economics, and politics. The DT framework recognises the constituent 
roles of each of these influences.  
 
h) The TA has intensified the political agitation in telecommunications: there 
was and is a continuing political game within and around interconnection 
and the TSO regime. In short, the scope of political interface has increased 
as the problematic is not ‘resolved’. There are four elements to this: 
 
i) Interested parties during the MIT and select committee process and the 
Government provided little detail around what the Act was actually 
going to do. The TA institutes TSLRIC as an interconnection 
methodology, but was silent on the detailed methods of TSLRIC. This 
provided scope for tremendous argumentation before the Commission, 
who was placed in a particularly difficult learning phase post the 
enactment of the TA. However, the contested nature of the 
Commission process (submission, draft determination, submission, 
final submission) has not improved the certainty of the regulation. In 
many ways, it is worse as the scope for contestability increased. 
 
ii) In terms of regulatory communication, it is acknowledged that 
Telecom presents most of the information for the Commission. This 
presents issues of regulatory capture, regulatory games-playing and 
issues of due process. The commission has demonstrated that where it 
is unsatisfied with the form, level, or type of information presented by 
Telecom, it is prepared to act upon the information presented by 
Telecom in light of its framework and model. This involves excluding 
information, using proxies, or researching equivalent cost-structures 
from international benchmarking. However, this raises issues of due 
process particularly around who has the right to exclude or include 
information, what constitutes a valid reason, why should information 
be excluded and how are these exclusion or inclusion decisions made? 
 
iii) The TA requires the Commission to consider ‘long-term benefits of 
end-users’, in public interest terms. However, given the commercially 
sensitive nature of information there is little scope for the ‘public’ to 
enter the forum. The Commission openly accepts that the public have 
little standing in these matters. The problem is further complicated as 
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there is little ability for the general public to work out what decisions 
have and have not been made. However, an interconnection price 
arrangement is deemed to be in the public interest.  
 
iv) The Government has been active in telecommunications since the TA, 
particularly around attempts to ‘wrest’ control from Telecom. This 
involved unbundling the local loop and mandating business separation.  
 
In short, telecommunications ‘re-regulation’ was overdue, but the overarching focus on 
the failings of the light-handed regime are over-determined in the resulting TA to the 
point that the underlying economic incentives for Telecom to prevent, restrict, or delay 
new entrants are relatively untouched. Thus, TA fails to adequately address the 
fundamental tensions of regulating telecommunications.  
 
 Given that the TA constructs cost as the central regulatory mechanism, this 
invites particular analysis of the interface of law and accounting.  
 
B Interface of Law and Accounting 
 
The traditional characterisation of the interface of law and accounting as 
an information flow with accounting subordinate to law is epistemologically-
bound and limited. This thesis illustrates that accounting and law are actively 
engaged in articulatory, antagonistic politics in a state of agitation, renegotiation, 
and transition. The interface of law and accounting is hegemonic: DT unpacks the 
traditional epistemological boundaries of the disciplines of law and accounting as 
they do not exist a priori, but rather, they emerge as discursive practices and 
structures. In illustration, the adoption of cost accounting in regulating accounting 
results in the ‘re-articulation’ of what ‘cost’, ‘accounting’, ‘law’, 
‘telecommunications’ and ‘regulation’ mean. The interface of law and accounting 
is an ontic interface, as it is about institution, construction and contestation of 
meaning. Therefore, this thesis illustrates that: 
a) There is a theoretical, methodological, and empirical interface between 
law and accounting that is overlooked in the literature. There are 
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significant opportunities for further research to examine the constituent 
aspects of this interface. Interestingly, accounting researchers have 
recognised and attempted to reconcile the interface, while legal 
researchers overlook or recognise the interface in terms of information 
processing. However, this thesis illustrates through the centrality of cost 
within telecommunications regulation that the interface of the disciplines 
is antagonistic, developmental, and constitutive. 
 
b) Law, economics, and other disciplines increasingly draw upon accounting 
concepts. However, disciplines tend to take simplistic representations of 
accounting concepts, which assumes accounting as just an information 
provider. The thesis argues that the arbitrariness, choice, and contestation 
within accounting is antagonistic to epistemological disciplines (like law 
and economics) as it exposes their limits, arbitrariness, and contingency.  
 
c) In researching the interface of law and accounting, it is necessary to look 
beyond superficial similarities. Despite law and accounting invoking 
‘contract’, ‘public interest’, and ‘judgment’ these are discursive terms of 
art. In particular, the researcher should examine the subtleties of 
disciplinary difference. DT’s ontic lens enables this. This is a core lesson 
from examining Moore (1991) whose analysis was epistemologically 
trapped by focusing on the similar, as opposed to the dissimilar. While 
broadly similar at the surface, the disciplines have many intricate, subtle, 
but informative differences. 
 
d) Accounting and law possess epistemological peculiarities, which renders 
epistemologically-based, interdisciplinary analysis difficult. In illustration, 
Chapter three demonstrated the degree of difference in the law and 
accounting’s conceptions of cost. As disciplines are epistemologically 
incommensurate, to examine their interface the ontological lens provided 
an approach to the epistemological challenges. In short, the ontological 
lens focuses on the construction of meanings in their social and cultural 
context. This study examined the construction of the meaning of the 
adoption of cost in legal regulation and the articulation of cost from an 
accounting perspective in the enactment and interpretation of the TA 
2001.  
 
Given the interface of law and accounting is articulatory and antagonistic, there is 
tremendous potential for further research due to the increasing scope of the interface. In 
particular, there is little research on the construction and presentation of accounting 
information for legal proceedings, on accountants as expert witnesses, and, discursively, 
how lawyers and accountants communicate, given the subtle but different languages 
unique to law and accounting.  
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More specifically, the interface of law and accounting invokes lessons for 
regulatory theory.  
C Regulatory Theory: In Illustration of the Interface of Law and Accounting 
 
This thesis focused on cost accounting assuming a central role in the regulation 
of telecommunications, which required reflection on regulatory theory, particularly 
from economic and post-structural perspectives regarding the following: 
a) As regulatory theory cuts across disciplines (law, accounting, economics, 
politics, and government) with multiple sites of contestable material, it 
requires ontic analysis. The disparity between economic regulatory theory 
such as Chicago and Harvard school economics, public interest regulation, 
and regulatory capture illustrates that regulatory theory is intimately 
linked to the social and political. To the extent that economic theorisations 
provide partial regulatory accounts, ignore the influence of competing 
accounts and paradigms, evaluate the failures of alternative approaches, 
and claim to provide comprehensive accounts of regulatory frameworks, 
there are social and political implications of economic approaches. 
 
b) Horwitz (1989) correctly concentrated on comprehensive theorising in the 
form of integrated historical, economic, and political accounts of 
regulation. However, this included a limited conception of the political, 
focusing on narrow, positivist politics, and consequently, underplaying 
power and politics. Thus, as Black (2002a) argues, there is a need to 
reinvigorate political analysis within regulation.   
 
c) Regulatory theory is complex by its very nature sitting across and 
alongside disciplines. Post-structural regulatory theory provides space to 
consider the ontic nature of the contestation over meanings. Black’s work 
develops regulatory theory but there are limitations that require 
articulation: 
 
i) Black’s analysis of regulation concentrates on the centred/decentred 
dichotomy (state/non-state dichotomy). While considering the scope of 
non-state regulatory pressures is an important movement in regulatory 
theory, such post-structural analysis should also challenge various 
‘forms’ of state-based regulation. The ‘decentred’ form of analysis, as 
demonstrated through the regulatory communications literature 
(Black, 2002a) indicates benefits from creating space to consider the 
regulatory effects and communication irrespective of the site of 
regulation (be it centred or decentred). The political still exists.  
 
ii) Black’s post-structural analysis is influenced by the Foucauldian 
approach to discourse, particularly in relation to the archive. Chapter 
five illustrated that Foucault requires the constitutive outside but fails 
to account for how this gets outside the archive. This is a limit to this 
analysis. The DT conception of ‘discourse’ in combination with the 
social, political, and fantasmatic logics, provides a framework to 
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understand how the ‘constitutive outside’ (the antagonistic element) 
takes its position through dislocation, articulation, and hegemony. 
These are all ‘events’ that the integrated logics of critical explanation 
should identify: e.g. this thesis illustrated that regulation is 
antagonised from multiple sources as in invoking ‘cost’ there is 
antagonism from accounting about the measurement and presentation 
of cost, but equally, there is antagonism of cost from ‘outside’, 
including the simplistic, objective assumption of law and economics. 
  
 
iii) With the linguistic turn of the post-structuralist project, there is scope 
to develop comprehensive ontic analysis of the employment of 
rhetoric in the construction of regulation. Equally, this thesis 
illustrated that regulatory politics and contestation permeates the 
regulatory phases, including the disruption of existing regulation, the 
institution of the new framework, and its interpretation and 
implementation. Linking post-structural regulation to DT is a powerful 
combination for understanding the present regulation, evaluating 
where regulation emerged, why it emerged, how it emerged, and 
where likely challenges and failures could result. 
 
d) Black’s (2002b) analysis of regulatory communications focuses on the 
provision of information in regulatory processes. However, Black’s 
analysis does not ‘question’ the information, but rather illustrates the 
tension of providing and receiving information. This thesis extended this 
analysis by examining the methodological, technical, and political levels 
of regulatory communication. This increased incentives for regulatory 
players to manipulate the information presented to the dispute forum. In 
an accounting sense, McBarnet (1996) warns that ‘creative accounting’ 
undermines law and regulation. Further, regulatory communication is not 
just about information, but is equally about strategy, regulatory games-
playing, and politics.  
 
e) Regulatory communication is also about political communication from the 
State to citizens. Rhetorically, the metaphor of regulation is that regulation 
‘resolves’. This plays an important ideological function (at the fantasmatic 
level) in this analysis. TSLRIC and net costing as regulatory drivers would 
solve the problems of the light-handed regime. However, analysis at the 
social and political logics suggested that ‘resolution’ is a myth and 
rhetorically, the empirical analysis unpacks this. 
 
f) Black’s call for discursive analysis of regulation is insightful, particularly 
due to the combination of micro and macro, and linguistic base and social 
science concerns (Black, 2002b, p. 196). However, there is unease in her 
analysis. Black is concerned about the ‘openness’ within discourse 
analysis and how this challenges law. But, what is law? What is 
accounting? Do they ‘exist’ per se? If it is accepted that the interface of 
law and accounting (and also regulation) is the site of antagonism and 
articulation, then this openness ontologically exists. Each instance the 
regulatory framework requires accounting information challenges and 
shapes the regulation and law. This thesis carefully showed that 
accounting and law are discursive constructions with no reified, a priori 
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existence. This invites the analysis of law and accounting as contingent, 
transitioning, changing, and evolving concepts.   
 
Thus, post-structural regulatory theory combines both micro- and macro-level analysis 
to provide space to examine internal political events with an integrated, external 
political overview: at the macro level in NZ, the drive to ‘re-regulate’ the State means 
that regulation is more common. Further, there are ever-increasing alternative 
regulatory pressures from community interest groups, non-governmental organisations, 
global capital markets, and consumers. These ‘decentred’ regulatory forces possess 
power. At the micro level, there is a process of articulation and antagonism as 
disciplines (law, accounting, and regulation) constitute and agitate. Given the discursive 
focus, the thesis examined the adversarial processes of cost construction in accounting 
at methodological, technical, and political levels, the adversarial nature of the political 
process in the construction, institution and implementation of new telecommunications 
regulation, and its ontological focus provides flexibility in order to conduct 
interdisciplinary research.  
 
This thesis developed post-structural regulatory theory by invoking post-Marxist 
DT.   
 
D Discourse Theory and the Empirics 
 
DT explains political ‘realities’ and movements, including societal complexity, 
the multiplicity of actors and organisations, and drawing together of seemingly 
disparate groups in the ‘name’ of a political goal. In considering regulation, the thesis 
argued that interrogating discursive constructions of social practices is appropriate 
given the range of discourses invoked: law, accounting, regulation, public policy, 
politics, and economics. The discursive focus invited rhetorical, genealogical, and 
deconstructive analysis to examine the strategies, effects, and aims of regulation, 
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industry players, Government, lawyers, accountants, and the use of cost accounting 
information in the regulatory process. Thus, in relation to DT: 
a) A distinguishing feature of concrete DT analysis is the combination of 
macro and micro political. This benefits empirical analysis as it 
discursively examines micro social events in relation to macro social 
movements. The introduction of cost accounting is contextualised in the 
re-regulation of telecommunications, which is contextualised in State re-
regulation. Through discursive events, DT conjoins the micro and the 
macro, through an analysis of antagonism and hegemony. 
b) The three levels of antagonism are a feature of DT. Antagonism operates 
as symbolic logic: the empirical analysis examined the structuring of 
discourse around the nodal points of TSLRIC and net costing (and 
subsequent signifies) through an analysis of equivalence and difference. 
Antagonism operates at the ideological, fantasmatic level through the 
constitution of the negative outside which constitutes, agitates and 
threatens the regulation (in this study, the “Baumol-Willig” pricing rule 
and ‘resolution’ are examples). Finally, antagonism operates the level of 
the ‘real’ by exposing the inherent impossibility of social structures and 
society being a closed, self-contained identity.  
  
c) DT is insightful on both law and accounting particularly through the shift 
to ontology and the ontic. Given the contestable and partial nature of both 
law and accounting there is tremendous scope for DT. The broad approach 
to ‘discourse’ furthers existing accounting literature by providing a 
theorised intervention into the discursive, extra-discursive, linguistic, and 
non-linguistic characteristics of accounting. Equally, the social, political, 
and fantasmatic ties sedimented social practices through the contested 
institution of those practices and associated ideological affects. Analysis 
in law and accounting tends to focus on one element in isolation, but in 
combination, this is a powerful, theorised intervention. 
 
d) The post-structural, post-Marxist spirit of DT develops existing critical 
theory literature in two ways. First, it enables critical and discursive 
analysis of areas where universal, singular signifiers may have been 
difficult to use: e.g. class based analysis would be difficult in this type of 
study. Although class would be a useful signifier, it would be limited in its 
analytical power (consider the limited explanatory power exhibited in 
Chapter two when considering each individual economic regulatory 
theory). Second, given multiple actors, interests, and perspectives, the 
ability to move between signifiers is a valuable aspect of the DT 
framework. The political, in a post-structural sense, is a mix of local 
politics possessing unique signifiers, but linked to macro-political 
movements.  
 
e) DT’s incorporation of the genealogical is beneficial for research in law 
and accounting. The adversarial nature of law and accounting suggests 
that genealogical analysis is fruitful in a democratising sense, as it allows 
the examination of exclusions, alternatives, and what was determined. 
This applies equally at the micro and macro level, but illustrates the 
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political nature of the decision making approaches of law and accounting. 
There is tremendous scope for such research in accounting and law. 
 
f) Perhaps the most challenging aspect of this thesis was the degree of 
translation and illustration required between DT and interface of law and 
accounting to make sense of the insights. This is partly to do with the 
dearth of research into the interface of law and accounting. However, 
more generally, the abstract, articulated language of DT (while insightful) 
renders it difficult to translate into day-to-day practices of accounting and 
law. This is somewhat concerning, and is a limitation of DT. As a theory 
of ‘discourse’ and ‘communication’, the fact that the language of DT 
alienates and loses a valuable section of the audience to which it wishes to 
communicate is problematic. DT research must continue to work at 
providing insight in a way that does not exclude or marginalise the 
audience that it trying to talk to. In my opinion, the logics of critical 
explanation (through the social, political, and fantasmatic) help this 
‘translation’. 
 
The complicated nature of the empirics required a flexible, political theoretical 
framework: as DT looks both internally to the processes of law, accounting, and 
regulation, and examines the external effects of the political process, DT re-
invigorates the political. Equally, the focus on ontology and the ontic allows the 
researcher to move through the bounded nature of epistemological, disciplinary 
inquiry, enabling the DT researcher to consider a broader range of research 
questions about the intersection of law, accounting, costing, regulation, and 
telecommunications. Finally, as law, accounting, and regulation are linguistic 
practices, concentrating on the act of persuasion through the employment of 
various rhetorical strategies, the focus on the linguistic turn is attractive. Law and 
accounting both present many examples that illustrate the limits of language, the 
scope for contestation, and articulation. 
 
 However, DT poses a set of challenges for research, primarily due to its 
articulated nature. The ‘negative ontology’ raises issues of commensurability for many 
research methods presuppose the concepts and structures that are used to understand the 
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social landscape. This is unsatisfactory for DT. Consequently, the thesis employed the 
logics of critical explanation.  
 
E Research Methods: The Logic of Critical Explanation 
 
As a methodological development of DT, Glynos and Howarth developed 
the logics of critical explanation, as well as providing a response to the normative 
and methodological deficits within DT. The five movements of the logics of 
critical explanation involve: 1) problematisation, where a concrete empirical case 
in DT examines a present problem; 2) retroduction, where a social fact is then 
identified and examined to understand what gave rise to it; 3) the three logics 
including social (sedimented social practices), political (institution of new social 
practices) and fantasmatic (how subjects are ideologically gripped); 4) 
articulation identifying privileged signifiers or reference points in a discourse; and 
5) critique through identifying dislocatory moments that are penetrated by radical 
contingency. Methodologically, there are series of lessons: 
a)  The logics of critical explanation, in analysing the social, political and 
fantasmatic provides a comprehensive analysis of political and social 
practice. This provides a unique way of considering sedimented social 
practices: what are they, what were they, what they could have been, how 
they got there, and what their ideological effects are. The combined nature 
of the analysis is unique, as analysis in law and accounting tends to focus 
on one element in isolation, but in combination, this provides a powerful, 
theorised intervention. 
  
b)  DT and the logics of critical explanation provide space to examine what is 
traditionally considered non-political. In particular, by concentrating on 
examining present problems, there is room to consider any current social 
practice and question and critique its ‘presence’. It does this by combining 
‘thick’ description with critique.  
 
c) The thesis employed document analysis and interviews with a strong 
experiential element, combining the non-reactive, linguistic research data 
of document analysis with the qualitative depth and flexibility of 
linguistic, reactive research data in the form of focused, unstructured 
interviews. The tools of data analysis included dislocation and rhetorical 
redescription. The examination of how actors construct the debate around 
the nodal point of ‘cost’ required the DT notion of dislocation. In 
particular, the thesis examined how interested actors succeeded in 
 - 307 - 
sedimenting TSLRIC as the new regulatory practice in interconnection 
and net costing for the TSO. Equally, the empirical questions examine 
rhetoric, and how actors articulate the metaphorical element of ‘cost’ in 
the agitation for costing methods, and in the implementation and 
application of the TA 2001. 
 
Thus, the logics of critical explanation identified and examined meanings attached to 
accounting information in construction, presentation, contestation, argument, and 
decision making. This places cost as an ontic tool, as there are different costs for 
different purposes. Finally, the act of application (determining the cost to apply to a 
particular situation) is an articulatory practice, which is a rhetorical technique.  
 
In qualitative, political research, there are two main research limitations. 
 
III RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
 
First, there are methodological limits. There is an experiential component to this 
research, based on my work as a regulatory lawyer. In part, these cannot be replicated 
and these influenced the reading of the telecommunications environment. Where 
possible, the experiential elements have been affirmed in interviews or with 
documentary sources, but this is incomplete.  
 
Qualitative research tends to attract criticism, primarily from positivists for the 
subjectivity of the research process, and in particular, problems of selection and 
generalisability. While these are acknowledged, the study employed appropriate 
qualitative methodology for the collection and analysis of data. The logics of critical 
explanation provide a considered methodology. Furthermore, this research is attempting 
to uncover subjectivities and nuances. In that light, it is counter-intuitive to apply 
‘objectivity’ criteria to the material.  
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At the end of the day, the qualitative researcher is a ‘research instrument’. I have 
analysed the interviews, documents, and experiences. Methodologically, this is ‘my’ 
researched story and my invitation is for you to examine and decide whether the 
conclusions are warranted based on the ‘record’ of this thesis.  
Secondly, there is a theoretical dichotomy. The articulation of DT is complex, 
but the empirical analysis is rich, informed, and quite simple. There are two potential 
limitations that flow from this: a) it is too far removed from day-to-day practice that the 
significance of the research is lost; b) the multi-faceted nature of the underpinning 
theoretical structure enables varying interpretations that are challengeable and 
contentious. Essentially, this risk can be minimised by engaging with interested and 
affected parties, keeping a firm grasp on empirical elements of the thesis, and telling a 
convincing, simple story. Again, this involves an invitation to examine and decide 
whether the conclusions are warranted based on the ‘record’ of this thesis. 
 
 
 - 309 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- APPENDICES - 
 
 
 - 310 - 
- Abbreviations - 
 
ABC: Activity Based Costing 
 
AC: Average Cost 
 
ACCC: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
 
ASRB: Accounting Standards Review Board  
 
ATPC: Australian Trade Practices Commission 
 
BT: British Telecom 
 
CAPM: Capital Asset Pricing Model  
 
CC: The Commerce Commission 
 
CCA: Current Cost Accounting 
 
CER: Closer Economic Relations (an economic arrangement between NZ and 
Australia) 
 
D: Demand 
 
DT: Discourse Theory 
 
EU: European Union 
 
FCC: Federal Communications Commission 
 
GAAP: Generally Accepted Accounting Practice 
 
ISP: Internet Service Providers 
 
KSO: Kiwi Share Obligation 
 
LRIC: Long Run Incremental Costs  
 
MC: Marginal Cost 
 
MED: Ministry of Economic Development 
 
MIT: Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications 
 
MJA: Marsden Jacobs Associates 
 
MR: Marginal Revenue 
 
MP: Member of Parliament 
 
NZ: New Zealand 
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NZIFRS: New Zealand Equivalents to the International Financial Reporting Standards 
 
OECD: the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 
OFTEL: The Office of Telecommunications 
 
P(m): Monopoly Price 
 
PAT: Positive Accounting Theory 
 
PSTN: Public Switched Telephony Network 
 
PWC: PricewaterhouseCoopers 
 
Q(m): Quantity supplied and demanded at monopoly price. 
 
SAC: Stand-alone Costs  
 
s: section 
 
TA: Telecommunications Act 2001 
 
TSLRIC: Total Service Long Run Incremental Costing 
 
TSO: Telecommunications Service Obligation 
 
TSPs: Telecommunications Service Providers 
 
TUANZ: The Telecommunications Users Association of New Zealand 
 
UK: United Kingdom 
 
USA: United States of America 
 
VTB: Value to Business 
 
WACC: Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
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- Appendix 1 - 
 
Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regulations 1999 
 
The Regulations detailed significant changes to Telecom’s disclosure regime including 
requiring Telecom to calculate and disclose the net economic cost of complying with 
the KSO obligations. Telecom had to disclose: 
 
i) Any losses incurred in complying with the KSO, including details of the 
amount of loss attributable to each KSO component, and the amount of 
loss attributable for to individual customer groups; and 
  
ii) The way it recovers KSO losses, including the internal or external sources 
for recovering losses, the amounts that Telecom recovered from each of 
sources, and the components of any charges that Telecom uses to recover 
these losses from. 
 
The Regulations prescribed principles for the calculation of the cost of the KSO: 
  
i) The cost of the KSO is the unavoidable net losses incurred by an efficient 
operator in providing the KSO-mandated services to the customers or 
groups of customers required;  
 
ii) The net cost calculation must be based on objective, transparent, non-
discriminatory and proportionate procedures and criteria;  
 
iii) The net cost calculation should identify the cost, less revenues and 
associated benefits of providing services covered by the KSO, to a 
customer or group of customers;  
 
iv) When calculating net cost, a quantification of the intangible benefits of 
being New Zealand’s only universal service provider, an implicit 
requirement of the KSO, should be added on the benefit side;  
 
v) The net costs of emergency services, directory services, directory listings 
and the provision of special equipment or services must be identified 
separately;  
 
vi) No account may be taken in calculating the net cost of KSO of obligations 
which are outside its scope other than those specifically included. 
 
Equally, the Regulations required Telecom to: 
 
i) publish an audited calculation of its KSO costs twice yearly in conjunction 
with the publication of its financial statements under the financial 
information disclosure regime;  
 
ii) disclose the full methodology used for calculating the above information 
(including any models used); and  
 
iii) to retain all data, including calculation models and associated 
documentation, for at least seven years. 
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Accounting Costing and Pricing for Designated Access Services 
 
Part 2 of Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act 2001 provides for a variety of 
pricing principles and methodologies, summarised in the following table: 
 
Designated 
Access Services 
Initial Pricing Principle Final Pricing Principle 
Interconnection 
with Telecom’s 
fixed PSTN 
Benchmarking against interconnection 
prices in comparable countries: 
(a) a forward-looking cost-based 
pricing method; or 
(b) if appropriate: 
(i) a pure bill and keep method; or 
(ii) a pure bill and keep method 
applied to two-way traffic in 
balance (or to a specified margin 
or out-of-balance traffic) and a 
forward-looking cost-based 
pricing method applied to out-of-
balance traffic (or traffic beyond a 
specified out-of-balance margin). 
Either – 
(a) TSLRIC  
(b) if appropriate: 
(i) a pure bill and keep method; or 
(ii)   a pure bill and keep method 
applied to two-way traffic in 
balance (or to a specified 
margin or out-of-balance 
traffic) and a forward-looking 
cost-based pricing method 
applied to out-of-balance traffic 
(or traffic beyond a specified 
out-of-balance margin). 
Interconnection 
with other PSTN 
other than 
Telecom’s PSTN 
Either – 
(a)     the price determined by the 
Commission (if any) for 
interconnection with a network of 
Telecom’s that corresponds most 
closely in nature to the access 
provider’s network; or 
(b)    a forward-looking cost-based 
pricing method; or 
(c)    if appropriate: 
(i)   a pure bill and keep method; or 
(ii)  a pure bill and keep method 
applied to two-way traffic in 
balance (or to a specified 
margin or out-of-balance 
traffic) and a forward-looking 
cost-based pricing method 
applied to out-of-balance traffic 
(or traffic beyond a specified 
out-of-balance margin). 
Either – 
(a)    the price determined by the 
Commission (if any) for 
interconnection with a network of 
Telecom’s that corresponds most 
closely in nature to the access 
provider’s network; or 
(b)   TSLRIC; or  
(c)    if appropriate: 
(i)  a pure bill and keep 
method; or 
(ii)    a pure bill and keep method 
applied to two-way traffic in 
balance (or to a specified 
margin or out-of-balance 
traffic) and a forward-looking 
cost-based pricing method 
applied to out-of-balance traffic 
(or traffic beyond a specified 
out-of-balance margin). 
Retail services 
offered by means 
of Telecom’s 
fixed 
telecommuni-
cations network 
Either – 
(a) retail price less a discount 
benchmarked against discounts in 
comparable countries that apply 
retail price minus avoided costs 
saved pricing in markets which 
Telecom faces limited, or is likely to 
face lessened, competition for that 
service; or 
(b) retail price less a discount 
benchmarked against discounts in 
comparable countries that apply 
retail price minus avoided costs 
saved pricing in markets which 
Telecom does not face limited, or 
lessened, competition for that 
service. 
Either – 
(a)    average or best retail price minus a 
discount comprising avoided costs 
saved pricing, in markets in which 
Telecom faces limited, or is likely to 
face lessened, competition for that 
service; or 
(b)    average or best retail minus a 
discount comprising actual costs 
saved, in markets which Telecom 
does not face limited, or lessened, 
competition for that service. 
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Designated 
Access Services 
Initial Pricing Principle Final Pricing Principle 
Residential local 
access and 
calling service 
offered by means 
of Telecom’s 
fixed 
Telecommuni-
cations network 
Telecom’s standard price for its price-
capped residential local access and calling 
service offered to end-users by means of 
its fixed telecommunications network in 
the relevant market, minus 2 %. 
Telecom’s standard price for its price-
capped residential local access and calling 
service offered to end-users by means of 
its fixed telecommunications network in 
the relevant market, minus actual costs 
saved. 
Bundle of retail 
services offered 
by means of 
Telecom’s fixed 
telecommuni-
cations network 
Wholesale price for the bundle is: 
(a) first, - 
               ( (100 - b) ) 
        a x ( ------------ ) = c 
                (    100    ) 
where – 
a = retail price of bundle 
b = discount (as a percentage) off the 
retail price for that bundle (benchmarked 
against comparable bundles in 
comparable countries) 
c = the wholesale price 
 
(b)   second, if Telecom’s price-capped 
residential access and calling service 
is included in the bundle, deduct 
from c a discount of 2% of the 
standard price. 
Wholesale price for the bundle is: 
        a – b = c 
where – 
a = retail price of bundle 
b = discount off the retail price for that 
bundle  
c = the wholesale price 
 
Retail services 
offered by means 
of Telecom’s 
fixed 
telecommuni-
cations network 
as part of a 
bundle of retail 
services 
Wholesale price for the retail service is: 
(a) in the case of Telecom’s price-capped 
residential access and calling service:  
               ( (100 - b) ) 
        a x ( ------------ ) = c 
                (    100    ) 
where – 
a = imputed retail price for the service 
b = is a 2% discount 
c = is the wholesale price 
 
(b) in the case of any other 
telecommunications service offered by 
Telecom in a bundle of retail services by 
means of its fixed telecommunications 
network: 
               ( (100 - b) ) 
        a x ( ------------ ) = c 
                (    100    ) 
where – 
a = imputed retail price for the service 
b = discount (as a percentage) off the 
imputed retail price for the service 
(benchmarked against comparable retail 
services in comparable countries) 
c = is the wholesale price 
Wholesale price for the retail service is: 
        a – b = c 
where – 
a = imputed retail price for the service 
b = discount off the imputed retail price 
for the service 
c = the wholesale price 
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1 Interpretation 
 
In this schedule, unless the context otherwise requires, - 
 
actual costs saved means the net costs saved by supplying the service on a 
wholesale rather than a retail basis to the access seeker 
 
avoided costs saved means the difference in the access provider’s costs between 
supplying the service on a wholesale basis only and supplying the service on both a 
wholesale and retail basis, including a share of retail-specific fixed costs 
 
fixed telecommunications network means - 
 
(a) any lines between a user's premises and the local telephone exchange or 
equivalent facility;  
(b) any fixed PSTN;  
(c) any telecommunications links between fixed PSTNs; 
(d) any fixed PDN;  
(e) any telecommunications links between fixed PDNs 
(f) any value-added telecommunications services associated with 
telecommunications services provided by those assets 
 
forward-looking common costs – 
 
(a) means those costs efficiently incurred by the service provider in providing the 
service that are not directly attributable to providing an additional unit to that 
service; but 
(b) does not include any costs incurred by the service provider in relation to a TSO 
instrument 
 
local loop network means that part of Telecom’s copper network that connects the 
end user’s building (or, where relevant, the building distribution frames) to the 
handover point in Telecom’s local telephone exchange or distribution cabinet (or 
equivalent facility) 
 
third generation cellular telephone network means a cellular telephone network 
based on the IMT 2000 set of radio technology standards as recognised by the 
International Telecommunication Union 
 
TSLRIC, in relation to a telecommunications service, - 
 
(a) means the forward-looking costs over the long run of the total quantity of the 
facilities and functions that are directly attributable to, or reasonably identifiable 
as incremental to, the service, taking into account the service provider's 
provision of other telecommunications services; and 
(b) includes a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs 
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Technical Accounting Requirements for the Calculation of the Net Cost of the TSO 
 
The Telecommunications Act 2001 provides extensive technical accounting 
requirements in relation to the TSO: 
 
a)  Within 60 days of the end of the financial year, liable persons and 
Telecommunications Service Providers [TSP] must provide prescribed 
information to the Commission [s 81(a) of the TA]. This currently 
includes: 
 
i) By s 83, the TSP must calculate the net cost of complying with the 
TSO.  
 
ii) By s 84, in calculating the net cost of compliance, TSPs must: 
 
• Consider the range of direct and indirect revenues and associated 
benefits from providing services to commercially non-viable 
customers, less the costs of providing those services; 
 
• Consider the provision of a reasonable return on incremental 
capital employed in providing services to commercially non-viable 
customers;  
 
• Provide information on profits from new telecommunications 
services with telecommunication capability not available to 
established telecommunication services; 
 
• Provide information to the Commission on losses from 
telecommunications services other than services that the TSO 
instrument requires the TSP to provide.  These losses must be 
excluded from the net cost calculation. 
 
b) Within 60 days of the end of the financial year, liable persons and TSPs 
must provide a report by a qualified auditor attesting to whether the 
information provided complies with the requirements of the Commission 
[s 81(b)]. 
 
The accounting requirements prescribed for the draft determination and the final 
determination concerning the TSO (net cost, revenue received, and amounts payable), 
as specified in ss 88 and 92, include: 
 
a)  If the TSO instrument does not contain a specified amount, the 
Commissioner must determine the net cost of complying with the TSO 
instrument for the TSP. This includes:  
 
i) All material information that relates to the calculation of the net cost, 
providing that such information would not unreasonably prejudice the 
commercial position of the TSP; 
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ii) The amount of revenue that the TSP receives from providing 
telecommunications services by means of its PSTN; 
 
b) The amount of revenue that each liable person in relation to the TSO 
instrument receives from providing telecommunications services by 
means of its PSTN; 
 
c) Any reduction to the amount that a TSP will receive from all liable 
persons for not complying with the TSO instrument; 
 
d) A statement that identifies the revenue basis, pursuant to s 85(1), in 
respect of each amount of revenue to which the draft determination 
applies. The Act requires the Commissioner to determine the appropriate 
revenue basis in relation to revenue received by a liable person in relation 
to the TSO instrument, and provides the following guidance: 
 
i)  The Commissioner may use a revenue basis with no weights or a 
weighted revenue basis where some or all revenue amounts are 
multiplied by a weight; 
 
ii)  In using a weighting, the Commissioner must disclose the particulars 
of the weighting attached to that amount of revenue; 
 
e) The revenue amounts that will be used for the purposes of calculating the 
amount payable by each liable person in relation to the TSO instrument; 
 
f) In the draft determination, the Commissioner must disclose the 
methodology applied in determining the amounts liable;  
 
g) In the final determination, the Commissioner must determine the amount 
payable by each liable person in relation to the TSO instrument to the TSP 
for the financial year. Section 93 provides the relevant methodology for 
calculating the amount payable by liable persons: 
 
 Calculation Formula 
Where the TSO instrument 
contains a specified amount, the 
formula is: 
                        a   
                       ---  x (c - d) 
                        b 
Where the TSO instrument does 
not contain a specified amount, 
the formula is: 
                  a                  b 
                 ---  x (e x (------- ) - d) 
                  b               f + b  
Where: 
a = amount of revenue of the liable person in relation to the TSO instrument in 
providing telecommunications services by means of its PSTN or by TSP’s PSTN. 
b = sum of the amounts of revenue of each liable person 
c = the specified amount 
d = amount of any reduction for non-compliance with TSO instrument 
e = net cost of TSP complying with TSO instrument 
f = amount of revenue of the TSP from providing telecommunications services by 
means of its PSTN 
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I THE LIMITATIONS AND CRITIQUES OF DISCOURSE THEORY 
 
Given the interdisciplinary nature of this project, there are various applicable 
theoretical frameworks that could inform this thesis. One DT strength, however, is that 
its highly articulated theoretical nature allows a broad range of analysis under the 
umbrella of the overarching theoretical framework. However, DT is subject to various 
critiques. Consequently, the following centres around three critiques: 
 
a)  Critiquing post-structuralism; 
 
b)  Critiquing post-Marxism; and  
 
c)  Critiquing Laclau and Mouffe’s DT. 
 
The following discussion considers each of these criticisms in turn. 
 
A Critiques of Post-Structuralism 
 
Devenney argues that it is “unsurprising … that post-structuralist theory is 
viewed with scepticism by many political scientists, since it entails a critical 
interrogation of the objects, subjects and tools naturalised by disciplines” (Devenney, 
2002, p. 176). For DT, Devenney acknowledges that critics argue that post-
structuralism undermines: 
 
1) the moral justification for the critique of inequality by questioning the 
universal nature of morals, drawing on the socially constructed nature of 
moral justification;  
 
2) the autonomy of the subject responsibility, by arguing the openness of 
subject construction, and by implicating the State, rendering it partly 
responsible; and 
 
3) liberal democracy by rendering ‘representation’ relative, questioning the 
legitimacy of representative institutions, and by doubting ‘democratic will 
formation’, by holding that the ‘will of the people’ is a convenient fiction 
(Devenney, 2002).  
 
Thus, critical theorists argue that post-structuralism provides no basis for political 
action, by providing no political vision or means of achieving a better society, as each 
position is inherently open and contingent (Epstein, 1996). In part, this misses the point 
of DT, which suggest no particular political motivation, other than politics itself, but 
holds that the specifics of politics is at the local and particular level. Thus, the critical 
theory critique is perhaps overstated, as not all philosophical movements have a 
particular political persuasion: having no 'particular' politics is not necessarily an 
indictment as this is common of many political, intellectual, and artistic movements. In 
conclusion, though, as indicated in Chapter five, post-structuralism requires 
structuralism, and equally, post-structuralism may be ‘more’ political than 
structuralism, for it does not provide a definition of ‘universal’ political movements 
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(such as class, etc) and is open to different, unique, local, and particular conceptions of 
the political.  
 
Thus, the next section considers how Marxists critique this post-Marxist claim to 
‘particular’ politics.  
 
 
B Critiques of Post-Marxism 
 
The criticisms of the post-Marxist aspects of DT concentrate on ‘class 
reductionism’, and readings of Althusser and Gramsci (Geras, 1987).  
 
1)  DT is critiqued as being a ‘performative’ act of identification as post-
Marxist, rather than politics or a theory. By hegemonically constructing 
subjects as ‘post-Marxist’ and ‘post-Marxist’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), 
critics argue that this form of Marxist revisionism provides little to address 
current political concerns. Consequently, if Marxist theory is the ‘opiate of 
the people’, then Laclau and Mouffe are the ‘the opiate of the intellectuals’ 
(Geras, 1997).  
 
2) For DT, antagonism is a key concept, but the post-Marxist conception of 
antagonism receives significant criticism. Laclau and Mouffe distinguish 
theoretically between relations of subordination and relations of 
oppression (2001, pp. 152-159), parallel to the structure/struggle 
distinction in Marxism. The first level of critique, here, results from 
Laclau and Mouffe holding that relations of subordination cannot be 
antagonistic: 
 
simply, a set of differential positions between social agents, . . . a system of 
differences which constructs each social identity as positivity” … “Serf”, 
“Slave”, and so on, do not designate in themselves antagonistic positions; it is 
only in terms of a different discursive formation, such as “the rights inherent 
to every human being”, that the differential positivity of these categories can 
be subverted and the subordination constructed as oppression. This means that 
there is no relation of oppression without the presence of a discursive 
“exterior” from which the discourse of subordination can be interrupted 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 154). 
 
An identity is antagonistic when, through displacement of the democratic 
discourse, the relation of subordination is discursively constructed as an 
external imposition: 
 
[I]t is only by coming out of itself and hegemonising external elements that 
the identity of the two poles of the antagonism is consolidated. The 
strengthening of specific democratic struggles requires, therefore, the 
expansion of chains of equivalence which extend to other struggles (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001, p. 182).  
 
Consequently, Marxists argue that DT reduces Marxism’s historicised-
material account of the working class through the tendency of the 
productive forces’ development to the moment which forms its 
culmination: “the capitalist relations of production constitute an 
insurmountable obstacle to the advance of these productive forces” 
(Geras, 1987, p. 77). This reduction allows them to describe struggles over 
the “general” development of the forces of production as struggles 
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external to their capitalist development (and the class antagonism that 
permeates it). 
 
3) Laclau and Mouffe incorporate Althusser’s overdetermination. However, 
critics claim that DT overstates the use of ‘overdetermination’ within 
Althusser’s work, without due regard to Althusser’s own comments on the 
incorporation of the concept: 
 
[N]ot only do Laclau and Mouffe misunderstand and therefore misappropriate 
[Althusser’s] concept of overdetermination, but that this misappropriation 
fatally undermines the book’s analysis of social space and of the possibilities 
for political action within that space” (Lewis, 2005, p. 3). 
 
Laclau and Mouffe reinterpret Althusser use of overdetermination by 
focusing on analysing overdetermination as a broad socio-economic 
concept, which allows DT to expose ‘essentialism’ within Marxist theory. 
It is the argument that the social constitutes itself as a symbolic order: 
 
the symbolic or overdetermined character of social relations … implies that 
[these relations] lack an ultimate literality which would reduce them to 
necessary moment of an immanent law … (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 98). 
 
For Lewis, this is the key movement for Laclau and Mouffe, 
demonstrating how overdetermination justifies a conception of the social 
as an open system comprised of largely determined, but open subjects 
(Lewis, 2005). Althusser incorporates the term ‘overdetermination’ into 
his essay, “On the Materialist Dialectic” (1968), acknowledging that he 
borrows the term from psychoanalysis. Lewis argues that when one 
borrows a term this does not mean that the word remains unchanged from 
its origin or that Althusser suggests anything like Laclau and Mouffe’s 
assertion that ‘overdetermination’ equals ‘symbolic’ equals ‘not tied down 
to any real’ (Lewis, 2005). In fact, in “Contradiction and 
Overdetermination”, Althusser states that he “is not particularly taken by 
this term” but that he “chooses to use [overdetermination] in the absence 
of anything better, both as an index and as a problem …” (Althusser, 
1968, p. 84).  
 
Thus, there is a marked difference in the conceptions of overdetermination 
between Laclau and Mouffe and Althusser: 
 
Viewing Marxism as a discursive practice, [Laclau and Mouffe] see Marx as 
not having searched for understanding of the material constraints on human 
life, but instead as having devised a new social imaginary, new terms of social 
cleavage … historical materials on does not, on this view, explain class 
conflict but merely legitimates it (Rustin, 1988, p. 153). 
 
Lewis concludes by arguing that due to Laclau and Mouffe’s privileging 
of discourse as the sole experiential medium (and the concomitant denial 
of a subject’s lived relation with a material real distinct from that subject’s 
ideas about that real), this is really ‘a thoroughly idealist political 
philosophy’ (Lewis, 2005). 
 
4)  Critics argue that Laclau and Mouffe ‘evade’ the origins of hegemony, 
irrespective of advocating for Foucauldian genealogy. For critics, a 
‘proper’ understanding of hegemony requires consideration of the Russian 
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context, particularly including Plekhanov’s emphasis on the importance of 
political struggle, class alliances, and consciousness (1978). For critics, 
Laclau and Mouffe concentrate too heavily on how and why hegemony 
articulates some agents or some interests rather than others (as hegemony 
creates social agents). This is problematic as they deny any pre-discursive 
social positions, and by arguing that interests are simply articulated 
identities, Laclau and Mouffe effectively conceptualise away social 
structure and relations of exploitation (Critchley, 2005). 
 
Therefore, the criticisms of the post-Marxist movement within Laclau and Mouffe’s DT 
concentrate on challenging the politics of DT arguing that it is only a performative act 
of identification, critiquing the notion of externalising antagonism through the 
distinction between oppression and subordination, by challenging the incorporation of 
overdetermination by arguing that there is a marked difference in the meaning of the 
terms as originally used by Althusser and how it is used by Laclau and Mouffe, and 
finally, challenging the use of hegemony by ignoring the insights of the Russian 
context. To these critiques, Laclau and Mouffe hold that it is necessary to move beyond 
Marx in its original form, but acknowledge that DT requires Marx. 
 
1 Response to post-Marxist criticisms 
 
Laclau and Mouffe respond by explaining why it is “necessary today to go 
beyond the theoretical and political horizon of Marxism” (1987, p. 106). Laclau and 
Mouffe pay tribute to the ability of Marxist theory to illustrate the tendency in the ‘self-
development’ of capitalism and associated antagonisms, but “the analysis is incomplete 
and … parochial” (1987, p. 106): 
 
Today we know that the dislocation effects which capitalism generates at the 
international level are much deeper than the ones foreseen by Marx. This obliges 
us to radicalise and to transform in a variety of directions Marx’s conception of the 
social agent and of social antagonisms (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, pp. 106-107). 
 
In terms of politics, Laclau and Mouffe argue that it is necessary to abandon the 
“myth of the transparent and homogeneous society – which implies the end of politics” 
(1987, p. 106). Consequently: 
 
[b]y locating socialism in the wider field of the democratic revolution, we have 
indicated that the political transformations which will eventually enable us to 
transcend capitalist society are founded on the plurality of social agents and of 
their struggles. Thus the field of social conflict is extended, rather than being 
concentrated in a ‘privileged agent’ of socialist change. This also means that the 
extension and radicalisation of democratic struggle does not have a final point of 
arrival in the achievement of a fully localised society. There will always be 
antagonisms, struggles, and partial opaqueness of the social; there will always be 
history (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, p. 107). 
 
Laclau and Mouffe acknowledge that Marxists and post-Marxists will not see eye-to-
eye, but argue that the movement is necessary: 
 
We believe that, by clearly locating ourselves in a post-Marxist terrain, we not 
only help to clarify the meaning of contemporary social struggles but also to give 
Marxism its theoretical dignity, which can only proceed from recognition of its 
limitations and of its historicality. Only through such recognition will Marx’s 
work remain present in our tradition and our political culture (Laclau & Mouffe, 
1987, p. 108). 
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In summary, though, as post-structuralism requires structuralism, so post-
Marxism requires Marxism. Thus, the next section considers the criticisms of Laclau 
and Mouffe’s work itself. 
 
C Critiques of Laclau and Mouffe 
 
There are a variety of criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe’s DT. With a highly 
articulated theoretical construction, DT is a target for theoretical, philosophical, and 
political critique. Torfing acknowledges that a recurrent series of critiques of DT 
predominantly “concentrate on the consequences of adopting a discourse theoretical 
perspective” (Torfing, 2005, p. 18). The following section presents ten common 
critiques of DT, beginning with Torfing challenging five common DT critiques.  
 
1) Critics allege that DT leads to idealism, based upon the assertion that the 
discursive character of all social meanings and identities leads to a denial 
of the independent existence of reality. As discussed, though, this 
constitutes a misreading of the constitutive nature of discourse, for DT 
does not deny that matter exists independent of our consciousness, 
thoughts, and language, but rather that nothing follows from matter alone: 
 
In fact, the social forms that render matter intelligible are neither passive 
reflections of an immanent essence of the experienced objects nor are they 
constituted by the omnipotence of the experiencing subject that reduces the 
object to a thought object. Rather, intelligible social forms are constructed in 
and through different discourses … First, the discursive construction of matter 
in and through processes of discursive signification also tends to produce or at 
least reinforce particular subjectivities … Second, matter does not merely 
await a particular signification that is stamped upon it by discourse. 
Discursive forms play an active role in constructing that which they signify … 
Third, the discourses that construct matter as a meaningful object are 
constantly disrupted by dislocation and social antagonism. The dream of 
constructing a final vocabulary that captures the world as it really is must be 
abandoned because there is always an unrepresentable kernel that prevents the 
symbolic order of a discursive system from fixing social meaning in a way 
that completely absorbs matter. Hence, discourse theory subscribes not only to 
the realist idea of independently existing matter, but also to the materialist 
insistence on an irreducible distance between the form and matter (Torfing, 
2005, p. 18). 
  
2) Some critics argue that DT holds a ‘nihilistic relativism’. This ‘relativist 
gloom’ flows from DT’s foundational lack, and thus, if everything is 
discursive, it is then impossible to defend a particular set of claims about 
truth, good, bad, right, or wrong. Torfing acknowledges that DT does hold 
that there is “no such thing as an extra-discursive truth, morality, or 
ethics”, but moves to argue that conclusion is incorrect, as “we never find 
ourselves in a situation where we are prepared to contend that all claims 
are equally valid” (Torfing, 2005, p. 19). Consequently: 
 
We are always part of a particular discourse that provides us with a set of 
relatively determinate values, standards, and criteria for judging something to 
be true or false, right or wrong, good or bad … However, the different 
cultures, traditions, and contexts that condition our truth claims are constantly 
dis-articulated and re-articulated through processes of mutual learning, 
political struggles, or violent conflicts. No discourse can be protected from 
contestation and contamination as their boundaries are continuously breached 
and redrawn (Torfing, 2005, p. 19).
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3) Critics challenge DT’s explanatory capacity, doing little more than 
describing the articulatory practices within and between various 
discourses, and thus, understanding, but not explaining social, political, 
and culture life. Howarth cautions against seeing understanding and 
explanation as opposites (Howarth, 2000), while Winch emphasises that 
explanation always requires some understanding and that “explanation is 
an attempt to complete our initial and somewhat fragmented 
understanding of a state of affairs” (Winch, 1990). For Torfing, this 
represents an ‘appropriate’ blurring of the lines between explanation and 
understanding: 
 
In keeping with Winch’s blurring of the lines separating explanation and 
understanding, we might ask how discourse theory attempts to explain things. 
Discourse theory opposes the causal explanations of social phenomena, which 
harness empirical events to the yoke of universal laws. It does not accept that 
the task of the social scientist should be to establish a covering law (Hempel, 
1966) or to reveal the intrinsic causal properties of social objects (Bhaskar, 
1988). Instead discourse theory aims to describe, understand, and explain how 
and why particular discursive formations were constructed, stabilised, and 
transformed. In order to reveal the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
discourse to be shaped and reshaped in a particular way, discourse theory 
employs a contextualised conceptual tool kit that includes important concepts 
like dislocation, hegemony, social antagonism etc. In other words, invoking 
Aristotle’s distinction between different scientific rationalities, we might 
conclude that discourse theory is a phonetic rather than epistemic theory. It 
aspires to both understand and explain social phenomena, through 
contextualised studies of the historical conditions in which discourse emerge 
and take effect (Torfing, 2005, pp. 19-20). 
 
4) Critics challenge DT’s ambition to criticise the discourses that it analyses 
(Torfing, 2005, p. 20). For Torfing, the argument is incorrect: 
 
First, discourse theory does not discard the emancipatory values of the 
Enlightenment. We are thrown into a political culture pregnant with 
emancipatory hopes that we do want to abandon. However, the problem is that 
emancipation is both necessary and impossible … Power has no deep 
foundation and resistance to power entails only the substitution of one power 
configuration for another, which on pragmatic grounds, we judge more 
agreeable. Second, discourse theory does not support the unrestrained 
proliferation of difference, which legitimises all political projects in the name 
of diversity. Certainly, we should, both analytically and in the kind of politics 
we pursue, try to avoid reducing difference to identity and the alterity of the 
other to our domesticated image of the other. However, the idea of a limitless 
diversity is self-defeating, since diversity can only exist to the extent that we 
are willing to repress those forces that seek to eliminate diversity. Intolerance 
towards the intolerant is the condition of possibility for tolerance. Finally, 
while it is true that all ethical and normative claims can be deconstructed, this 
does not mean that critique is impossible. We just have to rethink the very 
idea of critique. Critique should not consist of measuring a current state of 
affairs against some pre-established yardstick, defining once and for all what 
is right and good. It should rather take the form of an attempt to deconstruct 
the closure invoked by ethical, normative, political, cultural, economic, and 
other discourses … The conceptual and pragmatic undecidables that are 
revealed through deconstruction escape definition and institutionalisation, but 
are captured by the promise of something yet to come and always endlessly 
deferred. As such, we can criticise the eminently deconstructable law in the 
face of the indeconstructable justice, which is always justice to come. We can 
do that by confronting the totalising closure it produces with the aporias it 
fails to eliminate and which point towards an unrealised sense of justice 
(Torfing, 2005, p. 20). 
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5) DT is ‘guilty’ of the liar’s paradox, a performative contradiction: in 
claiming to be anti-essentialist, DT makes an essentialist stipulation about 
the world as having no essence. Torfing challenges this critique: 
 
If we accept that the claim about the absence of a deep essence of the social 
world is a decontextualised and thus truly universal statement, there is no 
logical escape from the performative contradiction. However, a closer 
analysis of the semantics reveals the paradox as being based on a fallacy of 
equivocation. The essence ends up meaning two different things in the claim 
‘there is no essence’ and the claim that ‘the stipulation of the absence of 
essences is an essentialist stipulation’. Hence, when discourse theorists claim 
that there is no essence they take issues with the metaphysical idea of a 
positively defined essence that is given in and by itself and from which it is 
possible to derive a whole series of determinate effects. Now, for the claim 
that there is no such essence to be an essentialist stipulation it requires that the 
affirmation of the absence of a deep ground of social identities produces a 
series of determinate effects. This requirement is exactly what is not fulfilled. 
Whereas it is possible to derive a whole series of effects from a positively 
defined ground, nothing which follows from the affirmation on an abyss of 
pure negativity … the rejection of an essentialist grounding of the social 
world cannot fulfil the role of a new essentialist ground (Torfing, 2005, p. 21).    
 
6) Critics challenge the arcane nature of the writing style, which is common 
to post-structural political theorists. Epstein criticises Laclau and Mouffe’s 
call for radical democratic politics, as “no one outside a small group of 
academics familiar with this vocabulary could be expected to understand 
it” (Epstein, 1988). For Epstein, the political movement is more about 
‘performance’ than politics.  
 
7) The Hegelian critique of discourse theory concentrates on the inherent 
contradiction of presupposing exactly what it omits: the totality of an 
inter-subjective rationality expressed in the medium of a shared language. 
There is a performative contradiction in Laclau and Mouffe in that the 
gesture by which they deny the possibility of a shared universe of 
meanings, they demonstrate that their argument relies on such a totality 
for its intelligibility. Hegelian’s argue that what their argument says (the 
constative value of the propositions) and what it does (its performative 
character) by being said are in contradiction with each other: hence, a 
“performative” contradiction (Dallmayr, 2004, pp. 43-44). The post-
Hegelian critique challenges DT ‘excessive’ emphasis on autonomous 
action and initiative, as evidenced by the incorporation of Luxemburg’s 
‘logic of spontaneism’ (Dallmayr, 2004, p. 45). 
 
8) Bertram accuses Laclau and Mouffe of fetishising ‘dislocation’, as the 
direct result of democracy and widespread capitalism (1995, p. 83). For 
Bertram, “[Laclau and Mouffe] are uninterested in any alternative to 
consumerism and representative (liberal) democracy” (1995, p. 83).  For 
Bertram, the belief in democratic hegemony results in Laclau and Mouffe 
too easily accepting everything that comes with it, for the simple reason 
that there is not one unified thing that everyone can believe in (a 
transcendental guarantor). Thus, this lack of unity allows a freedom never 
previously attainable: “we are free only once we are splintered, once we 
are dislocated; we are never truly unified and neither is society, but we are 
free because we have multiple choices” (Bertram, 1995, p. 84). Thus, 
Bertram critiques DT for trying to have it both ways: the fetishising of 
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dislocation is understandable if they warrant it with creating the pluralism 
they praise, but Bertram argues that unity can never be formed of disunity.  
 
9)  Zizek argues that Laclau and Mouffe’s construct hegemony upon a 
contradiction between the view of society and the view of the subject. For 
DT, society is open, due to the notion of impossibility and possibility. For 
Zizek, in DT, each subject position is closed to other subject positions. 
Zizek argues that it is not possible to have an open society with closed 
subject positions; it is necessary to have lack in both society and the 
subject. For Zizek, Lacanian theory of subjectivity provides an answer, as 
subjects are developed on the existence of a lack. Within psychoanalysis 
subjects constitute in the lack, and society is lacking (Zizek, 1985; Butler, 
Laclau & Zizek, 2000).  
 
McRobbie (1992), similarly, argues that DT simply replaces one set of 
limits with another set of limits, instead of removing the limits of 
structural theory. That is, in privileging ‘openness’, identity is key and any 
struggles over the meanings of identities are inherent to those identities. 
McRobbie argues that: 
 
[w]hen contingency is combined with equivalence and when no social group 
is granted a privileged place as an emancipatory agent, then a form of 
relational hegemony can extend the sequence of democratic antagonisms 
through a series of social displacements (McRobbie, 1992, p. 724). 
 
McRobbie challenges the utility of DT relating identity to openness and 
politics, when there is no scope for ‘taking sides’. McRobbie argues: 
 
… if emancipatory politics amounts to nothing more than ad hoc 
arrangements between “popular forces” which emerge contingently, then the 
moment of critique and contestation can be evaded. That is, any practice that 
one might be engaged in is potentially as important and useful as that of 
anyone else, or at least there would be no grounds for denying this. In this 
case, if various practices are “combined”, there is always the possibility that 
they will “add up” to emancipatory results. Or not. At any rate, there are no 
grounds for critique as a central element of political struggle (McRobbie, 
1992, p. 731). 
 
With respect to both Zizek and McRobbie, the tension with regards to 
‘openness’ is no more than saying that it is impossible to achieve final 
closure of structure and identity, but equally, in order for politics and due 
to human nature, there is a necessity to close identities in the short term. 
Thus, this is a duality – there is closure, but that closure is an illustration 
of the openness of systems or identity, for that which names the closure is 
unnameable or outside the structure. The structure is tendentially closed, 
but open – both society and subjects. 
 
10) Critics challenge DT for the impossibility of conceiving of a universal, or 
of conceiving of a universal that is tendentially empty. Gasché, for 
example, is concerned with Laclau and Mouffe emptying of the universal, 
arguing that it is a reaction to the rationalist, universalistic discourse of 
capitalism. For Gasché, a certain notion of universality it necessary for 
any constitution of the social and political: 
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[the universal] is absolutely essential for any kind of political interaction, for 
if the latter took place without universal reference, there would be no political 
interaction at all: we would only have either a complementarity of differences 
which would be totally non-antagonistic, or a totally antagonistic one, one 
where differences entirely lack any commensurability, and whose only 
possible resolution is the mutual destruction of the adversaries (Gasché, 2004, 
18). 
 
Gasché prime question is how empty is empty? The construction of 
radical democracy, premised upon hegemony and the logic of the empty 
signifier, must hold that the universal is empty of or absent of an ultimate 
telos. It is not that Gasché is attempting to posit fixity to the universal 
space, and in fact, Gasché acknowledges the ability for various particulars 
to fill the universal space, but rather how does an empty signifier fill such 
a space, and why does it have to be empty? For Gasché, these arguments 
imply that the space is not altogether empty, as not all particulars are 
capable of filling the space (Gasché, 2004, pp. 32-33). 
 
In conclusion, there are a series of challenges to DT. This is common to any 
philosophical movement. The development of the logics of critical explanation, in 
response to the methodological and normative deficits of DT, cannot satisfy all of 
these concerns, but they do help to shift DT, rendering it more approachable and 
usable.   
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- Appendix 5 - 
 
Tables of Submissions to the Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications 
 
SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED ON THE ISSUES PAPER: MIT 
Submission No. Name 
001 Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd 
002 Tasman Milk Products Ltd 
003 Australian Information Industry Association (AIIA) 
004 Noel Reid 
005 Neil James 
006 The Resource Rentals for Revenue Association (International) 
007 Standards New Zealand 
008 Nokia NZ Ltd 
009 Craig Morley 
010 Telecommunications Users Association of New Zealand (TUANZ) 
011 Kim Robinson 
012 Deaf Association of New Zealand (Inc) 
013 Minister for Rural Affairs 
014 Geoff Hindle 
015 John Crook Consulting 
016 Auckland City Libraries 
017 Kiwi Co-Operative Dairies Ltd, New Zealand Co-Operative Dairy Company, 
The New Zealand Dairy Board 
018 David L Hopkins 
019 John Small 
020 Credit Suisse First Boston NZ Ltd 
021 Peter Campbell 
022 Clear Communications Ltd 
023 Ericsson Communications Ltd 
024 POTENZ International Ltd 
025 New Zealand Business Roundtable 
026 Vodafone Airtouch Ltd 
027 Sky Network Television Ltd 
028 Frontier Economics 
029 Network Economics Consulting Group Pty Ltd 
030 Rural Women of New Zealand 
031 Television New Zealand 
032 IHUG 
033 Christchurch City Council 
034 Broadcast Communications Ltd (BCL) 
035 Vodafone New Zealand Ltd 
036 Information Technology Association of New Zealand (ITANZ) 
037 Employers and Manufacturers' Association (EMA) 
038 Southland District Council 
039 Riverton Community Board 
040 Progress Southland 
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041 Federated Farmers of New Zealand (Inc) 
042 Newcall Group Ltd 
044 Graeme Everton 
045 New Zealand Manufacturers Federation Inc 
046 Royal New Zealand Foundation for the Blind 
047 Disabled Persons Assembly (NZ) Inc 
048 Telstra Saturn Ltd 
049 Walker Wireless Ltd 
050 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd 
051 Consumers’ Institute 
052 Wellington Regional Chamber of Commerce 
053 Nortel Networks Australia Pty Ltd 
054 Geraldine Telecom Subscribers’ Action Committee 
055 UnitedNetworks Ltd 
 
SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED ON THE DRAFT REPORT: MIT 
Submission No. Name 
001 David Annett 
002 Janice Gray 
003 Web InterNet Ltd 
004 Michael Causley 
005 H Jessurun 
006 Grant Elder 
007 Rob WM Dowler 
008 Alan Brown 
009 Bill Keir 
010 Roger Duke 
011 Brian Bithell 
012 Perce Harpham 
013 Neil James 
014 Tricia Fitzgerald 
015 Alan Kemp 
016 South Catlins Promotions Inc 
017 Te Horo Telecom Users’ Group 
018 The Internet Group Ltd (IHUG) 
019 Nokia NZ Ltd 
020 Julie Pearse 
021 Nikolas Haden 
022 Campaign Against Foreign Control of Aotearoa 
023 Henk Klos 
024 Dr Nevil Brownlee 
025 Deaf Association of New Zealand (Inc) 
026 Don Wallace & Associates Ltd 
027 The Australian Information Industry Association - AIIA 
028 Telecommunications Users Association of New Zealand - TUANZ 
029 Ministry of Consumer Affairs 
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030 Kim Robinson 
031 Ministry of Education 
032 Muaupoko Co-Operative Society 
033 Royal Foundation for the Blind 
034 eVentures New Zealand Ltd 
035 Nortel Networks 
036 DPA (New Zealand) Ltd 
037 J Paterson 
038 Telstra Saturn Ltd 
039 Communications Centres Service Centre (New Zealand Police) 
040 Vodafone New Zealand Ltd 
041 New Zealand Business Roundtable 
042 Strath Taieri Community Board 
043 Broadcast Communications Ltd 
044 Clear Communications Ltd 
045 Mike Fouhy 
046 Ericsson Communications Ltd 
047 Maui Solomon 
048 Rural Women New Zealand 
049 WorldxChange Ltd 
050 Consumers’ Institute 
051 Television New Zealand Ltd 
052 Alcatel Australia Ltd 
053 IBM New Zealand Ltd 
054 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd 
055 Australian Electrical & Electronic Manufacturers’ Association Ltd 
056 Paul Buddle Communication Pty Ltd 
057 Federated Farmers of New Zealand (Inc) 
058 Information Technology Department, University of Canterbury 
059 Call Plus Ltd / Free InternetAccess Ltd (i4free) / Attica Communications Ltd 
060 Tony Girling 
062 The Internet Society of New Zealand Inc. 
063 E-Phone Ltd 
064 Lex Dean 
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MIT: SCHEDULE OF HEARINGS 
 
Time Monday 
14 August 
Tuesday 
15 August 
Wednesday 
16 August 
Thursday 
17 August 
Friday 
18 August 
9:00am 
–10:30am 
050 Telecom 
Corporation of 
New Zealand 
Ltd 
035 Vodafone 
New Zealand 
Ltd 
036 
Information 
Technology 
Association of 
New Zealand 
(ITANZ)  
051 
Consumers’ 
Institute 
11:00am 
–1:00pm 
050 Telecom 
Corporation of 
New Zealand 
Ltd 
017 Kiwi Co-
Operative 
Dairies Ltd, 
New Zealand 
Co-Operative 
Dairy 
Company, The 
New Zealand 
Dairy Board  
018 David L 
Hopkins 
021 Peter 
Campbell 
047 Disabled 
Persons 
Assembly 
(NZ) Inc  
041 Federated 
Farmers of 
New Zealand 
(Inc) 
2:00pm 
–3:30pm 
048 Telstra 
Saturn Ltd 
030 Rural 
Women of 
New Zealand  
045 New 
Zealand 
Manufacturers 
Federation Inc 
4:00pm 
–5:30pm 
026 Vodafone 
Airtouch Ltd 
044 Graeme 
Everton 
Panel in 
Recess 
Panel in 
Recess 
Panel in 
Recess 
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Time Monday 
21 August 
Tuesday 
22 August 
Wednesday 
23 August 
Thursday 
24 August 
Friday 
25 August 
9:00am 
–10:30am 
031 Television 
New Zealand  
001 Paul Budde 
Commu- 
nication Pty Ltd 
022  
Clear Commu- 
nications Ltd 
010  TUANZ 
11:00am 
–1:00pm 
027 Sky Network 
Television Ltd 
022  
Clear Commu- 
nications Ltd 
029 Network 
Economics 
Consulting 
Group Pty Ltd 
2:00pm 
–3:30pm 
049 Walker 
Wireless Ltd 
047 Disabled 
Persons 
Assembly (NZ) 
Inc 
  
4:00pm 
–5:30pm 
  025 New 
Zealand Business 
Roundtable 
  
Panel in 
Recess 
Panel in 
Recess 
 
Time Monday 
28 August 
Auckland 
Tuesday 
29 August 
Auckland 
Wednesday 
30 August 
Christchurc
h 
Thursday 
31 August 
Friday 
1 September 
9:00am 
–10:30am 
037 Employers and 
Manufacturers’ 
Association (EMA)  
006 The Resource 
Rentals for Revenue 
Association 
(International) 
050 Telecom 
Corporation of 
New Zealand 
Ltd 
033 
Christchurc
h City 
Council 
11:00am 
–1:00pm 
024 POTENZ 
International Ltd  
016 Auckland City 
Libraries 
050 Telecom 
Corporation of 
New Zealand 
Ltd 
038 
Southland 
District 
Council 
2:00pm 
–3:30pm 
012 Deaf 
Association of New 
Zealand (Inc)  
011 Kim Robinson 
055 
UnitedNetworks 
Ltd  
046 Royal New 
Zealand 
Foundation for 
the Blind 
054 
Geraldine 
Telecom 
Subscribers’ 
Action 
Committee 
4:00pm 
–5:30pm 
042 Newcall Group 
Ltd 
  
 
Panel in 
Recess 
Panel in 
Recess 
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CROSS SUBMISSIONS ON THE DRAFT REPORT: MIT 
Submission No. Name 
001 CLEAR Communications Ltd 
002 Vodafone New Zealand Ltd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 333 - 
- Bibliography - 
 
- LEGISLATION - 
 
Commerce Act 1975 
 
Commerce Act 1986 
 
Commerce Amendment Act 2001 
 
Financial Reporting Act 1993 
 
Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989 
 
Telecommunications Act 2001 
 
Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regulations 1999 
 
 
 
 
- CASES - 
 
ARA v Mutual Rental Cars [1987] 2 NZLR 647 (HC). 
 
Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL (Eng). 
 
Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Group Ltd v Commerce Commission (2001) 10 TCLR 
247 (CA). 
 
Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 421 (CA). 
 
Fisher & Paykel Ltd v Commerce Commission [1990] 2 NZLR 731 (HC). 
 
Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465 (HL (Eng). 
 
Kasturilal Lakshmi Reddy v State of Jammu and Kashmir 1980 (3) SCR 1338 (SC). 
 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v CLEAR Communications Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 385 
(PC). 
 
Telecom v Commerce Commission [1992] 3 NZLR 429 (HC). 
 
Tru Tone v Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 353 (CA). 
 
US (Federal Communications Commission) v Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of 
Virginia [1996] 94 SC 1893. 
 
 
 - 334 - 
- BOOKS AND ARTICLES - 
 
Manuel A Abdala “Institutional Roots of Post-Privatisation Regulatory Outcomes” (2000) 24 
Telecommunications Policy 645-668. 
 
R A Abdel-khalik “Incentives for Accruing Costs and Efficiency in Regulated Monopolies 
Subject to Roe Constraint” (1988) 26 (Supplement) Journal of Accounting Research 144-
174. 
 
Sammy Adelman and Ken Foster “Critical Legal Theory: The Power of Law” in The Critical 
Lawyers’ Handbook Vol 1 <http://freespace.virgin.net/suzanne/boyce/files/book/1_3.htm>. 
 
Matthew D Adler “Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices 
Ground US Law? (2006) 100 Northwestern University Law Review 719-805. 
 
Rex Ahdar “Consumer, Redistributions of Income and the Purpose of Competition Law” [2002] 
7 European Competition Law Review 345-363. 
 
Chandana Alawattage & Danture Wickramasinghe “Appearance of Accounting in a Political 
Hegemony” (2006) Critical Perspectives on Accounting forthcoming. 
 
Louis Althusser “On the Materialist Dialectic” in Pour Marx (Francois Maspero, Paris, 1968). 
 
Louis Althusser “Contradiction and Overdetermination” in Pour Marx (Francois Maspero, 
Paris, 1968). 
 
Louis Althusser “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)” 
in Slavoj Zizek (ed) Mapping Ideology (London, Verso, 1994). 
 
Andrew Altman “Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin” (1986) 15 Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 205-235. 
 
Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae (reprint, Blackfriars, London, 1975). 
 
Patricia J Arnold “The Limits of Postmodernism in Accounting History” (1998) 23 Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 665-684. 
 
Patricia J Arnold, Theresa D Hammond, and Leslie S Oakes “The Contemporary Discourse on 
Health Care Cost: Conflicting Meanings and Meaningful Conflicts” (1994) 7 Accounting, 
Auditing, & Accountability Journal 50-67. 
 
Dean Ardern and Maxwell Aiken “An Accounting History of Capital Maintenance” (2005) 32 
Accounting Historians Journal 23-61. 
 
Peter Armstrong “Changing Management Control Strategies: The Role of Competition between 
Accountancy and other Organizational Professions” (1985) 10 Accounting, Organizations 
and Society 129-148.  
 
Peter Armstrong “The Influence of Michel Foucault on Accounting Research” (1994) 5 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 25-55. 
 
C Edward Arrington “Tightening One’s Belt: Some Questions about Accounting, Modernity, 
and the Postmodern” (1997) 8 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 3-13. 
 
C Edward Arrington “Rhetoric and the Radically Chic: How Arguments about Academic 
Accounting Fall off the Runway” (2004) 15 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 249-253. 
 
 - 335 - 
C Edward Arrington and Jere R Francis “Letting the Chat Out of the Bag: Deconstruction, 
Privilege and Accounting Research” (1989) 14 Accounting, Organizations and Society 1-
28.  
 
C Edward Arrington and Anthony G Puxty “Accounting, Interests, and Rationality: A 
Communicative Relation” (1991) 2 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 31-58.  
 
C Edward Arrington and William Schweiker “The Rhetoric and Rationality of Accounting 
Research” (1992) 17 Accounting, Organizations and Society 511-533.  
 
C Edward Arrington and Jere R Francis “Accounting as a Human Practice: The Appeal of Other 
Voices” (1993a) 18 Accounting, Organizations and Society 105-106. 
  
C Edward Arrington and Jere R Francis “Giving Economic Accounts: Accounting as Cultural 
Practice” (1993b) 18 Accounting, Organizations and Society 107-124.  
 
C Edward Arrington and Ann L Watkins “Maintaining ‘Critical Intent’ Within a Postmodern 
Theoretical Perspective on Accounting Research” (2002) 13 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 139-157. 
 
Aristotle The Art of Rhetoric (Harvard University Press, London, 1947). 
 
Bill Atkin, Katrine Evans, Geoff McLay, Sandra Peterssen, with the assistance of David Carter 
Torts in New Zealand: Cases and Materials (3 ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 
2001). 
 
Jay Atkinson, Chris Barnekov, David Konuch, William W Sharkey and Brad Wimmer The Use 
of Computer Models for Estimating Forward-Looking Economic Costs: A Staff Analysis 
(Federal Communications Commission, United States of America, 1997). 
 
Arthur Austin The Empire Strikes Back: Outsiders and the Struggle over Legal Education (New 
York University Press: New York, 1998). 
 
John Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (reprint, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
 
C Richard Baker and Mark S Bettner “Interpretive and Critical Research in Accounting: A 
Commentary on its Absence from Mainstream Accounting Research” (1997) 8 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 293-310. 
 
Bala V Balachandran and Ram T S Ramakrishnan Joint Cost Allocation: A Unified Approach 
(1981) 56 The Accounting Review 85-96. 
 
Mark Barenberg “Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From 
Bureaucratic to Flexible Production” (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 753-983.  
 
Sebastian Barros and Gustavo Castagnola “The Political Frontiers of the Social: Argentine 
Politics after Peronist Populism (1955-1973)” in David Howarth, Aletta J Norval, and 
Yannis Stavrakakis Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and 
Social Change (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000). 
 
Katharine T Bartlett “Feminist Legal Methods” (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 829-888. 
 
Ian Bartle and Peter Vass “Self-Regulation within the Regulatory State: Towards a New 
Regulatory Paradigm?” (2007) 85 Public Administration 885-905. 
 
 - 336 - 
Yoram Barzel “Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets” (1982) 25 The Journal of 
Law and Economics 27-48. 
 
Steve Bastow and James Martin Third Way Discourse: European Ideologies in the Twentieth 
Century (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2003). 
 
Robert Baxt “True and Fair Accounts – A Legal Anachronism” (1970) 44 Australian Law 
Journal 541-551. 
 
Jane Baxter and Wai Fong Chua “Alternative Management Accounting Research - Whence and 
Whither (2003) 28 Accounting, Organizations and Society 97-126. 
 
Anthony Beck “Foucault and Law: The Collapse of Law's Empire (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 489-502. 
 
Ahmed Riahi-Belkaoui “Accounting and Language” (1989) 8 Journal of Accounting Literature 
281-292. 
 
Ahmed Riahi-Belkaoui The Cultural Shaping of Accounting (Greenwood Publishing Group, 
Westport, 1995). 
 
Leslie Bender “An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship” (1993) 78 Cornell Law Review 
575-596.  
 
Daniel A Benitez, Antonio Estache, D Mark Kennet and Christian A Ruzzier “The Potential 
Role of Economic Cost Models in the Regulation of Telecommunications in Developing 
Countries” (2002) 14 Information Economics and Policy 21-38. 
 
Jeremy Bentham “Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislation” in J Bowring (ed) 
Works (London, 1843). 
 
Benjamin Bertram “New Reflections on the ‘Revolutionary’ Politics of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe” (1995) 22 boundary 81-110. 
 
Roy A Bhaskar Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (Verso, London, 1987). 
 
Frank Birkin “The Art of Accounting for Science: A Prerequisite for Sustainable Development” 
(2000) 11 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 289-309.  
 
Frank Birkin “The Ecological Accountant: From the Cogito to Thinking Like a Mountain” 
(1996) 7 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 231-257. 
 
Trond Bjornenak “Conventional Wisdom and Costing Practices” (1997) 8 Management 
Accounting Research 367-382. 
 
Julia Black “Critical Reflections on Regulation” (2002b) 27 Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 1-31. 
 
Julia Black “Regulatory Conversations” (2002a) 29 Journal of Law and Society 163-196. 
 
William Blackstone Commentaries on the Law of England (reprint, The Chicago University 
Press, Chicago, 1979). 
 
Hubert M Blalock Causal Models in the Social Sciences (Aldine Publishing Company, New 
York, 1971). 
 
 - 337 - 
Richard J Boland Jr “Why Shared Meanings have no Place in Structuration Theory: A Reply to 
Scapens and Macintosh” (1996) 21 Accounting, Organizations and Society 691-697.  
 
C George Boeree Qualitative Methods: Part Three (Shippensburg University, 2004). 
 
Andrew Borrowdale (ed) Butterworths Commercial Law in New Zealand (4 ed, Butterworths of 
New Zealand Ltd, Wellington, 2000). 
 
Pierre Bourdieu An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Univ of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992). 
 
Robert M Bowen “Valuation of Earnings Components in the Electric Utility Industry” (1981) 
56 The Accounting Review 1-22. 
 
Helen Bowie “New Zealand to Overhaul Telecoms Rules” (2001) from 
<www.chapmantripp.co.nz/resource_library/published_article.asp?id=679> (last accessed 
27 February 2005). 
 
Gordon Boyce “Critical Accounting Education: Teaching and Learning Outside the Circle” 
(2004) 15 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 565-586.  
 
Gordon Boyce “Now and Then: Revolutions in Higher Learning” (2002) 13 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 575-601.  
 
James Boyle “The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought” (1985) 
133 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 685-780. 
 
John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000). 
 
William W Bratton, “Rules, Principles and the Accounting Crisis in the United States” (2004) 5 
European Business Organization Law Review 7–26. 
 
Scott Brewer “Figuring the Law: Holism and Tropological Inference in Legal Interpretation” 
(1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 823-844.  
 
David Brink “Legal Interpretation and Morality” in Brian Leiter (ed) Objectivity in Law and 
Morals (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001). 
 
Jane Broadbent “Critical Accounting Research:  A View from England” (2002) 13 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 433-449. 
 
Michael Bromwich and Anthony Hopwood (eds) Accounting and the Law (Prentice Hall 
International (UK) Ltd, Hertfordshire, 1992). 
 
Michael Bromwich and Cheolkyu Hong “Activity-Based Costing Systems and Incremental 
Costs (1999) 10 Management Accounting Research 39-60. 
 
Michael Bromwich and Cheolkyu Hong “Costs and Regulation in the UK Telecommunications 
Industry” (2000) 11 Management Accounting Research 137-165. 
 
Donald F Brosnan “Serious but not Critical” (1987) 60 Southern California Law Review 259-
396.  
 
Stephen Bryan and Leeseok Hwang “CEO Compensation in a Regulated Environment: An 
Analysis of the Utility Industry” (1997) 12 Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 
223-251. 
 
 - 338 - 
Rob A Bryer “Why Marx’s Labour Theory is Superior to the Marginalist Theory of Value: The 
Case from Modern Financial Reporting” (1994) 5 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 313-
340. 
 
Rob A Bryer “A Political Economy of SSAP22: Accounting for Goodwill” (1995) 27 British 
Accounting Review 283-310. 
 
Rob A Bryer “A Marxist Critique of the FASB’s Conceptual Framework” (1999a) 10 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 551-589. 
 
Rob A Bryer “Double-Entry Bookkeeping and the Birth of Capitalism: Accounting for the 
Commercial Revolution in Northern Italy” (1993) 4 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 
113-140. 
 
Rob A Bryer “Marx and Accounting” (1999b) 10 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 683-709. 
 
James M Buchanan Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory (Markham Publishing 
Co, Chicago, 1969). 
 
Stuart Burchell, Colin Clubb, Anthony Hopwood, John Hughes, Janine Nahapiet “The Roles of 
Accounting in Organizations and Society” (1980) 5 Accounting, Organizations and Society 
5-27. 
 
Jesse Burkhead and Jerry Miner Public Expenditure (Aldine-Atherton, Chicago, 1971). 
 
John Burrows “Statutory Interpretation” in David Carter and Matthew Palmer (eds) Roles and 
Perspectives in the Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Ivor Richardson (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 2002). 
 
Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: 
Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (Verso, London, 2000). 
 
Benjamin Cardozo The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1921). 
 
David Gray Carlson “Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence” (1999) 99 Columbia Law 
Review 1908-1954. 
 
Garry D Carnegie, Cheryl S McWatters and Brad N Potter “The Development of the Specialist 
Accounting History Literature in the English Language” (2003) 16 Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal 186-207. 
 
David Carter and Pala Molisa “Accounting Harmony, Neo-Gramscian. Disharmony: A New 
Zealand Perspective” (Centre for Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research, Victoria 
University of Wellington, Working Paper no. 37, 2005). 
 
Chris Carter and David Crowther “Unravelling a Profession: The Case of Engineers in a British 
Regional Electricity Company (2000) 11 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 23-49. 
 
Michael Carter and Julian Wright “Bargaining over Interconnection: The Clear-Telecom 
Dispute” (1999) 75 Economic Record 241-255. 
 
Lesley Catchpowle, Christine Cooper and Andrew Wright “Capitalism, States and Accounting” 
(2004) 15 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 1037-1058.   
 
George R Catlett “Factors that Influence Accounting Principles (1960) October Journal of 
Accountancy 44-89. 
 - 339 - 
Martin Cave “From Cost Plus Determinations to a Network Price Cap” (1997) 9 Information 
Economics and Policy 151-160. 
 
Alan F Chalmers What is this Thing Called Science? An Assessment of the Nature and Status of 
Science and its Methods (2 ed, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1982). 
 
Ray J Chambers “Positive Accounting Theory and the PA Cult” (1993) 29 ABACUS 1-26. 
 
Christopher S Chapman, Anthony G Hopwood, Michael D Shields Handbook of Management 
Accounting Research (Elsevier, Oxford, 2006). 
 
Roy A Chandler and John R Edwards British Audit Practice: 1884-1900 – A Case Law 
Perspective (Garland Publishing Inc, London, 1994). 
 
Charles River Associates Interconnection Pricing (submission to the Commerce Commission 
on behalf of Telecom NZ, 7 June 2002). 
 
Eve Chiapello “Accounting and the Birth of the Notion of Capitalism” (Working Paper) at 
<http://www.hec.fr/hec/fr/professeurs_recherche/upload/cahiers/786chiapello.pdf>. 
  
Charles Christenson “The Methodology of Positive Accounting” (1983) 58 The Accounting 
Review 1-22. 
 
John Christensen and Joel S Demski “The Classical Foundation of ‘Modern’ Costing” (1995) 5 
Management Accounting Research 13-32. 
 
Wai Fong Chua “Radical Developments in Accounting Thought” (1986) 61 The Accounting 
Review 601-632. 
 
Paul Cilliers Complexity & Postmodernism (New York, Routledge, 1998). 
 
J Maurice Clarke Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1923). 
 
Cheryl Cliffe and Alastair Marsden “The Effect of Dividend Imputation on Company Financing 
Decisions and the Cost of Capital in New Zealand” (1992) 4 Pacific Accounting Review 1-
30. 
 
Anthony M Clohesy “Provisionalism and the (Im)possibility of Justice in Northern Ireland” in 
David Howarth, Aletta J Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and Social Change (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2000). 
 
Ronald H Coase “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 16 Economica 386-405.   
 
Felix Cohen “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 Columbia Law 
Review 809-849. 
 
Susan Cohen and Martin Loeb “Public Goods, Common Inputs, and the Efficiency of Full Cost 
Allocations” (1982) 57 The Accounting Review 336-347. 
 
Katherine Collins “International Accounting Rate Reform: The Role of International 
Organizations and Implications for Developing Countries” (2000) 32 Law and Policy in 
International Business 1077-1092. 
 
David J Collison “Corporate Propaganda: Its Implications for Accounting and Accountability” 
(2003) 16 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 853-886. 
 - 340 - 
Commerce Commission A Guide to the Role of the Commerce Commission in Making Access 
Determinations under the Telecommunications Act 2001: Discussion Document 
(Wellington, 2001). 
 
Commerce Commission Application of a TSLRIC Pricing Methodology (Discussion Paper, 2 
July 2002). 
 
Commerce Commission Air New Zealand Ltd/Qantas Airways Ltd (Final Determination, 23 
October 2003). 
 
Commerce Commission A Guide to the Role of the Commerce Commission in Making Access 
Determinations Under the Telecommunications Act 2001 (Commerce Commission, May 
2002). 
 
Commerce Commission Determinations for TSO Instrument for Local Residential Service for 
period between 1 July 2002 and 30 June 2003 (Final Determination, 24 March 2005). 
 
Commerce Commission Guidelines to the Analysis of Public Benefits and Detriments in the 
Context of the Commerce Act (Commerce Commission, Wellington, 1994). 
 
Commerce Commission International Benchmarking Study: A Comparative Review of 
Interconnection Pricing (Discussion Paper, 2 September 2002). 
 
Commerce Commission Decision 410: Ruapehu Alpine Lifts (Final Determination, 14 
November 2000). 
 
Commerce Commission Telecommunications Act 2001 – Implementation of TSLRIC Pricing 
Methodology for Access Determinations under the Telecommunications Act 2001 
(Principles Paper, 20 February 2004). 
 
Commerce Select Committee Report on the Commerce Amendment Bill 2001 (New Zealand 
Parliament, 1 May 2001). 
 
Commerce Select Committee Report on the Telecommunications Bill 2001 (New Zealand 
Parliament, 18 September 2001). 
 
Auguste Comte Auguste Comte: The Foundation of Sociology (Kenneth Thompson (ed), 
Nelson, London, 1976). 
 
William E Connolly The Ethos of Pluralization (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1995). 
 
Rosemary J Coombe and Jonathan Cohen “The Law And Late Modern Culture: Reflections 
on/Between Facts and Norms from the Perspective of Critical Cultural Legal Studies” 
(1999) 76 Denver University Law Review 1029-1055. 
 
Rosemary J Coombe “Critical Cultural Legal Studies” (1998) 10 Yale Journal of Law & 
Humanity 463-486. 
 
Christine Cooper “Against Postmodernism: Class Oriented Questions for Critical Accounting” 
(1997) 8 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15-41. 
 
Christine Cooper “Ideology, Hegemony, and Accounting Discourse: A Case Study of the 
National Union of Journalists” (1995) 6 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 175-209.  
 
Christine Cooper “From Women’s Liberation to Feminism: Reflections in Accounting 
Academia” (2001) 25 Accounting Forum 214-245. 
 - 341 - 
Christine Cooper and Phil Taylor “The Transformation of the Accounting Craft” (2000) 25 
Accounting Organizations, and Society 555-578. 
 
David J Cooper and & Michael J Sherer “The Value of Corporate Accounting Reports – 
Arguments for a Political Economy of Accounting” (1984) 9 Accounting, Organizations 
and Society 207-234. 
 
David J Cooper and Trevor Hopper “Critical Theorizing in Strategic Management Accounting 
Research” (Paper presented at Interdisciplinary Perspectives in Accounting Conference, 
Cardiff, July 2006). 
 
Antonio Cordella and Kai A Simon “The Impact of Information Technology on Transaction and 
Coordination Cost” in K Braa and Eric Monteiro (eds) Proceedings of IRIS20: Social 
Informatics (Dept. of Informatics, University of Oslo, Oslo). 
 
Antonio Cordella “Does Information Technology Always Lead to Lower Transaction Costs?” 
(9th European Conference on Information Systems, Bled, Slovenia, June 2001). 
 
Antonio Cordella “Transaction Costs and Information Systems: Does IT Add Up?” (2006) 21 
Journal of Information Technology 195–202. 
 
Roger Cotterell The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy 
(Butterworths, London, 1989). 
 
Roger Cotterrell The Sociology of Law: An Introduction (2 ed, Butterworths, London, 1992). 
 
Mark A Covaleski, Mark W Dirsmith, and Sajay Samuel “Changes in the Institutional 
Environment and the Institutions of Governance: Extending the Contributions of 
Transaction Cost Economics within the Management Control Literature” (2003) 28 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 417-441. 
 
Mark A Covaleski and Mark W Dirsmith “An Institutional Perspective on the Rise, Social 
Transformation, and Fall of a University Budget Category” (1988a) 33 Administrative 
Science Quarterly 562-587. 
 
Mark A Covaleski and Mark W Dirsmith “The Use of Budgetary Symbols in the Political 
Arena: An Historically Informed Field Study” (1988b) 13 Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 1-24. 
 
Russel J Craig and J H Amernic “Enron Discourse: The Rhetoric of a Resilient 
Capitalism” (2004) 15 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 813-852. 
 
Kimberle Crenshaw “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics (1989) 
University of Chicago Legal Forum 139-168. 
 
Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchant (eds) Laclau: A Critical Reader (Routledge, London, 
2004). 
 
Gerald Crompton and Robert Jupe “Such a Silly Scheme: The Privatisation of Britain’s 
Railways 1992-2002” (2003) 14 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 617-645. 
 
Paul Crowther Philosophy After Postmodernism: Civilised Values and the Scope of Knowledge 
(Routledge, London, 2003). 
 
Michael Crotty The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research 
Process (Allen Unwin, Crows Nest, 1998). 
 - 342 - 
Scott L Cummings and Ingrid V Eagly “A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing” (2001) 
48 UCLA Law Review 443-518. 
 
David Cunliffe, MP Hansard: New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Tuesday, 18 September, 
2001a). 
 
David Cunliffe, MP Hansard: New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Tuesday, 27 November, 
2001b). 
 
Fred Dallmayr “Laclau and Hegemony: Some (post) Hegelian Caveats” in Simon Critchley and 
Oliver Marchant (eds) Laclau: A Critical Reader (Routledge, London, 2004). 
 
Margaret Davies Asking the Law Question: The Dissolution of Legal Theory (2 ed, The Law 
Book Company, Sydney, 2002). 
 
Ferdinand de Saussure Course in General Linguistics (Philosophical Library, New York, 1959). 
 
Craig Deegan Financial Accounting Theory (2 ed, North Ryde, McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2006). 
 
Craig Deegan and Grant Samkin New Zealand Financial Accounting (McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Auckland, 2001). 
 
Joel S Demski and Gerald A Feltham Cost Determination: A Conceptual Approach (Iowa State 
University Press, Iowa, 1976). 
 
Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference (Routledge, London, 1978a). 
 
Jacques Derrida Edmund Husserl’s ‘Origin of Geometry’ (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln, 1978b). 
 
Jacques Derrida “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy in Jacques Derrida 
Margins of Philosophy (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982). 
 
Jacques Derrida “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” in Drucilla Cornell, 
Michael. Rosenfeld and David G Carlson (eds) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice 
(Routledge, New York, 1992). 
 
Jacques Derrida The Gift of Death (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995). 
 
Jacques Derrida Of Grammatology (Corrected edition, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1997a). 
 
Jacques Derrida Politics of Friendship (Verso, London, 1997b). 
 
Rene Descartes Discourse on the Method; and, Meditations on First Philosophy (trans, Hackett 
Publishing, Indianapolis, 1998). 
 
Mark Devenney “Critical Theory and Democracy” in Alan Finlayson and Jeremy Valentine 
(eds) Politics and Post-structuralism: An Introduction (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2002). 
 
Carl Thomas Devine, Harvey S Hendrickson, Paul F Williams Carl Thomas Devine: Essays in 
Accounting Theory (Routledge New Works in Accounting History, New York, 2004). 
 
Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10 ed, Macmillan 
Education, Basingstoke, 1959). 
 
 - 343 - 
Wilhelm Dilthey “The Understanding of Others and Their Manifestations of Life” (26 volumes, 
Gesammelte Schriften, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1910). 
 
Wilhelm Dilthey “Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Writings” (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1976). 
 
Lena Dominelli and Ankie Hoogvelt “Globalisation, the Privatisation of Welfare, and the 
Changing Role of Professional Academics in Britain” (1996) 7 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 191-212. 
 
Anthony Downs “The Public Interest: Its Meaning in a Democracy” (1962) 29 Social Research 
1-36. 
 
Emile Durkheim Suicide: A Study in Sociology (trans, Routledge, London, 1952). 
 
Emile Durkheim The Division of Labour in Society (trans, Collier Macmillan, London, 1964). 
 
Emile Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method (Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1938).  
 
Ronald Dworkin A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985). 
 
Ronald Dworkin “A Reply” in Marshall Cohen (ed) Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary 
Jurisprudence (Duckworth, London, 1984). 
 
Ronald Dworkin “My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don’t Talk 
about Objectivity any More”, in W J T Mitchell (ed) The Politics Of Interpretation 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983). 
 
Ronald Dworkin Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
 
Ronald Dworkin “Natural Law Revisited” (1982) 34 University of Florida Law Review 165-
188. 
 
Ronald Dworkin “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It” (1996) 25 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 88-139. 
 
Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London, 1977). 
 
Thomas R Dyckman and Stephen A Zeff “Two Decades of the Journal of Accounting 
Research” (1990) 22 Journal of Accounting Research 225-297. 
 
Seth Eeles “An Overview of New Zealand’s New Telecommunications Regulatory Regime” 
from <www.gtlaw.com.au/publications.default.jsp?pubid=355> (last accessed 21 February, 
2005). 
 
Kathleen M Eisenhardt “Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches” (1985) 31 
Management Science 134-149. 
 
Deborah Ellenberg, Glen O Robinson, Michael F Urbanski and James R Wade, “Antitrust: Will 
It Change the Lives of Telecommunications Executives?” (1997) 4 Richmond Journal of 
Law and Technology 3, in particular, Michael Urbanski “Delivering on the Promises of the 
Telecommunications Act 1996”. 
 
R C Ellickson “Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study” (2002) 29 Journal of Legal 
Studies 517-543. 
 
 - 344 - 
Paul Embrechts, Hansjorg Furrer, Roger Kaufmann “''Quantifying Regulatory Capital for 
Operational Risk” (2003) 9 Derivatives Use, Trading & Regulation 217-233. 
 
Barbara Epstein “Radical Democracy and Cultural Politics: What About Class? What about 
Political Power” in Ricardo Blaug and John Schwarzmantel Democracy: A Reader 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988). 
 
Barbara L Epstein “Why Poststructuralism Is a Dead End for Progressive Thought” (1996) 95 
Socialist Review 83-120. 
  
Einer R Elhauge “Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent Supreme Court 
Decisions?” (2007) 3 Competition Policy International 59-103. 
 
Kenneth G Elizinga “The Goals of Anti-Trust: Other than Competition and 
Efficiency, What Else Counts?” (1977) 125 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1191-
1211. 
 
Henry Ergas “Brief comments on the Discussion Paper on Regulation of Access to Vertically-
Integrated Natural Monopolies” (Auckland, 19 September 1995). Speech delivered on 
investiture as BellSouth New Zealand Visiting Professor of Network Economics and 
Communications.   
 
Jeff Everett “The Politics of Comprehensive Auditing in Fields of High Outcome and Cause 
Uncertainty” (2003) 14 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 77-104. 
 
Ezzamel, Mahmoud “TransferPricing” in David Ashton, Trevor Hopper, and Robert Scapens, 
Issues in Management Accounting (2nd ed, Prentice-Hall, London, 1995). 
 
Norman Fairclough Critical Discourse Analysis (Addison Wesley, Boston, 1995). 
 
Eugene F Fama and Kenneth R French “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and 
Bonds” (1993) 33 Journal of Financial Economics 3-56.  
 
Frantz Fanon The Wretched of the Earth (McGibbon and Kee, London, 1965).  
 
Gerald R Faulhaber “Public Policy in Telecommunications: The Third Revolution” (1995) 7 
Information Economics and Policy 251-282. 
 
Stephen M Feldman “The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence” (1991) 76 
Iowa Law Review 661-699.  
 
John Ferguson, David J Collison, David M Power and Lorna A Stevenson “What are 
Recommended Accounting Textbooks Teaching Students about Corporate Stakeholders?” 
(2005) 37 British Accounting Review 23-46. 
 
Eric M Fink “Post-Realism, or the Jurisprudential Logic of Late Capitalism: A Socio-Legal 
Analysis of the Rise and Diffusion of Law and Economics” (2004) 55 Hastings Law 
Journal 931-964.  
 
John Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980). 
 
Joseph M Firestone and Richard W Chadwick “A New Procedure for Constructing 
Measurement Models of Ratio Scale Concepts”  (1975) 2 International Journal of General 
Systems 35-53. 
 
Richard Michael Fischl “The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies” (1992) 17 Law and 
Social Inquiry 779-820. 
 - 345 - 
Barbara J Flagg “Was Blind But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of 
Discriminatory Intent” (1993) 91 Michigan Law Review 953-1017. 
 
Hugh Fletcher Ministerial Inquiry on Telecommunications: Terms of Reference (Wellington, 
2000a). 
 
Hugh Fletcher Ministerial Inquiry on Telecommunications: Issues Paper (Wellington, 2000b). 
 
Hugh Fletcher Ministerial Inquiry on Telecommunications: Draft Report (Wellington, 2000c). 
 
Hugh Fletcher Ministerial Inquiry on Telecommunications: Final Report (Wellington, 2000d). 
 
Timothy J Fogarty “The Imagery and Reality of Peer Review in the US: Insight from 
Institutional Theory” (1996) 21 Accounting, Organizations and Society 243-267. 
 
Andrea Fontana and James H Frey “The Interview: From Structured Questions to Negotiated 
Text” in Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds) Handbook of Qualitative Research 
(2 ed, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2000). 
 
Michel Foucault  The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, Paul 
Rabinow (ed)  (Volume 3, New Press, New York, 2003) 
 
Michel Foucault (edited by Colin Gordon) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977 (Harvester Press, Brighton, 1980). 
 
Michel Foucault “Questions of Method” in Graham Burchell, Collin Gordon, and Peter Miller 
(eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmental Nationality (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
London, 1991). 
 
Michel Foucault  The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-
1984  Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (eds)  (New Press, New York, 2003). 
 
Michel Foucault The Order of Things (Tavistock, London, 1970). 
 
Gianni De Fraja and Paola Valbonesi “Revenue Sharing for International Telephony” (2001) 20 
Journal of Regulatory Economics 5-21. 
 
Jere R Francis “Auditing, Hermeneutics and Subjectivity” (1994) 19 Accounting, Organizations 
and Society 235-269. 
 
Jerome Frank Law and the Modern Man (Peter Smith, Gloucester, 1970). 
 
Manfred Frank What is Neo-Structuralism? Sabine Wilke and Richard Gray (trans) (University 
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988). 
 
Robert H Frank Microeconomics and Behaviour: International Editions (3 ed, The McGraw-
Hill Companies Inc, Singapore, 1998). 
 
Nancy Fraser and Sandra Bartky (eds) Revaluing French Feminism: Critical Essays on 
Difference, Agency, and Culture (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1992). 
 
Judith Freedman and Michael Power (eds) Law and Accountancy: Conflict and Cooperation in 
the 1990s (Paul Chapman Ltd, London, 1992).  
 
Alan D Freeman “Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship” (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 
1229-1237. 
 - 346 - 
Sigmund Freud (1900) The Interpretation of Dreams (trans, J Stracey, Penguin, London, 1976). 
 
Milton Friedman Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962). 
 
Milton Friedman “The Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse” (1999) 21 Cato Policy Report 
1-18. 
Susan S Friedman “Definitional Excursions: The Meanings of Modern/Modernity/Modernism” 
(2001) 8 MODERNISM/modernity 493-513. 
 
Frontier Economics Interconnection Pricing Methodology (report to the Commerce 
Commission, 5 April 2002). 
 
Julie Froud, Karel Williams, Colin Haslam, Sukhdey Johal and John Williams “Caterpillar: 
Two Stories and an Argument (1998) 23 Accounting, Organizations and Society 685-708. 
 
Mary Joe Frug Postmodern Legal Feminism (Routledge, London, 1992). 
 
Lon L Fuller The Morality of Law: Revised Edition (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964). 
 
Janet Galbraith “Processes of Whiteness and Stories of Rape” (2000) 14 Australian Feminist 
Law Journal 71-89. 
 
Sonja Gallhofer and Jim Haslam “Beyond Accounting: The Possibilities of Accounting and 
‘Critical’ Accounting Research” (1997) 8 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 71-95. 
 
Sonja Gallhofer and Jim Haslam Accounting and Emancipation: Some Critical Interventions 
(Routledge, London, 2003). 
 
Sonja Gallhofer, Jim Haslam and Juliet Roper “Applying Critical Discourse Analysis: Struggles 
over Takeovers Legislation in New Zealand” (2001) 8 Advances in Public Interest 
Accounting: Advances in Accountability: Regulation, Research, Gender and Justice 121-
155.  
 
Jagdish S Gangolly and Mohamed E A Hussein “Generally Accepted Accounting Principles: 
Perspectives from Philosophy of Law” (1996) 7 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 383-
407. 
 
Rudolphe Gasché “How Empty can Empty be? On the Place of the Universal” in Simon 
Critchley and Oliver Marchant (eds) Laclau: A Critical Reader (Routledge, London, 2004). 
 
Farid Gasmi, D Mark Kennet, Jean-Jacques Laffont and William W Sharkey Cost Proxy Models 
and Telecommunications Policy: A New Empirical Approach to Regulation (MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 2002). 
 
Theresa Gattung (CEO of Telecom New Zealand) “Why Telecom Charges so Much?” (Speech 
delivered at an Investment Analysts Forum in Sydney, Australia, Monday, March 20, 2006). 
 
Norman Geras “Post-Marxism?” (1987) 163 New Left Review 40-82. 
 
Dale L Gerboth “Research, Institution, and Politics in Accounting Inquiry” (1973) 48 The 
Accounting Review 475-482. 
 
Michel Ghertman and Bertrand Quélin “Regulation and Transaction Cost in 
Telecommunications” (1995) 19 Telecommunications Policy 487-500. 
 
Tristan Gilbertson “Beginning of the End of “Light Handed” Telecommunications Regulation 
in New Zealand [2001] 7 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 1-7. 
 - 347 - 
Jason Glynos “From Identity to Identification: Discourse Theory and Psychoanalysis in 
Context” (Paper No 11, Essex Papers in Politics and Government: Sub-Series in Ideology 
and Discourse Analysis, November 1999). 
 
Jason Glynos and David Howarth The Logics of Critical Explanation (Routledge, London, 
2007). 
 
Peter Goodrich “Sleeping With the Enemy: An Essay on the Politics of Critical Legal Studies in 
America” (1993) 68 New York University Law Review 389-426. 
 
Myron J Gordon The Cost of Capital to a Public Utility (East Lansing, MSU Public Utilities 
Studies, 1974).  
 
Antonio Gramsci Quaderni del Carcere (Volumes I-XI, Einaudi, 1948-1951) Selections from 
the Prison Notebooks, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (eds and trans) (New 
York: International Publishers, 1971).   
 
Antonio Gramsci “On the Southern Question” (1926) in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (eds and trans) (New York: International 
Publishers, 1971). 
 
Rob Gray, Dave Owen, and Carol Adams Accounting and Accountability: Changes and 
Challenges in Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting (Prentice Hall, London, 
1996). 
 
Rob Gray “Of Messiness, Systems and Sustainability:  Towards a More Social and 
Environmental Finance and Accounting” (2002) 34 British Accounting Review 357-386. 
 
Rob Gray “The Social Accounting Project and Accounting, Organizations and Society: 
Privileging Engagement, Imaginings, New Accountings and Pragmatism over Critique?” 
(2002) 27 Accounting, Organizations and Society 687-708. 
 
Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan The Hidden Gender of Law (Federation Press, Sydney, 
1990). 
 
Christopher Grey “Debating Foucault: A Critical Reply to Neimark” (1994) 5 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 5-24. 
 
Stephen Griggs and David Howarth “An Alliance of Interest and Identity? Explaining the 
Campaign against Manchester Airport’s Second Runway” (2002) 7 Mobilizations 43-58. 
 
Stephen Griggs and David Howarth “Metaphor, Catachresis and Equivalence: The Rhetoric of 
Freedom to Fly in the Struggle over Aviation Policy in the United Kingdom” (2006) 25 
Policy & Society 23-45. 
 
Peter Z Grossman and Daniel H Cole (eds) The End of a Natural Monopoly: Deregulation and 
Competition in the Electric Power Industry (JAI/Elsevier, New York, 2003). 
 
J A W Gunn “Bentham and Public Interest” (1968) 1 Canadian Journal of Political Science / 
Revue canadienne de science politique 398-413.  
 
Jürgen Habermas “Law as Medium and Law as Institution” in Gunther Teubner (ed) Dilemmas 
of Law in the Welfare State (Gruyter, Berlin, 1986). 
 
Tom Hadden and Denis Boyd ‘The Legal Control of Accounting Standards: A Critical View’ in 
Michael Bromwich and Anthony Hopwood (eds) Accounting and the Law (Prentice Hall 
International (UK) Ltd, Hertfordshire, 1992). 
 - 348 - 
Don R Hansen and Maryanne M Mowen Management Accounting (3 ed, Cincinnati, South-
Western Publishing Co, 1994). 
 
Norwood R Hanson Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of 
Science (University Press, Cambridge, 1958). 
 
Richard Harland Superstructuralism: The Philosophy of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism 
(Methuen, New York, 1987). 
 
Angela P Harris “Categorical Discourse and Dominance Theory” (1989) 5 Berkeley Women’s 
Law Journal 181-198.  
 
Cheryl L Harris “Whiteness as Property” (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 1707-1791. 
 
Herbert L A Hart “Book Review: The Morality of Law” (1965) 78 Harvard Law Review 1281-
1288. 
 
Herbert L A Hart The Concept of Law (2 ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994). 
 
John Hasnas “Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or 
How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument” (1995) 45 Duke Law Journal 
84-132. 
 
Jerry A Hausman and J Gregory Sidak “The Failure of Good Intentions: Is Regulation or 
Competition the Future of American Telecommunications?” (2007) 5 Journal on 
Telecommunications and High Technology Law 329-391. 
 
Keith Hawkins (ed) The Human Face of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994). 
 
David Heald “Contrasting Approaches to the ‘Problem” of Cross Subsidy” (1996) 7 
Management Accounting Research 53-72. 
 
Georg W F Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit  (A V Miller, trans, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1807). 
 
Martin Heidegger The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1954) (reprinted, Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1975). 
 
Martin Heidegger Being and Time (John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans, SCM Press, 
London, 1962). 
 
Martin Heidegger Poetry, Language, Thought (Albert Hofstadter, trans, Harper & Row , New 
York, 1971). 
 
Kenneth E Himma “Do Philosophy and Sociology Mix? A Non-essentialist Socio-Legal 
Positivist Analysis of the Concept of Law” (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 717-
738. 
 
Kenneth E Himma “Making Sense of Constitutional Disagreement: Legal Positivism, The Bill 
of Rights, and The Conventional Rule of Recognition in the United States” (2003) 4 
Journal of Law and Society 149-216. 
 
Ruth D Hines (1996) “Net Profit is a God” (1996) 9 Accounting Auditing and Accountability 
Journal 129-132. 
 
 - 349 - 
Ruth D Hines “Financial Accounting Knowledge, Conceptual Framework Projects and the 
Social Construction of the Accounting Profession” (1989) 2 Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal 72-92. 
 
Ruth Hines “Financial Accounting: In Communicating Reality, We Construct Reality” (1988) 
13 Accounting, Organizations and Society 251-262. 
 
Ruth Hines “The FASB’s Conceptual Framework, Financial Accounting and the Maintenance 
of the Social World (1991) 16 Accounting, Organizations and Society 313-351. 
 
Thomas Hobbes Leviathan, or, the Matter, Form, and Power of a Common-wealth 
Ecclesiastical and Civil (Andrew Crooke, London, 1651). 
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes The Common Law (Little Brown, Boston, 1881). 
 
Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, and Robert Baldwin The Government of Risk: 
Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001). 
 
Trevor Hopper, Marcia Annisette, N Dastoor, Shahzad Uddin, and Danture Wickramasinghe 
“Some Challenges and Alternatives to Positive Accounting Research” in Stewart Jones, 
Claudio Romano, and Janek Ratnatunga (eds) Accounting Theory: A Contemporary Review 
(Harcourt Brace and Company, Sydney, 1995).  
 
Trevor Hopper and Maria Major “Extending Institutional Analysis through Theoretical 
Triangulation: Regulation and Activity-Based Costing in Portuguese Telecommunications” 
(2007) 16 European Accounting Review 59-97. 
 
Trevor Hopper and Andrew Powell "Making Sense of Research into the Organizational and 
Social Aspects of Management Accounting: A Review of its Underlying Assumptions” 
(1985) 22 Journal of Management Studies 429-465. 
 
Trevor Hopper and Norman B Macintosh “Management Accounting as Disciplinary Practice: 
The Case of ITT under Harold Geneen” (1993) 4 Management Accounting Research 181-
216. 
 
Trevor Hopper, John Storey, and Hugh Wilmott “Accounting for Accounting: Towards the 
Development of a Dialectical View” (1987) 12 Accounting, Organizations and Society 437-
456. 
 
Anthony G Hopwood “The Archaeology of Accounting Systems” (1987) 12 Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 207-234. 
 
Anthony G Hopwood “Ambiguity, Knowledge and Territorial Claims: Some Observations on 
the Doctrine of Substance over Form: A Review Essay (1990) 22 British Accounting 
Review 79-87. 
 
Antony G Hopwood and Peter Miller (eds) Accounting as Social and Institutional Practice 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994). 
 
Charles T Horngren “Management Accounting: Where are We?” in Charles T Horngren 
Management Accounting and Control (University of Wisconsin-Madison Press, Madison, 
1975). 
 
Robert B Horwitz The Irony of Regulatory Reform: The Deregulation of American 
Telecommunications (Oxford University Press, New York, 1989). 
 - 350 - 
Keith Hoskin “Boxing Clever: For, Against, and Beyond Foucault in the Battle for Accounting 
Theory” (1994) 5 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 57-85. 
 
Ketih Hoskin and Richard Macve “The Genesis of Accountability: The Westpoint Connections” 
(1988) 11 Accounting, Organizations and Society 37-73. 
 
Herbert J Hovenkamp “The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant Firm” (University 
of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-19, 2007).  
 
David Howarth “Discourse Theory and Political Analysis” (1998) 49 Research Strategies in the 
Social Sciences 268-316. 
 
David Howarth and Jacob Torfing Discourse Theory in European Politics (Palgrave, London, 
2005). 
 
David Howarth, Aletta J Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and Social Change (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2000). 
 
David Howarth Discourse (Open University Press, Buckinghamshire, 2000). 
 
David Howarth “An Archaeology of Political Discourse? Evaluating Michel Foucault’s 
Explanation and Critique of Ideology” (2002) 50 Political Studies 117-135. 
 
David Howarth and Jacob Torfing Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and 
Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2004). 
 
Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance 
(Law and Social Theory) (Pluto, London, 1994). 
  
Edmund Husserl Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation 
with Heidegger (1931, reprinted, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1997). 
 
Roger Hussey and Arthur I Marsh Disclosure of Information and Employee Reporting 
(Aldershot, Brookfield 1983). 
 
Edvard Hviding “Between Knowledges: Pacific Studies and Academic Disciplines” (2003) 15 
The Contemporary Pacific 43-73. 
 
Yuji Ijiri The Foundations of Accounting Measurement: A Mathematical, Economic, and 
Behavioural Inquiry (Scholars Book Co, Houston, 1967). 
 
Bernard E Jacob “Ancient Rhetoric, Modern Legal Thought, and Politics: A Review Essay on 
the Translation of Viehweg’s “Topics and Law”” (1995) 89 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1622-1677.  
 
John V Jacobi “Competition Law’s Role in Health Care Quality” (2002) 11 Ann Health Law 45-
71.  
 
Ravi Jagannathan and Ellen R McGrattan “The CAPM Debate” (1995) Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis Quarterly Review 2-17.  
 
William James Pragmatism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1975).  
 
Adam Jaworski and Nikolas Coupland (eds) The Discourse Reader (Routledge, New York, 
2007). 
 
 - 351 - 
Michael C Jensen “Organizational Theory and Methodology” (1983) 58 The Accounting Review 
319-339. 
 
Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305-360. 
 
Mark L Jones “Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education: A Theoretical 
Framework (2001) 26 Oklahoma City University Law Review 547-630. 
 
Sten Jönsson and Norman B Macintosh “Cats, Rats, and Ears: The Case for Ethnographic 
Accounting Research” (1997) 22 Accounting, Organizations and Society 367-386.  
 
Paul L Joskow and Richard Schmalensee “Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities” (1986) 4 
Yale Journal of Regulation 1-50. 
 
Alfred E Kahn The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 1988). 
 
Alfred E Kahn Economic Report of the President – Congress 1996 (February 1996) 
<http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/index.html> (last accessed 20 March 2005). 
 
Mary A Kaidonis “Teaching and Learning Critical Accounting Using Media Texts as Reflexive 
Devices: Conditions for Transformative Action or Reinforcing the Status Quo” (2004) 15 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting 667-673. 
 
Hans Kelsen Society and Nature (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1943). 
 
Mark Kelman A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1987). 
 
Duncan Kennedy Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the 
System (Afar, Cambridge, 1983). 
 
Duncan Kennedy “Law and Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies” in Peter 
Newman The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Macmillan, New York, 
1998). 
 
Fred N Kerlinger Foundations of Behavioural Research (2 ed, Holt, Reinhart & Winston Inc, 
New York, 1973). 
 
Joe L Kincheloe and Peter L McLaren “Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research” 
in Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds) Handbook of Qualitative Research (2 ed, 
Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2000). 
 
Elizabeth Kingdom What’s Wrong with Rights? Problems for Feminist Politics of Law 
(Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1990). 
 
Anna Kingsbury “Competition, Collaboration or Control: Competition Law and Tertiary 
Education in New Zealand” (2000) Waikato Law Review 3 -15. 
 
David Knights and David Collison “Disciplining the shopfloor: A comparison of the 
disciplinary effects of managerial and financial accounting” (1987) 12 Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 457-477. 
 
Katarzyna Kosmala and Olivier Herrbach “The Ambivalence of Professional Identity: On 
Cynicism and Jouissance in Audit Firms” (2006) 59 Human Relations 1393-1428. 
 
Ken Kress “Legal Indeterminacy” (1989) 77 California Law Review 283-338. 
 - 352 - 
Guido A Krickx “Vertical Integration in the Computer Mainframe Industry: A Transaction Cost 
Interpretation” (1995) 26 Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization 75-91. 
 
Dr Tim Kuypers, Network Economics Consulting Group NZCC TSLRIC Conference 
(submission to the Commerce Commission, 15 July 2003). 
 
Warren Kyd, MP Hansard: New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Tuesday, December 18, 
2001). 
 
Jacques Lacan Écrits: A Selection (trans, Alan Sheridan, Norton, New York, 1977). 
 
Jacques Lacan The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II (trans, Sylvana Tomaselli,. Jacques-
Alain Miller, ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988). 
 
Ernesto Laclau (1991) “Note to PhD Students in Ideology and Discourse Analysis on 
Methodology” (unpublished). 
 
Ernesto Laclau “Power and Representation” in Mark Poster (ed) Politics, Theory, and 
Contemporary Culture (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993). 
 
Ernesto Laclau Emancipation(s) (Verso, London, 1996).  
 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (2 ed, Verso, London, 2001).  
 
Ernesto Laclau (ed) Making of Political Identities (Verso, London, 1994). 
 
Ernesto Laclau New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (Verso, London, 1990). 
 
Ernesto Laclau “Politics and the Limits of Modernity” in Andrew Ross (ed) Universal 
Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1988). 
 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe “Post-Marxism Without Apologies” (1987) 166 New Left 
Review 79-106. 
 
Ernesto Laclau On Populist Reason (Verso, London, 2005). 
 
Ernesto Laclau “Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics? In J Weeks (ed) The Lesser Evil 
and the Greater Good: The Theory and Politics of Social Diversity (London, Rivers Oram 
Press, 1994). 
 
Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole “The Politics of Government Decision-Making; A Theory 
of Regulatory Capture” (1991) 106 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1089-1127. 
 
Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation 
(MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993). 
 
Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole Competition in Telecommunications (Cambridge, The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2000). 
 
Kaouthar Lajili and Joseph T Mahoney “Revisiting Agency and Transaction Costs Theory 
Predictions on Vertical Financial Ownership and Contracting: Electronic Integration as an 
Organizational Form Choice” (2006) 27 Managerial and Decision Economics 573-586. 
 
Martin Lally “The CAPM Under Dividend Imputation” (1992) 4 Pacific Accounting Review 31-
44. 
 
 - 353 - 
Martin Lally “The Fama-French Model, Leverage and the Modigliani-Miller Propositions” 
(2004a) 27 Journal of Financial Research 341-349. 
 
Martin Lally “The Cost of Capital for Regulated Entities” (Report prepared for the Queensland 
Competition Authority, Brisbane, 2004b). 
 
John H Landon Incentive Regulation in the Electric Utilities Industry (San Francisco, National 
Economics Research Associates, 1990). 
 
Mary Jeanne Larrabee “The Contexts of Phenomenology as Theory” (1990) 13 Human Studies 
195-208. 
 
Richard Laughlin and Jane Broadbent “Accounting and Law: Partners in the Juridification of 
the Public Sector in the UK?” (1993) 4 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 337-368. 
 
Don Lavoie “The Accounting of Interpretations and the Interpretation of Accounts: The 
Communicative Function of ‘the Language of Business’” (1987) 12 Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 579-604.  
 
Stewart Lawrence, Howard Davey, and Mary Low Accounting at Work in Business, 
Government and Society (Pearson Education New Zealand Ltd, New Zealand, 1998).  
 
Stewart Lawrence, Manzurul Alam, Deryl Northcott, and Tony Lowe  “Accounting Systems 
and Systems of Accountability in the New Zealand Health Sector” (1997) 10 Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability Journal 665-683.  
 
Stewart Lawrence “From Welfare State to the Civil Society: The Constitutive Use of 
Accounting in the Reform of the NZ Public Sector” (1999) 10 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 223-246. 
 
Stewart Lawrence and Abu Rahaman “A Negotiated Order Perspective on Public Sector 
Accounting and Financial Control” (2001) 14 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal 147-165. 
 
Cheryl R Lehman and Fahretting Okcabol “Accounting for Crime” (2005) 16 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 613-639. 
 
Cheryl R Lehman and Tony Tinker “The ‘Real’ Cultural Significance of Accounts (1987) 12 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 503-522. 
 
Cheryl R Lehman “Accounting Ethics: Surviving Survival of the Fittest” (1988) 2 Advances in 
Public Interest Accounting 71-82.  
 
Cheryl R Lehman “Herstory in Accounting: The First Eighty Years” (1992) 17 Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 261-285. 
 
Brian Leiter “Legal Realism” in Dennis Patterson (ed) A Companion to Philosophy of Law and 
Legal Theory (Blackwell, Oxford, 1996). 
 
Michael E Levine and Jennifer L Forrence “Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public 
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis” (1990) 6 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 167-
198. 
 
William Lewis “The Under-theorisation of Overdetermination in the Political Philosophy of 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe” (2005) Studies in Social and Political Thought 1.1 
 
 - 354 - 
Reginald Lilly “Postmodernism and Political Philosophy” in Edward Craig (ed) Routledge 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Routledge, London, 1998).  
 
Douglas Litowitz “Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law” (2000) 2000 Brigham Young University 
Law Review 515-551.  
 
Karl Llewellyn “Some Realism about Realism – Responding to Dean Pound” (1931) 44 
Harvard Law Review 1222-1264.  
 
Daniel Lloyd “Telecommunications Regulation – Australia’s Third Generation and New 
Zealand’s First: Lessons from International Regulatory Best Practice” from 
<www.gtlaw.com.au/publications/default.jsp?pubid=293> (Last accessed 20 July 2006). 
 
Dennis Lloyd The Idea of Law (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1983). 
 
Edna Loehman and Andrew Whinston “A New Theory of Pricing and Decision-Making for 
Public Investment” (1971) The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 606-
625.  
 
Anne Loft “Towards a Critical Understanding of Accounting: The Case of Cost Accounting in 
the UK 1919-1925” (1986) 11 Accounting, Organizations and Society 137-169. 
 
Louise Longdin “Regulation of Exclusive Dealing in New Zealand: Chicago Triumphs?” [1990] 
4 European Competition Law Review 189-194. 
 
Mike Lucas “Pricing Decisions and the Neoclassical Theory of the Firm” (2003) 14 
Management Accounting Research 201-217. 
 
John Lye “Some Post-Structural Assumptions” (1996) available from  
<http://www.www.brocku.ca/english/courses/4F70/poststruct.php> (last accessed, 15 
March, 2008). 
 
Doreen McBarnet “After Enron Will ‘Whiter than White Collar Crime’ Still Wash? (2006) 46 
British Journal of Criminology 1091-1109. 
 
Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan “Challenging the Regulators: Strategies for 
Resisting Control”, in Christopher McCrudden (ed) Regulation and Deregulation: Policy 
and Practice in the Utilities and Financial Services Industries (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999a).   
 
Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan “The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the 
Struggle for Legal Control” (1991) 54 Modern Law Review 848-873. 
 
Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan “Creative Compliance and the Defeat of Legal 
Control: The Magic of the Orphan Subsidiary” in Keith Hawkins (ed) The Human Face of 
Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994). 
 
Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan Creative Accounting and the Cross-Eyed Javelin 
Thrower (John Wiley, London, 1999b). 
 
Donald (now Deirdre) N McCloskey The Rhetoric of Economics (University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison, 1985). 
 
Donald (now Deidre) N McCloskey If You're so Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990). 
 - 355 - 
Neil MacCormack Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2005). 
 
Christopher McCrudden (ed) Regulation and Deregulation: Policy and Practice in the Utilities 
and Financial Services Industries (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). 
 
Campbell R McConnell Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies (McGraw Hill, New 
York, 1960). 
 
Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb The New Zealand Legal System (2 ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1995). 
 
Richard Machin and Christopher Norris (eds) “Introduction” in Post-structuralist Readings of 
English Poetry (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987). 
 
Norman B Macintosh Accounting, Accountants and Accountability - Poststructuralist Positions 
(Routledge, London, 2002).  
 
Norman B Macintosh “A Comment on ‘Recovering Accounting’” (2004) 15 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 529-541.  
 
Norman B Macintosh, Teri Shearer, Daniel B Thornton, and Michael Welker Accounting as 
Simulacrum and Hyperreality: Perspectives on Income and Captial” (2000) 25 Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 13-50. 
 
Norman B Macintosh and Robert W Scapens “Structuration Theory in Management 
Accounting” (1990) 15 Accounting, Organizations and Society 455-477. 
 
Norman B Macintosh Management Accounting and Control Systems: An Organizational and 
Behavioural Approach (Wiley, Chichester, 1994). 
 
Norman B Macintosh and Teri Shearer “The Accounting Profession Today: A Poststructuralist 
Critique” (2000) 11 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 607-626. 
 
John McKernan and K Kosmal “Doing the Truth: Religion-Deconstruction-Justice, and 
Accounting” (2007) 20 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 729-764. 
 
Catherine A MacKinnon “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory” 
(1983a) 7 Signs 515-544. 
 
Catherine A MacKinnon “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence” (1983b) 8 Signs 635-658. 
 
Catherine A MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1987). 
 
Catherine A MacKinnon Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1989).  
 
Catherine A MacKinnon “From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway? 
(1991) 4 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 13-22. 
 
John R McNamara The Economics of Innovation in the Telecommunications Industry (Quorum 
Books, New York, 1991). 
 
Ken McPhail “The Threat of Ethical Accountants: An Application of Foucault’s Concept of 
Ethics to Accounting Education and Some Thoughts on Ethically Educating for the Other” 
(1999) 10 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 833-866.   
 - 356 - 
Angela McRobbie (1992) “Post-Marxism and Cultural Studies: A Post-script” in Lawrence 
Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula Treichler (eds) Cultural Studies (Routledge, New York, 
1994). 
 
Richard Macve “Capital and Financial Accounting: A Commentary on Bryer’s ‘A Marxist 
Critique of the FASB’s Conceptual Framework’” (1999) 10 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 591-613. 
 
Richard Macve “A Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting and Reporting: The 
Possibilities for an Agreed Structure” (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales, London, 1981). 
 
Gary Madden and Scott J Savage “Regulation and International Telecommunications Pricing 
Behaviour” (2001) 10 Industrial and Corporate Change 247–267. 
 
Gary Madden and Scott J Savage “Market Structure, Competition, and Pricing in the United 
States International Telephone Services Market” (2000) 82 The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 291-296.  
 
Alan R Madry “Analytic Deconstructionism? The Intellectual Voyeurism of Anthony 
D’Amato” (1995) 63 Fordham Law Review 1033-1068. 
 
Maria Major and Trevor Hopper “Managers Divided: Implementing ABC in a Portuguese 
Telecommunications Company” (2005) 16 Management Accounting Research 205-229. 
 
Burton G Malkiel and Yexiao Xu “Idiosyncratic Risk and Security Returns” (Working Paper, 
University of Texas, 2000).  
 
Trevor Mallard, MP “New Zealand Telecommunications Inquiry” (Press Release, Acting 
Minister of Communications, 23 February 2000). 
 
Gregory Mankin Principles of Economics (Harcourt College Publishers, USA, 2001).  
 
Robin Mansell The New Telecommunications: A Political Economy of Network Evolution 
(Sage, Thousand Oaks, 1993). 
 
Robin Mansell and Roger Silverstone (eds) Communication by Design: The Politics of 
Information and Communication Technologies (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996). 
 
Robin Mansell, Chrisanthi Avgerou, Danny Quah and Roger Silverstone (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Information and Communication Technologies (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2007).  
 
F Raymond Marks, Kirk Leswing, Barbara A Fortinsky The Lawyer, The Public and 
Professional Responsibility (American Bar Foundation, Chicago, 1972). 
 
Marsden Jacob Associates Comments on the TSO Cost of Capital: TSO Draft Determination 
2002-2003 (Submission to the Commerce Commission, 10 August 2004). 
 
Richard Marsden “A Political Technology of the Body: How Labour is Organised into a 
Productive Force” (1998) 9 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 99-136. 
 
Richard Marsden ‘Class Discipline: IR-HR and the Normalisation of the Workplace’ in 
Pushkala Prasad, Albert J Mills, Michael Elmes, and Anshu-man Prasad (eds) Managing the 
Organizational Melting Pot: Dilemmas of Workplace Diversity (Sage, London, 1997). 
 
 - 357 - 
Richard Marsden “The Unknown Masterpiece: Marx’s Model of Capital” (1999) 22 Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 297-324. 
 
David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds) Theory and Methods in Political Science (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000). 
 
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels The Communist Manifesto (Penguin Classics, London, 2002). 
 
Ugo Mattei “A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on US Hegemony and the Latin Resistance” 
(2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 383–449. 
 
Richard Mattessich “Accounting Representation and the Onion Model of Reality: A 
Comparison with Baudrillard’s Orders of Simulacra and his Hyperreality” (2003) 28 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 443-470.  
 
Keith T Maunders and Roger L Burritt “Accounting and Ecological Crisis” (1991) 4 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 9-26. 
 
Tim May Social Research: Issues, Methods, and Process (2 ed, Open University Press, 
Buckingham, 1997). 
 
Robert G May and Gary L Sundem “Research for Accounting Policy: An Overview” (1976) 51 
The Accounting Review 747-763. 
 
Margaret Mead Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western 
Civilization (William Morrow, New York, 1928).  
 
Margaret Mead Blackberry Winter: My Earlier Years (Morrow, New York, 1972). 
 
Elizabeth Mertz The Language of Law School: Learning to ‘Think’ Like a Lawyer  (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007).  
 
Martin Meyerson and Edwin C Banfield Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (The Free 
Press, New York, 1955). 
 
Russell A Miller “Lords of Democracy: The Judicialisation of ‘Pure Politics’ in the United 
States and Germany” (2004) 61 Washington and Lee Law Review 587-662. 
 
Peter Miller “Accounting Innovation Beyond the Enterprise: Problematizing Investment 
Decisions and Programming Economic Growth in the UK in the 1960s” (1991) 16 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 733-762. 
 
Peter Miller & Ted O’Leary “Accounting and the Construction of the Governable Person” 
(1987) 12 Accounting, Organizations and Society 235-265. 
 
Peter Miller & Ted O’Leary “Accounting Expertise and the Politics of the Product: Economic 
Citizenship and Modes of Corporate Governance” (1993) 18 Accounting, Organizations 
and Society 187-206. 
 
Peter Miller & Ted O’Leary “Accounting, ‘Economic Citizenship’ and the Spatial Reordering 
of Manufacture” (1994) 19 Accounting, Organizations and Society 15-43. 
 
Peter Miller & Ted O’Leary “Finding Things Out” (1998) 23 Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 709-714. 
 
David Millon “New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the 
Crisis in Corporate Law” (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1373-1394. 
 - 358 - 
Markus Milne “On Sustainability, The Environment and Management Accounting” (1996) 7 
Management Accounting Research 135-161. 
 
Andrew Milner Contemporary Cultural Theory: An Introduction (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 
1991). 
 
Ministry of Economic Development New Zealand Telecommunications 1987 – 2001 
(Wellington, 2001). 
 
Austin Mitchell, Prem Sikka, and Hugh Willmott “Sweeping It Under the Carpet: The Role of 
Accountantcy Firms in Money Laundering” (1998) 23 Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 589-607. 
 
Austin Mitchell, Prem Sikka, and Hugh Willmott “Policing Knowledge by Invoking the Law: 
Critical Accounting and the Politics of Dissemination” (2001) 12 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 527-556.  
 
Paul Montagna “Modernism vs Postmodernism in Management Accounting” (1997) 8 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 125-145. 
 
Francis J Mootz, III “Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration that the Obvious is 
Plausible” (1993) 61 Tennessee Law Review 69-195. 
 
Francis J Mootz III “Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Theory” (1998) 6 Southern 
California Interdiscipinary Law Journal 491-610. 
 
David Chioni Moore “Accounting on Trial: The Critical Legal Studies Movement and its 
Lessons for Radical Accounting” (1991) 16 Accounting, Organizations and Society 763-
791. 
 
Michael S Moore “The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?” (1989) 41 
Stanford Law Review 871-957. 
 
Underhill Moore and Gilbert Sussman “Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting 
of Direct Discounts” (1931) 40 Yale Law Journal 555-575. 
 
Thomas Morawetz “Understanding Disagreement, The Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying 
Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory, and Judging (1992) 141 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 371-456. 
 
Daniel More “The Boundaries of Negligence” (2003) 4 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 339-366. 
 
Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (eds) An Introduction To Law And Regulation: Text And 
Materials (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007). 
 
Gareth Morgan “Accounting as Reality Construction:  Towards a New Epistemology for 
Accounting Practice” (1988) Accounting, Organizations and Society 477-485. 
 
Tom Mouck “The Rhetoric of Science and the Rhetoric of Revolt in Positive Accounting 
Theory” (1992) 5 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 35-56. 
 
Tom Mouck “Irving Fisher and the Mechanistic Character of Twentieth Century Accounting 
Thought” (1995) 22 The Accounting Historians Journal 43-83. 
 
Tom Mouck “Financial Reporting, Democracy and Environmentalism: A Critique of the 
Commodification of Information” (1995) 6 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 535-553. 
 
 - 359 - 
Chantal Mouffe The Democratic Paradox (Verso, New York, 2000).  
 
Murray C Wells “Accounting for Common Costs” (The University of Illinois, Urbana, 1978). 
 
Christopher Napier “Intersections of Law and Accountancy: Unlimited Auditor Liability in the 
United Kingdom” (1998) 23 Accounting, Organizations and Society 105-128. 
 
Christopher Napier and Christopher Noke ‘Accounting and the Law: An Historical Overview of 
an Uneasy Relationship’ in Michael Bromwich and Anthony Hopwood (eds) Accounting 
and the Law (Prentice Hall International (UK) Ltd, Hertfordshire, 1992). 
 
Marilyn Neimark “The King is Dead. Long Live the King” (1990) 1 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 103-114.  
 
John S Nelson “Account and Acknowledge, or Represent. and Control? On Post-Modern 
Politics and Economics of Collective Responsibility'” (1993) 18 Accounting, Organizations 
and Society 207-229.   
 
Dean Neu and Alison Taylor “Accounting and the Politics of Divestment” (1996) 7 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 437-460. 
 
Dean Neu, David J Cooper, and Jeff Everett “Critical Accounting Interventions” (2001) 12 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting 735-762. 
 
Dean Neu and David J Cooper “Accounting Interventions” (Paper presented at Fifth 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference, University of Manchester, 1997). 
 
Dean Neu and Cynthia Simmons “Reconsidering the ‘Social’ in Positive Accounting Theory: 
The Case of Site Restoration Costs” (1996) 7 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 409-435. 
 
New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants New Zealand Accounting Standards (New 
Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants, Wellington, 2006). 
 
Saul Newman Power and Politics in Post-Structuralist Thought: New Theories of the Political 
(Routledge, Oxon, 2005) 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1873) “On Truth and Falsity in an Extramoral Sense” in Oscar Levy (ed) 
The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (Russell & Russell, New York, 1964). 
 
Andrew Norris “Against Antagonism” (2002) 9 Constellations 554 – 573. 
 
Aletta Norval Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse (Verso, London, 1996) 
 
Emeka T Nwaeze “Regulation and the Valuation Relevance of Book Value and Earnings: 
Evidence from the United States” (1998) 15 Contemporary Accounting Research 547-573. 
 
Emeka T Nwaeze “Rate of Return Regulation and the Behaviour of Return on Equity for 
Electric Utilities” (1997) 49 Journal of Economics and Business 491-510. 
 
Fahretting Okcabol and Tony Tinker “The market for positive theory: deconstructing the theory 
for excuses” (1990) 3 Advances in Public Interest Accounting 71-85. 
 
OFTEL Beyond the Telephone, the Television and the PC – III (London, 1998). OFTEL’s 
second submission to the Inquiry into Audiovisual Communications and the Regulation of 
Broadcasting, held in London, 1998. 
 
 - 360 - 
Stuart G Ogden and Fiona Anderson “The Role of Accounting in Organizational Change: 
Promoting Performance Improvements in the Privatised UK Water Industry” (1999) 10 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting 91-124. 
 
Mustapha Oughdi, Alexandre Caminada, Sid Lamrous, Bertrand Morin “Load Regulation in 
Mobile Network with Planned Pricing Model based on User Behaviour” in IEEE 
International Conference on Networking and Services, (Multimedia Session, no 53, CD-
ROM., October 2005). 
 
David Owen, Rob Gray, and Jan Bebbington “Green Accounting: Cosmetic Irrelevance or 
Radical Agenda for Change? (1997) 4 Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting 175-198. 
 
David Owen, Tracey Swift, and K Hunt “Questioning the Role of Stakeholder Engagement in 
Social and Ethical Accounting, Auditing and Reporting” (2001) 25 Accounting Forum 264-
282. 
 
Ray Pahl After Success: Fin de Siècle Anxiety and Identity (Polity, Cambridge, 1995). 
 
R H Parker “History of Accounting for Decisions” in John Arnold, Bryan Carsberg, and Robert 
Scapens (eds) Topics in Management Accounting (Phillip Alan, Southhampton, 1980). 
 
Christine Parker, Colin Scott, Nicola Lacey, and John Braithwaite (eds) Regulating Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004). 
 
Christine Parker “Reinventing Regulation within the Corporation: Compliance-Oriented 
Regulatory Innovation” (2000) 32 Administration & Society 529-565.  
 
Ernest C Pasour Jr ‘Information, Incentives, and Regulation’ in John C Moorhouse (ed) Electric 
Power: Deregulation and the Public Interest  (San Francisco, Pacific Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 2004). 
 
Ross Patterson “Light Handed Regulation in New Zealand Ten Years On” (1998) 6 Competition 
& Consumer Law Journal 134-148. 
 
Sam Peltzman “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation” (1976) August Journal of Law 
and Economics 211-240. 
 
Chaїm Perelman The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, 1963). 
 
Michael Peters Poststructuralism, Politics and Education (Bergin & Garvey, London, 1996). 
 
Michael Peters and Kenneth Wain “Postmodernism/poststructuralism” in Nigel Blake, Paul 
Smeyers, Richard Smith And Paul Standish (eds) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of 
Education (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2002).  
 
Penelope J Pether “Critical Discourse Analysis, Rape Law and the Jury Instruction 
Simplification Project” (1999) 24 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 53-98. 
 
Marianne W Jorgensen and Louise J Phillips Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method 
(Routledge, New York, 2002). 
 
Georgiĭ V Plekhanov Selected philosophical works (trans, R Dixon, Lawrence & Wishart, 
London, 1961)  
 
Mary Poovey A History of Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and 
Society (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998). 
 - 361 - 
Richard A Posner “Theories of Economic Regulation” (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economics & 
Management Science 335-358. 
  
Richard A Posner “The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation” (1975) 83 The Journal of 
Political Economy 807-827. 
 
Richard A Posner Economic Analysis of Law (4 ed, Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 
1992). 
 
Mark Poster Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context (Cornell University 
Press, New York, 1989). 
 
Chris Poullaos “Globalisation, Accounting Critique and the University” (2004) 15 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 715-730.  
 
Michael Power and Richard Laughlin “Habermas, Law and Accounting (1996) 21 Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 441-465. 
 
Eva Powers “Public Interest Implications of Telecommunications Deregulation” (1987) 16 
Policy Studies Journal 146-159. 
 
Alistair M Preston and Andrew M Vesey “The Construction of US Utility Accounting: 1882-
1944” (2008) 33 Accounting, Organizations and Society 415-435. 
 
Price Waterhouse Coopers Comments on the TSO Cost of Capital Estimate (Submission to the 
Commerce Commission, 13 August 2004). 
 
Price Waterhouse Coopers The Weighted Average Cost of Capital to be Applied in Calculating 
the Cost of the Telecommunications Service Obligation for the Period 1 July 2002 to 30 
June 2003 (9 September 2003). 
 
Price Waterhouse Coopers TSLRIC Conference (submission to the Commerce Commission, 16-
17 July 2003). 
 
Anthony Puxty “Social Accounting as Immanent Legitimation: A Critique of a Technist 
Ideology” (1986) 4 Advances in Public Interest Accounting 35-46. 
 
Anthony Puxty The Social and Organizational Content of Management Accounting (Academic 
Press Paperback, London, 1993). 
 
Paulo Quattrone “Constructivism and Accounting Research: Towards a Trans-Disciplinary 
Perspective” (2000) 13 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 130-155. 
 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal International Law from Below Development, Social Movements and 
Third World Resistance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003). 
 
Robert N Rapoport “Three dilemmas in action research” (1970) 23 Human Relations 499-513. 
 
Joseph Raz The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal Systems (2 
ed, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992). 
 
Peter Reason and Hilary Bradbury Handbook of Action Research: The Concise Paperback 
Edition (Sage, London, 2006). 
 
Rod A W Rhodes Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Accountability 
and Reflexivity (Routledge, London, 1997). 
 - 362 - 
Sara Ann Reiter “Economic Imperialism and the Crisis in Financial Accounting Research” 
(1998) 9 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 143-176.  
 
Sara Ann Reiter “Theory and Politics: Lessons from Feminist Economics” (1995) 8 Accounting, 
Auditing, and Accountability Journal 34-59. 
 
Simon Roberts “After Government? On Representing Law Without the State” (2005) 68 The 
Modern Law Review 1-24. 
 
Gillian Rose Dialectic of Nihilism, Post-Structuralism and Law  (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1984). 
 
Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller “Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government” 
(1992) 43 The British Journal of Sociology 173-205.  
 
Nikolas Rose Powers of Freedom: Re-Framing Political Thought, (Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 1999). 
 
Nikolas Rose “Government and Control” in  David Garland and Richard Sparks Criminology 
and Social Theory (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000). 
 
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1762) The Social Contract Or Principles of Political Right (Penguin 
Classics, London, 1953). 
 
Jed Rubenfeld “The Right of Privacy” (1989) 102 Harvard Law Review 737-807. 
 
Edward L Rubin “Passing through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal 
Scholarship” (2001) 150 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1-83. 
 
Bertrand Russell (1912) The Problems of Philosophy (paperback edition, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1977). 
 
Michael Rustin “Absolute Voluntarism: Critique of a Post-Marxist Concept of Hegemony”  
(1988) 43 New German Critique 146-173.  
 
Paul A Samuelson and William D Nordhaus Economics (13 ed, McGraw Hill, New York). 
 
David E M Sappington “Strategic Firm Behaviour Under a Dynamic Regulatory Adjustment 
Process” (1980) 11 Bell Journal of Economics 360-372. 
 
Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer (eds) The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia 
(Routledge, New York, 2006). 
 
Derek Sayer Marx's Method: Ideology, Science, and Critique in Capital (Hassocks, Harvester 
Press, 1979). 
 
Eileen A Scallen “Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence” (1995) 44 
American University Law Review 1717-1816.  
 
Robert W Scapens, M Y Gameil, and David J Cooper “Accounting Information for Pricing 
Decisions” in David J Cooper, Robert W Scapens and John A Arnold (eds) Management 
Accounting Research and Practice (Institute of Cost and Management Accountants, 1983). 
 
Robert W Scapens Management Accounting: A Review of Recent Developments (Macmillan 
Publishers Ltd, London, 1985). 
 
 - 363 - 
Robert W Scapens and Michael Bromwich  “Management Accounting Research: The First 
Decade” (2001) 12 Management Accounting Research 245–254. 
 
Freiderich Schleiermacher Hermeneutics and Criticism And Other Writings 
Andrew Bowie (trans and ed)  (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993). 
 
Colin Scott “Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post- 
Regulatory State” (National Europe Centre Paper No 100, 6 June 2003). 
 
Anthony J Sebok Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
 
Jean Shaoul “A Critical Financial Analysis of the Performance of Privatised Industries: The 
Case of the Water Industry in England and Wales” (1997) 8 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 479-505. 
 
Teri Sherer and C Edward Arrington “Accounting in other Wor(l)ds: A Feminism without 
Reserve” (1993) 18 Accounting, Organizations and Society 253-272. 
 
David Silverman “Analyzing Talk and Text” in Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1994). 
 
Michael Silverstein and Greg Urban “The Natural History of Discourse” (eds) Natural Histories 
of Discourse (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996). 
 
Quentin Skinner Visions of Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002). 
 
Quentin Skinner (ed) The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences (Cambrige, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
Dorothy Smith The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Open University 
Press, Milton Keynes, 1988). 
 
Marcellus S Snow Marketplace for Telecommunications: Regulation and Deregulation in 
Industrialised Democracies (Longman, White Plains, 1986). 
 
Jill F Solomon and Lauren Darby “Is Private Social, Ethical and Environmental Reporting 
Mythicising or Demythologising Reality?” (2005) 29 Accounting Forum 27-47. 
 
Richard Sotto “The Virtual Organization” (1997) 7 Accounting, Management, and Information 
Technology 37-51.  
 
Crawford Spence “Social Accounting’s Emancipatory Potential: A Gramscian Critique” (2007) 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting forthcoming. 
 
Dan Sperber “Why Rethink Interdisciplinarity? (Trans, “Rethinking interdisciplinarity” 
http://www.interdisciplines.org/interdisciplinarity/papers/1/, 2003). 
 
Urs Stäheli Spektakuläre Spekulation (Velbrück, 2004).  
 
Henri Staten Wittgenstein and Derrida (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1984). 
 
Yannis Stavrakakis “On the Emergence of Green Ideology: The Dislocation Factor in Green 
Politics” in David Howarth, Aletta J Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis Discourse Theory and 
Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and Social Change (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2000). 
 
 - 364 - 
Marta Steeman “Phone Companies in Price Battle” (17 September 2002) The Dominion Post 
Wellington C1. 
 
Marta Steeman “Telecom Rivals Urge Government to Rethink TSO Deal” (26 September 2002) 
The Dominion Post, Wellington, C1. 
 
Robert Sterling “Positive Accounting: An Assessment” (1990) 26 ABACUS 97-135. 
 
Jon Stern and Stuart Holder “Regulatory Governance: Criteria for Assessing the Performance of 
Regulatory Systems: An Application to Infrastructure Industries in the Developing 
Countries of Asia” (1999) 8 Utilities Policy 33-50. 
 
Ross E Stewart “Book Review: Accounting as Social and Institutional Practice” (1995) 22 The 
Accounting Historians Journal 151-154 
 
George J Stigler “The Theory of Economic Regulation” (1971) 2 The Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 3-21. 
 
John Sturrock Structuralism (Paladin, London, 1986). 
 
Lawrence Sullivan Handbook of the Law of Antitrust (West Publishing Company, St Paul, 
1977). 
 
Shyan Sunder Theory of Accounting and Control (Thomson Press, Cincinnati, 1997). 
 
Paul Swain, MP “Government Announces ‘World Leading’ Telecommunications Reform” 
(Press Release and Summary of Key Government Decisions, Minister of Communications, 
20 December 2000a).  
 
Paul Swain, MP Hansard: New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Wednesday, 9 May, 2001a). 
 
Paul Swain, MP Hansard: New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Tuesday, 27 November, 
2001b). 
 
Paul Swain, MP Hansard: New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Tuesday, 18 December, 
2001c). 
 
Paul Swain, MP “Landmark Telecommunications Act Passed” (Press Release, Minister of 
Communications, 18 December 2001d).  
 
Anthony D Taibi “Race Consciousness, Communitarianism, and Banking Regulation” (1992) 
1992 University of Illinois Law Review 1103-1197. 
 
Linghui Tang “The Determinants of International Telephone Traffic Imbalances” (2003) 15 
Information Economic and Policy 127-145. 
 
Linghui Tang “The Imbalances of Telephone Traffic for the United States” (2001) 25 
Telecommunications Policy 421-430. 
 
Walter R Teets “The Association Between Stock Market Response to Earnings Announcements 
and Regulation of Electric Utilities” (1992) 30 Journal of Accounting Research 274-285.  
 
TelstraClear Ltd Submission on the Commerce Commission’s Interconnection Pricing 
Methodology Discussion Paper Prepared by Frontier Economics (submission to the 
Commerce Commission, 7 June 2002). 
 
Gunther Teubner (ed) Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (Gruyter, Berlin, 1986). 
 - 365 - 
Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer, Declan Murphy (eds) Environmental Law and Ecological 
Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organization (Wiley, New 
York, 1994). 
 
Gunther Teubner (ed) Autopoietic Law: A New Approach To Law And Society (W de Gruyter, 
Berlin, 1987). 
 
G F Thirlby ‘Economists’ Cost Rules and Equilibrium Theory’ in James M Buchanan and G F 
Thirlby (eds) London School of Economics: Essays on Cost (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1973). 
 
Robyn Thomas and Annette Davies “Theorizing the Micro-politics of Resistance: New Public 
Management and Managerial Identities in the UK Public Services” (2005) 26 Organization 
Studies 683-706. 
 
Della Thompson (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (9 ed, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1995). 
 
G F Thompson “Capitalist Profit Calculation and Inflation Accounting” (1978) Economy and 
Society 395-429. 
 
Matthew V Tilling and Carol A Tilt “Alas Poor Critical Accounting, We Knew Him, Karl” 
(2004) 15 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 557-563.  
 
Tony Tinker “Mickey Marxism Rides Again” (1999) 10 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 
643-670. 
 
Tony Tinker Paper Prophets: A Social Critique of Accounting (Praeger, New York, 1985). 
 
Tony Tinker “Paper Prophets: An Autocritique” (2001) 33 British Accounting Review 77-89. 
 
Tony Tinker “The Withering of Criticism: A Review of Professional, Foucauldian, 
Ethnographic, and Epistemic Studies in Accounting (2005) 18 Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal 100-135. 
 
Tony Tinker “Towards a Political Economy of Accounting: An Empirical Illustration of the 
Cambridge Controversies” (1980) 5 Accounting, Organizations and Society 147-160. 
 
Tony Tinker, Barbara D Merino and Marilyn Neimark “The Normative Origins of Positive 
Theories: Ideology, and Accounting Thought”  (1982) 7 Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 167-200. 
 
Tony Tinker and Marilyn Neimark “The Struggle over Meaning in Accounting and Corporate 
Research: A Comparative Evaluation of Conservative and Critical Historiography” (1988) 
1 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 55-74. 
 
Tony Tinker and Rob Gray “Beyond a Critique of Pure Reason: From Policy to Politics and 
Praxis in Environmental and Social Research” (2003) 16 Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal 727-761. 
 
Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (3 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001). 
 
Jacob Torfing Politics, Regulation and the Modern Welfare State (Macmillan, London, 1998). 
 
 - 366 - 
Jacob Torfing “Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges” in David 
Howarth and Jacob Torfing (eds) Discourse Theory in European Politics (Palgrave, 
London, 2005). 
 
Mark Tushnet “Critical Legal Studies: A Political History (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1515-
1544. 
 
Mark Tushnet “Survey Article: Critical Legal Theory (Without Modifiers) in the United States  
(2005) 13 The Journal of Political Philosophy 99-112. 
 
Shahzad Uddin and Trevor Hopper “Accounting for Privatisation in Bangladesh: Testing World 
Bank Claims” (2003) 14 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 739-774. 
 
United States of America Senate The Fall of Enron: How Could it have Happened (Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Hearing, 107th Congress, S Hrg 107–376, 
24 January, 2002). 
 
Jeffrey Unerman and Mark Bennett “Increased Stakeholder Dialogue and the Internet: Towards 
Greater Corporate Accountability or Reinforcing Capitalist Hegemony?” (2004) 29 
Accounting, Organizations, and Society 685-707.  
 
William J Vatter “A Re-examination of Cost Accounting from a Managerial Viewpoint” in John 
J W Neuner Cost Accounting (Business Publications Inc, Chicago, 1938). 
 
Roel J in’t Veld, J A Catrien, M Termeer, Linze Schaap, Mark J W van Twist (eds) Autopoiesis 
and Configuration Theory: New Approaches to Societal Steering (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 
1991). 
 
Ingo Vogelsang and Bridger M Mitchell Telecommunications Competition: The Last Ten Miles 
(The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, 1997). 
 
Jeremy Waldron “Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues” (1994) 82 
California Law Review 509-540. 
 
Stephan P Walker “Laissez-Faire, Collectivism and Companies Legislation in Nineteenth 
Century Britain” (1996) 28 British Accounting Review 305-324. 
 
Ann L Watkins and C Edward Arrington “Accounting, New Public Management and American 
Politics: Theoretical Insights into the National Performance Review” (2007) 18 Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 33-58. 
 
Ross L Watts “Nature and Origins of Positive Accounting Research” in Stewart Jones, Claudio 
Romano, and Janek Ratnatunga (eds) Accounting Theory: A Contemporary Review 
(Sydney, Harcourt Brace, 1995). 
 
Ross L Watts and Jerold L Zimmerman Positive Accounting Theory (Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice Hall, 1986). 
 
Ross L Watts and Jerold L Zimmerman “Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year Perspective” 
(1990) 65 The Accounting Review 259-285. 
 
Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter “Discourse Analysis and the Identification of 
Interpretive Repertoires” in Charles Antaki (ed) Analysing Everyday Explanation: A 
Casebook of Methods (Sage, London, 1988). 
 
Peter Weingart “Interdisciplinarity: The Paradoxical Discourse” in Peter Weingart and Nico 
Stehr (eds) Practising Interdisciplinarity (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000). 
 - 367 - 
Richard H Weisberg “Text into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution” (1986) 20 
Georgia Law Review 939-994. 
 
Gerald Wetlaufer “Rhetoric and its Denial in Legal Discourse” (1990) 76 Virginia Law Review 
1545-1597.  
 
Geoffrey Whittington “Current Cost Accounting: Its Role in Regulated Utilities” (1994) 15 
Fiscal Studies 88-101. 
 
Danture Wickramsinghe and Chandana Alawattage Management Accounting Change: 
Approaches and Perspectives (Routledge, London, 2007). 
 
Danture Wickramasinghe and Trevor Hopper “A Cultural Political Economy of Management 
Accounting Controls: A Case Study of a Textile Mill in a Traditional Sinhalese Village” 
(2005) 16 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 473-503. 
 
Jennifer Wicke “Postmodern Identity and the Legal Subject” (1991) 62 University of Colorado 
Law Review 455-473. 
 
Paul F Williams “The Logic of Positive Accounting Research” (1989) 14 Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 455-468. 
 
Raymond Williams Modern Tragedy (Hogarth Press, London, 1992). 
 
Oliver Williamson “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs” (1968) 58 
American Economic Review 18-36. 
 
Oliver Williamson The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (Free Press, New York, 1985). 
 
Oliver Williamson The Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996). 
 
Hugh Willmott, Anthony Puxty, David J Cooper, E Anthony Lowe, and Keith Robson 
“Regulation of Accountancy and Accountants: A Comparative Analysis of Accounting for 
Research and Development in Four Advanced Capitalist Countries” (1992) 5 Accounting, 
Auditing, and Accountability Journal 32-56. 
 
Peter Winch and Raymond Gaita Value and Understanding: Essays for Peter Winch 
(Routledge, London, 1990). 
 
Monique Wittig The Straight Mind and Other Essays (Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1992). 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations (GEM Anscombe Translation, 1974). 
 
Alastair Wright Matisse and the Subject of Modernism (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2004). 
 
<www.libertyhaven.com/theoreticalorphilosophicalissues> (last accessed 1 August, 2005). 
Economics and the Subjectivity of Costs. 
 
<www.plato.stanford.edu> (last accessed 30 November, 2007). Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. 
 
Ernest J Yanarella “Whither Hegemony?: Between Gramsci and Derrida” in John Paul Jones 
III, Wolfgang Natter, Theodore R Schatzki (eds) Postmodern Contentions, Epochs, Politics, 
Space (Guildford Press, New York, 1993). 
 
Robert Young White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (Routledge, London, 1990). 
 - 368 - 
Jerold L Zimmerman “The Costs and Benefits of Cost Allocations” (1979) 54 The Accounting 
Review 504-521. 
 
Slavoj Zizek The Sublime Object of Ideology (Verso, London, 1989). 
 
David M Zlotnick “The Buddha’s Parable and Legal Rhetoric” (2001) 58 Washington & Lee 
Law Review 957-1018. 
 
